








DOMESTICATING CIVIL SOCIETY: 


























Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs 







Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements 





































Anthony James DeMattee 
 
Domesticating Civil Society: 
How and Why Governments Use Laws to Regulate CSOs 
 
 A single topic unifies my dissertation chapters: how and why do governments regulate civil 
society organizations (CSOs)? Three sets of research questions engage this topic using a multi-
method research design. My first set is descriptive: what exists in the range of legal provisions 
governments use to regulate CSOs and how often do governments enact these provisions? In the 
second set of questions, I examine policy adoption, asking: under what conditions do 
governments enact various CSO regulation? Then, to what extent are these legal institutions path 
dependent—meaning, shaped by current laws and institutions—and to what extent are they 
affected by international factors and influences? And why do nondemocratic governments enact 
permissive provisions more frequently than restrictive ones? Finally, the third set of questions 
examines enforcement, asking under what conditions do governments enforce these provisions? 
Do de facto rules always match de jure rules, and if not, why not? 
 My dissertation speaks to what human rights defenders identify as a growing number of 
governments enacting new, restrictive CSO laws—a trend referred to as the “closing space” 
phenomenon. This pattern is concerning, and we cannot afford to misunderstand it. The 
conventional explanation is that governments use these CSO laws to maintain power by rattling 
social cohesion and weakening democratic opposition. Discourse within the literature suggests 
that democracies pass permissive laws that protect the freedom of association, while autocracies 
and hybrid regimes pass restrictive laws that hinder voluntary association. What is more, the 
traditional argument frames these laws as a relatively new phenomenon beginning in the late 
twentieth century. Yet closely examining primary legal sources reveals a puzzling, non-trivial 
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number of exceptions to these rules. One type of exception is that nondemocratic regimes 
frequently enact permissive provisions. Another type is that CSO laws are not new and often 
predate a country’s independence. If these legal institutions are neither categorically restrictive 
nor necessarily new as we once thought, why do governments enact them, and how do they 
enforce them to regulate CSOs? 
 My theory argues that a government uses both CSO laws and regulatory enforcement 
actions to maintain political control and to expand legitimacy among its citizenry and the 
international community. A government whose grip on power is secure uses legal rules to 
provide CSOs with greater operational space that directly and indirectly bolsters its legitimacy. 
When a regime’s grip on control is fragile, the government manipulates legal rules and 
enforcement actions to observe civil society and control CSOs. This theory applies to all regime 
types and levels of development.   
 I test my theory using five methods and four datasets. Among the data analyzed is a novel 
dataset created by systematically and holistically coding 285 laws enacted by 17 countries 
between 1872 and 2019. Twelve are East African countries; the remaining cases are the 
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. A single-country case study of Kenya 
completes my research design. Using site-intensive methods, I collected archived government 
records and interviewed elected officials, bureaucrats, and CSO regulators. Qualitative analysis 
triangulates my findings to identify causal processes. My primary findings are that the legal 
institutions that regulate CSOs, what I introduce as “CSO regulatory regimes,” are neither new 
nor categorically restrictive. Regulatory regimes are instead historically informed, rewritten at 
different moments in different ways, and enforced inconsistently for political expediency. In its 
simplest form, my argument is that governments tactically alter their regulatory regime’s 
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contents and enforcement as part of a broader strategy to increase their legitimacy and control. 
Governments maintain the status quo—both written rules and enforcement actions—as long as 
the current regulatory regime achieves the government’s aims. When change is necessary, 
governments alter enforcement actions, enact new provisions and enforce them as written, or 
enact provisions with the intention of sabotaging their enforcement. 
 Enacting or not enacting a particular CSO law does not guarantee civil society’s 
environment will open or close. To truly understand whether a law “helps” or “hinders,” we must 
know the law’s contents and see how the government enforces it. I consider these matters as I 
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REGULATING THE FREEDOM TO VOLUNTARILY ASSOCIATE 
 For the first time in nearly 20 years, the majority of countries in the world are autocracies, 
and undemocratic regimes now govern more than half of all human life.1 Existing 
conceptualizations of the state-society relationship focus on civil society’s ability to act as a 
bulwark against the state. Civil society and the state are independent entities, pushing against 
each other in a zero-sum game: an unstoppable force versus an immovable object. In this 
framework, a slowly backsliding political world signals that civil society is losing its strength as 
the positive force for change that we think and hope it is (de Tocqueville, 1840a; Smith, 1973; E. 
Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Mutunga, 1999; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). 
The global proliferation of autocracies must be the outcome of autocratic states growing 
independently stronger, or of bulwarks—civil societies—becoming independently weaker. If 
autocrats are suddenly more powerful, what has stripped civil society of its capacity to be an 
effective defense against the state? What has robbed it of its power to protect civil liberties? Is 
civil society failing us?  
 I argue that civil society is not an unstoppable, independent force, but is defined in scope 
and efficacy by the legal institution the state enacts and enforces. In the way a farmer builds a 
greenhouse to grow plants, CSO laws create the architecture in which civil society exists and the 
space in which civil society organizations (CSOs) operate. Like plants in a greenhouse, civil 
society’s ability to bear fruit and contribute to positive sociopolitical outcomes is profoundly 
 
1 According to Lührmann et al. (2020, p. 13), 92 of 179 countries in the world are now autocracies, and those countries 






shaped by the legal institutions that structure its activity. In short, civil society thrives when the 
institutional environment favors it. More concretely, CSO laws have the potential to either 
bolster or upend democratic transitions and good governance because of the laws that provide 
positive and negative rights to CSOs. Organizations use those rights to establish themselves, 
work with and challenge government, and provide the organizational space in which individuals 
may associate freely. Removing such rights diminishes their ability to contribute to positive 
sociopolitical outcomes directly. Then, as a secondary effect, a weakened civil society limits 
opportunities for citizens to understand the “science of association” and learn how to overcome 
the weakness of individuals in democratic societies (de Tocqueville, 1840b, p. 902) and develop 
the political capacity necessary to engage society and make democracy a viable way of life (V. 
Ostrom, 1973, pp. 106-107; 1997, pp. 272-273). 
 Emphasizing the shaping influence of legal institutions on civil society allows us to 
carefully consider one factor driving global democratic backsliding: governments enact 
restrictive laws to weaken civil society and undermine the bulwark. This argument is what 
scholars and practitioners refer to as the “closing space” or “shrinking space” phenomena. It 
occurs when governments enact and enforce CSO laws to maintain power and control by 
monitoring and repressing CSOs within their borders (Wiktorowicz, 2000; Carothers, 2006; 
Gershman & Allen, 2006; Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Swiney, 2019). Discourse within the 
literature suggests that democracies pass permissive laws that protect the freedom of association 
and help CSOs (World Bank, 1997; Kiai, 2012), while autocracies and hybrid regimes pass 
restrictive laws that hinder voluntary association (Gyimah-Boadi, 1998; Mendelson, 2015; Wolff 
& Poppe, 2015; Tripp, 2017). According to this view, restrictive laws and coercive enforcement 






settings. The research and limited data that exists accords with this conventional explanation. Yet 
there are a puzzling, non-trivial number of exceptions to this rule, in which nondemocratic 
regimes enact permissive provisions. For example, in 1979, the Soviet Union as a communist 
ideocracy enacted provisions giving “public organizations” a tax exemption and allowed those 
charitable organizations to engage in “economic activities” unrelated to the charitable mission.2 
Turning to Kenya for another example, in the final years of his one-party autocracy, President 
Moi enacted Kenya’s Non-Governmental Organization Co-ordination Act, 1990. The 
government amended the law numerous times, but its original version contained multiple 
permissive provisions, including not requiring CSOs to obtain additional licenses or permits 
before conducting operations (§ 12(3)); providing the ability to appeal and dispute any decision 
made by the regulator (§ 19); creating the “Kenya National Council for Voluntary Agencies” as a 
collective forum and self-regulator (§ 23); and establishing strong oversight of the regulator’s 
activities (§§ 4, 6, 30, 31).  
These exceptions to the proposed rule—the puzzle of nondemocratic regimes enacting 
permissive provisions for CSOs—raise two pressing questions. First, why do governments of all 
types enact restrictive or permissive CSO laws? And more specifically, why would 
nondemocratic governments enact permissive provisions? Most CSO laws, regardless of the 
political regime type that enacted them, fuse numerous permissive legal provisions with 
restrictive ones. The idea that democracies always pass permissive laws, while autocracies 
always pass restrictive ones, oversimplifies why and how governments use regulation to the 
point of distortion. A strict democracy-autocracy conceptualization also neglects to consider the 
 






durable semi-authoritarian regimes that govern “gray-zone countries” (Carothers, 2002, p. 19; 
Levitsky & Way, 2010). Hybrid regimes may use permissive laws to tactically manipulate civil 
society as part of a quest for legitimacy within a broader strategy to maintain control and power. 
Of course, full-scale authoritarian regimes that have successfully eliminated democratic rule and 
openly violate political rights and civil liberties (Levitsky & Way, 2002) may also choose to use 
this tactic. 
 The second pressing question asks, under what conditions do governments enforce these 
provisions? Law-in-the-book does not always match law-in-action (Pound, 1910, p. 12).3 The 
actual effect and intention of CSO laws may not be understood until we know how a government 
chooses to enforce them. Particularly, restrictive provisions may not be enforced as quickly or to 
the extent that we may fear, and permissive provisions may never be enforced because the 
government enacted them with disingenuous intent. 
 To answer these questions, I make four arguments. First, CSO laws in all political contexts 
contain provisions that both help and hinder CSOs. These legal institutions, what I have referred 
to as CSO regulatory regimes, fuse permissive and restrictive provisions to regulate CSOs. 
Second, path dependency shapes regulatory regimes through a process of institutional 
development. In moments of institutional change, preexisting rules make some changes more 
likely, and other changes less likely. Third, international influence, path dependency, and local 
politics explain the institutional development of regulatory regimes. Fourth, rules-in-form do not 
necessarily match rules-in-use. A government’s enforcement actions may deviate from the 
 
3 The same distinction is also made using terms rules-in-form versus rule-in-use, de jeure versus de facto, and legal 






provisions that exist in the de jure regulatory regime. This deviation is not necessarily malicious. 
It only hinders civil society when permissive provisions are under-enforced, and certain 
restrictive ones are over-enforced. In the final analysis, it is this de facto regulatory regime that 
affects CSOs and society, and those effects initiate future institutional change. 
Why CSOs are Important, and What Governments are Doing About Them 
Conceptualizing Necessary Terms 
 Before I elaborate the four arguments, it is necessary to establish definitions for several key 
terms that I use throughout my writing: civil society, CSOs, and CSO Regulatory Regimes.  
 Civil society is a rich concept that many disciplines have found tremendously productive 
when studying many topics, including democratization, governance, and political behavior. In 
1821, Hegel defined civil society broadly as that which fulfills the system of needs that exists 
between the family and the state (Hegel & Wood, 1991, p. xviii). Inspired by Dewey (1927), 
Habermas (1962 [1989]), and Gramsci (1971), scholars have conceptualized civil society as a 
public forum in which citizens voluntarily interact, debate, build social capital, and pursue 
numerous forms of political and social behaviors. I adopt Warren’s definition of civil society as 
“the domain of society organized through associative media” that is separate from both legally 
empowered bureaucracy and market transactions mediated by money (Warren, 2001; 2011, p. 
377). Politically, civil society supports democratic transitions and consolidation, provides a space 
for people to demand greater rights and better constitutions, and assists society in developing the 
political capacity necessary to engage government (de Tocqueville, 1840a; V. Ostrom, 1973 
[2008]; Linz & Stepan, 1978; Mutunga, 1999). Socially, civil society is the sphere in which 






voluntary organizations and develop interpersonal networks of norms, trust, and reciprocity that 
affect governance (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999; Putnam, 2000; 
Howard, 2003; Skocpol, 2003). Economically, civil society is the space where individuals 
overcome market and government failures to provide local solutions to unmet needs (de 
Tocqueville, 1840a; V. Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971; Weisbrod, 1977; Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 
1988; Hansmann, 2003). In this capacity, civil society allows individuals to support museums, 
libraries, and cathedrals. These cultural symbols allow citizens to reinvigorate their passions, 
expand their knowledge, and celebrate their faith without the government’s approval or support 
(Young, 1983; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Frumkin, 2002). 
 Civil society is related to but distinct from CSOs. I define civil society organizations as 
private, self-governed organizations, established on the principle of voluntary association for 
purposes other than political control and economic profits. This definition excludes political 
parties and entities organized to raise and retain profits. The definition includes advocacy 
organizations, professional associations, and religious congregations. My definition does not 
require CSOs to be politically active, prosocial, or even socially desirable. The definition 
resembles what Madison referred to as “factions” in Federalist Papers, No. 10: 
“By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community.” 
(Madison, 1787 [1961], p. 72) 
CSOs can exist informally, without registration with a government, but are legal in most 
countries. CSO laws in many countries contain provisions that incentivize informal CSOs to 
incorporate as legal entities. Once registered, CSOs often enjoy many privileges, such as tax-






nonprofits if they operate in the Global North, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) if 
they work in the Global South. However, there is no steadfast rule, and analysts use many 
terms—ranging from BINGOs representing big and international organizations (Vakil, 1997) to 
GINGOs representing smaller grassroots groups started by amateurs (Appe & Schnable, 2019; 
Schnable, 2021)—to identify these formally registered organizations that operate in the non-
market, non-governmental arena.   
 Terms such as “civil society organization,” “nonprofit,” and “non-governmental 
organization” are generally synonymous and interchangeable. In essence, each organizational 
type is private rather than public, held together by voluntary association rather than economic 
gain or political control, and self-governed, making it an autonomous actor rather than an 
appendage of government. When studying the laws that regulate civil society and its 
organizations, “CSO” allows for a degree of conceptual extension and comparability that 
alternative terms cannot achieve.4 To talk about the collection of instruments that governments 
use to regulate CSOs, I use the term CSO regulatory regime. I conceptualize CSO regulatory 
regimes in terms of five key elements: first and foremost, they are overt legal rules; second, they 
are not limited to single statutes and can contain multiple laws and regulatory policies; third, they 
are holistic and include all legal provisions that affect CSOs; fourth, they are institutions with 
long histories that vary over time; and fifth, government agencies enforce them. Combining these 
 
4 The number of legal definitions and CSO-subtypes increases as the number of countries studied expands. The CSO 
laws for the six East African Community countries contain 42 legal definitions of private, self-governed organizations 
established on the principle of voluntary association, for purposes other than political control and economic profits 
(Appendix Table 1A). Thus, the choice to study NGO laws—or charitable trusts laws, society laws, or 501(c)(3) laws 
for that matter—is a decision to study only one CSO legal form. That choice may be desirable for some research, but 







five elements yields the following definition: CSO regulatory regimes are legal institutions of 
multiple laws that fuse restrictive and permissive legal rules—or “provisions”—to constrain and 
incentivize CSOs’ behavior. I refine this definition slightly further. A de jure CSO regulatory 
regime is the formal rules-in-form that governments develop through a process of institutional 
change. The enforcement of those rules, by contrast, is the de facto CSO regulatory regime that 
CSOs experience on a day-to-day basis. 
Why Governments Regulate CSOs 
 Setting the political context to the side for the moment, Young describes CSOs as having 
complementary, supplementary, or adversarial relationships with governments (2000, 2006). The 
relationship is complementary when CSOs are engaged in public service provision in partnership 
with governments; supplementary when CSOs remedy social dislocations left unresolved by 
unresponsive governments; and adversarial when they advocate for social change or are 
regulated by governments.5 Economic theory underpins most of these relationships, and from 
that perspective, regulation is the development of institutions to facilitate exchange and minimize 
 
5 The complementary model emerges when high transaction costs make governments partner with local, private 
organizations to deliver public service goods. This model matches the critical features of interdependence theory 
(Salamon, 1987, p. 43; 1995; 2002, p. 21) and the theory of coproduction (Parks et al., 1981, p. 1002; McGinnis, 1999, 
p. 382). The critical feature among these is that technological, economic, and institutional factors are present to allow 
CSOs to work with the government and provide public service goods. Supplementary models occur when governments 
cannot provide public service goods and markets will not provide them (Weisbrod, 1977). The critical feature in this 
model is that CSOs provide public service goods but lack a full-throated government partner and underwriter. Using 
a panel dataset of 172 countries between 1980-2017, Shimek (2020, pp. 12, 17) finds a positive relationship between 
CSOs and increased public good provision. That relationship exemplifies the positive effects of the complementary 
and supplementary models. The adversarial model calls for a more in-depth explanation. CSOs in the form of public- 
and private-interest advocacy organizations and coalitions regularly engage governments to lobby for new policies or 
to stop enforcing current ones. Yet, governments can be adversarial towards CSOs as well. Such adversarial tactics 
can manifest as overt shows of power such as the specific events of “Bloody Sunday” on the Edmund Pettus Bridge 
in Alabama (March 1965) and the violent “Tiananmen Square Massacre” in Beijing (June 1989). Or, their adversary 
can manifest on paper as laws that that are clear, properly scoped, and necessary for democracy, applied to specific 






transaction costs. Young’s models are valuable for their ability to transcend contexts, study 
change over time, and analyze regulatory variation by sectors within a country. Still, these 
models do not consider the context in which the government-CSO relationships unfold.  
 Bratton (1989b) provides an alternative framework that focuses on politics, rather than 
economics, to explain a government’s posture towards CSOs in the Global South. The 
government-CSO relationship becomes strained when CSOs provide public service goods that 
the government relies on for its justification for holding power. However, a CSO’s 
supplementary role in a weak or failed state is insufficient to provoke governmental blowback on 
its own. Bratton proposes that a government’s confidence in its grip on power determines the 
operating space given to CSOs. Conflict in the government-CSO relationship is inversely related 
to a government’s confidence in its grip on power (p. 576). Governments use four strategies to 
regulate CSOs. Two lower-conflict strategies are monitoring and coordination. Monitoring 
requires CSOs to register with the government as a legal entity so that the government can gain 
information on civil society actors (p. 577), and coordination occurs when the government 
intervenes to orchestrate and synchronize the activities of many diverse and independent CSOs 
(p. 578). Higher-conflict strategies are cooptation and dissolution. Cooptation happens when a 
“superordinate agency” captures a CSO and directs its activities (p. 579). Dissolution includes all 
forms of overt government actions that range from impeding operational activities of 
autonomous CSOs to shuttering voluntary associations altogether (p. 579). 
 Combining Young’s economic-centric models with Bratton’s politics-based theory offers a 
more complete picture of when and how governments regulate CSOs. If a government is 
unthreatened by civil society, we expect a low-conflict relationship that uses monitoring and 






with governments. It is important not to conflate “low-conflict” with “democratic” because some 
nondemocratic governments have shown it is possible to domesticate civil society (e.g., Spires, 
2011). The more fragile the government’s political control, the more prominently conflict defines 
the government-CSO relationship. No government-CSO relationship is unidirectional or 
permanent, and as “new policies create new politics” (Schattschneider, 1935, p. 288) 
governments will change the laws that regulate CSOs.  
Four Pillars of The Argument 
 In this dissertation, my primary argument is that governments tactically alter their CSO 
regulatory regime’s contents and enforcement as part of a broader strategy to increase their 
legitimacy and control. Governments maintain the status quo—both written rules and 
enforcement actions—as long as the current regulatory regime achieves the government’s aims. 
Four empirical and theoretical foundations support this argument. First, CSO laws in all political 
contexts contain provisions that both help and hinder CSOs. The CSO regulatory regime fuses 
permissive and restrictive provisions into a single legal institution. Second, regulatory regimes 
are shaped by a path-dependent process of institutional development domestically. They are not 
new and, in some cases, predate a country’s independence. Third, international influence also 
directly affects institutional change within these legal institutions. This means international 
influence works alongside path dependency and local politics to shape the institutional 
development of regulatory regimes. Finally, the de jure regulatory regime may contain a 
different set of rules than regulators enforce. This deviation is not random, and governments 
have reason to produce this deviation intentionally. I discuss each of these before presenting my 






Janus-Faced CSO laws: Permissive and Restrictive Legal Provisions Both Exist 
 Scholars, practitioners, and human rights advocates warn that nondemocratic governments 
enact restrictive legal provisions to minimize and repress civil society. This is a concerning 
development, and we cannot afford to misunderstand it. Studying only the enactment of 
restrictive provisions misses the larger and more concerning pattern that permissive and 
restrictive provisions exist together, and they cooccur where least expected. Research in this new 
body of literature is quickly evolving, however, and has moved from studying a very narrow set 
of restrictive provisions limiting CSOs’ access to foreign assistance (Christensen & Weinstein, 
2013; Rutzen, 2015; Reddy, 2018; Bromley, Schofer, & Longhofer, 2019) to now including 
provisions restricting CSOs’ ability to self-govern, register, and operate (Maru, 2017; DeMattee, 
2019b; Musila, 2019; Bakke, Mitchell, & Smidt, 2020; Glasius, Schalk, & De Lange, 2020). Not 
only has most research focused only on restrictive provisions (cf. World Bank, 1997; Lorch & 
Bunk, 2017; DeMattee, 2019b), but most analyses have studied only laws enacted by 
nondemocratic governments (cf. Swiney, 2019).  
 Unfortunately, unlike data on constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton, 2009, 2014b), 
international commitments to safeguarding human rights (United Nations Office of Legal 
Affairs, 2018), and de facto civil liberties (e.g., Freedom House, 2018), data on CSO laws are 
difficult to find and even harder to analyze. The dearth of information has led researchers to rely 
on secondary data collected by credible sources, such as the International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law or ICNL, USAID’s NGO Sustainability Index, the World Movement for Democracy, 
and Global Integrity (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Glasius et al., 2020), and country reports 






al., 2020).6 Reliance on secondary sources has been a data-windfall for researchers, but there are 
concerns. Secondary sources do not claim to code laws systematically, holistically, or 
historically. Indeed, many of these sources only report on select restrictive elements of these 
laws. This narrow scope has limited theory-building to the data available to test it—i.e., 
restrictive provisions identified by secondary sources. It also means that theory-testing has used 
censored data that omits the permissive provisions enacted alongside restrictive ones.  
 The systematic and holistic coding of primary sources reveals new insights that challenge 
the conventional explanation that regime type is sufficient to explain how and why governments 
regulate CSOs. Two of my empirical chapters demonstrate this insufficiency and why a better 
conceptualization of CSO laws is necessary. In Chapter Three, I use a global data set of 139 
countries that enacted restrictive foreign funding provisions between 1993 in 2012. The data 
appear to suggest that regime type correlates with enactment; yet the data also show several 
cases that violate the conventional explanation and show that democracies and hybrid regimes 
also enact restrictive foreign funding provisions. I argue that these governments are not, upon 
closer inspection, passing the same laws. Even among a narrow set of restrictive foreign funding 
provisions, some rules are unequivocally more restrictive than others—e.g., Oman (2000) 
categorically prohibiting foreign funding, versus Pakistan (2003) or Uruguay (2004) merely 
requiring ex-post notification or accounting requirements. As the second analysis in Chapter 
 
6 In one of the most widely cited articles in the literature, the authors used secondary data from “the International 
Center for Non-Profit Law; country reports from the US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor; the World Movement for Democracy; the NGO Regulation Network; Civicus; the International Center for 
Civil Society Law; USAID’s NGO Sustainability Index; country reports from United States International 
Grantmaking; reports by Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch; and country-specific 
academic and policy sources” and found that among 153 countries, only 39 had passed a CSO law containing a 






Three shows, assuming all restrictive laws and legal provisions are the same increases the Type-I 
and Type-II errors. More accurate classifications are needed.  
 My findings in Chapter Three show the need for better data on CSO laws, and I accept that 
challenge in Chapter Four. I begin that chapter with a review of the research studying CSO laws. 
That process produces a broad typology of provisions that makes the systematic study of CSO 
laws across contexts more feasible. While it is true that restrictive provisions exist that limit 
foreign support of CSOs or restrict organizations’ operational activities, other provisions 
facilitate the accountability and transparency of CSOs, guarantee the right to self-regulate and 
appeal regulatory decisions, and hold both CSOs and regulators accountable to citizens and 
governments.  
 In their CSO law research, analysts discuss 58 types of legal provisions. These legal 
provisions exist in four mutually exclusive subgroups that create a matrix typology of legal 
provisions. I transform this typology into a 58-item coding protocol to systematically code 285 
laws from 17 countries. The data shows these legal institutions are neither new nor represented 
by a single law. Instead, and contrary to conventional approaches, these legal institutions are 
frequently inherited from colonial governments, and contain both permissive and restrictive 
provisions. The data illustrates that since 1980, it is more than twice as common for governments 
to enact institutional change that takes the shape of new permissive provisions rather than 
restrictive ones. The data also suggests that the bundles of new permissive provisions are twice 






Timeworn Institutions: Path Dependency Affects CSO laws 
 CSO regulatory regimes are not new. In many postcolonial countries, these legal institutions 
are inherited from colonial powers at independence and slowly altered over time.7 This 
observation challenges the conventional approach that presumes institutional change is an 
unconstrained process of “lawmaking in the wild.” But as I illustrate in great detail in Chapter 
Four, the regulatory regimes in place today are the product of a long, slow, and muddled process 
of incremental institutional change. Path dependency affects regulatory regimes in two ways. 
The first is that governments make commitments that can constrain future choices. Specifically, 
a government’s commitment to safeguarding civil liberties and political rights, and the 
constitutional rules that strengthen such commitments, establish limits on the types of provisions 
a government can enact. The institutional development of regulatory regimes, moreover, is also 
shaped by the laws that already exist. As the legal corpus shows, when institutional change 
occurs, it very frequently alters the legal provisions within the preexisting regulatory regime 
rather than rewriting it anew. 
 International commitments that safeguard civil and political rights and the guarantees that 
bolster those commitments are examples of “constitutional rules” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1961; 
Brennan & Buchanan, 1985; E. Ostrom, 2005). These rules define the process for how 
governments make laws—e.g., from where bills originate, what is needed to override an 
executive’s veto, etc.—and constrain the contents of ordinary legislation. By ratifying the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, governments make an 
international commitment that any law regulating voluntary association will meet a three-part 
 






test: (1) prescribed by law and use sufficiently precise and accessible language; (2) established to 
meet legitimate aims specified by Article 22(2) to include “national security or public safety, 
public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”; (3) be “necessary for democracy” to meet a pressing social need in a 
proportional manner. In Chapter Three, I show that countries that have made a global 
commitment to safeguard civil and political rights and whose constitutional rules demand those 
commitments be honored are less likely to pass restrictive provisions. What is more, this 
institutional arrangement has shown itself to be incredibly robust across different statistical 
models and datasets. 
 The CSO laws that comprise my legal corpus are examples of “collective-choice rules” 
made by representative institutions following the processes that constitutional rules prescribe (E. 
Ostrom, 2005, p. 58). Research on CSO laws often discusses the long histories of regulatory 
regimes and acknowledges that laws add, amend, and replace each other over time (Salamon & 
Toepler, 1997; Mayhew, 2005; Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, & Prakash, 2014, p. 723; Dupuy, 
Ron, & Prakash, 2015; Breen, Dunn, & Sidel, 2017; Maru, 2017; DeMattee, 2019b, pp. 11-13; 
Musila, 2019; Toepler, Pape, & Benevolenski, 2019). Yet scholars have been unable to include 
these preexisting collective-choice rules in their analyses. Theoretically, historical 
institutionalism and institutional analysis tell us that our default position should be to assume 
preexisting institutions are relevant until they are proven insignificant (Lindblom, 1959; Pierson, 
1993, 2000, 2003; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Methodologically, failing to account for these 
preexisting institutions leaves analysis susceptible to omitted variable bias.  
 In Chapter Five, I very clearly detail that preexisting collective-choice rules are more than 






changes more likely, and other changes less likely. This guided institutional development 
constrains and steers lawmaking. Whenever the government considers an institutional change, 
the regulatory regime’s current rules take on one of four relationships with new rules: 
complementary, if current rules make the institutional change more likely; substitutive, if the 
current rules make the change less likely; contingent, if the preexisting rule is necessary for the 
change to occur; and finally, independent, if there is no relationship (Mahajan & Peterson, 1985). 
Using my original dataset that codes permissive and restrictive provisions in 285 laws, I find that 
the permissiveness of the current regulatory regime has a substitutive relationship with future 
permissive expansions and a complementary relationship with future restrictive expansions. 
There are separate explanations for these relationships. The substitutive relationship suggests that 
once a regulatory regime is sufficiently permissive, the government no longer adds additional 
permissive provisions. The opposite is true for the complementary relationship. Here, lawmakers 
use institutional change to either cull permissive provisions or counterbalance them with 
restrictive ones. I discuss these processes thoroughly in Chapter Five. 
International Influences: Diffusion of CSO laws 
 Third, I identify another factor that affects the institutional development of CSO regulatory 
regimes: international influences. Prior research studying CSO laws shows mixed results 
concerning foreign influence on domestic lawmaking. This is partly attributable to the way 
analysts have conceptualized foreign influence. Some may consider an international commitment 
to safeguarding civil and political rights an international influence on lawmaking. I assert that 
this is a self-imposed institutional constraint. Other analyses measure international influence as 






analyses can account for the sources of the funds. Totaling all foreign aid received discards all 
information on donors and immediately blunts the once-promising measure.8 Research finds 
mixed support on the importance of geographic adjacency and proximity—sometimes referred to 
as “neighborhood effects”—when event history analyses study when jurisdictions enact a law 
(e.g., Reddy, 2018; DeMattee, 2019a; Glasius et al., 2020). 
 A more rigorous approach to studying international influence considers the precise 
mechanisms of influence. Policy diffusion theory studies the inter-jurisdictional processes by 
which the adoption of a policy in one jurisdiction influences the adoption decision of another 
jurisdiction (Strang, 1991, p. 325; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006, p. 787; Berry & Berry, 
2014, p. 308). There are three broad processes of policy diffusion—learning, competition, and 
emulation (Gilardi, 2015)—and the shared trait of all processes is that laggard governments 
considering adoption first evaluate information from leaders who have already adopted a similar 
policy. Learning is a pragmatic form of information evaluation that focuses on the policy and its 
outcomes. Policies are likely to diffuse if they create more positive results or fewer negative 
ones. For example, if a government aims to increase (or decrease) the number of CSOs registered 
in its country, it first looks to foreign jurisdictions to learn what policies have worked best, then 
enacts them at home. 
 The competition process evaluates policy according to what maximizes a jurisdiction’s 
resources; it is simply a resource-motivated version of the pragmatic evaluation of information. 
Assuming the aim is to increase foreign assistance, the competition process predicts that a 
 
8 Analyses that operationalize foreign assistance in this way show foreign aid is an unreliable predictor of enactment, 






jurisdiction first learns which provisions seem to increase foreign assistance (or those that 
jeopardize it), then enacts them. 
 Emulation is a sociological form of information evaluation that focuses on the leader 
government that adopted the policy, rather than the policy or its objective consequences. 
Governments vary in terms of their democratic principles and political ideology. They can be 
bastions of liberalism, authoritarian exemplars, and anything in between. When countries are not 
independently powerful, enacting restrictive provisions may require protection from a foreign 
ally that can dull the threats and attenuate the costs of international blowback (Christensen & 
Weinstein, 2013). The suggestion that governments emulate strong international allies is sound, 
but analysts have not yet tested global leaders’ importance beyond comparative case studies.   
 Rigorously analyzing the diffusion processes was central to my research design and 
methods. As I detail in Chapters Two and Five, monadic country-year observations are ill-suited 
for testing policy diffusion. To properly account for international influence, I transform my 
original monadic data into dyadic data that includes 13,843 directed-dyad-year observations 
(1950-2018). This dyadic data allows me to rigorously assess the effect of international influence 
on institutional change while controlling for historical and domestic factors. Chapter Five uses 
this data to show that the learning and emulation processes of policy diffusion are associated 
with the institutional development of regulatory regimes in East Africa. I do not find that 
common colonial history is a relevant factor regarding institutional change.  
Legal Rules vs. Working Rules: Solving the Puzzle as to Why They Differ 
 My discussion to this point has focused primarily on the CSO laws as they appear on paper, 






themselves, and rarely have scholars studying CSO laws discussed the implications of the legal-
rules versus working-rules difference (cf. DeMattee & Swiney, 2020). Yet acknowledging this 
difference is critical to the full understanding of CSO regulatory regimes, because scholars have 
identified the inconsistent, subnational enforcement of permissive and restrictive provisions in 
contexts such as China, Ethiopia, North Korea, and Russia (S. Snyder, 2007; Spires, 2011; 
Cunningham, 2018; Toepler et al., 2019). This legal-rules versus working-rules differential is 
perhaps the least studied yet most essential item in the research studying CSO laws. Emphasizing 
enforcement provides one explanation to the puzzle that nondemocracies enact permissive 
provisions: governments tactically alter their enforcement as part of a broader strategy to 
increase legitimacy and control. 
 Legitimacy theory originates from Weber’s (1919) three-part typology of charismatic, 
traditional, and rational-legal legitimacy found in all political systems. He argued that 
charismatic and traditional legitimacy were not durable; a functioning state bureaucracy 
dominated legitimacy in the rational-legal form. Scholars have used legitimacy to describe 
concepts at different levels of analysis within societies. At the systems level, legitimacy is 
analogous to “system affect” and “diffuse support” and describes the citizenry’s general 
evaluation of the political system (Lipset, 1960; Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965, 1975). 
When used to evaluate particular government actors and policies, legitimacy is tantamount to 
“specific support” (Easton, 1965), “effectiveness” (Lipset, 1960), and “incumbent affect” 
(Almond & Verba, 1963). Gaining or losing legitimacy is a dynamic process at both levels 
(Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Mattes & Bratton, 2007).  
  Legitimacy is central to CSO law research because, as we discussed earlier, scholars 






and is confident in its grip on power (Bratton, 1989b; Brass, 2012a, 2016). The loss of legitimacy 
and control is central to the “closing space” argument that predicts governments enact restrictive 
provisions. This logic presupposes governments are honest actors: if they are legitimate and in 
control, then they enact and enforce permissive provisions; if their legitimacy is fragile and their 
control in jeopardy, then they pass and enact restrictive provisions. I build on this logic and 
consider the possibility that governments enact provisions that they never enforce.  
 Lorch and Bunk (2017, pp. 989-991) masterfully review and theorize that laws governing 
CSOs are part of a broader strategy to expand a regime’s legitimacy, control, and power. Six 
tactics contribute to the government’s strategy though direct or indirect legitimization or through 
manipulation.9 The first direct tactic (Tactic #1) uses permissive provisions to strengthen the 
regime’s democratic façade. Here, permissive provisions give the impression of democratic 
qualities to domestic and international onlookers, which increases diffuse support for the current 
regime. The other direct tactic (Tactic #2) engages CSOs on social matters to demonstrate 
responsiveness. Permissive provisions allow for the controlled growth of CSOs that the 
government meets with when it wants to claim to represent society’s concerns, which increases 
responsiveness legitimacy. 
 
9 Prior research shows these tactics are used in contexts such as the Middle East and North Africa (Wiktorowicz, 
2000; Dimitrovova, 2010), Southeast Asia (Lorch, 2006; Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011), Sub-Saharan Africa (Tripp, 
2001; Brass, 2016; Lorch & Bunk, 2017), and many other authoritarian and hybrid regimes around the world 
(Lewis, 2013; Froissart, 2014; Teets, 2014; Benevolenski & Toepler, 2017; Toepler et al., 2019; Toepler, Zimmer, 






 Next are two tactics that indirectly add to the regime’s legitimacy. The first (Tactic #3) uses 
permissive provisions to increase compliance. Here, permissive provisions increase compliance 
that gives credibility to the regulatory regime and the regulators. The intention is to turn specific 
support for the legal institution into diffuse support that legitimizes the government’s authority to 
govern. The other (Tactic #4) uses CSOs’ service provision to increase the government’s output 
of public service goods. By enacting certain permissive provisions, governments engineer the 
growth of particular types of CSOs, specifically service-oriented ones. Enlisting CSOs in service 
provision increases the regime’s output legitimacy.  
 The final tactics are manipulative. The first (Tactic #5) uses permissive provisions to 
ensnare CSOs “in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes” (Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 43) 
that increases the regime’s control through administrative power. Permissive provisions increase 
voluntary compliance, and the manipulation is that CSOs willingly surrender information that 
makes these autonomous organizations observable. With increased administrative power, the 
government can monitor, control, and prevent collective action. The final tactic (Tactic #6) uses 
permissive provisions to attract international assistance that expands the regime’s resource base. 
Permissive provisions promote foreign assistance to local CSOs. The manipulation happens 
when the provisions legally require international assistance to flow through specific locations—
e.g., escrow at government ministries—allowing the regime to use those funds to increase its 
influence and resource base.  
 I apply Lorch and Bunk’s theory to interview and archival data in Chapter Seven and find 
that each tactic appears to have been used by a case study government, that of Kenya, as it has 
altered its regulatory regime over time. As I detail in the chapter, Kenyan elected officials, 






CSO laws to legitimize itself and maintain control. The participants provided responses that 
support the tactics discussed above. The three most salient tactics are: enacting (but not 
enforcing) permissive provisions to bolster the democratic façade (Tactic #1), meeting with civil 
society stakeholders to demonstrate responsiveness (Tactic #2), and using CSO regulators to 
collect the information necessary to expand administrative power, then handing that power to 
massively resourced national security apparatus (Tactic #5). Together, these findings show that 
governments can use legitimization tactics collectively, separately, or episodically to increase 
their legitimacy and control. 
A Summary of the Argument 
 To understand the puzzling variation in CSO regulatory regimes across different types of 
governments, we must consider four different factors that characterize these legal institutions: (1) 
they fuse permissive and restrictive provisions; (2) path dependency shapes their development; 
(3) international influence affects institutional change; and (4) enforcement conditions the degree 
to which working rules resemble legal rules. I combine these four arguments into a causal theory 
that predicts the conditions under which governments enact and enforce specific types of CSO 
laws. The degree to which a government is confident in its hold on power is central to my 
argument. My theory has five parts, as represented in my causal diagram (Figure 1.1). 
Horizontally, the figure has three self-defining sections that correspond with the discussion that 
follows. Table 1.1 provides additional information to understand the causal diagram, including 
variables relevant to the argument’s different components, and predictions on the likelihood that 







Figure 1.1 The Argument 
 
 
 to maintain political control and expand its legitimacy among its citizenry and the 
international community. If the current legal rules do not sufficiently meet the government’s 
aims, the process moves down the diagram towards the letter (B). At this stage, the government 
seeks to enact institutional change that will alter the composition of the legal rules. This process 
literally rewrites the de jure CSO regulatory regime. Several factors determine the types of 
provisions the government enacts. The first is the political system of power in which the 
government operates. All else being equal, the legislative process will look different and yield a 
different output if the actors are a democratic society with a system of checks and balances, a 
semi-authoritarian that must stand for reelection in the future, or a full-scale authoritarian with a 






that predicts the types of provisions a government enacts, but rather a distal factor that describes 
the political context in which lawmaking occurs. 
 More proximate factors are the structural constraints facing the government. These 
constraints include pledges made to the international community when committing to protect 
political rights and civil liberties or promising to make certain policy changes to receive foreign 
assistance from international donors. During the Cold War, many governments worldwide 
adopted a “non-alignment” policy that they used strategically to avoid international pressure. But 
after the Cold War, international donors could demand greater concessions for their foreign aid. 
 The most proximate factor in determining the contours of a regulatory regime is how the 
government perceives its control and legitimacy. This factor is closely related to the relationship 
Bratton (1989b, p. 576) introduced to argue that the way the government perceives CSOs’ 
activities as affecting its power is critically consequential to the type of strategy it uses to 
regulate the sector: “where leaders are confident of their grip on power, they will not fear 
[CSOs]. The more fragile a government’s sense of political legitimacy, the less permissive it is 
likely to be toward [CSOs].” Depending on this evaluation, the government draws from four 
strategies to regulate CSOs: monitor, coordinate, coopt, and dissolve. Bratton’s argument 
predicts that conflict in the government-CSO relationship is inversely related to the 
government’s confidence in its grip on power, and notes “relations are likely to blow erratically 
hot and cold” depending on whether the government perceives national sovereignty or state 
security are at stake (1989b, p. 585). Governments have varying grips on power within the same 
regime type; thus, regime type is insufficient to explain why a government enacts its regulations. 
 My theory applies to the institutional development of regulatory regimes in all political and 






which the government evaluates its options on the types of legal provisions to enact. When their 
grip on control is weak, governments alter legal rules and working rules to observe and control 
civil society. By contrast, governments whose grip on power is strong use the regulatory regime 
to provide CSOs with greater operational space. Different permutations of these factors produce 
any of the following changes: enact only permissive provisions (helpful change), enact only 
restrictive provisions (hindering change), or enact a combination of permissive and restrictive 
provisions (mixed and manipulative change). Whatever type of incremental change governments 
enact combines with preexisting institutions—letter (C)—in the long, slow, and muddled process 
of institutional development that updates and rewrites the rules in the de jure regulatory regime. 
Enforcement is not part of the de jure regulatory regime.    
 Returning to the beginning of the causal diagram, if the current legal rules sufficiently 
achieve the government’s aims, then no institutional change is required, and the process moves 
to up the diagram towards the letter (D). Laws do not enforce themselves, and elected officials 
within government direct, fund, and oversee the bureaucracy’s enforcement of legal rules. 
Several factors contribute to the rules-in-use deviating from the rules-in-form, such as the 
government’s policy priorities, the agency’s expertise and resources, and bureaucrats’ 
willingness to enforce laws impartially. Taking these factors as given, my argument is that the 
government can use enforcement as an opportunity to figuratively rewrite the laws and create a 







Table 1.1 The Argument’s Variables and Predicted Outcomes 
 Legal Rules and Institutional Change Working Rules and Enforcement 
Response 
Variables 
• Enacts a law that contains a restrictive 
financial provision (Ch. 3). 
• Enacts particular restrictive financial 
provision (Ch. 3). 
• Enacts multiple permissive and restrictive 
provisions (Ch. 4 and 5). 
• Enforcement and why working rules 
deviate from the legal rules (Ch. 7). 
Independent 
Variables 
• Preexisting Institutions: international 
commitments to safeguard human rights (Ch. 
3 and 5), current laws (Ch. 4 and 5), colonial 
institutions (Ch. 5). 
• Government’s grip on control and power: 
foreign aid and electoral contestation (Ch. 4), 
strength of autocratic institutions (Ch. 5), and 
international diffusion processes of learning 
and emulation (Ch. 5). 
• Legitimization Tactics: using laws to give 
the impression of democracy, enticing 
compliance so that regulator and laws 
seem credible, establishing administrative 
power, output legitimacy, and 
responsiveness legitimacy (Ch. 7). 
Democratic 
Regimes 
Enacts Permissive Provisions—Highly likely, 
the democratic rules broadly protect political 
rights and civil liberties, allied with western 
democracies, control and legitimacy achieved 
by maintaining democratic institutions. 
Unlikely if sufficiently permissive. 
Enacts Restrictive Provisions—Unlikely but 
possible. Restrictive provisions likely properly 
scoped and necessary for democracy or passed 
in moments of hysteria and later repealed. 
Enforces Permissive Provisions—Highly 
likely and conforms with the conventional 
explanation. Enforcement is Predictable, 
impartial, and follows the rules of law. 
Enforces Restrictive Provisions—Likely, 
but enforcement actions do not overreach. 
Restrictive provisions later repealed or 
amended if unconstitutional. 
Hybrid 
Regimes 
Enacts Permissive Provisions—Likely, even 
weakened democratic rules expect the regime 
to protect rights and liberties, appease western 
democracies and international organizations, 
and allow the regime to legitimize itself to 
onlookers. 
Enacts Restrictive Provisions—Likely, but not 
the heavy-handed coercive type. May learn 
from other nondemocratic regimes. Restrictive 
provisions allow the regime to observe and 
possibly control some CSOs that would work 
to delegitimize the regime. 
Enforces Permissive Provisions—
Selectively and may be manipulated to 
advance specific aims—e.g., supporting 
service provision and hindering claims-
making. Enforcement gives laws credibility 
and regime legitimacy. 
Enforces Restrictive Provisions—
Unpredictable and manipulated to advance 
the regime’s interest. Enforcement actions 
may overreach without interference if the 
judiciary is coopted. 
Authoritarian 
Regimes 
Enacts Permissive Provisions—Unnecessary 
but possible. Democratic rules eliminated, and 
the government openly violates political rights 
and civil liberties. Quest for legitimacy is 
second to maintaining control.  
Enacts Restrictive Provisions—Highly likely 
and conforms with the conventional 
explanation. Unlikely if sufficiently restrictive. 
Enforces Permissive Provisions—
Unnecessary but possible, and not 
guaranteed to continue. The rule of law is 
weak because the regime has successfully 
eliminated democratic rules and openly 
violates rights and liberties.  
Enforces Restrictive Provisions—Swift, 








following the rule of law and impartially enforcing the regulatory regime. It may also manifest as 
enforcement that strays from what is reasonable and becomes the malicious over-enforcement of 
restrictive provisions. It could be the case that permissive provisions are under-enforced, 
meaning enforcement is selective or nonexistent. In the end, it is the enforcement of the current 
legal institution that constrains and incentivizes CSOs’ behavior. I predict this de facto 
regulatory regime remains unchanged—both its written rules and enforcement actions—as long 
as it sufficiently achieves the government’s aims. When it no longer does, the government will 
choose to alter the legal rules or the working rules.  
A Roadmap for the Chapter Ahead 
 This chapter has discussed relevant theories, proposed research questions, and presented a 
new argument for why and how governments regulate CSOs. Chapter Two discusses my mixed-
methods research design and explains the process I followed to collect, translate, and code 285 
laws from 17 countries. The ADICO syntax was central to that effort, and I review it in detail for 
those unfamiliar with that method of institutional analysis. My empirical chapters follow. These 
vary in their level of analysis, research methods, and contributions to theory-testing and theory-
building. These differences allow each chapter to make unique contributions to my unifying 
question: how and why do governments regulate CSOs?  
 Chapter Three is my first empirical chapter and is one of three with a comparative, cross-
national scope. It uses separate analyses to make two key contributions. The first analysis builds 
on current theory to introduce institutional variables, specifically preexisting institutions. A 
country’s international commitment to safeguarding civil and political rights is one preexisting 






Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a critical international human rights treaty that commits 
its parties to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms (Henkin, 2000; Donnelly, 2013). 
A pledge to safeguard human rights means little if governments can choose to ignore it, but 
certain constitutional rules condition whether governments must honor its international 
commitment. These constitutional rules exist as another preexisting institution. From an 
institutional analysis perspective, the strength of an international commitment depends on 
whether constitutional rules strengthen those commitments. The second analysis disaggregates 
law types to explore nuanced relationships. Given reports of the growing number of laws 
restricting civil society around the world (e.g., CIVICUS, 2018; Amnesty International, 2019; 
Musila, 2019), it is empirically expedient and sometimes necessary to classify all laws as equally 
restrictive and presume marginal and unimportant differences. I challenge this presumption and 
test the degree to which it holds. I do so by organizing laws restricting foreign funding into three 
qualitatively different groups that fall along a continuum from highly- to minimally-restrictive. 
The resulting statistical analyses show that the same sets of factors rarely predict the enactment 
of different law types, which means presuming conceptual equivalence across legal provisions 
produces Type-I and Type-II errors. 
 Chapter Three uses a preexisting dataset covering 138 countries. That data is strong because 
it covers a wide range of countries, but it is limited in the number and type of legal provisions 
considered. In Chapters Four and Five, I correct those deficiencies by coding 285 primary legal 
sources to create an original dataset capable of testing my research questions about CSO 
regulatory regimes in their entirety. Chapter Four introduces key concepts and presents a matrix 
typology of CSO legal provisions. The second part of the chapter uses the ADICO syntax to 






original dataset. I conclude the chapter with a descriptive analysis of the legal corpus enacted by 
17 countries. Two primary insights from the chapter are that when institutional change occurs, it 
is more likely to take the form of permissive expansions. Two, permissive expansions are 
generally twice as large as restrictive ones. 
 Chapter Five uses this original data to study the institutional development of regulatory 
regimes. The analysis applies a directed-dyad event history analysis to the legal corpus discussed 
in Chapters Two and Four to test new explanations for why these legal institutions vary. The 
results make several original contributions. First, the greater entrenchment of autocratic 
institutions positively correlates with governments enacting permissive provisions. Conventional 
explanations have not considered this possibility, and I explore several causal process 
explanations for why it occurs (see Chapter Seven). The remaining contributions show that path 
dependency steers institutional development and identifies two pathways by which international 
influence affects institutional change. Beginning with preexisting institutions, I find evidence of 
a substitutive relationship that shows governments add fewer permissive provisions when current 
institutions are sufficiently permissive. I also see a complementary relationship where highly 
permissive preexisting institutions lead governments to add specific types of restrictive 
provisions. Turning to policy diffusion, my analyses suggest governments learn from each other, 
but that the relationship varies depending on the type of institutional change that occurs. A 
learning process of policy diffusions appears strongest when explaining permissive expansions. 
By contrast, the emulation process of policy diffusion only appears relevant to restrictive 
expansions. A common colonial history does not seem to predict institutional change when 






 Chapters Six and Seven probe the causal processes behind the statistical associations 
identified in Chapter Five. Chapter Six is a historical overview of the Kenyan case. It provides a 
very general history of Kenya that sets the political context in which the government altered the 
regulatory regime. I combine prior research and two sources of primary data to show that 
Kenyan presidents have altered legal rules and working rules to create the government-CSO 
relationship they want. Chapter Seven is my fifth empirical analysis and uses a controlled 
comparison of four CSO regulators in Kenya. Three of these have existed since independence; 
the fourth was added in the early 1990s. My analysis uses interview data collected from asking 
Kenyan government officials why Kenyan CSO laws exist and how they enforce them. The 
interview data identifies causal process explanations for how and why Kenya altered its 
regulatory regime.  
 The conclusion reviews all findings, discusses implications, and identifies areas for future 
research. A hefty appendix includes supplementary information for each chapter and the 
repositories from which I collected primary sources. It also includes a bibliography of the 285 
laws coded as part of this dissertation. 
 Voluntary association is a fundamental human right that allows people to associate 
peacefully, or not be compelled to associate, if that is their choice (§20 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). Constitutions, international commitments, and statutes 
comprise the legal institutions that protect this right. Together they create the space in which 
civil society and CSOs thrive just as a greenhouse protects seedlings as they grow. Possessing a 
greenhouse does not guarantee success, however. Seedlings can wither and pests can run amuck 
if the farmer poorly constructs the greenhouse, neglects its maintenance, borrows the wrong 






affects voluntary association, we know not whether it is good or bad or whether it helps or 
hinders. Enacting or not enacting a particular law does not guarantee civil society’s environment 
will open or close. To know such things, we must understand the law’s contents before declaring 
it “good” or “bad.” Then we must understand how the government enforces it before deciding 
whether it “helps” or “hinders” citizens’ rights and liberties. I engage each of these 








RESEARCH DESIGN: MULTIPLE FORMS OF DATA & ANALYSES 
 In this chapter, I discuss the comparative approach that I use to study how and why 
governments regulate CSOs. My comparisons are of three types. The first are between-country 
analyses that explore the types of CSO laws that countries enact. The second type of 
comparisons are historical, between-country analyses that give history and preexisting 
institutions serious considerations. Finally, the third type are historical, within-country analyses 
that use a sub-national comparison. The research begins with a broad perspective that focuses as 
the chapters progress. I start with a global cross-national study (Chapter Three), narrow to cross-
national regional comparisons with a long observation period (Chapters Four and Five), and 
conclude with a detailed controlled comparison of government regulators in a single country 
(Chapters Six and Seven). My findings in earlier chapters inform the analyses in subsequent 
chapters. In this chapter, I focus exclusively on the case selection for my cross-national study, 
my process for collecting and coding legal texts, and the analytical narrative of my primary case: 
Kenya. Subsequent chapters discuss precise research questions and explain the methods I use to 
collect and analyze the data necessary to address those particular inquiries.  
Cross-National Comparisons: Strengths and Weaknesses of a Global Dataset 
 To understand why and how governments regulate CSOs, I begin by examining the 
variation in the types of legal provisions governments enact. Most existing research examines the 
conditions under which governments enact a legal provision restricting CSOs’ foreign financial 
support. In Chapter Three, I study whether the risk factors that predict enacting new laws vary 






study, I replicate the data used in prior studies and then complexify and add to it to better 
understand the nuance in these legal institutions. I begin by replicating data used in existing 
research (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2016; Reddy, 2018; Bromley et al., 
2019). This data relies exclusively on secondary sources—e.g., country reports or legal 
summaries—for the raw information to create a global country-year dataset that covers 138 
countries between 1993-2012. Next, I disaggregate the response variable into three conceptually 
distinct types: prohibitive provisions, red-tape provisions, and notification provisions. Then, I 
add constitutional provisions and ratification of human rights treaties as key preexisting 
institutions. Relative to existing studies, I show that legal provisions that appear different in 
content also have different causal factors, and preexisting institutions affect the enactment of 
legal provisions.  
 I was not entirely satisfied with the level of detail afforded by this type of analysis, 
however. First, the data operationalizes the legal institution concept as either 0 (country lacks 
legal provisions) or 1 (country has legal provisions). Operationalizing legal institutions in this 
binary manner is imprecise because these concepts can contain many laws, and each law can 
contain various provisions. Second, the data omits several essential types of legal institutions. 
The data excludes constitutions and international treaties, ignores permissive provisions, and 
omits consideration of non-financial policy types. Finally, the data omits CSO laws passed 
before the secondary data started its coverage. These limitations lead to a “lawmaking in the 
wild” assumption that fails to account for the preexisting legal provisions. To overcome these 







Cross-National Comparisons: Identifying a Regional 17-Country Sample 
 Chapters Four and Five study the legal provisions governments use to regulate CSOs and 
how those legal institutions change over time. To answer these questions with historic and 
domestic explanations, I needed data on which laws were active, which legal provisions current 
laws contained, and the legal changes the government made. To satisfactorily test international 
explanations, I required a primary group of core countries and a peripheral group that represents 
the core’s politically relevant dyads. These analyses called on me to move beyond simply 
“whether a law existed,” and required inventorying the legal provisions present in each country 
in each year. Developing this “thick analysis” (Brady & Collier, 2010, p. 355) and rich 
knowledge of cases demanded that I trade breadth for depth. My sample includes 17 countries, 
which is similar in quantity to edited volumes that have made significant contributions to this 
research area.1   
 Laws are highly accessible primary sources because they are public documents that can be 
collected, translated, and systematically coded. To sufficiently account for preexisting 
institutions and not succumb to the “lawmaking in the wild” fallacy, I coded the legal texts for 
my cases’ entire statehood, including laws that regulated a jurisdiction during its colonial 
occupation and were kept by new governments at independence.2 Expanding the observation 
 
1 The International Guide to Nonprofit Law (Salamon & Toepler, 1997) enlists the expertise of national legal experts 
to carefully review laws in 22 countries. While the legal analyses follow a shared outline, the summaries do not leave 
room for systematic comparison.  In Regulatory Waves (Breen et al., 2017), scholars and subject-matter experts 
discuss 15 “country narratives” of self-regulation policies of nonprofit sectors around the world. The editors and 
authors admirably unpack the history and politics of each case study, but they do not systematically compare cases. 
See Appendix Table 2A for more information. 
2 I thank a highly reputable legal expert in East Africa for this idea. My research finds a similar legal reality holds for 
countries that experience dissolution—e.g., Section II Article 2 of The Constitution of the Russian Federation states: 
“Laws and other legal acts in effect on the territory of the Russian Federation until the enactment of this Constitution 






period in this way allowed me to capture institutional creation and institutional change. I 
resolved the “conceptual equivalence” fallacy by systematically coding all laws with a broad 
coding protocol, which I discuss in detail in Chapter Four.  
 To create the coding protocol, I first developed a typology of 58 legal provisions that, when 
viewed through a theoretical lens that identifies provisions as either permissive or restrictive, 
creates a matrix typology of the legal provisions that comprise CSO regulatory regimes. By CSO 
regulatory regimes, I mean the various laws that combine with constitutional protections to 
create carefully institutionalized regulatory systems that govern CSO activity. Then, I 
transformed the matrix typology into the ADICO syntax (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; S. E. S. 
Crawford & E. Ostrom, 2005), which produced a 58-item coding protocol that I used to 
systematically inventory the legal provisions of 285 laws enacted between 1872 and 2019.  
 The CSO regulatory regime concept is a national-level concept that persists even as the laws 
that comprise it change. I could study it as a single indicator, or disaggregate into its elemental 
subgroups—i.e., governance, formation, operations, and resources provisions. My data’s 979 
country-year observations (1950 and 2018) allowed me to effectively study how regulatory 
regimes change over time and test domestic and historical factors associated with institutional 
development. Despite the data’s long history and careful coding, monadic country-year 
observations are ill-suited for testing whether one country’s laws affect another’s. To account for 
international factors, I transformed the monadic data into dyadic data that includes 13,843 
directed-dyad-year observations (1950-2018). This dyadic data allowed me to rigorously test if 
international, historical, and domestic factors predict when and how governments change the 







Primary Group: Six East African Community Countries  
I chose the East African Community (EAC) as the core group of countries to study for 
theoretical and practical reasons. The EAC is an intergovernmental organization of six member 
states—Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania—unified by The Treaty 
for the Establishment of the East African Community.3 EAC members have nominal variation in 
their colonial histories and legal systems. Five members gained independence from two different 
European powers, while the sixth earned independence from Sudan. The colonial occupation had 
a profound impact on these colonies and strongly correlate with current legal systems in use 
today (Klerman, Mahoney, Spamann, & Weinstein, 2011; Berinzon & Briggs, 2019). Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda were colonized by the British and have legal systems that mix customary 
law with the English common law tradition. Common law systems assign the preeminent 
position to “judge-made rules” (Head, 2011, p. 19), as opposed to legislation, where judges use 
legal precedent to guide their present decision. 
Burundi and Rwanda, by contrast, merge the civil law legal system of their Belgian 
colonizer with customary laws. Civil law legal systems, in a Roman tradition, stress the idea that 
the state is supreme, and citizens are obedient to it. This system generally chooses a systematic 
codification of laws that makes statutory law superior to case law and minimizes judge-made 
precedential authority (Apple & Deyling, 1995; Head, 2011). Joireman (2001, pp. 582-583, 592) 
 
3 The treaty was signed on November 30th 1999 and entered into force on July 7th 2000 following its ratification by 
the original three Partner States - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi 
acceded to the EAC Treaty on June 18th 2007 and became full Members of the Community with effect from July 1st 
2007. The Republic of South Sudan acceded to the Treaty on April 15th 2016 and became a full Member on 15 August 
2016. The vision of EAC is to be a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa and 
pursues four pillars of regional integration: customs union, common market, monetary union, political federation 






finds that African countries with a common law system are generally better at providing the rule 
of law—as measured by the strength of the court system, lower corruption, and greater civil 
liberties—than those with civil law institutions. 
Table 2.1: Categorizing Countries by Legal System Classifications 






Weak Law in 
Transition 
Common Law United Kingdom United States   













1 Mixed Legal System is Common law/Customary law. Kenya also incorporates Muslim law (Source JuriGlobe).  
2 Not classified by either source. Classification presumably matches Sudan’s, which was colonized by the British. 
3 Mixed Civil/Customary (Source JuriGlobe). JuriGlobe is a research center of comparative law faculty at the 
University of Ottawa (www.juriglobe.ca/). 
Table 2.1 shows the categorization of EAC members and the 12 other countries in the 
sample using two different taxonomies. Rows categorize countries according to the taxonomy 
developed by research faculty of comparative law at the University of Ottawa. Columns 
represent a similar taxonomy derived from an inductive method that clusters countries into 
groups depending on their similarities across 15 variables (Siems, 2016, pp. 586, 595-597). The 
European legal culture cluster includes groups from any legal tradition whose strong institutions 
produced high values on the 15 indicators used in the analysis. The mixed legal systems cluster 
includes countries that merge some common law features with civil law or secular legal 
traditions. The rule by law cluster includes many nondemocratic countries and some countries 
with Islamic law systems. Finally, the weak law in transition cluster contains democratizing 
countries with mediocre and imperfect legal institutions. 
Their static legal systems aside, the EAC countries are representative of Africa and low- 






indicators for all countries in my sample measuring the extent to which each case achieves a 
liberal democracy (political), the pervasiveness of social group exclusion (social), and GDP per 
capita (economic). Higher values for each indicator correlate with shading and indicate fuller 
liberal democracy achievement, more substantial social group exclusion, and higher GDP per 
capita. Although the small group imperfectly represents all countries, it satisfactorily represents 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Global South more broadly.  
Then, on practical grounds, the cases received their independence relatively recently—
Burundi 1962 (German control 1885 ceded to Belgium 1919), Kenya 1963 (British control 
1888), Rwanda 1962 (German control 1885 ceded to Belgium 1919), South Sudan 2011 
(Sudanese independence from Britain 1956), Tanzania 1961 (German control 1885 ceded to 
Britain 1919), Uganda 1962 (British control 1894). And most of these countries publish their 
legal texts in English, which decreases the resources necessary to code the laws for their entire 
statehood.  
Peripheral Group: Six Neighboring East African Countries 
My sample also includes a peripheral group of peer neighbors and global hegemons whose 
proximity and politics might influence institutional change within the core group though policy 
diffusion. Countries adjacent to the EAC and the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security 
Council (P5) constitute this peripheral group. I include the EAC’s neighbors in the sample.4 
These six countries are geographically contiguous to at least one EAC member, which allows me 
to control for a rudimentary conceptualization of “geographic” proximity. Half of the cases have 
 
4 Funding limitations did not allow me the opportunity to translate and code five laws enacted by Sudan, I was unable 






a contiguous colonial history with EAC members, making them “historically” proximate as well. 
The European powers that colonized EAC countries colonized three countries in this neighboring 
group. In contrast, three other powers colonized the remaining territories: Central African 
Republic 1960 (French control 1894), Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960 (Belgian King 
Leopold II personal rule via Congo Free State 1885 annexed by Belgium 1908), Ethiopia 1941 
(Italian control 1936), Malawi 1964 (British control 1889), Mozambique 1975 (Portugal control 
1498), and Zambia 1964 (British control 1889).  
Geographic and colonial contiguity are invariant factors with theoretical and conceptual 
importance (Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Quackenbush, 2006; MacLean, 2010; Berinzon & Briggs, 
2019). Changing political, social, and economic conditions in countries creates temporal 
variation that causes two countries to become more (or less) “politically,” “socially,” or 
“economically” proximate. The average country-year measures for the political, social, and 
economic indicators are similar, on average, for each African country group during the 
observation period. The ranges of these indicators are also similar across groups. In EAC 
countries, average liberal democracy ranges 0.25 points (min = 0.07, max = 0.32), while in 
neighboring African countries the range is a slightly smaller 0.19 points (min = 0.07, max = 
0.26). The range of social group exclusion in the EAC is a narrower 0.51 points (0.37 to 0.88) 
compared to neighboring countries where the range is 0.58 points (0.31 to 0.89). GDP per capita, 
meanwhile, spans more than $1,100 ($967 to $2,076) in the EAC, and over $1,200 ($669 to 







Peripheral Group: Five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council 
China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA represent global hegemons and complete the 
peripheral group. Data for this cohort allows me to test the effect of global hegemons on the 
institutional development of CSO laws in East Africa. Collectively, these countries appropriately 
represent global leaders for two reasons. One is that their P5 status gives these countries a 
privileged role in global affairs that is invariant and unrivaled.5 As a group of 15 countries, the 
Security Council disproportionally determines global affairs on issues such as multilateral 
sanctions and military action. This opportunity to sway global affairs makes the Security 
Council’s remaining ten seats highly coveted (Malone, 2000) and lucrative with member 
countries receiving more aid and favorable treatment from World Bank, United States, and 
United Nations (Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006; Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009). 
Scholars use Security Council membership as an exogenous measure of  “a country’s 
geopolitical importance” (Besley & Persson, 2011, p. 1432) and labeled the elite P5 as 
“disproportionately powerful” (Langmore & Farrall, 2016, p. 59). Indeed, for the past 75 years, 
no other group of countries has been able to shape world events so dramatically and consistently 
as the P5.  
Their political heterogeneity is the second reason why the P5 appropriately represent global 
hegemons. The P5’s vetoes suggest there are two factions within it. According to the United 
 
5 Germany was a significant factor in the colonization of Africa. Otto von Bismark convened the Berlin Conference 
(1884-1885) that initiated the scramble for Africa, and Germany itself colonized large regions in present-day East 
Africa that it relinquished to Belgium at the end of WWI. Recently, Germany’s economic and political capacities 
make it a critical leader within the European Union and globally. Although I hope to include Germany in my future 
and believe it to be a necessary case for any similar research studying Eastern Europe, I exclude it here because it is 






Nations Security Council Veto List,6 P5 members have cast 255 veto votes on 207 occasions 
since February 1946. While the number of vetoes ranges considerably, all countries have at least 
once individually vetoed an agenda item. The compelling pattern is that among the 20% of 
agenda items where more than one veto is cast, never have western democracies and eastern 
autocracies vetoed together. Stated differently, while most vetoes are individual, coalition vetoes 
appear to be the coordinated product of either democracies or autocracies. Though the P5 vary in 
critical ways, these geopolitically powerful countries are, on average, more democratic, less 
exclusionary, and richer than African countries (see Table 2.2). 
Their permanent membership on the Security Council aside, the P5 countries are relevant to 
the politics of East Africa and the Global South more broadly. Historians credit France with 
inventing liberalism and its current characterization for people who are “freedom-loving, 
generous, and civic-minded, and who understood their connectedness to others and their duties to 
the common good” (Rosenblatt, 2018, pp. 3,40). Although France did not colonize East Africa, it 
did successfully and illiberally colonize parts of North, West, and Equatorial Africa as well as 
other territories around the world. In the 1980s, France actively promoted rayonnement (spread) 
of French culture and language. It targeted former Belgian colonies—i.e., Burundi, Rwanda, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo—with aid to support la francophonie (French cultural 




6 Data last updated March 17th, 2020 from https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. The data show the number vetoes 






Table 2.2: Political, Social, and Economic Indicators (between- and within-case variation) 
 
A Liberal Democracy Index measures the extent to which liberal democracy is achieved. The indicator measures 
achievement as an interval scale from low to high (0 to 1) for years 1960 thru 2019. B Exclusion by Social Group 
measures the extent to which individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on 
their identity or belonging to a particular group. The indicator measures exclusion as an interval scale from low to 
high (0 to 1) for years 1960 thru 2018. C GDP per capita measures gross domestic production on a per capita basis for 
years 1960 thru 2016. 1 Referent groups are Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Least Developed Countries (LDC), and World. 
Source Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem v.10).  
 Neither Russia nor China had African colonies, but both had embassies in these countries at 






capitalist models on display in France, Britain, and America (Attwood, 1967, pp. 154-155). 
Many African societies claimed a national ideology located between Marxism-Leninism and 
Western liberalism, known as African socialism. But many “merely paid lip service to 
theideology” and only a few countries—led by Tanzania’s Ujamaa (family hood)—earnestly 
implemented it (Nyerere, 1969; Samuel Alfayo Nyanchoga & Muchoki, 2010, pp. 84-85). 
 On international matters, many African countries adopted a non-alignment policy to 
navigate the bipolarity of Cold War geopolitics and affirm a country’s independence and 
sovereignty (Orwa, 1994). The collapse of the Soviet Union led China to alter its foreign policy 
to check on America’s sole hegemonic status (Kragelund, 2008). Since then, its increasing 
involvement on the continent is undeniable. The Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, 
Beijing October 2000) marked the beginning of the remarkable escalation in Chinese-African 
relations. As Nicholas Cheeseman (2015, pp. 137-138) notes, by 2003 Chinese-African arms 
sales rivaled any European country; by 2006, China traded more with Africa than any other 
economic partner (except the United States); and in 2013, Chinese-African trade doubled 2006-
levels and was more than twice the trade between Africa and the United States.   
Kenya: A Typical Case and Valuable Subnational Controlled Comparison  
 In addition to research questions about the legal institutions governments use to regulate 
CSOs that I can answer using large-N statistical techniques, I conducted in-depth research on one 
country, Kenya. This single-case study allowed me to explore different research questions and 
generate hypotheses about the enforcement of these CSO regulatory regimes. Historically, I 
investigated the conditions under which different presidential administrations enforced the same 






some regulators to successfully enforce laws while others fail. And behaviorally, I identified 
possible causal processes that led individuals to enforce legal provisions differently.     
Situating Kenya Among its Peers  
 Kenya is an important case to study because it is representative of a broader set of Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and Least Developed Countries (LDC) (Brass, 2016, p. 21). I consider 
Kenya a “typical case” because it exemplifies typical values across multiple indicators in my 
cross-national sample, which makes it useful for hypothesis testing (Gerring & Seawright, 2007, 
pp. 89, 91-97). Table 2.2 shows Kenya’s Liberal Democracy Index nearly matches the mean, 
median, and variation of the SSA and LDC referent categories. And while social exclusion is 
more pronounced in Kenya than those referent categories, the country’s GDP per capita is 
squarely between the two referent categories. The United Nations Development Programme and 
its Human Development Index (HDI)7 provides a fourth perspective of Kenya’s standing relative 
to other countries globally. The HDI consistently ranks Kenya in the upper-tier of the bottom-
quartile of countries: 24th percentile (1990), 20th percentile (2000), 23rd percentile (2010), 22nd 
percentile (2018).8  
 
7 HDI is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a 
long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/. Data retrieved 
June 4, 2020. 
8 In 1990, Kenya was in the 24th percentile and followed Guatemala and Vietnam (107th and 108th ranks) and led 
Morocco and Ghana (110th and 11th) among 144 countries. Kenya’s HDI score (0.47) was above the SSA referent 
group (0.40) but below the developing country average (0.52). A decade later in 2000, Kenya fell to the 20th percentile 
and followed Zimbabwe and Pakistan (137th and 138th ranks) and led Nepal and Mauritania (140th and 141st) of 174 
countries. At that time, its score (0.45) was above SSA (0.42) but below the average developing country (0.57). Then 
in 2010, Kenya ranked in the 23rd percentile behind Laos and Cambodia (142nd and 143rd) and ahead of Zambia and 
Nepal (145th and 146th) of 188 countries. Kenya’s score (0.53) increased but remained between SSA (0.50) and 
developing countries (0.64) averages. Most recently, in 2018, Kenya ranked in the 22nd percentile behind Myanmar 
and Cambodia (145th and 146th) and ahead of Nepal and Angola (148th and 149th) of 189 countries. Its score (0.58) 






 Another indicator of its representativeness is the number of years other countries have a 
political regime similar to Kenya’s (Table 2.3 data from V-Dem, p. 266). The data in Table 2.3 
suggests Kenya is the only country in the sample that spends the entire observation period as the  








































































Closed autocracy defined as no multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature. Electoral autocracy 
defined as de-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature but failing to achieve that elections 
are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites of polyarchy. 
Electoral democracy defined as de-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional 
prerequisites for polyarchy. But either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect 
for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive are not satisfied. 
Liberal democracy defined as De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional 
prerequisites for polyarchy are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal 
principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive 
are satisfied. Mozambique not coded 1975-1993. Source Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem v.10) Regimes of the World 
Indicator (v2x_regime).  
same political regime type. Analysts often disagree on regime type classifications, and Kenya is 






1992-01), a one-party autocracy (1982-91), and a liberal democracy (2002-10). The Autocratic 
Regime Dataset (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014) marks it as a party-based autocracy (1963-02) 
and then a democracy (2003-10). These classifications reach agreement that Kenya had a single-
party system under Kenyatta  and Moi (de facto 1963-81 and 1992-01; de jure 1982-91), and 
then a multiparty liberal democracy under Kibaki (approximately 2002-2010). Kenya, therefore, 
is typical of East African cases that spend considerable portions of their independence transiting 
the political regime continuum.    
 Comparative data on civil society is sparse, but an ambitious project led by John Hopkins 
University provides an opportunity to assess Kenya relative to and 35 other countries at one 
point in time (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). The John Hopkins project surveyed France, the 
UK, and the USA among its 16 developed countries. For developing countries, it included 
Argentina, Colombia, India, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and three East African 
countries among its 15 developing countries. The rest of the John Hopkins sample includes five 
transitioning countries. The project collected data from Uganda in 1998, and Kenya and 
Tanzania in 2000. Collectively, these authors use the comparative, cross-section data to describe 
Kenyan civil society as “similar to other developing countries” (Kanyinga, Mitullah, Odhiambo, 
Sokolowski, & Salamon, 2004, p. 97), Tanzania’s civil society as “relatively larger than other 
developing countries” (Kiondo, Ndumbaro, Sokolowski, & Salamon, 2004, p. 128), and civil 
society in Uganda as “above average” (Nyangabyaki, Kibikyo, Barya, Sokolowski, & Salamon, 







Scaling Down and Applying Site-Intensive Methods   
 In addition to its representativeness as a typical case, Kenya has a bureaucratic framework 
that allows me to access a powerful sub-national, comparative research design. Kenya uses four 
government agencies to regulate CSOs that operate nationally (Makanda, 2008, p. 189).9 Scaling 
down to study these regulators allows me to compare observations matched along contextual 
factors—e.g., culture, history, socioeconomic, politics—while also allowing those factors to vary 
over time (R. Snyder, 2001). A priori, comparing these “most-similar cases” is useful for both 
exploratory (hypothesis generation) and confirmatory (hypotheses testing) purposes (Gerring & 
Seawright, 2007, pp. 89, 131-139). Three of these regulators predate Kenya’s independence. The 
State Law Office contains the Registrar of Societies and the Registrar of Companies. The former 
regulates “societies” according to the Societies Act (Cap. 108) and the latter “companies limited 
by guaranteed” according to the Companies Act (Cap. 486). Next, the Trustees (Perpetual 
Succession Act) (Cap. 164) charges the massive Ministry of Lands with the duty to regulate 
“charitable trusts.” Finally, the Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board, or 
simply the “NGOs Board,” is a state corporation established by the Non-Governmental 
Organizations Co-ordination Act (No. 19 of 1990) to regulate and “national non-governmental 
organizations” and “international non-governmental organizations.”10 
 
9 I exclude cooperative societies and grassroots organizations because the former operate with an economic purpose 
and the latter only work at the community level (Maru, 2017, p. 43). Community-based organizations (CBOs) fall 
outside my scope for three reasons: (1) unlike other CSO legal forms in Kenya, CBOs operate only within single 
counties, (2) they may exist to generate private profits for members (3) there does not appear to be a Kenyan statute 
that regulates them. See Chapter Six for further discussion. 
10 Unlike other Kenyan regulators, the NGOs Board has reported to seven different executive officials since its 
inception. According to Kenya’s official Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure, until 1998, the NGOs Board was part 
of the Office of the President. From 1999 thru 2002 it was part of the Office of the Vice-President and Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Heritage, and Sports. In 2003, the NGOs Board was part of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was 






 I use site-intensive methods (Kapiszewski, MacLean, & Read, 2015) to collect original data 
for this controlled comparison.11 In-depth interviews act as one site-intensive method and allow 
me to understand the enforcement and compliance of Kenyan CSO laws. I analyze interview data 
collected from elected leaders and bureaucrats with current or former ties with the Government 
of Kenya. Archival methods collect preexisting source materials from Kenya’s four regulators, 
its Library of Parliament, and other repositories.12 Chapters Six discusses the Kenyan case and 
data collection process more fully; Chapter Seven carefully analyzes the interview and archival 
data.   
Assembling an International Legal Corpus 
 After selecting my sample, I collected the legal documents that comprise each country’s 
CSO regulatory regime. Constitutions, international treaties, and ordinary legislation comprise 
these legal institutions because they cumulatively affect political outcomes (Kiser & Ostrom, 
1982). Constitutions and treaties are “constitutional rules” that determine how a government 
creates a law and provides the judiciary with the calculus to judge its fairness (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1961; Brennan & Buchanan, 1985; E. Ostrom, 2005). By contrast, laws are “collective-
choice rules” made by representative institutions following the processes that “constitutional 
rules” prescribe (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 58). Constitutional rules may be superior to collective-
 
Board was part of the Ministry of State for National Heritage (and Culture), then relocated to the Ministry of 
Devolution and Planning in 2013 which was renamed the State Department for Planning in 2014. Finally, in 2017, the 
NGOs Board was moved to the State Department for Interior. 
11 Kenya requires researchers to affiliate with a local institution and obtain a Research Clearance Permit in addition to 
university IRB. NACOSTI Permit No. NACOSTI/P/18/65047/23638 dated July 13th 2018, and Indiana University 
Protocol No. 1805354074 dated June 5th, 2018. 
12 Data collected from several private archives and government repositories at the Kenyan Auditor General, Bureau 
of Statistics, Hansards Office of Parliament, Kenyan Law Reform Commission, Ombudsman, Public Service 






choice rules, but laws affect the day-to-day activities of people and organizations more closely. 
Information for constitutions and treaties is readily available13 and makes evaluating those 
constitutional rules straightforward. Accessing information on CSO laws is far more complicated 
and is perhaps the most significant barrier to studying these collective-choice rules.   
 A law’s content—i.e., its legal provisions—determines whether it is constitutional or 
unconstitutional, liberal or illiberal, permissive or restrictive. When an appropriate lens, such as 
constitutional rules or applicable theory, evaluates the laws, then the process is reliable and 
replicable. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is 
considered the principal treaty in the area of international human rights (Henkin, 2000; ICNL, 
2009; Kiai, 2012; Donnelly, 2013; ICNL, 2015), is one such appropriate lens. As I discuss more 
thoroughly in Chapter Three, international lawyers have used Article 22(2) to establish the three-
part test to evaluate CSO laws (U.N. Human Rights Committee, 2006, 2007, 2015).14 The three-
part test, or a similar diagnostic tool, allows researchers to evaluate legal provisions across 
countries consistently. For example, analysts applying the three-part test to two laws from 
different countries, but with the same content, should reach the same evaluative conclusion. I use 
a similar approach to evaluate the legal provisions of 285 laws passed by 17 countries between 
1872 and 2019 (see Chapter Four). But instead of the three-part test, I apply a 58-item coding 
protocol developed from a review of the literature studying CSO laws. Qualitative methods 
 
13 Ratification status for international treaties is available through the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, the 
Comparative Constitutions Project systematically codes the constitutions for all countries from 1789 forward (Elkins 
et al., 2009; Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton, 2014a). 
14 International law’s three-part test draws on Article 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The threshold is that all laws regulating voluntary association must be: (1) prescribed by law and use sufficiently 
precise and accessible language; (2) established to meet legitimate aims specified by Article 22(2) to include “national 
security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 






allowed me to produce an original country-year dataset that covers more time than any prior 
study in this research area, and successfully operationalizes the legal institution as the 
multidimensional concepts they are. These data allow me to speak confidently about the legal 
institutions that governments have and the legal provisions they contain. 
Data Preparation: Collecting and Translating an International Legal Corpus 
 I collected primary source materials in the form of legal texts from 25 legal research 
collections. Most of my legal corpus comes from repositories organizing data for either specific 
or multiple countries—e.g., the Uganda Legal Information Institute and the International Center 
for Not-for-Profit Law. Though many repositories were open access, some required paid 
subscriptions or the ability to read non-English languages—e.g., Westlaw China and the 
Consultant Plus legal databases. The Appendix describes these online collections. I collected 
missing primary sources by contacting analysts who published legal summaries that discussed 
CSO laws. Although my search for primary sources was thorough, it may not be perfect.15 
 As I collected laws, I indexed them in a manner that allowed me to avoid collecting 
redundant files and assisted me in identifying missing versions.16 The legal corpus contains laws 
written in six languages—Amharic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, Russian—and 
translations into English followed one of two processes. The first used a cloud-based API to 
translate laws into English while maintaining the original formatting. I then hired native 
language speakers to improve accuracy by editing the automated translations while side-by-side 
 
15 Missingness may not be random, which may raise concerns about bias in the sample that may threaten inference. 
Anticipating these concerns, I correct for missingness in two ways: (1) through a careful research design, and (2) by 
quantifying how much bias would have to be due to the non-random sample to invalidate inference. As part of my 
analysis in Chapter Four, the Appendix Table 4A contains a discussion of measurement validity. 






referencing the original text. This preferred process was quick and decreased translation costs by 
over 80%. I used a traditional—and also slower and costlier—process when the API did not 
support the original language, or the document was not machine-readable. Here, native language 
speakers translated legal documents directly into English. All five native language speakers were 
North American doctoral students at three research universities. 
Table 2.4: Summary of International Legal Corpus 
 EAC Members Full Sample 
Number of Countries 6 17 
Laws Coded 72 285 
Laws Coded per Country (avg.) 12.0 16.8 
Range (years) 1888 to 2019 1872 to 2019 
Total Pages 4,737 (~65 pages/law) 22,863 (~80 pages/law) 
Number of Sections (avg.) 81.9 99.3 
Number of Schedules (avg.) 2.5 2.1 
Delay between Assent and Commencement (avg.) 29.5 days 64.9 days 
New, Non-Amending Statutes 21 of 72 (29%) 82 of 285 (28%) 
 
 The legal corpus includes 285 laws enacted by 17 countries between 1872 and 2019. Table 
2.4 summarizes the corpus for the EAC countries and the full sample with a bibliography of all 
285 coded laws in the Appendix. Systematically coding the laws required over 567 person-hours. 
The process began by reading a law and identifying the portions of the text that appeared 
relevant to the coding protocol. I conducted this initial reading and identification exclusively in 
electronic form. I then reread the document giving increased attention to the relevant portions. 
During this second reading, I referenced the text in electronic form and I used a hardcopy coding 
sheet to cite which blocks of text—e.g., article, section, and paragraph numbers—discussed each 
item in the coding protocol. Coding sheets also captured metadata, including length (number of 
sections and schedules), whether a preamble justified its existence, if the law added, amended, or 
removed a preexisting law, and finally assentation and commencement dates. By default, I coded 






amendment. Each coding sheet represents a piece of a regulatory regime and provides 
information regarding which provisions the law adds to the legal institution and for what years. 
 I followed this systematic process and coded one country at a time. This focus allowed me 
to familiarize myself with a country’s legal writing style. Further, I coded laws in the order that 
they contributed to the country’s legal institution, but I coded all amended versions of a law 
before moving to the next. Like acclimating to a country’s writing style, consecutively coding 
the amended versions of each law allowed me to familiarize myself with the legal jargon 
particular to one law. This sequencing technique caused me to be more alert to changes in the 
text from one version to another. After coding a country’s entire legal corpus, I transformed 
hardcopy coding sheets into digitized data using a Qualtrics survey to minimize errors during 
digitization. The survey collected metadata for each statute including length (e.g., number of 
sections), critical dates (e.g., when the government enacted/passed, enforced/commenced, and 
replaced/amended the legislation), and how it changed the legal institution (e.g., whether it 
added, replaced, or amended other statutes). The final result is a rectangular dataset where each 
row represents a coding sheet, and each column is a field from the coding sheet. 
Institutional Analysis: The Grammar of Institutions 
 This final section reviews the ADICO syntax and explains how I used it to transform the 
matrix typology (illustrated in full detail in Chapter Four) into a 58-item coding protocol. 
Institutionalists often cite the grammar of institutions—often referred to as the ADICO syntax—
to differentiate three types of institutional statements: rules, norms, and shared strategies. But as 
S. E. S. Crawford and E. Ostrom (2005, p. 140) explain, the ADICO syntax is a powerful tool of 






expressed in natural language, they can be rewritten or summarized in the ADICO format” and 
allows analysts to “compare the institutional statements in use in a variety of settings.” By 
facilitating a rigorous comparison of laws from different countries over a long period, the 
ADICO syntax helps produce the original data necessary to study why and how governments 
regulate CSOs. In this work specifically, I use the ADICO syntax to transform the legal 
provisions that scholars discuss in research and standardize them into a 58-item coding protocol 
that I then use to inventory my legal corpus (see Chapter Four).  
Reviewing the ADICO Syntax 
 An institutional statement rewritten using the syntax is a concatenation of five components: 
[ATTRIBUTE][DEONTIC][AIM][CONDITIONS][OR ELSE]. Only if all five components are 
present is an institutional statement a rule. If statements are missing an institutionally assigned 
consequence for not following a rule (O) then it is a norm. If statements also omit an obligation 
on behavior (D) then it is a shared strategy.  
(A)  attribute identifies to whom the institutional statement applies, and if no attributes 
are named then the default assumption is all members of the group;  
(D)  deontic identifies the expectation of behavior identified by the qualifiers ‘may’ 
(permitted), ‘must’ (obliged), and ‘must not’ (forbidden);  
(I)  aim, specifies the particular action or outcome prescribed, or actions or outcomes 
that are forbidden;  
(C)  conditions, explain when and where the institutional statement applies, and if no 
conditions exist then the default assumption is it applies to all persons, at all times 
and all places, under all circumstances;  
(O)  or else, institutionally assigned sanction for noncompliance. This component must 
have three qualifications: (i) sanctioning provision is the result of an explicit 
collective-choice decision that separate from any internal or social penalty, (ii) be 
backed by at least one other institutional statement that if noncompliance occurs 
changes the DEONTIC assigned to some AIM for at least one actor, and (iii) affect 
the constraints and opportunities of actors responsible for monitoring the 






Table 2.5: Examples of Institutional Statements Rewritten in the ADICO Syntax 
 Example 1: 
If you use the 
microwave, you 
must clean up 
your own mess! 
Example 2: 
Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Example 3: 
Any society which is aggrieved by the 
Registrar’s refusal to register it, or by his 
cancelling or suspending its registration 
under section 12 of this Act, may, with a 
period of twenty-one days, or such extended 
period as the Minister in any particular case 
may allow, from the date of the refusal, 
cancellation or suspension, appeal to the 
Minister against the refusal, cancellation or 
suspension, and, where the society does so 
and is not a society of one of the kinds 
specified in paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of 
the proviso to section 4(1) of this Act, it shall 
not, pending the decision to appeal, be an 





“the United States government” 
“registered societies and individuals wishing 
to register a society” 
(D) 
“must” / 
“forbidden to not” 
“must not” / “forbidden to” “may” 
(I) 
“clean the mess 
you made in the 
microwave” 
“enact legislation favoring any one 
religion, limit expressing ideas 
through speech or press, gathering as 
private voluntary associations or as 
groups to protest, practicing religious 
beliefs.” 
“appeal a decision refusing to register an 
informal CSO or affecting the legal status of 
a registered society” 
(C) 
“all users under all 
circumstances” 
“all U.S. governments and their 
entities under all circumstances” 




“the law conflicts with the 
Constitution and the law is 
challengeable/null per the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution of the 
United States (Article VI, Clause 2)” 
“accept the Minister’s original decision” 
Example 1 used by Crawford and Ostrom (2005, p. 139). Example 2 is the First Amendment (Amendment I) to 
the United States Constitution. Example 3 is § 15 the Societies Act 1968 (Kenya) that was later amended by Statute 
Law (Repeals and Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1997 (pages 897-899).  
 Table 2.5 contains examples of institutional statements in their natural language and 
rewritten in the ADICO syntax. The simple example regulates the behavior of a shared 
microwave, the one in the middle is the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Both 
explicitly identify to whom the statements apply, set expectations of behavior, and discuss 
particular actions or outcomes. Neither identifies conditions under which they apply; therefore, 






omit an explicit sanction for noncompliance, only the first is reduced to a norm. A strict 
interpretation of the syntax might conclude the First Amendment is a norm if one did not know it 
was part of a broader legal institution. It is a rule because other rules back it—e.g., the 
Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2)—that allows unconstitutional legislation to be 
challenged or voided.  
 Many laws contain legal language requiring action that was the opposite of the rules in the 
coding protocol. This means the legalese addressed the same action or outcome (AIM) as the 
coding protocol but with an inverted expected behavior (DEONTIC). The ADICO syntax adeptly 
handles these situations that might otherwise frustrate simpler coding instruments. Institutional 
statements easily transform into their negation by manipulating the DEONTIC operator. As 
Crawford and Ostrom (2005, p. 143) explain, the three DEONTIC operators—permitted/may, 
obliged/must, forbidden/must not—have interdefinability and if one is taken as the initial starting 
point, or the primitive, then the others can be defined in terms of that primitive.17 This typically 
 
17 Crawford and Ostrom (2005, p. 143) explain the DEONTIC operators are interdefinable and if one is taken as the 
initial starting point, or the primitive, then the others can be defined in terms of that primitive. For example, let us use 
P as a primitive, initial starting point. If referring to a permitted action [ai], then [P][ai] would be read: an actor may 
do ai. The statement that an act is forbidden [F][ai] can be restated using P as the primitive as [∼P][ai]. Because [F][ai] 
and [∼P][ai] are equivalent, both would be read: an actor may not do ai. On the other hand, if the negation of an action 
[∼ai] is forbidden, one is obliged to take the action. The statement that an act must be done, [O][ai], can be defined as 
[∼P][∼ai] and be read as: an actor may not not do ai. If an action is obligatory, one is not permitted to not do [ai]. 
Alternatively, F can be the primitive. Then, P can be defined as [∼F][ai] and O can be defined as [F][∼ai]. With O as 
the primitive, P can be defined as [∼O][ai or ∼ai], while F can be defined as [O][∼ai]. This same interdefinability 
exists for prescriptions that refer to outcomes instead of actions. Any prescriptions with a DEONTIC assigned to some 
OUTCOME, oi, can be restated using either of the other two DEONTIC operators: 
• [P] = permitted/may; [F] = forbidden/may not; [O] = obliged/must 
• [~P] = ~permitted/may not/forbidden; [~F] = ~forbidden/may/permitted; [~O] = ~obliged/may/needn’t 
• [P][ai] is read as: an actor may do ai. 
• [F][ai] is read as an actor is forbidden to do ai, and is equivalent to [∼P][ai] an actor may not do ai. 
• [O][ai] an actor is obliged to do ai, is equivalent to [∼P][∼ai] an actor may not not do ai. 
• [P][ai] is equivalent to [∼F][ai] an actor is not forbidden to do ai. 






involves taking the negation (~) of the operator. For example, ~[permitted/may] is equivalent to 
[forbidden/may not]. Negating the DEONTIC operator in this way flips the sign on the assigned 
value in the coding protocol: ~[-1] is equivalent to +1, and ~[+1] becomes -1. 
 The third example in Table 2.5 demonstrates how effortlessly the ADICO syntax avoids 
coding conflicts using a negated DEONTIC. The example in Table 2.5 cites Kenya’s Societies 
Act (§ 15, 1968), which gives a particular CSO legal form the ability to appeal registration 
decisions handed down to it from the regulator. The article’s legalese is 114 words long and 
contains all five components of the ADICO syntax. This example relates to the coding-protocol 
item read as all CSOs are forbidden to appeal a registration denial or a deregistration order 
after such a decision has been communicated or else face a noncompliance sanction.18 In 
simpler words, the coding-protocol item is a restrictive provision that denies CSOs the ability to 
appeal a regulator’s unfavorable decision. Numerically, this restrictive provision carries a value 
of -1. This situation would frustrate simpler coding protocols for the following reasons. First, the 
Societies Act § 15 is a permissive provision that gives CSOs the right to appeal. Second, the 
coding protocol is specifically coding for a restrictive provision that denies CSOs the right to 
appeal. Thus, a rigid coding protocol may code this as 0 or N/A because the restrictive provision 
in the coding protocol does not appear in the law. Yet, Article 15 unquestionably contains 
language related to appealing deregistration decisions. The ADICO syntax is unphased by legal 
language that does not perfectly match the protocol item. In this case, Article 15’s explicit 
positive right to appeal these decisions simply negates the DEONTIC operator and flips the sign 
 
18 The protocol item appears in the AIDCO syntax as: [CSOs][Forbidden][appeal registration denial or deregistration 






of the coded value this way: ~[-1] becomes +1. The negated DEONTIC momentarily causes the 
protocol item to appear as: 
[CSOs][~F][appeal registration denial or deregistration order][after such a 
decision has been communicated][or else face noncompliance sanction].19  
       
ADICO Syntax as a Method: Examples from Recent Research   
 The usefulness of institutional statements is widely recognized, but the direct application of 
the ADICO syntax in empirical research is generally limited to analyses of fewer than a dozen 
documents. Basurto, Kingsley, McQueen, Smith, and Weible (2010) studied only four regulatory 
documents governing aquaculture practice in Colorado and found those documents contained 
346 institutional statements. Then, to study the composition of policy change, Weible and Carter 
(2015) used the syntax to compare Colorado’s 1977 and 2006 smoking bans, which included 38 
and 62 institutional statements, respectively. Additional applications have studied five climate 
change laws in Japan and the Republic of Korea (Mi Sun & Yeo-Chang, 2013), compared ten 
city charters for statements structuring mayoral powers (Feiock et al., 2016), surveyed the United 
Way Worldwide’s global membership rules (Siddiki & Lupton, 2016), and been used to 
understand the behavior of individuals participating in ecological restoration in Chicago and 
cyclists competing in the Tour de France (Fink & Smith, 2012; Watkins & Westphal, 2016).  
 Though the volume of institutional statements generated by these studies is massive, the 
rigor of the syntax leads to intercoder reliability scores that typically range between 85-95% 
across studies (Siddiki, Weible, Basurto, & Calanni, 2011, p. 91). It is worth noting that this 
convergence is among studies using an inductive, open-ended approach. I argue it is reasonable 
 
19 This ADICO syntax can be read as all CSOs are not forbidden to appeal a registration denial or a deregistration 






to expect that a semi-structured protocol that codes for a predetermined set of statements will 
have at least similar and perhaps higher intercoder reliability. In summary, researchers attest that 
the “strength of [the ADICO syntax] approach is the systematic and explicit recognition that 
institutional statements can be coded as small, single units of observation and aggregated into 
broader units of analysis” and argue “Crawford and Ostrom’s grammatical syntax can serve as a 
useful analytical tool to understand complex policy issues” (Basurto et al., 2010, p. 536).  
ADICO Syntax as a Method: Application to CSO Laws 
 In Chapter Four, I detail the three-step process that created the matrix-typology that is the 
primary input for my coding protocol. In that process, I first reviewed research studying CSO 
laws and identified that analysts discuss over 50 different legal provisions. Next, I organized 
those provisions into four broad subgroups: governance, formation, operations, and resources 
provisions. Lastly, I used theory to identify each legal provision as either permissive or 
restrictive. This theory-driven identification dichotomized the mutually exclusive subgroups and 
created a matrix typology of 58 legal provisions analysts discuss when studying CSO laws. Then, 
the ADICO syntax standardized those provisions to develop a disciplined 58-item protocol that I 
used to code the legal corpus systematically.  
 My choice to use “CSO” as the ATTRIBUTE is intentional as it identifies to whom the 
institutional statement applies and avoids definitional conflicts. To be concrete, replacing the 
term with “NGOs” or “501(c)(4)s” would considerably narrow the coding protocol’s scope and 
steer it away from legal entities relevant to this study. And replacing it with a broader term—e.g., 
“organizations”—would stretch its scope and lead the protocol to consider legal provisions 






Table 2.6: Standardizing Natural Language Legal Provisions with the ADICO Syntax 
Provision in Scholarship Provision in Natural Language Provision in ADICO Syntax 
“In 2008, Jordan enacted a new Law of 
Societies that requires any NGO seeking 
to receive foreign funding to obtain 
approval from the Jordanian cabinet and 
inform officials of the funding source, 
amount, and intended purpose” 
(Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014: 8). 
Ex-ante approval from the 
government required for foreign 
funding is restrictive. 
[CSOs][must][acquire one-time 
approval to receive foreign 
funding that is separate from 
formal registration][if the law is 
enacted][or else it cannot receive 
those resources without facing 
penalty for noncompliance]. 
 
(-1 = restrictive) 
“Foreign funding prohibited [in Oman]” 
(Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016: Table 
2). 
Prohibiting foreign funding is 
restrictive. 
[CSOs][forbidden to][receive 
any foreign funding under any 
circumstances][if the law is 
enacted][or else face penalty for 
noncompliance] 
 
(-1 = restrictive) 
“Explicit [financial] transparency 
requirements can provide additional 
assurance that organizations are operating 
in a way that is consistent with public 
expectations” (Salamon and Toepler 
2000: 6). 
“Reporting requirements [required in 
Bhutan, Burundi, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Sierra Leone, Uganda,]” (Dupuy, Ron, 
and Prakash 2016: Table 2). 
Requiring organizations to be 
financially transparent so that 
profiteers do not abuse the legal 
form is permissive. 
[CSOs][must][report their 
finances for public access][if the 
law is enacted][or else face 
penalty for non-compliance]. 
 
(+1 = permissive) 
  
 Table 2.6 demonstrates the process for standardizing three legal provisions into the ADICO 
syntax for use in the coding protocol. The first two rows are straightforward, but the final row 
shows the methodological value of the ADICO syntax. Salamon and Toepler (2000a, p. 6) 
discuss financial transparency as permissive provisions used as a means to protect CSOs and 
society from abusing the legal form’s tax privileges. Dupuy and colleagues (2016, p. 311), by 
contrast, discuss “reporting requirements” as one of the many illiberal restrictive provisions 
governments use to restrict foreign aid. The same coding-protocol item handles both versions of 
the reporting requirement due to the specificity of the particular action or outcome prescribed, or 






permissive. But when the reporting requirement exists but does not explicitly grant the public 







COVENANTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND DISTINCT LAW TYPES: A CROSS-NATIONAL & 
GLOBAL ANALYSIS1 
 To understand how and why governments regulate CSOs, we must understand the 
conditions under which governments change their CSO regulatory regimes—specifically, which 
factors reliably predict enactment across countries. Existing work has begun to do this by 
focusing on regime type and electoral contestation as factors associated with governments 
enacting legal provisions restricting foreign funding to CSOs. Thirty-nine countries enacted 
restrictive foreign financing laws between 1993 and 2012 (Dupuy et al., 2016). Figure 3.1 shows 
the countries that have enacted restrictive foreign funding laws relative to their levels of 
democracy and freedom. The data show a strong correlation between authoritarianism and 
enactment, which accords with the conventional argument that authoritarian regimes are more 
likely to restrict CSOs than are democracies. Yet, the data also show several cases that violate 
the conventional explanation: democracies and hybrid regimes enact these laws.  
 This figure raises two questions. First, it appears regime type is strongly associated with 
CSO foreign funding restrictions, but what particular legal institutions affect enacting these 
provisions? This institutional context is crucial because it represents factors—separate from 
regime type—that accelerate or decelerate the enactment of illiberal legal provisions. In this 
chapter, I show that when controlling for other factors, countries that have made global 
commitments to safeguard civil and political human rights and whose constitutional rules 
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in 2019 as: “Covenants, Constitutions, and Distinct Law Types: 
Investigating Governments’ Restrictions on CSOs Using an Institutional Approach” in VOLUNTAS: International 






demand those commitments be honored are less likely to enact restrictive provisions. This 
chapter examines this issue globally, looking at restrictions across almost 140 countries.  
Figure 3.1: Enactment of “More Restrictive” Foreign Funding Laws 
 
Figure shows the enactment of restrictive foreign funding laws by year (x-axis) and level of democracy (y-axis). Solid 
shapes identify the year a country enacts its restrictive law, and hollow shapes identify countries that enacted a second 
law during the analysis period—i.e., Belarus (2001,2003), Indonesia (2004, 2008), Uzbekistan (2003, 2004). 
Background shows country-year values of nearly 100 additional countries that did not enact laws. Sources “Hands Off 
My Regime!” (Dupuy et al. 2016: Table 1); Values of Democracy (V-Dem); Freedom House. 
 Second, the observation that countries of all regime types and freedom levels enact funding 
restrictions calls in to question whether these provisions are actually all the same and if a sounder 
conceptualization is to disaggregate the category logically. Thus, in addition to examining the 
possibilities of institutional path dependencies, this chapter also challenges the notion that all 






restrictive—such as Oman (2000) categorically prohibiting foreign funding versus Pakistan 
(2003) or Uruguay (2004) merely requiring ex-post notification or accounting requirements—are 
conceptually different and therefore are enacted under different circumstances. I demonstrate this 
is the case by showing the legal provisions that restrict CSOs differently are predicted by 
different factors. This finding informs subsequent chapters, in that it beckons the need to 
disaggregate CSO laws into their elemental legal provisions to understand CSO regulatory 
regimes and their complexity in full. Together, these findings inform my typology of provisions 
developed in Chapter Four and the analyses of a regional set of countries and global hegemons in 
Chapter Five. 
 To preview, this chapter asks first, do preexisting institutions affect the enactment of 
restrictive laws? Second, do the political factors that predict the enactment of highly-restrictive 
laws also predict the enactment of moderately- and minimally-restrictive ones? I examine these 
questions using a form of event history analysis known as competing risk models (CRMs) to 
gain refined estimates on how different factors—such as the level of democracy, ideology with 
superpowers in the United Nations, preexisting institutions, and organized civil society 
activity—relate to the enactment of particular laws. The models analyze a sample of 138 




2 Belize and Vietnam are not analyzed because they are not coded in several datasets. These countries adopted laws 






Path Dependence in the Enactment of Regulations Affecting CSOs 
 Under what conditions do preexisting international commitments to safeguard human rights 
upend governments’ attempts to enact CSO laws with illiberal and restrictive legal provisions? 
To answer this question, I scrutinize the institutions that most directly represent these concepts 
because regime type alone is insufficient.  
 Differences in constitutions, international commitments to safeguard civil and political 
rights, and domestic laws affect de facto civil liberties and the organizational ecology of CSOs 
(Salamon & Toepler, 1997; World Bank, 1997; Hathaway, 2002; Elkins et al., 2009). From an 
institutional analysis perspective, constitutions are the ultimate preexisting institution because 
they structure the terms and conditions of governance and establish the boundaries of 
government activity (Buchanan & Tullock, 1961; V. Ostrom, 1997) and inform our 
understanding of how predatory states develop a credible commitment and the state capacity 
necessary to undertake protective and productive roles for society (Buchanan, 1975; Boettke & 
Candela, 2019). Constitutions sit atop a multi-level rulemaking process that determines the 
creation of laws and working rules that affect decision making (Brennan & Buchanan, 1985; E. 
Ostrom, 2005; Cole, 2017). Relevant examples are systems of checks and balances, whether 
ratification of international treaties constrains domestic lawmaking, and power bestowed to the 
executive. At the same time, constitutions affect individuals by creating and maintaining a sense 
of shared identity (Pitkin, 1987; Murphy, 1993; Mutunga, 1999; Breslin, 2009), protecting and 
enforcing property rights conducive to development (North & Weingast, 1989), and 
constitutionalism that guarantees a state’s commitment to “a set of inviolable principles” such as 
freedom of association and religion (Elkins et al., 2014b, p. 38). Studying constitutional 






rules. Although constitutional-level rules change slower than collective-choice or operational-
rules (E. Ostrom & Ostrom, 2004), scholarship on the topic finds the average life expectancy of 
constitutions is only 19 years with a “decline in constitutional life spans after World War II” 
(Elkins et al., 2014b, p. 131).  
At the international level, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) is considered the principal treaty in the area of international human rights (Henkin, 
2000; ICNL, 2009; Kiai, 2012; Donnelly, 2013; ICNL, 2015).3 The ICCPR safeguards the civil 
and political rights of citizens in the majority of countries in the world, with new signatories 
ratifying the agreement each year (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 2018). Article 22(2) 
outlines the limited conditions under which restrictions on association are permissible with 
similar language appearing in several subsequent regional treaties such as Article 16(2) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969), Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981), and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2010). 
International law uses Article 22(2) to establish legal criteria to evaluate the legitimacy of 
laws affecting voluntary association (U.N. Human Rights Committee, 2006, 2007, 2015). A 
three-part test sets a threshold that all rules regulating voluntary association must be:  
1. Prescribed by law that uses sufficiently precise and accessible language; 
2. Established to meet legitimate aims specified by Article 22(2) to include “national 
security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”; and 
3. “Necessary for democracy” in that they meet a pressing social need in a proportional 
manner.  
 
3 The ICCPR protects freedoms of expression and belief (Articles 18, 19, 27), rights to associate and organize (Articles 
1, 18, 21, 22), rule of law and human rights (Articles 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25, 26), and personal autonomy and 






In general, the three-part test suggests that states may regulate (prescribe by law) CSOs to 
perform specific actions in the interests of transparency and accountability (legitimate aims) if 
such requirements are properly scoped to prevent real dangers to democracy (necessary for 
democracy). 
Ratification of the ICCPR provides information concerning when a country makes an 
international commitment to safeguard human rights—i.e., when the pledge becomes a 
preexisting institution. But the strength of that international commitment depends on the status 
constitutional rules give such international commitments. Thus, the preexisting institution is 
most influential when a constitution elevates the ICCPR’s obligations above ordinary legislation.  
Table 3.1 shows the year each country enacted its restrictive law (Law Enacted). It also displays 
the year it enacted its law, whether a country has made a commitment to safeguard civil and 
political rights (Guards Human Rights), and if constitutional rules bolster that commitment by 
awarding it a status superior to ordinary legislation (Constitutional Commitment). Of these 39 
countries, 25 ratified the ICCPR before the start of the observation period, and nine ratified 
during the observation period. But two of those countries, Indonesia and Pakistan, ratified the 
covenant after enacting restrictive laws. In total, 33 countries enacted laws in an institutional 
context that either had no preexisting commitments to promote civil and political rights or had no 























Bhutan 2007 No No Egypt 2002 1982 No 
China 2009 No1 No Somalia 2010 1990 No 
Myanmar  2006 No No Sri Lanka 2005 1980 No 
Oman 2000 No No Sudan 2006 1986 No 
    Thailand 2000 1996 No 
    Tunisia 2011 1969 No* 
Indonesia 2004+ 2006 No TKM 2003 1997 No 
Pakistan 2003 20102 No Somalia 2010 1990 No 
    Uganda 2009 1995 No 
    Ukraine 1999 1973 No 
Afghanistan 2005 1983 No* Uruguay 2004 1970 No 
Angola 2002 1992 No Uzbekistan 2003+ 1995 No 
Belarus 2001+ 1973 No Venezuela 2010 19782 No 
Belize 2003 19962 No Vietnam 2009 1982 No 
Bolivia 2007 1982 No Zimbabwe 2007 1991 No 
Burundi 1999 1990 No     
GNQ 1999 1987 No     
Eritrea 2005 2002 No Algeria 2012 1989 Yes* 
Ethiopia 2009 1993 No Azerbaijan 2004 1992 Yes* 
India 2010 1979 No Benin 2003 1992 Yes 
Jordan 2008 1975 No Cameroon 1999 1984 Yes* 
Nepal 2012 1991 No Ecuador 2011 1969 Yes* 
Sierra Leone 2009 1996 No Rwanda 2012 1975 Yes* 
Table organizes countries into four groups and then sorts alphabetically with Equatorial Guinea (GNQ) and 
Turkmenistan (TKM) shortened for space. Bhutan begins a group that never ratified the ICCPR and did not possess 
constitutional rules making international treaties superior to ordinary legislation at the time of enactment. Indonesia 
and Pakistan ratified the ICCPR after enacting their restrictive law. Afghanistan is the first of 27 countries that ratified 
the ICCPR before enacting a restrictive law. For this group, enactment occurred under constitutional rules that did not 
give international treaties an elevated status. Algeria is one of six countries that ratified the ICCPR and enacted 
restrictive laws under a set of constitutional rules that privilege international treaties. Although 39 countries enacted 
restrictive laws, the models analyze only 37 because Belize and Vietnam are not coded in several datasets. Models 
analyze only initial enactments of the three countries that enacted multiple laws during the analysis period—Belarus 
(2001 & 2003), Indonesia (2004 & 2008), Uzbekistan (2003 & 2004). Sources Dupuy et al. (2016: Table 1); UN 
Office of Legal Affairs; Comparative Constitutions Projects; UN Treaty Collection. 1 Signatory but has not ratified 
the ICCPR and therefore not committed to safeguarding human rights. 2 Reservation made upon ratification. + Denotes 
countries that enacted a similar law in subsequent years. * Denotes variation in the country’s constitutional rule 
regarding treaties before the enactment of the law.     
 Countries that abstained from enactment also changed their institutional contexts during the 
observation period. Of the 101 countries that did not enact restrictive laws, 23 altered their 
constitutional rules regarding international treaties, and 44 ratified the ICCPR during the analysis 
period. Figure 3.2 summarizes the institutional context for all countries in the sample. Abstainers 






integer values express the number of countries that sort into the given institutional context for at 
least one year. Percentage values denote the proportion of country-year observations that match 
the institutional context. The top branch of Figure 3.2 is the institutional arrangement that  
Figure 3.2: Frequencies of Institutional Contexts 
 
Integer values express the number of countries that sort into the given institutional context for at least one year during 
the analysis period (138 countries, 1993-2012). It is possible for a single country to represent multiple institutional 
contexts because ratification status and constitutional rules vary within countries over time. Circle sizes signify the 
proportion of country-year observations that match the given institutional context. The area of the four circles on the 
right is the same as the two in the center, and the one on the left. Sources Dupuy et al. (2016, Table 1); United Nations 
Office of Legal Affairs; Comparative Constitutions Projects; United Nations Treaty Collection. 
maximizes the effect of the preexisting institutions. The next highest branch is less constraining 





























































or ignore the ICCPR’s commitments. When the ICCPR is not ratified (Figure 3.2, bottom 
branches), the constitutional rules concerning international treaties are inactive because ICCPR 
ratification is absent. 
Constitutions and international treaties are preexisting institutions that shape the 
institutional context that affects lawmaking in several ways. Principally, the enactment of laws or 
policies is commonly an exercise of incremental change rather than significant reordering 
(Lindblom, 1959; Pierson, 2000). Next, preexisting policies provide society with the opportunity 
to form opinions about policy as well as gives lawmakers and bureaucrats experience in 
implementing and adapting objectives to local conditions and preferences (Lowi, 1964, 1972; 
Pierson, 1993, 1994). Finally, understanding policy enactment as part of a link in a historical 
process of institutional change means the enacted law or policy has one of four relationships with 
preexisting institutions: independent, complementary, contingent, or substitute (Mahajan & 
Peterson, 1985). Analytical frameworks of institutional analysis underscore the importance of 
history and show that one period’s policy outcome shapes the rules of future political action 
arena (E. Ostrom, 1990; E. Ostrom & Cox, 2010; E. Ostrom, 2011; Cole, Epstein, & McGinnis, 
2014; McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014).        
For this analysis, constitutions both define the processes of lawmaking and determine the 
degree to which prior commitments constrain future legislation. The former are the rules of 
rulemaking, and the latter are preexisting institutions. The ICCPR is an international treaty 
whose parties accept additional commitments to promote civil and political rights. Once ratified, 
the treaty both modifies current institutions and constrains future attempts to alter the CSO 
regulatory regime. But the strength of the ICCPR’s international commitments as a preexisting 






some give treaties a status that is less than or equal to domestic legislation, and others explicitly 
grant them a status that is superior to ordinary laws. Two institutional hypotheses follow: 
H1A: Making an international commitment to guard civil and political rights decreases the 
probability of enacting a restrictive CSO law. 
H1B: Countries are least likely to enact a restrictive law when (A) a government is bound 
by its international commitment to guard civil and political rights and (B) 
constitutional rules guarantee international commitments by making them superior to 
ordinary legislation. 
 
Are All Restrictions on Foreign Aid to CSOs the Same? 
Many recent studies focus on legal provisions that restrict access to financial resources, 
even though they are just one of several elements of CSO regulatory regimes (Kiai, Stern, 
Simons, Anderson, & Kaguongo, 2017; DeMattee, 2019b). Because more data exists on these 
provisions globally, I also focus only on them in this chapter. Legal experts identify various 
tactics of philanthropic protectionism that restrict the flow of resources to CSOs (Rutzen, 2015) 
such as requiring prior governmental approval, capping the total amount of international funding, 
requiring burdensome reporting, and mandating the routing of foreign funds through state-
controlled financial institutions.  
 With so many provisions restricting foreign aid to CSOs, it is empirically expedient and 
sometimes necessary to classify all laws under the same monolithic group—”restrictive laws”— 
 which suggests there exist only slight differences among them. This practice may be a misstep 
for theoretical and conceptual reasons. Law and policy differences are central to theories that 
explain the enactment and effects of regulation.4 Conceptualizing these more precisely can 
 
4 Policy differences have theoretical implications for the politics and policies streams of the Multiple Stream Approach 
(Kingdon, 1984) where various policies compete in the policy stream, and only proposals that successfully match the 






advance our understanding of the laws that restrict CSOs. Here, I show it is possible to 
consistently categorize distinct law types. Figure 3.3 organizes restrictions on CSOs’ ability to 
access foreign funding from prohibitive (highly-restrictive, left) to notification (minimally-
restrictive, right). The figure provides examples of provisions discussed by scholars (bottom 
row).  
An ordering logic grounded in access to foreign funding is not useful for conceptualizing 
other legal provisions that affect CSOs. For instance, I find analysts regularly discuss four broad 
subgroups of legal provisions: governance, formation, operations, and resources (DeMattee, 
2019b). These subgroups include over 50 distinct provisions including whether organizations 
must meet a defined membership or financial threshold before they can register (e.g., Maru, 
2017, p. 56), or if the government has the discretion to intervene and dissolve an organization 
unilaterally (e.g., Mayhew, 2005, pp. 745-746). The breadth of these legal provisions requires 
alternative logics to accommodate consistency in our conceptualizations. International law 
provides one alternative. Here, the three-part test organizes law types from highly-restrictive and 
illegitimate to minimally-restrictive and contestable (Figure 3.3, second row). Transaction costs 
are another conceptualization logic (Salamon & Toepler, 2000a, 2012). Laws that impose 
debilitating transaction costs are predatory (highly-restrictive), while less restrictive laws may be 
 
the theoretical lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993), strong, established 
interests in the policy subsystem make enactment of substantial policy changes less likely. Only in disequilibrium are 
entrenched players unable to railroad massive policy changes. In the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (Sabatier, 1988; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007), policies that are an affront to a coalition’s belief systems 
are met with stiff resistance whereas minor changes may be the result of a cross-coalitional learning or the negotiated 
outcome of the dialogue with policymakers. While the above theories predict differences in policies affect 
policymaking, policy differences are shown to have different effects on public and elite opinion and the social 
construction of target groups (Ingram & Schneider, 1990, 1991; Schneider, Ingram, & deLeon, 2014) and affect the 






either inefficient or prescriptive. The three logics use different criteria but produce a consistent 
categorization of restrictions on CSOs’ ability to access foreign funding.    
Figure 3.3: Continuum of Restrictive Laws, Regulations, and Policies 
 
Sources Salamon and Toepler (1997); World Bank (1997); Kameri-Mbote (2002); Mayhew (2005); Gershman and 
Allen (2006); Tiwana and Belay (2010); Christensen and Weinstein (2013); Hodenfield and Pegus (2013); Carothers 
and Brechenmacher (2014); Rutzen (2015); Wolff and Poppe (2015); Chikoto-Schultz and Uzochukwu (2016); Dupuy 
et al. (2016); Appe and Marchesini da Costa (2017); Dupuy and Prakash (2017); Gugerty (2017); Maru (2017); Sidel 
(2017); Cunningham (2018). 
Readers may disagree with the ordering of these provisions along the continuums of 
restrictiveness, illegitimacy, or transaction costs. And others may still propose more useful 
categorizations as prior attempts to classify laws, policies, and regulations have shown (e.g., 
Lowi, 1964, 1972; Gormley, 1986; Salamon, 2002). The significant point on which I hope many 
agree is that the broad category of restrictive laws is not monolithic, and theory predicts these 
differences have consequences for research analyzing enactment.  
•Caps on funding; 
•Must not exceed threshold of budget 
spent on overhead; 
•Must pay taxes on unrelated business 
activities;
•Must provide an annual report of 
financial flows;
•CSOs must follow reporting require-
ments;
•Taxation of foreign funding.
Highly Moderately Minimally
Restrictions on CSOs’ 
ability to access foreign 
funding. 
Prohibitive Laws
Contain strong language forbidding 
certain organizational activities.
Red-tape Laws 
Erect ex-ante conditions organizations 
must meet before receiving funds.
Notification Laws 
Impose ex-post instructions for what 
organizations must do after receiving 
foreign funding.
Illegitimacy according 
to international law’s 
three-part test (Article 
22(2) of the ICCPR).
Provisions limiting 
access to foreign fund-
ing according to ana-
lysts. Provisions 
sorted from highly- to 
minimally-restrictive.
Transaction costs im-
posed on CSOs 
(Salamon and Toepler 
2000; 2012). 
•Foreign funding prohibited;
•Certain CSOs forbidden to receive 
foreign funds; 
•CSOs cannot operate in a sector if 
they received foreign funds; 
•Restrictions on the source of funds; 
•Stigmatization of foreign funding;
•Restrictions on use of funds.
•CSO allows the government to monitor 
financing agreements and contracts;
•Must route money through government 
financial institution; 
•CSOs must be approved to receive 
funds;
•One-time approval for all future 
transactions;
•Government approval is necessary for 
each transaction.
Illegitimate Laws
Inaccessible or vague, fails to meet 
legitimate aims, or overreaches while 
declaring to meet a pressing social 
need. 
Unnecessary Laws 
Precise and accessible, but does not 
meet legitimate aims, or is unnecessary 
for democracy.
Contestable Laws 
Precise and attempts to meet legitimate 
aims, but the approach is challengable 
as “disproportional” in its attempt to 
protect voluntary association.
Predatory Laws
Make the day-to-day operation of a 
CSO overly difficult or impossible.
Inefficient Laws
Procedural hurdles create uncertainty 
and waste scarce resources, but still 
allow CSOs to operate at suboptimal 
levels.
Prescriptive Laws
Required actions drain organizational 
resources but are predictable and can 







Two sets of hypotheses follow. One tests the conceptual equivalence of laws, and the other 
evaluates their conceptual distinctness. If laws are conceptually equivalent, then the factors that 
predict enactment for one type of law should also predict the enactment of other laws. This 
means the factors believed to be positively associated with the enactment of restrictive laws—
e.g., foreign aid flows, competitive elections, and the degree to which CSOs seek to topple the 
existing political system—should predict the enactment of different laws similarly as indicated 
by the variables’ sign, effect size, and significance. Likewise, factors believed to be negatively 
associated with the enactment of restrictive laws—e.g., higher levels of democracy—should also 
be generally consistent in their sign, size, and significance. Four conceptual-equivalence 
hypotheses follow: 
H2A: Higher levels of overseas development aid increase the probability of enacting 
restrictive laws, and that relationship is generally similar for all restrictive law types.     
H2B: The context of electoral competition increases the probability of enacting restrictive 
laws, and that relationship is generally similar for all restrictive law types. 
H2C: Higher levels of organized opposition by CSOs to the current political system 
increases the probability of enacting restrictive laws, and that relationship is generally 
similar for all restrictive law types. 
H2D: Higher levels of democracy decrease the probability of enacting restrictive laws, and 
that relationship is generally similar for all restrictive law types.  
 
The second set of conceptual hypotheses proposes the predictive power of individual factors 
varies across law types. At least four types of variation may exist that signal conceptual 
distinctness. First, a factor can increase the probability of enacting highly-restrictive laws, but the 
effect wanes for less restrictive types. Research discusses Russia as possessing highly-restrictive 
CSO laws (Benevolenski & Toepler, 2017; Toepler et al., 2019), therefore, a shared ideology 
with Russia—as measured by voting alignment in the UN General Assembly—should increase 






Second, a factor may decrease the probability of enacting highly-restrictive laws but also 
increase the probability of enacting minimally-restrictive ones. Although CSOs may lobby to 
dissuade lawmakers from enacting laws that harm the sector’s organizational ecology, this 
relationship is likely too weak to identify in the data because lawmakers likely excluded CSOs 
when such laws are under consideration. CSOs may support minimally-restrictive laws, however, 
to establish ‘reasonable regulation’ that promotes trust, accountability, and transparency. 
Therefore, greater participation by CSOs in the lawmaking process increases the probability of 
enacting minimally-restrictive. 
Third, a factor may decrease the probability of enacting highly-restrictive laws, but the 
effect wanes for less restrictive types. The institutional arrangement of treaties and constitutions 
discussed in H1B is expected to exhibit this behavior because, according to international law’s 
three-part test, countries can prescribe by law actions in the interests of legitimate aims if such 
requirements are properly scoped and necessary for democracy. The presence of this particular 
institutional arrangement decreases the probability of enacting rightly-restrictive laws that do not 
meet the three-part test. 
Finally, a factor may increase the probability of enacting minimally-restrictive laws, but be 
unrelated to the enactment of more restrictive types. Research discusses the United States as 
possessing a legal approach that supports CSOs (Salamon & Toepler, 1997; Barber & Farwell, 
2017), but its tax code contains provisions that may be characterized as minimally-restrictive. 
For example, its laws require CSOs to file tax forms if they wish to be formal tax-exempt 
organizations, and 501(c)(3)s must pay taxes revenue earned through activities that are unrelated 






voting alignment in the UN General Assembly—increases the probability of enacting minimally-
restrictive laws. Four conceptual-distinctness hypotheses follow: 
H3A: Greater voting alignment with Russia in the UN General Assembly increases the 
probability of enacting highly-restrictive laws. 
H3B: Greater participation by CSOs in the lawmaking process increases the probability of 
enacting minimally-restrictive laws. 
H3C: The institutional arrangement that minimizes the probability of enactment is one that 
(A) a government is bound by its international commitment to guard civil and 
political rights and (B) constitutional rules guarantee international commitments by 
making them superior to ordinary legislation, decreases the probability of enacting 
highly-restrictive laws, but this relationship wanes or vanishes for moderately- and 
minimally-restrictive types. 
H3D: Greater voting alignment with the US in the UN General Assembly increases the 
probability of enacting minimally-restrictive laws.   
 
Methods & Data 
 This study uses competing risk models (CRMs), which are a type of event history analysis 
that assesses the degree to which explanatory variables have consistent or inconsistent 
relationships with different type-specific outcomes (for review see Jones, 1994; Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004a, pp. 155-182; Allison, 2014, pp. 53-66). A logit model acts as the 
primary modeling strategy, and two additional methods act as robustness checks. The first is a 
Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972, 1975). This model is appropriate because 
preliminary testing showed the proportional-hazards assumption holds for some laws but not 
others, which requires the incorporation of time-varying coefficients. The second robustness 
check concerns rare events. The data show that 37 of 138 countries enacted a law between 1993 
and 2012. For some, these laws represent only 37 country-year ‘events’ among nearly 2,400 
‘non-events’ (approximately 1.5%), making them rare events because there are “dozens to 






software corrections are unavailable,5 methodologists prescribe specific data collection and 
sampling strategies to minimize bias (King & Zeng, 2001, pp. 141-143).6  
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is the enactment of a law that restricts foreign aid to CSOs. In the 
first analysis, the variable is coded as 0 and changes to 1 if a countryi enacts the law at time t. 
This pooled approach is typical for most of the literature on this topic, and I use it here to test the 
institutional hypotheses (H1A and H1B). Three countries enacted multiple laws during the 
analysis period,7 but specifications here analyze only initial enactments. While losing these 
country-year observations that occur before these subsequent enactments is statistically 
inefficient, doing so allows for consistent estimation of factors that predict the enactment of 
initial laws without having to model the effects of initial enactments on later enactments.  
In the CRM analyses, the coding of the dependent variable depends on the law type. Testing 
the conceptual hypotheses (H2A-D and H3A-D) requires recoding the dependent variable for 
each CRM. In these models, the content of enacted laws determines their values.8 Prohibitive 
Laws are highly-restrictive and contain strong language regarding what organizations cannot do.9 
 
5 Statistical software corrections—such as relogit or firthlogit in Stata 15—for analyzing rare events with logistic 
regressions are not yet available for panel data or analyzes requiring clustered standard errors. 
6 This involves first collecting all the ‘events’ and an equal number of randomly selected ‘non-events,’ and continuing 
to add randomly sampled non-events and stop when the confidence intervals are sufficiently small for the substantive 
purposes at hand. In the rare events analysis, countries that adopt laws appear in all analyses (482 country-year 
observations). 
7 Belarus (2001, 2003); Indonesia (2004, 2008); and Uzbekistan (2003, 2004). 
8 Legal content provided by Dupuy et al. (2016, p. Appendix Table 3). 
9 The variable takes the value of 1 if at least one of the following nine provisions exist: “certain organizations are 
prohibited from receiving foreign funding”; “certain types of organizations are prohibited from receiving foreign 
funding”; “foreign funded organizations prohibited from carrying out particular activities”; “foreign funding can be 
used only for certain purposes”; “foreign funding prohibited”; “foreign funding prohibited for certain activities”; 
“foreign-funded NGOs prohibited from working on certain issue areas”; “foreign-funded organizations prohibited 






The coding protocol identified laws as prohibitive/highly-restrictive if the description of the legal 
restriction included forms of the qualifier “prohibited.” The dependent variable equals 1 if a 
country enacts a law that year and that law is coded as prohibitive, 0 if a country enacts a law in 
that year, but the law is not prohibitive, and 0 if the country does not enact a law in that year.  
Coding for red-tape and notification laws follows the same protocol. Red-tape Laws are 
moderately-restrictive and communicate ex-ante conditions that organizations must meet before 
receiving funds.10 The protocol coded laws as red-tape/moderately-restrictive if the description 
of the law included variations on terms “restrictions on,” “required to,” and “approval for.” This 
category also includes laws that require “government monitoring of contracts” (i.e., Ecuador 
2011) because foreign funding is allowed given the ex-ante condition. The variable equals 1 if a 
country enacts a law that year and that law is a red-tape type, and 0 otherwise. Notification Laws 
are minimally-restrictive and include instructions for what organizations must do after receiving 
foreign funding.11 The protocol uses terms such as “notification,” “reporting,” and “taxation” to 
code notification/minimally-restrictive laws. The variable equals 1 if a country enacts a law in 
that year and that law is a notification type, and 0 otherwise.      
 
10 The variable equals 1 if at least one of the following twelve provisions exist: “government approval for foreign 
funding”; “government approval required for particular uses of foreign funding”; “government may cap the 
amount”; “government monitoring of NGO contracts financed with foreign funding”; “government restrictions on 
use and source”; “government restrictions on whether foreign funding can be received”; “other restrictions on use 
of foreign funding”; “requirements for how organizations can receive foreign funding”; “restrictions on certain types 
of organizations receiving foreign funding”; “restrictions on receipt and use of foreign funding”; “restrictions on 
sources from which foreign funding can be acquired”; “restrictions on use of foreign funding”. 
11 The variable equals 1 if at least one of the following six provisions exist: “foreign funds are taxed”; “government 
notification of foreign funding required”; “organizations must report source of revenues”; “reporting and accounting 







 This analysis uses the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) that provides data for 201 
countries from 1789-2018 (Coppedge et al., 2018), to include as many countries as possible in 
the analysis. Data are added from other sources as necessary. The UN Office of Legal Affairs 
and the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) provide data to test hypotheses H1A and H1B, 
which assess the path dependence of restrictive legal provisions. The former provides 
information on a country’s support for human rights, specifically whether and when a country 
ratifies the ICCPR. For each country-year observation, International Commitment to Guard Civil 
and Political Rights (Commitment to Guard Human Rights for short) is operationalized as 1 if 
the country ratified the ICCPR human rights treaty, and 0 if it did not. The CCP provides 
constitutional texts for 214 independent countries from 1789 thru 2013 (Elkins et al., 2014b). 
Constitutional Rules Strengthen International Commitments (Constitution Bolsters Commitments 
for short) is operationalized as 1 for all constitutional systems that explicitly states international 
treaties are superior to ordinary legislation. The variable equals 0 if the constitution does not 
mention international treaties or gives them a status equal or inferior status to ordinary 
legislation. Executive Power measures the powers given to the country’s chief executive and 
follows the working paper on the constitutional boundaries of executive lawmaking (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, & Melton, 2012; Elkins et al., 2014b). The variable ranges from 0-7 with higher 
values indicating more constitutional powers entrusted to the chief executive.12 Analyses do not 
lag institutional variables because they frame the institutional context in the current year.   
 
12 Operationally, the additive index increases by 1 for each of the following binary variables present in the 
constitutional system as identified by CCP: (i) power to initiate legislation (coded 1 if head of state, head of 






The models lag all control variables discussed below. Electoral Competition measures 
whether elections to fill chief executive offices and the legislative body are characterized by 
uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition 
to gain power (Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 299). The variable equals 1 when electoral competition 
exists. This operationalization differs from others that use the National Elections Across 
Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 2012), which provides 
information on all national elections from 1945-2012. The NELDA dataset does not contain 
information for years that did not experience national elections. Thus, I use the V-Dem variable 
to achieve a consistent measure of electoral competition for election and non-election years. 
The World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018) provide country-year data for 
population, GDP (constant 2010 US$), and the net official development assistance received 
(constant 2014 US$). Following the practice of prior scholarship, this analysis removes countries 
with GDP per capita exceeding $12,615 throughout the observation period (Dupuy et al., 2016, 
p. 9). Net ODA is divided by the total population to normalize ODA on a per capita basis. Zero 
and negative ODA per capita values are set to $0.01 before transforming the variable with a 
natural log function to achieve a normal distribution. Multiplying ln(Net ODA per capita) and 
 
government can issue decrees); (iii) power to declare emergencies (coded 1 if head of state, head of government, or 
government can declare emergencies); (iv) power to propose amendments (coded 1 if head of state, head of 
government, or government can propose amendments to the constitution); (v) power veto legislation (coded 0 if no 
vetoes are possible or can be overridden by a plurality or majority in the legislature; coded 1 if vetoes are possible but 
require at least 3/5 supermajority of the legislature to override veto); (vi) power to challenge the constitutionality of 
legislation  (coded 1 if head of state, head of government, or government can challenge the constitutionality of 
legislation); (vii) power to dissolve the legislature (coded 1 if head of state, head of government, or government can 






Electoral Competition produces an interaction term that recent research finds relevant for 
explaining the enactment of restrictive laws (Dupuy et al., 2016).13  
 The Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations) is often 
used to measure the vitality of civil society with a country. That data only includes information 
for intergovernmental and international non-government organizations. Scholarship finds both 
local and international non-state actors can affect politics in developing counties by merely 
providing the necessary infrastructure to establish civil society (Stremlau, 1987; Brown, Brown, 
& Desposato, 2008), providing charitable service without political motivations (Frantz, 1987; 
Brass, 2012b), and serving as a catalyst for policy change in an international system (Kajese, 
1987; Keck & Sikkink, 1999). This suggests the role and character of CSOs, from both local and 
international origins, matter more than merely the number of non-state actors in attendance. Two 
variables control for the degree to which CSOs influence lawmaking. CSO Routinely Consulted, 
measures the degree to which policymakers consult major CSOs with higher values representing 
more meaningful consultation (Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 176). CSOs are Anti-System measures 
the level of organized opposition to the current political system with higher values representing 
more muscular anti-system activity (Ibid, p. 178). Both variables were initially collected using 
 
13 Dupuy et al. (2016, p. 304) argue “governments assess the implication of international influences through the lens 
of domestic politics. Government concerns about foreign aid will be magnified during periods of intense political 
challenge.” The authors identify these intense political challenges as competitive elections measured with “three 
indicators from the NELDA dataset: (1) whether the opposition was allowed to participate [NELDA3 variable], (2) 
whether more than one political party was legal [NELDA4], and (3) whether the electoral ballot displayed a choice of 
candidates [NELDA5]. If the answer was ‘yes’ to all three, we coded this binary variable as ‘1’. If not, we coded it as 
‘0’” (p. 308). However, the NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 2012) only includes observations for years in which 
election events occurred. Thus, using NELDA imposes a fourth indicator: whether an election occurred. As an 
example, every United States election since 1946 meets the three-part criteria above, but the USA only appears in the 
NELDA dataset during presidential and midterm elections (i.e., even years). This means the measure conflates (A) 
“countries that undergo an uncompetitive election” with (B) “countries that did not have an election.” The conflation 






ordinal intervals and then converted to a continuous interval using a Bayesian item response 
theory measurement model (Ibid.). 
The Polity2 indicator represents the balance of autocratic and democratic authority in any 
particular regime context (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017, p. 17). Scholars commonly use this 
indicator to control for regime type in cross-national analyses, to limit studies to cases with 
specific profiles of democratic quality, or proxy variables of theoretical interest such as 
institutional effectiveness (Hellwig & Samuels, 2008; Bauerle Danzman, Winecoff, & Oatley, 
2017; Baldwin, Carley, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2019). Unfortunately, the data are only available for 
countries whose populations exceeded 5000,000 in 2006 (Marshall et al., 2017). This population 
cutoff omits small countries such as Belize, which enacted its law in 2003 but only had a 
population of approximately 300,000 in 2006. This analysis instead uses Imputed FH/Polity2 to 
control for regime type to include as many countries as possible. The variable uses Freedom 
House Political Rights and Civil Liberties values, and the original Polity2 variable to impute 
values for countries where Polity data are missing (Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 290). The scale 
ranges from the least democratic (0) to most democratic (10), and methodologists find it has 
better validity and reliability than its component indicators (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005).      
Researchers use UN voting behavior in numerous ways, including to construct measures of 
policy preference similarity between two states (T. L. Chapman, 2009) and test whether foreign 
aid is a reward for UN votes (Morgan, 2018). This analysis uses votes in the UN’s 
multidimensional issue space to triangulate a measure of government ideology that is comparable 
across time. UN votes with the USA (%) and UN votes with Russia (%) are continuous variables 
of all votes during a particular session. The variables range from 0-100 with higher values 






2017). The correlation between these variables is approximately -0.46. A third variable, Regional 
Diffusion, controls for policy diffusion across borders. The variable represents the percentage of 
states within a country’s World Development Indicators regional group (World Bank, 2018) that 
enacted the law type studied as the outcome.        
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) provides data for PTS Average, which measures local 
political terror and unrest (Gibney et al., 2017). PTS provides three separate indicators coded 
from annual human rights reports published by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
and the US Department of State. Each variable is measured on a 5-point scale with higher values 
indicating higher levels of abuse and physical integrity rights violations. In this analysis, the 
control variable averages all PTS scores available for each country in the given year.  
Research shows states’ decisions to violate human rights is negatively related to their 
judicial effectiveness, which is the primary enforcement mechanism of legal obligations at home 
and abroad (Powell & Staton, 2009). Rule of Law Index measures the degree to which laws are 
fairly enforced and to what extent the actions of government officials comply with the law. The 
index is a latent variable that methodologists show is superior to using a single indicator or 
averaging several measures (Linzer & Staton, 2015) and uses a Bayesian factor analysis of 15 
indicators (Coppedge et al., 2018, pp. 235-236). The variable Time represents the number of 
years a country has gone without enacting a law since entering the dataset. To maintain a 
consistent sample, countries always leave the dataset the year they enact any law. But the value 
of the dependent variable for those countries varies according to the competing risk model used.  
The appendix contains a table with descriptive statistics for all variables (Appendix Table 3A). 
The top panel summarizes dependent variables for the 138 cases while the bottom panel 







Results for the first set of hypotheses show that the institutional arrangement that minimizes 
the enactment of restrictive laws is one where a government has made an international 
commitment to safeguarding civil and political rights and whose constitutional rules guarantee 
that global commitment will be honored by making it superior to ordinary legislation. Competing 
risk models related to the second set of hypotheses demonstrate that the factors that predict the 
enactment of one law type do not necessarily predict the enactment of a different type. For 
example, minimally restrictive laws correlate with higher levels of CSOs consultation, whereas 
moderately restrictive ones are predicted by high executive power and context with electoral 
competition. Findings also show laws are more distinct than equivalent. An interpretation of 
these results follows.14   
Results of Institutional Hypotheses using Event History Analysis 
Table 3.2 shows the results of an event history analysis using logistical regression to test the 
institutional hypotheses: first, that the international commitment to safeguarding civil and 
political rights decreases the probability of enacting restrictive laws (H1A). Second, that the 
institutional arrangement that minimizes the probability of enactment is one in which a 
 
14 The discussion of results follow recommended practice and uses marginal effects at the means (AMEs) to summarize 
practical implications of independent and linked interaction variables (Long, 1997; Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Hanmer 
& Ozan Kalkan, 2013; Greenland, 2017; Amrhein, Greenland, & McShane, 2019; Amrhein, Trafimow, & Greenland, 
2019; Wasserstein, Schirm, & Lazar, 2019). This is done because logit models produce coefficients that are difficult 
to interpret or depend on specific values that are inconsistent across cases. The logit models used here produce 
coefficients that represent the direction of the variable’s effect on the probability of enactment but are difficult to 
interpret or odds ratios whose substantive meanings depends on the specific value of the odds before they change 
(Long & Freese, 2014, pp. 228-235). AMEs are direct, interpretable measures that compute the marginal change of 
the factor across all cases in the sample and then calculates an average size of the effect in the sample (Long & Freese, 
2014). The implication for the reader is that numeric values discussed may not appear in the accompanying regression 






government makes an international commitment to safeguarding civil and political rights and 
whose constitutional rules guarantee international commitments are honored by making them 
superior to ordinary legislation (H1B). The baseline specification (model 1) suggests contexts 
with higher values of electoral competition and increased voting alignment with Russia increase 
the probability of enacting restrictive laws. In contrast, higher levels of democracy decrease the 
probability of enactment. Model 2 introduces the international commitment as an independent 
variable and executive power as a control variable. The data suggest that ratification has no 
apparent relationship with enacting restrictive laws. This finding is contrary to the first 
institutional hypothesis that predicts ratification decreases the probability of enactment (H1A). 
However, model 2 omits constitutional rules that condition the status of international treaties. 
Subsequent models (3-5) analyze constitutional differences in various ways. These latter models 
show that constitutional rules that constrain governments and force them to honor international 
commitments decrease the predicted probability of enacting a restrictive law.  
The interaction term specified in model 5 tests the second institutional hypothesis (H2A) that 
argues the institutional arrangement that minimizes the probability a country enacts a restrictive 
law is one where constitutional rules elevate ICCPR ratification commitments above ordinary 
legislation. The interaction term and the main effect have a strong relationship with the predicted 
outcome. Given ICCPR ratification by the average country in the sample, a discrete change in its 
constitutional rules to privilege international commitments decreases the probability of 
enactment by one-half a percentage point (-0.005, p = 0.01). Though the magnitude might seem 
small, the effect is larger than both a standard deviation increase in the level of democracy within 







Table 3.2: Pooled Event History Analysis (EHA) with Logistic Regression 






Rules Institutions Interaction 
(DV: Enacts any law)      
Commitment to Guard Human Rights  0.71  0.59 0.37 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments   -1.46** -1.41** -14.24*** 
Commitment x Constitutional Rules     12.99*** 
Electoral Competition a 1.72* 1.96** 1.71* 1.72* 1.72* 
ln(ODA/cap)a 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.10 
ln(ODAcap) x ElectComp a -0.14 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 
CSO Routinely Consulted a 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.26 
CSOs are Anti-System a -0.14 -0.17 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 
Imputed FH/Polity2 a -0.54*** -0.66*** -0.53*** -0.57*** -0.56*** 
UN votes with USA (%)a -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
UN votes with RUS (%)a 0.04* 0.04+ 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Observations 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 
AIC 350.46 345.89 338.76 339.42 339.78 
BIC 425.63 432.63 425.50 431.94 438.08 
Degrees of Freedom 12 14 14 15 16 
Failure Events 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries in Sample 138 138 138 138 138 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a Denotes one-year lag on variables 
Models ran with Stata 15 with cluster-robust standard errors grouped by unique country IDs. Some controls omitted. 
See Appendix for the full table. 
The data show the effect of this institutional arrangement varies by context. For an 
otherwise average country with ICCPR ratification, the average estimated effect of constitutional 
rules that privilege international commitments is 2.5 percentage points larger when states are a 
standard deviation below the mean level of democracy (-0.026, p = 0.01) than when states are 
one standard deviation above the mean (-0.001, p = 0.08), the difference is significant at the 0.03 
level. For the average country, the average effect of this institutional arrangement is one 
percentage point larger when political competition is present (-0.013, p = 0.01) than when absent 
(-0.003, p = 0.03), the difference is significant at the 0.07 level.       
Figure 3.4 shows the effect of preexisting institutions in different contexts. For the average 
country, possessing constitutional rules that make international commitments superior to 






of executive power (Figure 3.4, left panel) and net ODA per capita (Figure 3.4, right panel). 
Comparing the effect when executive power is low (2) versus high (6) in an otherwise average 
country, the data suggests the decrease in predicted probability is smaller for lower levels of 
executive power (-0.004, p = 0.01) than higher ones (-0.012, p = 0.03). The difference is 
significant at the 0.07 level. However, the average effect of preexisting institutions is only 
slightly smaller when the natural log of net ODA per capita is 0 ($1 per capita) compared to 6 
($403 per capita). The difference is not significant (p = 0.78). 
Figure 3.4: The Effect of Constitutional Rules on Enacting Restrictive Laws 
 
Figure shows the average marginal effect (with 95% confidence intervals) of the discrete change of constitutional 
rules that elevate international treaties above ordinary legislation. Thin gray lines show the distribution of observations 






These results support the second institutional hypothesis (H1B) that the institutional 
arrangement that minimizes the probability a country enacts a restrictive law is one where 
ICCPR ratification exists alongside constitutional rules that elevate international treaties above 
ordinary legislation. Robustness checks support these findings. The average effect size for this 
institutional arrangement varies across context, but its impact appears strongest in settings 
described as undemocratic, politically competitive, or possessing a strong constitutional 
executive.   
Results of Conceptual Hypotheses using Competing Risk Models (CRMs) 
CRMs indicate whether the risk factors that predict the enactment of laws varies across 
different law types. Table 3.3 shows the results of the logit primary modeling strategy, and the 
appendix contains the full regression tables (Appendix Tables 3B.1-3B.3). Models recode 
dependent variables, but the specification and sample remain the same. ‘Pooled Laws’ (model 1) 
presumes laws are the same and analyzes them as a monolithic group. Models 2-4 disaggregate 
this monolithic group to assess equivalence (hypotheses H2A-D) and distinctness (hypotheses 
H3A-D). The ‘Prohibitive Laws Only’ model shows the factors that predict the enactment of 
highly-restrictive laws containing strong language regarding what organizations cannot do. In 
column three, the ‘Red-Tape Laws Only’ model identifies the factors that predict the enactment 
of moderately-restrictive laws that erect ex-ante conditions for what organizations must do 
before receiving foreign funding. Finally, ‘Notification Laws Only’ reveals factors associated 
with the enactment of minimally-restrictive laws that prescribe actions that organizations must 







Table 3.3: Competing Risk Model (CRM) with Logistic Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








(DV: Enacts specific law)     
Commitment to Guard Human Rights 0.37 0.33 0.49 -0.36 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -14.24*** -14.13*** -15.03*** -13.74*** 
Commitment x Constitutional Rules 12.99*** 12.57*** 13.86*** 13.23*** 
Electoral Competition a 1.72* 1.92 1.93* 1.53 
ln(ODA/cap)a 0.10 -0.09 0.09 0.14 
ln(ODAcap) x ElectComp a -0.15 -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 
CSO Routinely Consulted a 0.26 -0.31 0.21 1.25** 
CSOs are Anti-System a -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.33 
Imputed FH/Polity2 a -0.56*** -0.35 -0.58*** -0.62** 
UN votes with USA (%)a -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
UN votes with RUS (%)a 0.04* 0.02 0.04 0.08** 
Observations 2398 2398 2398 2398 
AIC 339.78 141.53 284.52 184.09 
BIC 438.08 239.83 382.82 282.39 
Degrees of Freedom 16 16 16 16 
Failure Events 37 10 29 15 
Countries in Sample 138 138 138 138 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a Denotes one-year lag on variables 
Models ran with Stata 15 with cluster-robust standard errors grouped by unique country IDs. Some controls omitted, 
see Appendix for full table 
In comparing the pooled logit results to the competing risk estimates, it is clear that the two 
approaches produce different results regarding the relationship a factor has on the enactment of 
law types. In general, the coefficients’ signs in the pooled model are the same as those in the 
CRMs. The pooled results cannot differentiate among law types and so represent an ‘average’ or 
‘dampened’ effect. The CRMs show more refined estimates on how a type-specific covariate 
relates to a particular law type. The pooled model produces false positives (Type I errors) or 
false negatives (Type II errors) when coefficients are type-specific hazards that correlate with the 
enactment of only one law type. The CRMs’ nuanced results identify these spurious results. For 
example, the pooled model’s emphasis on electoral competition is a false positive because the 
type-specific hazard positively correlates with the enactment of red-tape laws only (p < 0.05). 






of CSO consultation’s significance is a false negative because the coefficient positively 
correlates with the enactment of notification laws (p < 0.01). I continue this exercise to assess the 
conceptual equivalence and distinctness of law types.  
Assessing Conceptual Equivalence 
Table 3.4 organizes data to evaluate the equivalence and distinctness of law types. The top 
panel contains the conceptual-equivalence hypotheses (H2A-D), and the bottom includes the 
conceptual-distinctness hypotheses (H3A-D). Each row consists of the hypothesis followed by 
the average marginal effect of a discrete change in the factor for each law type. Appendix Table 
3C is an expanded table that combines this information with data from the robustness checks.  
If factors predict enactment of different law types in generally consistent ways, then such 
patterns signal laws are conceptually equivalent and are perhaps best analyzed as a monolithic 
group. If this is the case, factors associated with the enactment of restrictive laws should predict 
the enactment of different law types in similar ways as indicated by the variables’ sign, effect 
size, and significance. The data does not support the hypothesis that ODA per capita is a 
significant, positive, and consistent predictor of restrictive laws (H2A). The analyses found no 
evidence suggesting a statistical relationship between a standard deviation increase in ODA per 
capita and the enactment of any law type. Robustness checks confirm this finding.  
The data partially support the hypothesis that the context of electoral competition increases 
the probability of enacting restrictive laws. Although the factor has a statistically significant 
coefficient in all pooled models, CRMs show the presence of electoral competition robustly 
predicts the enactment of moderately-restrictive, red-tape laws only. For the average country in 






by less than one percentage points in the primary modeling strategy (0.002, p = 0.07) and almost 
one percentage point in the rare-events robustness check (0.009, p = 0.14). Electoral competition 
weakly predicts the enactment of highly- and minimally-restrictive laws. Hypothesis H2B is 
unsupported because electoral competition is not a significant, positive, and consistent predictor 
of all restrictive laws. 







Panel A: Conceptual-equivalence Hypotheses    
































Panel B: Conceptual-distinctness Hypotheses    
H3A: Voting alignment with Russia positively correlated 















H3C: International commitment and constitutional 
guarantees negatively correlated with enacting prohibitive 







H3D: Voting alignment with USA positively correlated with 







Primary modeling strategy only. See Appendix for full table. Bold text represents statistically significant factors 
(p<0.10) in either main effects or interaction effects. See regression tables for additional information. Shaded cells 
identify statistically significant discrete marginal effects at the p<0.10 and p<0.20 levels. Discrete changes are 0 to 1 
in binary variables and a standard deviation increase in continuous variables. Average marginal effects accompanied 
by p-values for readers to evaluate statistical significance on their own. Predictions computed in Stata 15 using 






If factors predict enactment of different law types in generally consistent ways, then such 
patterns signal laws are conceptually equivalent and are perhaps best analyzed as a monolithic 
group. If this is the case, factors associated with the enactment of restrictive laws should predict 
the enactment of different law types in similar ways as indicated by the variables’ sign, effect 
size, and significance. The data does not support the hypothesis that ODA per capita is a 
significant, positive, and consistent predictor of restrictive laws (H2A). The analyses found no 
evidence suggesting a statistical relationship between a standard deviation increase in ODA per 
capita and the enactment of any law type. Robustness checks confirm this finding.  
The data partially support the hypothesis that the context of electoral competition increases 
the probability of enacting restrictive laws. Although the factor has a statistically significant 
coefficient in all pooled models, CRMs show the presence of electoral competition robustly 
predicts the enactment of moderately-restrictive, red-tape laws only. For the average country in 
the sample, a context of electoral competition increases the probability of enacting red-tape laws 
by less than one percentage points in the primary modeling strategy (0.002, p = 0.07) and almost 
one percentage point in the rare-events robustness check (0.009, p = 0.14). Electoral competition 
weakly predicts the enactment of highly- and minimally-restrictive laws. Hypothesis H2B is 
unsupported because electoral competition is not a significant, positive, and consistent predictor 
of all restrictive laws. 
The data does not support the claim that CSOs’ organized opposition to the current political 
system is a significant, positive, and consistent predictor of restrictive laws. The CRMs find no 
relationship between a standard deviation increase in CSOs’ organized opposition to the current 






The data finds evidence that higher levels of democracy decrease the probability of enacting 
restrictive laws. The factor is generally significant and always negative. However, the CRMs 
show that for the average country, the change in the predicted probability caused by a standard 
deviation increase in democracy is consistent for only two types of laws in only one modeling 
strategy: in the primary modeling strategy, a discrete change decreases the predicted probabilities 
of enacting red-tape (-0.001, p < 0.01) and notification (-0.001, p < 0.10) laws by the same 
amount.  The Cox model robustness check shows the average marginal effect of a positive 
discrete change is insignificant across the types of laws. This statistical insignificance may be 
because the democracy-enactment relationship varies over time. According to the Cox model 
with time-varying coefficients (Appendix Table 3B.2), the level of democracy has a significant 
correlation with highly-restrictive, prohibitive laws only. The factor’s main effect is negative (p 
< 0.05), and its time-varying component is positive (p < 0.05). These estimates suggest the level 
of democracy as an enactment deterrent declines over time.15 This time-varying relationship is 
inconsistent across law types, however. The hypothesis that higher levels of democracy decrease 
 
15 According to the Cox model with time-varying coefficients (Table 3.2), the level of democracy has a negative sign 
for all types of laws but is statistically significant for highly-restrictive laws only (-3.05, p<0.05).  A standard deviation 
increase in the level of democracy (approximately 2.85 points on a 10-point scale) at the beginning of the observation 
period, while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to exp(-3.05*2.85)=0.0001. Thus, the 
rate of enactment decreases by (100%-0.01%) = 99.99% with a standard deviation increase in democracy at the 
beginning of the observation period. The time-varying component of the level of democracy has a positive sign for all 
types of laws but is statistically significant for highly-restrictive laws only (0.18, p<0.05). This suggests the level of 
democracy as a deterrent for adopting highly-restrictive declines with every unit of time. A standard deviation increase 
in the level of democracy at year 10 of the observation period, while all other variables are held constant yields a 
hazard ratio equal to exp(-3.05*2.85 + 0.18*2.85*10)=0.0283. Thus, the rate of enactment decreases by (100%-2.89%) 
= 97.11%. While holding all other variables constant, this discrete change at year 20 yields a hazard ratio equal to 
exp(-3.05*2.85 + 0.18*2.85*20)=4.79, which increases the rate of enactment by (479%-100%)=379%. Holding all 
else equal, a positive and discrete change in democracy causes a decrease in the rate of enactment by 99.99% at the 






the probability of enacting restrictive laws in a manner that is consistent for all types of 
restrictive laws (H2D) is unsupported.  
Assessing Conceptual Distinctness 
If the predictive power of individual factors varies across law types, then the laws are 
conceptually distinct and best analyzed in a disaggregated manner. The pooled models suggest 
greater voting alignment with Russia in the UN General Assembly increases the probability of 
enacting restrictive laws. This relationship appears unique to only one law type, but not the type 
predicted. For the average country, a positive discrete change in voting alignment with Russia 
produces an average marginal effect that is significant for predicting minimally-restrictive, 
notification laws only. The Cox model robustness check shows the average marginal effect of a 
positive discrete change is insignificant across law types. Like other factors, this statistical 
insignificance may be because the factor’s effect varies over time. According to the Cox model 
with time-varying coefficients (Appendix Table 3B.2), voting alignment with Russia correlates 
with highly-restrictive, prohibitive laws only. The factor’s main effect is positive (p < 0.01), and 
its time-varying component is negative (p < 0.01). These estimates suggest the impact of voting 
alignment with Russia as an enactment propellant declines over time.16 Together these findings 
 
16 According to the Cox model with time-varying coefficients (Table 3.2), voting alignment with Russia has a positive 
and statistically significant relationship with highly-restrictive laws (0.22, p<0.01).  A standard deviation increase in 
the voting alignment with Russia (approximately 11.75 points on a 100-point scale) at the beginning of the observation 
period, while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to exp(0.22*11.75)=13.26. Thus, the rate 
of enactment increases by 1226% with a standard deviation increase in voting alignment with Russia at the beginning 
of the observation period. The time-varying component has a negative and statistically significant relationship for 
highly-restrictive laws only (0.18, p<0.05). This suggests the voting alignment with Russia is a propellant for 
enactment for highly-restrictive laws declines with every unit of time. A standard deviation in the factor, while all 
other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to exp(0.22*11.75 + -0.02*11.75*10)=1.264. Thus, the 
rate of enactment increases by 26.4%. While holding all other variables constant, this discrete change at year 20 yields 
a hazard ratio equal to exp(0.22*11.75 + -0.02*11.75*20)=0.1206, which decreases the rate of enactment by (100%-






partially support the hypothesis that increased voting alignment with Russia increases the 
probability of enacting only one law type (H3A), but the hypothesis incorrectly predicted the law 
type.  
Data show that for the average country, a positive discrete change in CSO participation 
produces an average marginal effect that is significant for predicting minimally-restrictive, 
notification laws. Depending on the modeling strategy, a discrete change increases the predicted 
probabilities of enacting notification laws by less than one percentage point in two of the three 
modeling strategies (p < 0.05). This relationship suggests increased CSO participation in 
lawmaking may coincide with a push for reasonable regulation from within the sector. Notably, 
the same discrete change produces an average marginal effect that decreases the predicted 
probability of enacting prohibitive laws. That relationship conforms to theory but lacks statistical 
evidence (p > 0.20). In support of hypothesis H3B, the data show increased participation by 
CSOs in the lawmaking process increases the probability of enacting notification laws only. 
The data finds an international commitment to safeguarding civil and political rights 
combined with constitutional rules guaranteeing those commitments decreases the probability of 
enacting restrictive laws. Table 3.4 shows this relationship is not unique to any one law type. 
Contrary to hypothesis H3C, the effect is not strongest for highly-restrictive laws and then wanes 
for less restrictive ones. Instead, the data show that in the average country, the preexisting 
institution decreases the predicted probability of enacting moderately-restrictive, red-tape laws 
by less than one percentage point in two of the three modeling strategies (p < 0.05, Appendix 
 
rate of enactment by more than 1000% at the beginning of the observation period, 26% at year 10, and decreases the 






Table 3C). This institutional context has smaller effects for prohibitive and notification laws, but 
these relationships have weaker statistical evidence in those models. For the final hypothesis, the 
data does not support the claim that greater voting alignment with the US in the UN General 
Assembly decreases the probability of enacting highly-restrictive, prohibitive laws. Instead, the 
analysis finds the no relationship and H3D is not supported.    
The above eight hypotheses carefully examined factors’ type-specific relationships to assess 
whether qualitatively different laws are conceptually equivalent or distinct. A signal of 
conceptual equivalence occurs when factors predict enactment in ways generally consistent 
across law types. Such patterns would imply—but not prove—conceptual equivalence and 
support pooling various law types into a monolithic group. Of the four factors examined, only 
electoral competition and level of democracy showed robust signs of a relationship with 
enactment. The data show the relationship between these two factors and enactment varies in 
effect size—as measured by both regression coefficients and average marginal effects—and 
significance across law types. Thus, the analysis is unable to produce reliable evidence 
supporting the argument that restrictive laws are conceptually equivalent. 
Not only do these null results fail to demonstrate restrictive laws are a monolithic group, but 
the findings provide additional support to the argument that restrictive laws are conceptually 
distinct. The case for conceptual distinctness relies on the relationship between individual factors 
and enactment to vary across law types. Several factors portray this behavior and deserve 
mention: electoral competition, voting alignment with Russia, and CSO participation in 
lawmaking have robust relationships with only one type of law. These relationships are 
consistent within a particular law type and across robustness checks, regression coefficients, and 






The remaining variables—level of democracy and preexisting institutions—predict multiple 
types of laws with varying degrees of success. Looking at the factors’ regression coefficients is 
the minimal approach. Here, while holding all else constant, the factors predict enactment for 
red-tape and notification laws reasonably well, but only preexisting institutions robustly predict 
enactment of prohibitive laws. A stricter approach uses average marginal effects. This shows that 
for the average country, the average effect of a discrete change in democracy or preexisting 
institutions robustly predicts one and perhaps two law types depending on the significance 
threshold used. In total, the evidence from five of the eight factors examined implies the laws 
that restrict foreign aid to CSOs are conceptually distinct and should be analyzed and 
conceptualized accordingly.  
Discussion  
This analysis makes two original contributions. First, the study incorporates two types of 
preexisting institutions that constrain lawmaking: countries’ international commitment to guard 
civil and political rights, and the constitutional rules that strengthen those international 
commitments. I find the institutional arrangement that minimizes the probability a government 
enacts a restrictive law is one where the country has made an international commitment to 
safeguarding civil and political rights backed by constitutional rules that constrain lawmaking in 
such a way that ordinary legislation must honor that international commitment. This critical 
finding calls for a turn to history when analyzing the institutional development of the laws and 
policies that regulate civil society around the world.  
Second, current work tends to analyze the laws that restrict CSOs as a monolithic group and 






counterintuitive and overlooked relationships. For example, the positive relationships that voting 
alignment with Russia and CSO consultation have with increasing the probability of enacting 
minimally-restrictive, notification laws. The mechanisms behind these associations are beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but become the focus of my analysis in Chapters Four and Five.  
Researchers often invoke the Russian and Chinese cases as the most visible examples of 
regimes that use laws to minimize civil society (Toepler et al., 2020, p. 2). Thus, as a 
government’s decisions on international matters align with Russia’s, we may expect an increased 
probability that the country enacts harsh, Putin-style laws as a result of policy diffusion through 
learning, coercion, or emulation processes. This analysis shows that this is not the case; instead, 
the data show a positive correlation between voting alignment with Russia and the enactment of 
minimally-restrictive, notification laws. This finding may seem peculiar, but a focus on 
institutions offers two possible explanations. One explanation is that CSO regulatory regimes are 
legal institutions that change incrementally over time. Thus, the enactment of minimally-
restrictive laws is not necessarily an endpoint but may instead be a waypoint or entry-point 
towards a more “bureaucratically illiberal” regulatory regime that uses laws and policies to raise 
the transaction costs for CSOs to emerge and operate (DeMattee, 2019b, p. 10). I investigate this 
path dependency explanation in Chapters Five.     
Another explanation is that describing the Russian case as entirely closed to civil society may 
be a mischaracterization of its government-CSO relationship. Such a conclusion fails to account 
for the complicated relationship between formal legal rules and social norms to produce what 
Cole (2017, p. 6) and others call “working rules.” While laws may closely resemble working 
rules in some contexts, in other settings, informal rules and social norms amend legal rules to 






apolitical CSOs that provide services complementary or supplementary to the government while 
at the same time enforcing a harsher set of working rules to crackdown on CSOs that are 
politically inconvenient. This pattern of differential enforcement exists as “the Russian 
government’s divergent positions towards civil society” (Salamon, Benevolenski, & Jakobson, 
2015; Benevolenski & Toepler, 2017, p. 64; Toepler et al., 2019; Toepler et al., 2020) with 
additional patterns identified in Burundi (Popplewell, 2018) and Kenya (Chapters Six and 
Seven).  
This differential enforcement explanation matches work discussing “the Russian 
government’s divergent positions towards civil society” (Salamon et al., 2015; Benevolenski & 
Toepler, 2017, p. 64; Toepler et al., 2019; Toepler et al., 2020). This is congruent with research 
on dictators’ decision-making studied as both a tradeoff between suppressing rivals and 
delivering public services (Woldense, 2018) and the rational use of their tools of office to gather 
information that prolongs their stay in power and maximizes their gains from office (Sartori, 
1976; Wintrobe, 1998; Malesky & Schuler, 2011; Smyth & Turovsky, 2018).17 Forthcoming 
work on the Russian case suggests this is a possibility and identifies CSO laws are one of several 
strategies regimes use to gather information about political opponents’ public support and 
resources (Smyth, 2019, pp. 17-21).           
An entirely different set of explanations seem to drive the positive relationship between the 
enactment of minimally-restrictive laws and consultation with CSOs. The magnitude of this 
relationship is substantial. A standard deviation increase in voting alignment with Russia is 
 
17 The dictators dilemma of comparative politics stresses undemocratic leaders use their tools of office—such as 
elections, laws, and policy implementation—to gather information that prolongs their stay in power and maximizes 






roughly half the size of the same discrete change in CSO consultation. Not only does the effect 
size deserve attention, but the sign on the coefficient itself challenges received wisdom: why 
would a political opportunity structure open to CSOs also be one that, ceteris paribus, propels the 
enactment of restrictive laws? One explanation is that CSOs successfully pull lawmakers away 
from highly- or moderately-restrictive bills and negotiate agreement around minimally-restrictive 
laws. Although supported by theory, this explanation lacks supporting evidence in this data 
because neither the prohibitive nor red-tape models show CSO consultation to be negative and 
significant.  
An alternative account asserts these minimally-restrictive, notification laws might not be as 
undesirable as analysts interpret them to be. Notification laws may be attempts to minimize 
patterns of wrongdoing within the sector (Gibelman & Gelman, 2004) or correct the dualism 
foreign funding causes among domestic CSOs (Chahim & Prakash, 2013; Pallas, Anderson, & 
Sidel, 2018, p. 259). Perhaps these notification laws are a type of “reasonable regulation” that 
CSOs support to enjoy the privileges that accompany registration as a nonprofit or religious legal 
entity. And given the ballooning of development NGOs beginning in the early-1990s (Anheier & 
Salamon, 1998; Reimann, 2006; Cammett & MacLean, 2014; Schnable, 2015), CSOs’ support 
for minimally-restrictive laws may be an attempt to cull “briefcase NGOs” from the sector while 
at the same time earn regulatory legitimacy (Popplewell, 2018) and show themselves as 
transparent and accountable to citizens, donors, and governments (Arhin, Kumi, & Adam, 2018). 
There is increasing evidence steering research away from the caricature of CSO laws that 
suggests they are new, homogenous, and enacted by dictatorial regimes to prolong their stay in 






liberal and illiberal provisions; regulatory regimes erected and altered by governments regardless 
of regime type. 
Conclusion 
Scholars offer many reasons why countries enact laws that restrict foreign funding to CSOs. 
Despite the growing body of work on this topic, scholars have not studied the institutional 
context of lawmaking, nor has research investigated how factors’ relationships with enactment 
vary across law types. This paper has explored these understudied areas to explain the conditions 
that propel or deter the enactment of laws that restrict CSOs. It has made both theoretical and 
conceptual contributions in the process.  
The first analysis introduced institutional variables to further our understanding of the 
factors that predict the enactment of restrictive laws. The argument focused on preexisting 
institutions to explain the changing constraints lawmakers face. An international commitment to 
safeguarding civil and political rights—represented by the ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which legal scholars consider the principal 
treaty guarding civil and political rights (Henkin, 2000; Hathaway, 2002; ICNL, 2009; Kiai, 
2012; Donnelly, 2013; ICNL, 2015)—should have a strong and negative association with the 
enactment of laws that impinge on voluntary association. Yet, the analyses here show that 
pledging to safeguard human rights is not a sufficient condition. Incorporating constitutional 
rules into the analysis explains why international commitments such as ratifying the ICCPR do 
not individually stifle efforts to enact restrictive laws. Constitutions condition the degree to 
which international commitments constrain lawmaking. Thus, the effect of ICCPR ratification—






constrains lawmaking is most effective when constitutional rules give such international 
obligations a status that is superior to ordinary legislation. Although the average effect size for 
this institutional arrangement varies across context, its impact appears most effective in settings 
described as undemocratic, politically competitive, or possessing a strong constitutional 
executive.  
Next, while researchers and practitioners discuss many types of laws that regulate CSOs, 
most empirical studies analyze them as a monolithic group. The second analysis showed several 
benefits to disaggregating law types. First, analyses that pool laws may unknowingly overstate 
factors’ relevance in enacting restrictive laws. The pooled models identified several factors 
thought to propel or deter the enactment of restrictive laws. However, after disaggregating laws, 
the analyses showed these factors robustly predicted only one law type: electoral competition 
positively correlates with the enactment of moderately-restrictive laws, higher levels of 
democracy negatively correlates with moderately-restrictive laws, and greater voting alignment 
with Russia in the UN positively correlates with minimally-restrictive laws. Pooling laws also 
risks understating or overlooking the relevance of a particular factor. The pooled models rejected 
the importance of CSO consultation in all instances. Only after conceptualizing laws as distinct 
did we identify nuanced relationships such as greater participation by CSOs in the lawmaking 
process positively correlates with the enactment of minimally-restrictive laws. 
These findings call on researchers to give increased attention to institutions and 
conceptualizations when studying the enactment of laws that restrict CSOs. Constitutions and 
history matter and analysts should consider these and other important factors when analyzing the 
laws that restrict CSOs. Findings also urge researchers not to oversimplify or ignore the 






instead embrace legal differences and use them as analytical leverage in empirical research and 
theory building. Going forward, research studying the laws, policies, and regulations of civil 








CREATING BETTER DATA: CODING AND DESCRIPTIVELY ANALYZING AN 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CORPUS1 
 Using a global dataset of 138 countries, findings in Chapter Three showed that existing 
institutions constrain lawmaking and confirmed that within a type of legal provision, particular 
provisions are different and should not be lumped together arbitrarily. The findings also show 
that political regime types are inconsistently and only partially associated with enacting the 
restrictive provisions studied. What is more, given that a number of democratic and free 
countries enacted these provisions suggests the possibility that some CSO laws may actually 
benefit society and help CSOs. These findings, along with the observation that existing CSO law 
research tends to focus entirely on restrictive financial provisions and relies heavily on secondary 
sources, combine to highlight the need for longer and more carefully coded data on CSO laws.   
In this chapter, I address this need for better data in two ways. First, I propose a broad 
typology of provisions intended to make the systematic study of CSO laws and policies across 
contexts more possible. I do this by reviewing 21 research publications that study CSO 
regulatory regimes and coding the types of legal provisions analysts discuss in each. In so doing, 
I argue for the need to recognize that CSO regulatory regimes contain many varieties of legal 
provisions and are never wholly permissive or categorically restrictive. While it is true that 
restrictive laws exist that limit foreign support of CSOs or restrict organizations’ operational 
activities, other regulatory requirements facilitate the legitimacy and transparency of CSOs, 
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in 2019 as: “Toward a Coherent Framework: A Typology and 






guarantee the right to self-regulate and appeal regulatory decisions, and hold both CSOs and 
regulators accountable to citizens and governments. I find that in addition to the financial, or 
resource, related regulations examined in Chapter Three, there are in fact four policy subgroups 
that merit consideration: governance, formation, operations, and resources, which I explain in 
depth. Within each subgroup are provisions from each side of the restrictive-permissive 
continuum. Combining these points results in a matrix typology of 58 legal provisions that 
researchers have identified as regulating CSOs. 
Second, I use the matrix typology to code primary sources and generate an original dataset. 
I create this better data by using the typology as a coding protocol to inventory the legal 
provisions of 285 laws from 17 countries. This process captures the institutional development of 
regulatory regimes over time and at different levels of analysis. This approach recognizes that 
regulatory regimes are like other institutions: they develop incrementally through a long, slow, 
and muddled process of institutional change. I show that regulatory regimes are neither new nor 
represented by a single law. Instead, and contrary to conventional thinking, I find that these legal 
institutions are timeworn and are frequently inherited from colonial governments, that both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes erect and maintain them, and that permissive legal 
provisions comprise the majority of these rules-in-form. 
Methods 
 To create my typology, I reviewed a non-random assortment of secondary sources, 
intentionally selected for diversity in authorship, geographic focus, and methods. I chose sources 
from a review of literature across a wide range of disciplines, including specialized publications 






reached saturation on the types of provisions discussed. Ultimately, the sample consists of a 
diverse assortment of book chapters, peer-reviewed articles, and professional reports produced 
by analysts from around the world. These works examine regulatory regimes in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, North America, and Western Europe. They include in-depth case studies, 
extensive cross-national statistical analyses, comparative historical analyses, expert legal 
reviews, and descriptive accounts connecting real-world events to policy changes. While they 
vary in scope and level of detail, each contributes toward a systematic conceptualization of CSO 
regulatory regimes.   
I used an inductive approach. I carefully read each source to identify as many types of 
provisions as are in use around the world. I copied these provisions directly from the secondary 
sources and categorized them by type. In total, I inventoried 71 unique provisions discussed by 
the authors. Next, I used an iterative process to recategorize these provisions into the fewest 
number possible. Once I had organized provisions by type, I rewrote the provisions into a 
generalizable institutional syntax2 and merged these 71 unique provisions into 58 based on the 
rights and obligations they gave CSOs.3 This transformation proved a necessary and valuable 
step. It not only made the number of provisions discussed by analysts manageable but also 
 
2 For a comprehensive explanation of institutional (or ADICO) syntax read “A Grammar of Institutions” by Sue 
Crawford and Elinor Ostrom in Understanding Institutional Diversity (E. Ostrom 2005). Or, see Chapter Two. 
3 A brief note on the terminology used throughout this article. First, regarding organization types: these regulations 
identify a broad array of legal entities—e.g., cooperative societies, NGOs, resident societies, foreign charities (Maru, 
2017; Cunningham, 2018). These legal forms are subtypes of civil society organizations, which I define as voluntary 
associations that exist between the family and the state not operated for profit (see Chapter One). The organizations 
are generally legal entities but may also include informal groups. While they are typically private, non-profit-
distributing, self-governing bodies organized for public benefit, CSOs also include mutual benefit organizations, 






translated laws from their natural language into institutional statements that allow for 
comparability across contexts.  
 I discuss various top-down, command-and-control legal instruments. Utmost among them 
are written constitutions, which I consider superior to the laws of a country, even though 
constitutions and legislation are not always as consequential as presumed (Elkins et al., 2009, p. 
48). Laws are legal rules coproduced by the legislature and the executive. Constitutions and laws 
contain numerous written provisions, or what I sometimes refer to as “institutional statements”: 
which through their shared nature describe opportunities and constraints that create expectations 
about actors’ activities by prescribing, permitting, or advising behavior or outcomes (S. 
Crawford & E. Ostrom, 2005, pp. 137-138, 140). Therefore, in a nested architecture, various 
provisions comprise laws, and multiple laws combine with constitutional protections4 to create 
the regulatory regimes that structure and incentivize CSO behavior. Ultimately, the typology and 
conceptualization discussed below show different combinations of provisions exist, which I 
argue are explanatory factors available as leverage in an analysis.   
A Typology of CSO Regulatory Regimes 
 It is first necessary to emphasize a characteristic of these legal provisions: that to varying 
degrees, each either helps or hinders CSOs. But focusing on a particular provision risks missing 
the forest for the trees. I find that the CSO laws that comprise CSO regulatory regimes contain 
various provisions from both sides of the permissive-restrictive continuum. This means that to 
understand the institutional development of regulatory regimes, one must know what the current 
 
4 My appreciation to the reviewers who rightly explain constitutional protections both guarantee freedoms and also 






legal institution is, and which provisions are added (or removed). Knowing the precise content of 
a country’s regulatory regime may not be sufficient, however, because laws do not implement 
themselves. Thus, knowing the rules-in-form is a necessary first step in assessing whether the 
government is acting within the scope of the law, overreaching in its enforcement actions, or 
underperforming in the services it is required to provide citizens.   
 The coherent framework that I propose classifies and tallies the legal provisions that 
comprise regulatory regimes.5 Labeling a provision as either permissive or restrictive can be 
controversial. If we focus only on the organization, we might classify any provision that requires 
CSOs to do “something” as restricting CSOs. Such an approach would classify provisions 
requiring that formal organizations register with the government as “restrictive,” irrespective of 
the simplicity of the process or the tax advantages that accompany registration. Alternatively, 
focusing on the state might classify any provision as “permissive” as long as representative 
institutions created it. These organization- and state-centric positions may overemphasize certain 
actors or processes when determining what is restrictive or permissive.  
The moderate approach applied here assumes reasonable and impartial enforcement of 
provisions and then uses theory to predict the effect those provisions have on society and the 
voluntary sector as compared to not having the provision. Using a standard classification 
(Anheier, 2005), I consider demand-side theories of trust in nonprofits (Hansmann, 1980) 
followed by supply-side theories that explain the emergence of nonprofits (Young, 1983; 
 
5 Such an exercise may lose precision and is undoubtedly imperfect. Nevertheless, there is a precedent for such a 
device in the social sciences. One example of this positive/negative classification and tallying is the Polity IV indicator 
of democratic well-being, which is merely a country’s institutionalized autocracy score subtracted from its 
institutionalized democracy score (Marshall et al., 2017). Similarly, regulatory regimes are an aggregation of 






Frumkin, 2002). I classify provisions as either restrictive or permissive using a two-step process. 
First, a provision is permissive if its reasonable and impartial enforcement improves trust, 
accountability, or resolves “voluntary failures” (Salamon, 1987, pp. 38-42; Edwards & Hulme, 
1996). Classification advances to the second stage if there is no clear demand-side prediction. 
Here, a provision is restrictive if its reasonable and impartial enforcement limits organizational 
autonomy or stifles organizational emergence.  
 I conceptualize provisions in terms of five key elements: their source, their predicted effect 
on society’s demand for CSOs, whether they protect society and democratic interests, whether 
they bestow rights, and their effect on individual participation. These elements allow me to 
conceptualize two types of provisions.  
 I begin by with permissive provisions, which I conceptualize using the above key elements. 
First, the source of permissive provisions is a law. Second, when enforced, theory predicts they 
increase society’s demand for CSOs. Provisions that meet legitimate aims such as facilitating 
transparency and accountability, and protecting the freedom to associate (and the freedom not to 
associate) are permissive. Third, societal and democratic interests outweigh organizational 
convenience. Permissive provisions can be onerous from an organizational perspective--e.g., 
requiring bylaws before registration and financial filings to maintain tax-exempt status. Limiting 
organizational autonomy or requiring CSOs to perform some activity may also be permissive if 
those provisions support legitimate aims that protect society and democracy. Fourth, permissive 
provisions provide CSOs rights that oblige government action (positive rights) or inaction 
(negative rights). Fifth, they empower individuals to associate in groups, establish new CSOs, 
and support existing organizations. Combining these elements yields the following 






increasing society’s trust in (or demand for) CSOs, that provide CSOs with positive and negative 
rights, or that encourage individuals to participate in CSOs.  
 The key feature is that permissive provisions, when reasonably and impartially enforced, 
build trust for CSOs among the public and prevent unscrupulous actors from abusing the legal 
form for private gain. These policies encourage the development of a country’s voluntary sector, 
allow CSOs to self-regulate and appeal regulators’ decisions, provide legal rights and 
protections, permit access to funds, and incentivize private donations. 
 I conceptualize restrictive provisions in terms of these same key elements. First, restrictive 
provisions are prescribed by law. Second, when enforced, theory predicts they decrease society’s 
demand for CSOs because the provisions allow the government to intimidate and harass CSOs. 
Third, they restrict organizational autonomy without achieving legitimate aims that protect 
society and democracy. Fourth, restrictive provisions empower the government to make demands 
of CSOs without reasonable cause or make decisions affecting individual organizations without 
due process and appeal. Fifth, they discourage individuals from joining, establishing, and 
supporting CSOs. Combining these elements yields the following definition: restrictive 
provisions are legal provisions that erode society’s trust in (or demand for) CSOs, that 
unnecessarily limit organizational autonomy and deny CSOs the right to due process, or that 
discourage individuals from participating in CSOs.  
 In the vernacular of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981), restrictive provisions 
increase transaction costs and make it more costly to operate and create such organizations 
(Salamon & Toepler, 2000b, p. 7). In extreme instances, these provisions legalize corrosive state 
action, impose excessive burdens, restrict the freedom to associate, limit pluralism and stoke 






concerning, but theory still leads me to categorize them as restrictive. Prohibiting CSOs from 
self-regulating, requiring a minimum number of members before an informal group can formally 
register, mandating CSOs adopt a certain organizational structure, and capping executive’s 
compensation are examples of restrictive provisions because they do not clearly protect society 
or expand organizational pluralism.     
Despite the dichotomy presented here, it may be possible to have a flourishing—if not 
entirely admirable—array of CSOs within a regulatory regime described as restrictive. Likewise, 
a de jure permissive regulatory regime is not guaranteed to sow a vibrant civil society that 
generates positive democratic values among citizens.  
Elements of the Institutional Context 
 Matrix typologies allow for the intersection of multiple mutually-exclusive organizing 
principles (Gerring, 2012a). The restrictive-permissive dichotomy is the first of two organizing 
principles. The second arranges provisions into four subgroups that comprise the institutional 
context of regulatory regimes. These mutually exclusive categories stipulate how provisions are 
made and enforced (governance); define the types of CSOs that can exist and the procedures for 
their emergence (formation); establish if and how a CSO obtains permission to conduct activities 
(operations); and outlines how to record and report financial and non-financial assets 
(resources).  
Governance Provisions 
 Governance provisions structure the amendment and enforcement of provisions contained in 
other subgroups. These provisions create and empower institutional actors such as government 






that restrict constitutionally protected freedoms—such as the right to associate—are governance 
provisions because they relate to constitutional provisions that supersede legislative laws and 
policies. In effect, this category is superior to others because governance provisions control the 
creation, enforcement, and amendment of other regulatory provisions. Table 4.1 organizes the 12 
governance provisions identified in the sample. The footnotes show examples of restrictive and 
permissive governance provisions6 quoted from the studies reviewed.  
Formation Provisions 
 Formation provisions are primarily concerned with the legal status and processes of 
voluntary associations that choose to incorporate as formalized CSOs. Whether informal 
associations must incorporate with a government sponsor is also a formation provision. These 
provisions stipulate the requirements for registration (e.g., membership, financial capital), how 
the registration process unfolds, and whether registrations expire. As a legal matter, the status of 
a CSO and the decision to become a formal organization may determine which provisions apply 
to it (e.g., lobbying, tax-deductible donations). As a political matter, these policies have a 
legitimizing effect on organizations, and failure to secure/renew the proper status might lead to 
decreased assets from donors and suspicion from citizens. There are 14 formation provisions, 
including both permissive and restrictive types.7 
 
6 Governance Examples: Restrictive “[The Ecuadorian Presidential Executive Decree No. 982 (2008)] Registry of 
Civil Society Organizations (RUOSC) was a first attempt by the Ecuadorian government to standardize and centralize 
information on nonprofit organization and was woven into the process of an organization’s legal formation” (Appe 
and Marchesini da Costa 2017: 166); Permissive “[Uganda’s Non-Governmental Organizations Act (2016)] 
introduced [CSOs’] right to appeal to the District Non-Governmental Monitoring Committee, the [National Bureau 
for NGOs], or the Adjudication Committee. In addition, an aggrieved person may invoke Article 42 of the 1995 
Constitution which guarantees the right to be treated fairly and justly and the right to apply to a court of law in respect 
of any administrative decision taken against that person” (Maru 2017: 61). 
7 Formation Examples: Restrictive “Eritrea, Proclamation No. 145/2005 requires that local CSOs engaged in relief 






Operations Provisions  
 Operations provisions regulate how CSOs deploy assets in pursuit of organizational goals. 
These provisions stipulate issue areas and establish what CSOs can or cannot do. Legal 
definitions and funding sources often define this operational space. For example, American 
501(c)(3)s are limited in their ability to lobby, while nonprofit 501(c)(4)s have no such 
restriction. These provisions also outline whether and how CSOs must receive permission to 
conduct operations. The highest burden appears to be provisions that require CSOs to obtain a 
permit to perform specific projects, but less burdensome is the requirement that CSOs obtain a 
license to perform a general task repeatedly. These provisions communicate what (if any) 
reporting CSOs must make available and to whom. Existing literature discusses 14 operational 
provisions,8 but coding primary sources identified two additional provisions: a restrictive 
provision requiring CSOs to acquire an operations authorization after formally registering, and a 
permissive provision forbidding government agencies to mandate an operating license in 
addition to formal registration.    
Resources Provisions 
 Resources provisions govern the financial and non-financial assets of CSOs. Some studies 
consider only provisions that regulate if and how CSOs can receive foreign funding, or what 
 
currency.’ This amount is approximately 15,000 average monthly per capita GDP in Eritrea” (Rutzen 2015: 17); 
Permissive “[CSOs in Nigeria] must be registered or incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA Act) of 1990, if they wish to enjoy the benefits of having a legal personality, or the limited tax advantages 
that may be available to them…if a CSO’s registration request is denied, it can challenge this decision with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC)” (Chikoto-Schultz and Uzochukwu 2016: 148). 
8 Operations Examples: Restrictive “[Restrictive policies] increase the discretionary supervisory power of government 
authorities and enable an arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of organizations, [and] restrictions that concern 
certain ‘sensitive’ activities (for instance, political activities, or human rights advocacy)” (Wolff and Poppe 2015: 6); 
Permissive “Cambodia appears to have no explicit [project] approval procedure other than the initial approval of the 






Rutzen (2015) refers to as “philanthropic protectionism.” While foreign funding restrictions have 
been the focus of numerous scholarly studies and reports, the 16 resources provisions include 
other restrictive and permissive provisions.9 They include provisions that prohibit specific legal 
forms from engaging in fundraising altogether and others that permit CSOs to raise funds 
through business activities unrelated to their charitable missions. This subgroup regulates taxable 
activities, whether a CSO receives a tax-exemption, whether individuals who donate receive a 
tax deduction, and other similar matters. These provisions also discuss requirements for auditing 
and financial reporting, ownership of non-financial resources such as property and equipment, 
and expectations for working with local partners. 
 The sources reviewed studied many provisions in different contexts. It is worth noting two 
understudied topics in the sample: penalties for noncompliance, and the enforcement of the 
policy. Penalties are especially relevant because they structure the incentives that CSOs face in 
their decision-making (Rowe, 1989; S. Crawford & E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 152). The most 
discussed provision in the sample, which requires CSOs to submit annual reports of financial 
flows, carries a penalty for noncompliance that ranges from written warnings and graduated 
sanctions for repeat offenders, to immediate deregistration of CSOs. The topic of enforcement 
and the political factors that affect the government’s enforcement of policies and CSOs’ 
compliance with legal provisions are equally crucial to the research agenda.  
 
9 Resources Examples: Restrictive “In 2008 Jordan enacted a new Law of Societies that requires any NGO seeking to 
receive foreign funding to obtain approval from the Jordanian cabinet and inform officials of the funding source, 
amount, and intended purpose…The Venezuelan National Assembly in December 2010 passed the Law for the 
Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination, which explicitly prohibits NGOs that ‘defend 
political rights’ or ‘monitor the performance of public bodies’ from receiving any income from foreign sources” 
(Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014: 8); Permissive “Explicit [financial] transparency requirements can provide 
additional assurance that organizations are operating in a way that is consistent with public expectations” (Salamon 






Creating a Matrix Typology 
 Intersecting the restrictive-permissive dichotomy with the four subgroups creates the matrix 
typology of CSO regulatory regimes (Tables 4.1 thru 4.4). The matrix typology includes an equal 
number of restrictive and permissive provisions and shows the frequency each provision appears 
in the research reviewed. Each column dichotomizes provisions as either illiberal and restrictive 
(left) or liberal and permissive (right). Columns correspond to the numeric values I assign to 
each institutional statement (-1 = restrictive, +1 = permissive) when aggregating the legal 
provisions into a cumulative index. Provisions appear as institutional statements with essential 
components of the institutional syntax identified using brackets. All provisions take the form of 
“regulative rules” that include all elements of the ADICO syntax10 because it is reasonable to 
assume that legal provisions have institutionally assigned sanctions for noncompliance or are 
backed by other rules that levy consequences to offenders. The values in parentheses represent 
tallies in the research-publication sample. They are not indicative of rigor or depth of analysis, 
nor do they measure the prevalence of any provision in the real world. For example, noting 
Swedish law does not recognize charitable donations as tax-deductible (Salamon & Toepler, 
1997, p. 298) is sufficient to qualify a study as discussing this particular resources provision. 
 The matrix typology and the coding protocol creates data that demonstrates a tension 
between “law as language” and “law as data.” I fully agree with those who argue there is 
something unquantifiable about laws and legal texts, but I do not take a maximalist position in 
defending that argument. I do, however, share the concern that some analyses cherry-pick 
 
10 The ADICO syntax is a tool of institutional analysis developed by (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; 2005). See Chapter 






specific legal provisions and omit laws that are essential components of a country’s regulatory 
regime. In Chapter Two, I reviewed the qualitative method that I used to responsibly transform 
legal language into quantifiable data. That process involved thoroughly reading and 
systematically coding only primary sources. Furthermore, the approach sought to be as holistic 
as possible and included every law that showed itself relevant to the country’s regulatory regime. 
Although the transformation from language to data was imperfect, it was as thorough, 
systematic, and complete as I could make it. I will add that it was also necessary. To my 
knowledge, none have attempted to thoroughly inventory the contents of the CSO laws that 
comprise regulatory regimes. Relying on existing research to create the matrix typology and the 
coding protocol made the quantification of the legal corpus possible. My future work will revisit 
this legal corpus and coding strategy.11  
 Analysts studying CSO laws discuss 12 types of governance provisions, which I rewrite and 
present as institutional statements in Table 4.1. All provisions appeared in the 285-law corpus, 
but only three are so common as to appear in more than 100 laws. These high-frequency 
provisions discuss the creation of a regulator (157 laws, 55%), assign sanctions for 
noncompliance (137 laws, 48%), and identify whether regulators can unilaterally create new 
rules (106 laws, 37%). The least common provisions are those that discuss the government-led 
creation of a CSO self-regulation forum (12 laws, 4%), whether the government can use a special 
 
11 My future work will improve clarity and quantitatively evaluate fidelity and robustness. A codebook will carefully 
detail each item in the coding protocol and include examples of each provision and explanations for the coded value. 
Next, I will use the codebook to train others to code parts of the legal corpus. Intercoder reliability will assess the 
fidelity of my qualitative coding for all items in the coding protocol.  Finally, various techniques will judge robustness. 
One technique uses an exclusion strategy to assess if there is a systematic bias in the coding. This technique assesses 
robustness before the data are used in an analysis. A postestimation assessment measures the robustness of inference 






process to pass new CSO laws (2 laws, 1%), and whether the government is the only actor 
capable of creating new CSOs (1 law, 0%). 
Table 4.1: Governance Provisions Rewritten with the ADICO Syntax 
Restrictive Provision Permissive Provision 
[Government][O][create or appoint agency to 
implement and enforce the law][if the law is 
enacted][or else it is negligent] (14) 
[Agency][O][clearly explain penalty for particular 
offenses, or explain a ‘general penalty’ for offenses 
where no penalty is expressly provided][under all 
circumstances][or else it is negligent] (8) 
[CSOs][O][accept restricted freedoms on certain 
matters][if the law is enacted][or else face 
noncompliance sanction] (10) 
[Government][O][create or empower a dispute 
resolution forum] such as a court [if the law is 
enacted][or else it is negligent] (6) 
[Government][P][create or empower cabinet minister 
to make new rules regulating CSOs on certain 
matters][if the law is enacted][or else leave the 
regulatory regime unchanged] (5) 
[CSOs][P][self-regulate through associations][if the 
law is enacted][or else choose not to be self-regulated] 
(6) 
[Agency][P][publish information about CSO, or seize 
property and documents][with or without reasonable 
cause after law’s commencement][or else choose other 
tactics to receive CSOs’ information]  (4) 
[Government and agency][O][create or empower self-
regulation forum for CSO self-governance][if the law 
is enacted][or else it is negligent] (5) 
[Government][P][use unorthodox process to pass new 
CSO laws][if the law is enacted][or else follow normal 
pathway to change regulatory regime] (3) 
[CSO self-regulatory body][P][create a code of 
conduct] to license, supervise, or sanction members if 
such actions are warranted [if the law is enacted][or 
else use other legal means of self-regulation] (4) 
[CSOs][F][create new CSOs] because only the state 
may do so [under all circumstances][or else face 
noncompliance sanction] (3) 
[Agency][F][regulate CSOs without oversight] such as 
an oversight board of CSO participants, a nomination 
& approval process, or clear accountability to elected 
officials [if the law is enacted][or else it is 
overstepping its authority] (3) 
DEONTIC operators: [P]=permitted/may; [F]=forbidden/may not; [O]=obliged/must. The syntax concatenates five 
components: [ATTRIBUTE][DEONTIC][AIM][CONDITIONS][OR ELSE]. ATTRIBUTE identifies to whom the 
statement applies, and if no attributes are named then the default assumption is all members of the group; DEONTIC 
identifies the expected behavior may/permitted/[P], must/obliged/[O]; must not/forbidden/[F]; AIM, specifies the 
particular action or outcome prescribed or forbidden; CONDITIONS, explains when and where the statement applies, 
the default assumes all persons under all circumstances; (OR ELSE) institutional sanction for noncompliance. 
 My review of the literature revealed 14 formation provisions (Table 4.2). All appeared in 
the legal corpus, with four appearing in more than 100 laws. These high-frequency provisions 
discuss precise legal definitions (211 laws, 74%), outline the process for revoking, suspending, 
terminating, or dissolving CSOs (136 laws, 48%), specify whether self-governing documents 
such as bylaws are necessary for registration (136 laws, 48%), and stipulate if voluntary 






The low-frequency provisions discuss protections against burdensome registration processes (41 
laws, 14%), whether CSOs must demonstrate that they possess certain resources (18 laws, 6%), 
and if a government agency partnership is a prerequisite for registration (6 laws, 2%). 
Table 4.2: Formation Provisions Rewritten with the ADICO Syntax 
Restrictive Provision Permissive Provision 
[CSOs][F][operate as informal, voluntary associations] 
and instead must register with the government [if the 
law is enacted][or else face noncompliance sanction] 
(14) 
[Agency][O][follow explicit process concerning 
revoking, suspending, terminating, or dissolving CSO’s 
permit, registration, or legal standing][ if the law is 
enacted][or else it is negligent] (14) 
[CSOs][F][appeal registration denial or deregistration 
order][after such a decision has been communicated][ 
or else face noncompliance sanction] (7) 
[Agency][O][explain precise legal definitions of CSOs 
that it regulates][if the law is enacted][or else it is 
negligent] (11) 
[CSOs][O][reregister or otherwise apply for 
continuation of the organization][on a certain day, after 
a fixed duration, or following meaningful changes to 
the organization] such as renaming the society, 
amending its constitution, or becoming a branch of 
another organization [or else face noncompliance 
sanction] (7) 
[Agency][F][reject registration for reasons other than 
those explicitly stated][if the law is enacted][or else it 
is overstepping its authority] (9) 
[CSOs][O][identify minimum number of founders or 
members][ if the law is enacted][or else the CSO is 
ineligible for registration or reregistration] (5) 
[Agency][F][make registration unnecessarily complex 
or burdensome][if the law is enacted][or else it is 
overstepping its authority] (8) 
[CSOs][O][demonstrate minimum capital 
requirements] such as financial, non-financial, or 
expertise [if the law is enacted][or else it is ineligible 
for registration or reregistration] (5) 
[Agency][O][review and make registration decisions 
within specified time period][if an application has been 
submitted as prescribed][or else it is negligent] (7) 
[CSOs][O][have government agency partner] such as a 
sponsorship or memo of understanding [if the law is 
enacted][or else the CSO is ineligible for registration or 
reregistration] (3) 
[CSOs][O][produce governing document for self-
management] such as bylaws minimally prescribed in 
policy [if they seek to be a formal organization][or else 
face noncompliance sanction] (5) 
[CSOs][O][pay processing/application fee in addition 
to an application that must be completed as 
prescribed][if the law is enacted][or else the 
registration or reregistration application will not be 
reviewed] (3) 
[Agency][O][provide written explanation of 
registration and reregistration decision] such as 
certificate of approval or justification for refusal [after 
a CSO has applied as prescribed][or else it is negligent] 
(2) 
DEONTIC operators: [P]=permitted/may; [F]=forbidden/may not; [O]=obliged/must. The syntax concatenates five 
components: [ATTRIBUTE][DEONTIC][AIM][CONDITIONS][OR ELSE]. 
 All 18 operations provisions appeared in the corpus. Three appeared over 100 times, and 
only one appeared once. These include legal language controlling CSOs’ administrative matters 
such as name changes and leadership appointments (164 laws, 58%), directing external 






property, plant, and equipment to the government (101 laws, 35%). Only one law discussed 
whether CSOs are forbidden to engage in specified activities if they receive foreign funding. The 
low-frequency provisions include those that relate to operating licenses that permit a CSO to 
repeatedly engage in a particular activity (17 laws, 6%), whether certain operational activities 
can use foreign funds (6 laws, 2%), and whether the CSO must not engage in certain activities if 
it exceeds a certain threshold of money from foreign sources (1 law, 0%). 
Table 4.3: Operations Provisions Rewritten with the ADICO Syntax 
Restrictive Provision Permissive Provision 
[CSOs][O][obtain government permission, “permits”, 
for individual projects][if the law is enacted][or else 
face penalty for non-compliance] (10) 
[CSOs][O][produce summary of operations and 
activities for public access][if the law is enacted][or 
else face penalty for non-compliance] (11) 
[CSOs][O][comply with agency’s interference 
regarding external operations or prescribed 
coordination][when instructions are communicated 
with or without reasonable cause][or else face penalty 
for noncompliance] (10) 
[CSOs][F][pursue certain operational activities due to 
their legal type and irrespective of other matters] such 
as when the activity is incongruent with the legal type 
[if the law is enacted][or else face penalty for 
noncompliance] (11) 
[CSOs][F][exceed specific threshold of budget spent 
on overhead] such as a certain percentage of budgets 
spent on administrative costs [if the law is enacted][or 
else face penalty for noncompliance] (7) 
[CSOs][O][obtain a license to perform a general 
activity repeatedly] as opposed to obtaining a permit 
each time it plans to perform the activity [if the law is 
enacted][or else face penalty for noncompliance] (9) 
[CSOs][F][engage in specified activities][if it receives 
foreign funds that exceed a threshold][or else face 
penalty for non-compliance] (7) 
[Agency][O][have reasonable cause and follow explicit 
rules when conducting inspections of CSOs] such as 
requesting specific documentation or investigating 
offenses [if the law is enacted][or else it is 
overstepping its authority] (8) 
[CSOs][O][obtain operational approvals—i.e., general 
licenses or individual permits—from multiple 
government units] such as multiple agencies, 
administrative jurisdictions, or a combination of both 
[if the law is enacted][or else face penalty for 
noncompliance] (3) 
[CSO][P][use foreign funds for certain activities 
because its legal definition either expressly permits it 
or does not explicitly prohibit it][if the law is 
enacted][or else choose not to accept the funds] (7) 
[CSOs][O][follow prescribed rules regarding internal 
administrative matters and/or activities][if the law is 
enacted][or else face penalty for non-compliance] (3) 
[CSO][P][conduct activities without notifying local 
governments][if the law is enacted][or else notify 
government or not conduct activities] (5) 
[CSOs][O][surrender project assets to 
government][after it is completed or CSO is 
dissolved][or else face penalty for non-compliance] (1) 
[Agency][F][hold CSOs to different requirements for 
staff than other employers][if the law is enacted][or 
else it is overstepping its authority] (4) 
[CSOs][O][acquire approval to operate separate from 
formal registration][after commencement of law][or 
else face penalty for non-compliance] 
[Agency][F][require CSOs to renew operational 
approvals][if CSOs’ activities are generally unchanged 
and they are registered][or else it is overstepping its 
authority] 
DEONTIC operators: [P]=permitted/may; [F]=forbidden/may not; [O]=obliged/must. The syntax concatenates five 






Table 4.4: Resources Provisions Rewritten with the ADICO Syntax 
Restrictive Provision Permissive Provision 
[CSOs][O][acquire one-time approval to receive 
foreign funding that is separate from formal 
registration][if the law is enacted][or else it cannot 
receive those resources without facing penalty for 
noncompliance] (10) 
[CSOs][O][report their finances for public access][if 
the law is enacted][or else face penalty for non-
compliance] (15) 
[CSOs][F][receive more than a specified threshold of 
foreign funding] such as a fixed value or percentage of 
its budget [if the law is enacted][or else face penalty 
for noncompliance] (9) 
[Private entities][P][take a tax deduction for supporting 
certain CSOs according to their legal type] such as 
donations to 501(c)(3)s but not contributions to 
political parties [if the law is enacted][or else choose 
not to take the deduction] (9) 
[CSOs][O][acquire government approval for each 
financial transaction or project][if the law is 
enacted][or else it cannot receive those resources 
without facing penalty for noncompliance] (7) 
[Government][O][ensure CSOs enjoy all rights of their 
legal type] such as a preferential treatment on property, 
sales, or payroll taxes [if the law is enacted][or else it is 
negligent in its duties] (9) 
[CSOs][O][use certain depository institutions] such as 
government banks [if the law is enacted][or else face 
penalty for non-compliance] (7) 
[CSOs][P][engage in unrelated business activities] 
such as revenue generation [if the law is enacted][or 
else choose not to pursue those activities] (4) 
[CSOs][O][provide information on its financial 
matters] such as financing agreements, contracts, or 
employee salaries [when the regulating agency 
requests][or else face penalty for noncompliance] (7) 
[CSOs][P][engage in legal fundraising for financial and 
non-financial resources] such as donations, mission-
related business, foreign funding, loans, and 
government contracts [if the law is enacted][or else 
choose not to pursue those activities] (4) 
[CSOs][F][receive foreign funding from certain 
sources] such as foreign governments or private 
sponsors explicitly stated [if the law is enacted][or else 
face penalty for noncompliance] (5) 
[CSOs][O][pay taxes on unrelated business activities] 
such as revenue earned on sales of products/services 
unrelated to their charitable mission [if the law is 
enacted][or else face penalty for noncompliance] (2) 
[CSOs][O][pay taxes on foreign funding]when similar 
funding from domestic sources would not be taxed [if 
the law is enacted][or else face penalty for 
noncompliance] (5) 
[CSOs][P][appeal decisions disadvantaging their 
positioning on financial and non-financial matters] 
such as orders regarding fines, taxes, foreign funding, 
and ownership of property [after such decisions are 
communicated][or else accept the decision] (1) 
[CSOs][F][receive any foreign funding under any 
circumstances][if the law is enacted][or else face 
penalty for non-compliance] (4) 
[International CSOs][F][crowd-out local CSO from 
funding opportunities] such as winning grants or not 
partnering with domestic CSOs [when funding 
opportunities are announced][or else face penalty for 
noncompliance] (1) 
DEONTIC operators: [P]=permitted/may; [F]=forbidden/may not; [O]=obliged/must. The syntax concatenates five 
components: [ATTRIBUTE][DEONTIC][AIM][CONDITIONS][OR ELSE]. 
 Existing research discusses 16 different resources provisions (Table 4.4). Four of these 
appeared in the legal corpus over 100 times. High-frequency provisions are those that discuss 
whether CSOs can pursue fundraising activities (151 laws, 53%), enjoy special privileges (132 
laws, 46%), publicly report their finances (118 laws, 41%), and if these organizations can engage 






36%). The resources provisions that appear the least frequently in the legal corpus are those that 
require government approval for each foreign transaction (7 laws, 3%) and those prohibiting 
foreign funding from specific sources (2 laws, 1%). The laws in the legal corpus contain no legal 
provisions taxing foreign funding or structuring access to financing that would benefit local 
CSOs. 
“Working Rules”: The Risk of Overemphasizing Rules-in-Form 
 The coding protocol creates a novel and robust dataset by carefully and systematically 
inventorying the legal provisions of a large legal corpus. These data are also limited, however, 
because they do not capture the difference between the rules-in-form that are confined to the four 
corners of legal text versus the rules-in-use that the government and civil society experience 
during day-to-day activities. I recognize the consequences of this de jure and de facto distinction 
and assert its threat to inference is smaller in analyses studying the enactment of legal provisions 
and more problematic in studies exploring enforcement and compliance. Accordingly, I conduct 
the analysis in this chapter, along with those in Chapters Three and Five, with the assumption 
that rules-in-form match rules-in-use. I do not carry the assumption into Chapter Seven, where I 
use a controlled comparison to study the implementation and enforcement of Kenya’s regulatory 
regime. 
 As many have identified, rules do not enforce themselves, and rules in the book do not 
always mirror rules in action (Pound, 1910; Commons, 1924; V. Ostrom, 1976; E. Ostrom, 2005; 
McGinnis, 2011). Cole (2017, pp. 11-16), working in the Ostroms’ tradition of institutional 
analysis, provides the necessary terminology to explain these observed differentials using a 






According to Cole, there are three types of rules. Type 1 working rules include formal legal rules 
that closely resemble working rules. Type 2 working rules are those where legal rules interact 
with social norms to produce working rules that deviate from legal rules. Then, Type 3 working 
rules are those where legal rules share no apparent relation with de facto working rules. The 
following figure attempts to visually depict Cole’s typology (left panel) and apply it to an 
example comparing constitutional rights (de jure) and civil liberties (de facto) (right panel).  
Figure 4.1: Cole’s Typology Applied to Constitutional Rights and De Facto Civil Liberties 
 
Adapted from “Laws, Norms, and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework” (Cole, 2017, pp. 11-16) 
and The Endurance of National Constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009:54, Figure 3.3(b)). Shaded areas 
arbitrarily assigned to depict Cole’s typology among de jure constitutional rights and de facto civil liberties. 
 The scatterplot in Figure 4.1 shows measures of civil liberties enshrined in constitutions (x-
axis) and civil liberties experienced by citizens (y-axis). Higher numbers indicate greater civil 
liberties in both directions. The shading represents Cole’s working rules. Type 1 working rules, 
where formal rules closely resemble working rules, are countries where constitutional protections 
closely approximate civil liberties. In these countries, there is a strong, positive correlation 
between de jure and de facto. Type 2 rules, where formal rules interact with social norms to 
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produce working rules, are countries in the moderately shaded area. In these cases, the 
correlation between de jure and de facto is positive but nosier than Type 1 rules. Type 3 rules, 
where formal rules share no apparent relation with working rules, are in the lightly shaded 
periphery. Notice that deviating from legal rules is not necessarily bad. Some deviations signal 
“outperforming” legal rules, such as New Zealand and Australia (top-left), where de facto civil 
liberties exceed de jure civil rights. The opposite is also true, and some countries “underperform” 
the rights enshrined in their constitutions—e.g., Eretria and Turkmenistan (bottom-right). 
 Rarely have scholars studying CSO laws discussed the implications of the legal-rules versus 
working-rules difference (cf. DeMattee & Swiney, 2020). Yet, acknowledging Cole’s typology is 
relevant to the study of regulatory regimes because scholars have identified the inconsistent, 
subnational enforcement of permissive and restrictive rules in countries such as Ethiopia, North 
Korea, and Russia (S. Snyder, 2007; Cunningham, 2018; Toepler et al., 2019), but theory for 
explaining inconsistent enforcement and compliance does not yet exist. This legal-rules versus 
working-rules differential is perhaps the least studied yet most important agenda in the research 
program studying CSO laws and policies. This task of theory-building is at the center of my 
analysis in Chapter Seven.  
Operationalizing a Coded Legal Corpus 
 In Chapter Two, I discussed collecting, translating, and coding a legal corpus of 285 laws 
enacted by 17 countries between 1872 and 2019. A critical step in that process was using the 
ADICO syntax to transform the matrix typology mentioned above into a 58-item coding 
protocol. With coding complete, the data exist as a rectangular dataset where each row represents 






that inventoried that version’s contents. I use a deductive approach to construct indicators 
following a priori decision rules (Gerring, 2012b, p. 172). The rules are that if the law contains a 
particular restrictive provision, I code the provision as -1. If the law does not discuss the 
restrictive provision, I code the provision as absent (N/A). If the law contains the negation of the 
restrictive provision, I code the provision as +1. The rules do not use 0 for any outcome because 
present, absent, and negation represent all possible coding outcomes. A symmetrical set of rules 
codes permissive provisions: present +1; absent N/A; negation -1. From there, it is possible to 
quantify several aggregate scores that are clear, explicit, and replicable.12   
• Law-level Score13—sum all nonzero values of a given law. Aggregation produces an 
integer value between -58 (i.e., all provisions present and all permissive provisions in 
negation) and +58 (i.e., all provisions present and all restrictive provisions in negation). 
This summative index allows analysts to compare laws coarsely.  
• Country-year-provision Score—average nonzero counts of a given provision from all 
laws actively contributing to the country’s regulatory regime in the given year. Averaging 
equally weights all laws and creates a country-year-provision value (possibly non-
integer) between -1 and +1. Averaging is preferred to summation so as not to overcount 
countries with many laws active at once. The coding protocol does not contain 0 values, 
and the only way for a country-year-provision value to be zero is if a country’s regulatory 
regime contains an equal number of -1s and +1s for that provision. It is possible to 
 
12 The Appendix contains a discussion of measurement validity that some readers may find valuable. 
13 The aggregation formula equally weighs all provisions because there is no theoretical expectation that leads to an 
alternative weighting scheme. Researchers have used similar equally-weighted indexes to estimate constitutional 
boundaries of executive lawmaking and immigrant policy in American states (J. Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-






calculate country-year-provision values for any legal provision in the coding protocol. 
This precision allows analysts to compare between and within cases the presence of each 
provision (or constellations of provisions). 
• Country-year-regime Score—sum all country-year-provision scores for all provisions (or 
within subgroup for a subgroup score). Aggregation results in a value (possibly non-
integer) between -58 and +58. The summative index allows analysts to compare 
regulatory regimes cross-nationally or over time. 
Illustrating the Institutional Development of CSO Laws in 17 Countries 
 Several interesting empirical questions emerge from conceptualizing CSO regulatory 
regimes more precisely. Most pressing is the argument that the government-led crackdown of 
civil society is happening primarily through the enactment of laws, not the removal of policy 
(Carothers, 2006; Gershman & Allen, 2006; Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Rutzen, 2015; 
Dupuy et al., 2016). This suggests regulatory regimes are changing by becoming bigger and 
more restrictive. The degree to which this is true is a falsifiable, empirical question that can be 
studied systematically. I demonstrate how this can be done using my regulatory regime concept 
and operationalizing it by applying my coding protocol to my 285-law legal corpus.  
Because this conceptualization can bore into a regulatory regime’s underlying subgroups, 
research can assess the sequence, tempo, and distance each subgroup changes and moves through 
the two-dimensional space. I find regulatory regimes very rarely change in a stepwise, discrete 
manner and instead develop through a long, slow, and muddled processes. As I illustrate in the 
following sections, knowing what a regulatory regime looks like today is a strong predictor of 






 The following analyses focus primarily on the East African Community (EAC) countries, 
but I also discuss neighboring African countries and the P5 members. The most granular level of 
measurement is the legal provision, which is equivalent to the institutional statements in the 
coding protocol (Tables 4.1 thru 4.4). The level of analysis is always the country, but the units of 
observation can encompass the entire regulatory regime or be as specific as a subgroup or 
particular provision. My descriptive analyses begin at the most aggregate—i.e., the number of 
active laws—and gradually narrow to discuss the data at smaller units of observation. 
 To preview my main descriptive findings, my analysis shows that regulatory regimes are 
not new, and governments have changed these complex legal institutions since statehood. 
Indeed, most of these legal institutions predate a country’s independence and are inherited from 
colonial powers. Second, as expected, laws imprecisely measure regulatory regimes because they 
vary widely and contain very different permutations of legal provisions. Indeed, in each year 
since 1960, the regulatory regimes studied here include, on average, nearly 20 of the 58 legal 
provisions contained in the coding protocol. Next, a “net” measure that subtracts the stock of 
restrictive provisions from the stock of permissive ones is also blunt and imprecise because it 
produces a muddled middle where multiple combinations of restrictive and permissive stocks 
produce identical “net” measures. Fourth, my data show that the four provision subgroups 
change at different speeds and that governments have regularly enacted permissive expansions 
over time. Finally, the data suggest the most effective approach to evaluate the institutional 
change in regulatory regimes is to analyze the subgroup. Analyzing the data at this level 
indicates that governments add permissive provisions more than twice as frequently than 






regulatory regime, those bundles are, on average, more than two times larger than the bundles of 
restrictive provisions that governments add.  
Changing Legal Institutions: Active CSO Laws 
 Figure 4.2 shows the number of active laws within the EAC has steadily increased over 
time. Thin lines represent the number of laws in EAC member countries, and thick lines 
represent averages for the EAC (solid), neighboring African countries (dotted), and the P5  
Figure 4.2: Increasing Number of Active Laws (1960 to 2018) 
 
Figure shows the number of laws actively contributing to each country’s CSO regulatory regime. Thin lines represent 
the six EAC member countries, and thick lines sample average for the sample’s three groups: EAC, neighboring 
African countries (Peer Africa), and the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council (P5). Lowess functions 
smooth lines to ease interpretation of the 60-year period. Sources are original data created by qualitatively coding 
primary source documents (i.e., laws) from 17 countries.   
(dashed). The trend of a steadily increasing number of laws appears to apply to other African 






their independence. The group ended the observation period averaging over six laws each and 
averaged four active laws per country throughout the nearly 60-year period. Kenya has the 
highest number of active laws (13 from 2013 onward), while Tanzania and Uganda each had 
only one law early in their history. Combining this data with that from Chapter Three confirms 
that regulatory regimes almost always contain preexisting institutions. Data from other countries 
generally support this: of the data’s 919 country-year observations beginning in 1960, over 89% 
(820) have at least one active law.14 Therefore, analyzing these legal institutions as empty policy 
spaces is an unsupported assumption and may produce spurious findings.  
 These histories also suggest current regulatory regimes are, at least in part, a continuation of 
colonial institutions inherited at independence. Tanzania was the first EAC member to secure its 
independence (1961). At that moment, the Societies Ordinance (enacted 1954; amended 1957, 
1962, 1963, 1969) comprised the Tanzania regulatory regime until new laws joined it in 1973. 
Uganda and Kenya experienced similar colonial inheritances (see Statute Coding Bibliography in 
Appendix). In 1962, Burundi and Rwanda secured their independence with three Nineteenth-
Century Belgian laws shaping their regulatory regimes. Belgian authorities enacted these laws 
between 1888 and 1902, a period during which German East Africa controlled the territories.15 
After its defeat in WWI, Germany ceded control of its African territories to Belgium. At that 
moment, the Belgian mandate expanded and regulated these territories until their independence. 
 
14 This percentage increases to over 93% when I exclude the years before which the Russian and Chinese legal 
databases provide coverage. 
15 German control (approx. 1885 to 1919), Belgian King Leopold II exercised personal rule over the Congo Free State 
(approx. 1885 to 1908), and his government enacted several decrees to regulate civil society that remained part of the 
Belgian mandate (approx. 1908 to 1962). Then, after Germany’s defeat in WWI, it ceded to Belgium control of its 
African territories. At that moment in 1919, the Belgian mandate regulated Burundi and Rwanda until their 






Rwanda eventually repealed the decree with its statute Relating to Non-Profit Making 
Organizations (Law No. 20/2000 § 45). Burundi’s laws contain no such provisions and the 
decree, Institutions. Associations Scientifiques, Religieuses, Philanthropiques, etc. (28 décembre 
1888), appears to still contribute to the Burundian regulatory regime. 
 Countries neighboring the EAC averaged slightly more than one law early in the 
observation window and ended the period averaging over five. The group averaged over 2.5 
active laws per country throughout the period. Ethiopia has the highest number of active laws (at 
least 11 from 2003 onward) while the Central African Republic and Mozambique did not enact 
their first CSO law until 2004 and 1991, respectively. 
 The data suggests P5 members average more active laws than either group of African 
countries. In 1960, France and the United States each had two active laws, and the United 
Kingdom had nine. When legal databases started covering Russia (1979) and China (1980), each 
country had only one active law. Over the remaining four decades, most P5 members gradually 
added laws to their regulatory regimes. They ended the period averaging 14 active laws per 
country in 2018. The United States, however, has never exceeded two active laws for the 
duration of its legal institution that began with the Tariff Act of 1894. This low volume does not 
mean an early ossification of the American regulatory system. The legal corpus contains more 
than two dozen statutes that incrementally changed America’s regulatory regime for over a 
century. Most of these changes are friendly, permissive expansions that changed the tax code, 
which swelled from 89 pages in 1913, to 879 in 1986. Others, such as the Internal Security Act 
of 1950 (amended 1968, 1971; fully repealed 1993), hindered voluntary associations that the 
government—and specifically the Subversive Activities Control Board (“the Board”)—believed 






Provision Types: Changing Stocks of Restrictive & Permissive Provisions 
 The number of active laws in a country is just one measurement of the government’s 
attitude toward civil society. Its imprecision is evident, so perhaps a more useful measure is one 
that explores the contents of laws. Figure 4.3 (left panel) shows the counts of restrictive and 
permissive provisions for every country-year observation in the sample. The different shapes 
represent different country groupings, and the diagonal reference line identifies locations where 
counts of restrictive and permissive provisions are equal. Values above the reference indicate 
permissive provisions outnumber restrictive ones. The data show that the 17 countries in the 
sample generate over 100 unique combinations of restrictive and permissive counts, which is 
another indication that institutional change regularly occurs. The average permissive count (11.5) 
is almost double the average restrictive count (6.5), which explains why most observations are 
above the reference line. Kenya 1963 is the closest country-year value to those average values. 
Illustrating the data in this way reinforces two central arguments of my dissertation: one, a call 
on scholars to conceptualize CSO regulatory regimes as legal institutions of multiple laws fusing 
many restrictive and permissive legal provisions; two, a reminder that these legal institutions 
have long histories. 
 Figure 4.3 shows the same data for a restricted sample of EAC countries at three points in 
time: the year they achieved independence, 1990, and 2018 (right panel). The differences 
between these decades-long observations further demonstrate that preexisting institutions and a 
process of institutional change characterize these legal institutions. At independence, four EAC 
members had more permissive provisions than restrictive ones. Uganda and Tanzania are the 
exceptions. At independence, their regulatory regimes were overweight restrictive provisions. 






It appears Tanzania is the only member to add permissive provisions, and South Sudan the only 
member to expand its restrictive stock while shrinking its permissive one. The remaining  
Figure 4.3: Changing Stocks of Restrictive and Permissive Provisions (1945 to 2018) 
 
Figure shows country-year counts of restrictive provisions (x-axis) and permissive provisions (y-axis). Left panel 
shows data for the full sample (1945 thru 2018). Shapes represent EAC members (squares), neighboring African 
countries (circles), and the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council (triangles). Right panel highlights EAC 
member countries at three points in time: statehood, 1990, and 2018. Diagonal reference lines represent equal counts 
of restrictive and permissive provisions.  
members increased both stocks. Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda began in approximately the same 
location at independence and added similar amounts of restrictive and permissive provisions to 
their regulatory regimes. In general, their additions appear to overweight permissive provisions. 
Burundi, in sharp contrast to other EAC members, aggressively added to both provision types 







Subgroup Variation: Expanding Subgroups 
 Unpacking regulatory regime to the subgroup level provides even further information. The 
following figure shows the percentage of coding protocol items that existed in the country’s 
regulatory regime in a given year. I refer to this percentage as “density,” which appropriately 
suggests that higher values represent subgroups with more legal provisions. For example, a 
country-year value of 1 indicates maximum density: the country’s active laws contain legal 
language matching all items in the coding protocol for that subgroup. The indicator is a 
percentage, which standardizes comparison across subgroups with an unequal number of coding 
protocol items.  
Figure 4.4a: Changing Compositions of Regulatory Regime Subgroups (1960 to 2018) 
 
Figure shows density of coding protocol items present in each country’s regulatory regime. Density is a percentage of 
all institutional statements in the subgroup. Panels represent subgroups: Governance (left, 12 provisions) and 
Formation (rightt, 14 provisions). Figure 4.4b contains remaining subgroups. Thin lines represent EAC member 
countries, and thick lines averages for the EAC (solid), neighboring African countries (dotted), and the Permanent 
Members of the U.N. Security Council (dashed). Horizontal reference lines represent average density for each 
subgroup calculated for all country-year observations. Lowess functions smooth lines to ease interpretation of the 60-
year period. 
 Panels in Figures 4.4 show the changing density of each subgroup in the regulatory regime. 
Thin lines represent EAC members, and thick lines represent averages for the EAC (solid), 
neighboring African countries (dotted), and the P5 (dashed). Horizontal reference lines represent 






subgroup (Figure 4.4a, left panel) has 12 items in the coding protocol (see also Table 4.1). The 
average density in the governance subgroup for the regulatory regimes is 0.32. This value means 
that, since 1960, the average regulatory regime contained nearly four governance provisions.16 
The positive slope of all lines in the subgroup suggests governments have added new governance 
provisions to their regulatory regimes over the observation period. The formation subgroup 
(Figure 4.4a, right panel) has 14 items in the coding protocol. The average density is 
approximately 0.50, which is markedly higher than the governance subgroup. On average, the 
regulatory regime contained legal language matching seven of the formation provisions in the 
coding protocol.  
 Figure 4.4b: Changing Compositions of Regulatory Regime Subgroups (1960 to 2018) 
 
Figure shows density of coding protocol items present in each country’s regulatory regime. Density is a percentage of 
all institutional statements in the subgroup. Panels represent subgroups: Operations (left, 16 provisions), Resources 
(right, 16 provisions). Figure 4.4a contains remaining subgroups. Thin lines represent EAC member countries, and 
thick lines averages for the EAC (solid), neighboring African countries (dotted), and the Permanent Members of the 
U.N. Security Council (dashed). Horizontal reference lines represent average density for each subgroup calculated for 
all country-year observations. Lowess functions smooth lines to ease interpretation of the 60-year period. 
 Similarly, the average density for the operations and resources subgroups is 0.26 and 0.28, 
respectively. The values are represented by the horizontal lines in Figure 4.4b. The coding 
protocol contains 16 provisions for each subgroup, which means that regulatory regimes contain 
 






about four operations and resources provisions each. Combining the average values for each 
subgroup leads to a straightforward interpretation suggesting that since 1960, the 17 regulatory 
regimes studied here contain, on average, nearly 20 unique provisions across the four subgroups. 
Over time, this average has increased from 15 unique provisions in 1970, to 17 in 1990, to 29 in 
2018.  
 The panels show interesting subnational variation between and within subgroups that higher 
levels of aggregation hide. Formation provisions are consistently the most represented subgroup 
in the sample. This is logical because formation provisions discuss the legal status and processes 
by which informal voluntary associations incorporate as formal legal entities. Thus, for laws to 
affect particular CSOs, laws must also be created (or updated) to specify distinct legal 
definitions, explain registration processes and requirements, describe rejection and appeal 
protocols, etc. (see Table 4.2). Governance provisions are the second most represented subgroup. 
In 1960, the average EAC country had higher densities of governance provisions (almost 30%) 
than operations or resource provisions. It took three decades of institutional change before 
operations and resource densities reached that 30% benchmark. The EAC added provisions in the 
other subgroups over the period, and by 1990 each had surpassed the subgroup’s average density. 
These patterns of incremental institutional change and subnational variation inform my analyses 
in the next chapter.   
 The EAC, neighboring African, and P5 countries appear to travel unique developmental 
paths, and each path consistently represents institutional change. The average EAC country 
seems to pursue consistent and moderate institutional change over the nearly 60-year period. The 
solid and mostly straight line in each panel supports this, but the thin lines representing EAC 






representing neighboring African countries shows little institutional change before 1980, after 
which the developmental path consistently and moderately increases. Differences in colonial 
institutions may be one possible explanation for this delay. The EAC has more former British 
colonies among them than neighboring countries, which raises the possibility that different 
mechanisms connected with colonial institutions may expedite institutional change. For example, 
British colonial institutions may have established a practice of frequently changing legal 
institutions, or a shared colonial history causes policy innovations to quickly diffuse among a 
network of countries with the same colonial history. 
 The average P5 density was high in 1960, declined until 1980, promptly rebounded to set 
new highs in the early-1990s, and continues to add provisions in each subgroup. This path of 
institutional change is consistent and positive in these global hegemons starting in 1980, about 
the same time when the coverage of Russian and Chinese legal databases begins. These trends 
will inform the analyses of Chapter Five, where I examine policy diffusion from P5 countries to 
East Africa.    
 The density indicator also suggests the sample may contain leader and laggard groups. For 
most years, the average P5 country has higher densities in each subgroup. While the EAC closes 
this gap in the governance and operations subgroups in 1980 and 2018, respectively, the average 
neighboring African country continually lags the P5 in all subgroups. In the late-1990s, however, 
neighboring countries seemed to accelerate the development of resource provisions, and by the 
end of the observation period, those countries closely resembled the EAC. These leader-laggard 
positions are purely suggestive when used with group averages. Assigning these roles to specific 






Subgroup Variation: Changing Permissiveness 
 The regulatory regimes we see today are legal institutions with long histories. While many 
appear inherited from colonial powers, all have incrementally changed at different points in 
different ways. The EAC’s six regulatory regimes contain, on average, over 20 various 
provisions pulled from four provision subgroups. They have included as few as 11 to as many as 
38 provisions (or densities between 0.19 to 0.66). While there are many indications that 
regulatory regimes are getting bigger, it does not necessarily mean they are getting “badder” nor 
“better.” The density measure usefully scales-down to assess regulatory regimes’ changing 
compositions. Yet, similar to counting the number of active laws (e.g., Figure 4.2), the indicator 
bluntly measures institutional change and fails to account for the changing quality of the regime. 
It is my assessment that the best analytical approach is to measure and analyze CSO regulatory 
regimes in a manner that (1) scales-down to the subgroup level to capture the variation that is 
lost by merely counting laws, and (2) maintain the restrictive-permissive dichotomy so as to 
avoid the muddled middle of simple “net” measures. I discuss such a proposal here and use it my 
analyses in Chapter Five. 
 The permissiveness of any regulatory regime, or any of its subgroups, is the degree to which 
the legal institution creates an enabling environment that encourages civil society to grow and 
thrive. If a government develops a regulatory regime to protect and help civil society, then its 
subgroups should contain fewer restrictive provisions and more permissive ones. Regulatory 
regimes undergo permissive expansions if governments add permissive provisions or remove 
restrictive ones. The opposite is also true. Restrictive expansions occur when governments add 






  Next, I compare the sample’s permissiveness across subgroups while also conducting 
within-country comparisons at two points in time—1980 and 2018—for all 17 countries17 
(Figure 4.5). The referent year is 1980 because it is the first year both Russian and Chinese legal 
databases covered laws. Of the five EAC members that existed in 1980, most had favorable 
permissiveness scores in all subgroups. Though Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda all had 
net-restrictive governance provisions, only two had an additional subgroup where restrictive 
provisions outnumbered permissive ones. In 1980, Tanzania had a net-restrictive formation 
subgroup, while Uganda had a net-restrictive operations subgroup. In the decades that followed, 
the five EAC countries changed their regulatory regimes to benefit civil society. 
 Because each country’s regulatory regime contains four subgroups, there are four times as 
many country-subgroup combinations as there are regulatory regimes. Between 1980 and 2018, 
75% of the EAC’s country-subgroup combinations became more permissive, and only 20% 
became more restrictive (formation subgroup Burundi; operations subgroup Burundi, Rwanda, 
Uganda). These percentages are somewhat surprising because this is the period when the 
“closing space” phenomena emerged, and governments began passing laws restricting the civic 
space. In 2018, all six EAC members had a net-permissive resources subgroup, and four had 
favorable permissiveness scores for their governance and formation subgroups. The operations 
subgroup, meanwhile, is net-permissive for only Tanzania and Kenya, which both implemented 
permissive expansions. The four remaining EAC members all have a net-restrictive operations 
subgroup. These countries represent four of the least permissive operations subgroups in 2018. 
 
 
17 Except South Sudan, which earned its independence from Sudan on July 9th, 2011, and was formally admitted to 






Figure 4.5: Changing Permissiveness within Subgroups 
 
Figure shows the changing permissiveness of each subgroup. Left column compares permissiveness in 1980 (hollow 
figures) to 2018 (solid shapes). Missing shapes indicate no provisions of that type in the given year. Right column 
graphs the net change in 1980 and 2018 values. Positive values indicate permissive expansions, while negative values 






 Next is a broader discussion of all countries in the sample. In 1980, the resources subgroup 
had the most countries with net-permissive environments, represented by the large proportion of 
hollow figures with positive values (Figure 4.5 bottom panel). The United States and the United 
Kingdom were the most permissive of these 13 countries. Three countries had neutral 
environments, but none had a net-restrictive resource subgroup. The formation subgroup had the 
second most net-permissive environments. The United States, France, and Malawi led these ten 
countries. Only one country, Tanzania, had a net-restrictive formation subgroup. The data show 
the 1980s operations subgroups are mixed. While there are slightly more net-permissive 
environments than net-restrictive ones, nine countries had neutral operations subgroups. Eight 
net-restrictive governance subgroups outnumbered two net-permissive ones. Burundi, DRC, 
Rwanda, Malawi, and Uganda were the most restrictive, while France and the United States 
represented the only net-permissive environments.        
 The regulatory regimes that existed in 1980 each contained subgroups in which institutional 
change occurred over a nearly 40-year period. By 2018, the greatest number of net-permissive 
environments were resources subgroups (15), formation subgroups (13), governance subgroups 
(8), and operations subgroups (6). The most net-restrictive environments mirrored these: 
operations (9), governance (5), formation (3), and resources (1). Figure 4.5 (left panel) represents 
institutional change as gaps between hollow figures (1980 values) and solid shapes (2018 
values). Solid shapes to the right of hollow figures indicate permissive expansions, and wider 
gaps suggest greater expansions. The horizontal bar chart (Figure 4.5, right panel) communicates 
the same information and standardizes the referent value to zero. Of the 64 country-subgroup 
combinations that existed in 1980 and 2018, 17 (27%) experienced restrictive expansions, but 






experienced no net change. Again, the data challenge the central thesis of the “closing space” 
argument that suggests governments pass restrictive laws to minimize civil society. It is the case 
that restrictive provisions emerge, but that is not the whole story. Indeed, permissive expansions 
occur more frequently than restrictive ones, and they often happen in places where we least 
expect: in semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes. This shows the conventional explanation 
that “democracies enact liberal laws while nondemocracies enact illiberal ones” is incorrect.  
 I submit that the conventional explanation is inaccurate because its theorizing and empirical 
investigation have only considered restrictive provisions. In simpler words, conventional wisdom 
is inaccurate because its theory and analyses are incomplete. The data show restrictive 
expansions are not only less frequent but also smaller than permissive expansions. Restrictive 
expansions ranged from -0.07 points (Ethiopia, formation subgroup) to -5.5 points (Burundi, 
operations subgroup), and changed permissiveness by an average -1.77 points. Permissive 
expansions, meanwhile, ranged from 1 point (China, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, United States, 
Zambia in various subgroups) to 8.3 points (Russia, formation subgroup), and changed 
permissiveness by an average +2.99 points.  
 Descriptive inference suggests three findings that I apply in my analyses in Chapter Five. 
One, institutional change began early and occurred frequently. Two, when institutional change 
occurs, governments add more permissive provisions than restrictive ones. And three, the 
majority of observed institutional change occurs within nondemocratic political regimes. This 
discussion and descriptive analysis has introduced the analytical value of subgroups and, at 
several points, emphasized the importance of preexisting institutions and institutional change. 






through the addition of restrictive and, more commonly, permissive legal provisions. But as the 
data also shows, institutional change varies by country. 
Conclusion 
 Recent global affairs and political developments have led governments, practitioners, and 
social scientists to give renewed attention to the regulatory systems that oversee the activity of 
civil society organizations, or what I call CSO regulatory regimes. While this is a relevant and 
timely subject, academic research in this area has existed for decades (Brass, Longhofer, 
Robinson, & Schnable, 2018), and the contributions of this chapter owe a particular debt to the 
existing work of scholars and analysts. I divided this chapter into two halves. In the chapter’s 
early sections, I conceptualize these legal institutions for the first time and then theorize how 
different ideal-type affect civil society. The remainder of the chapter applied those concepts to a 
legal corpus of 285 laws from 17 countries to produce an original dataset that is more capable of 
studying CSO laws than any to have come before it. These concepts, theories, and original data 
provide new opportunities to answer questions regarding why and how countries regulate CSOs.  
  Reviewing existing research led to the creation of a mixed typology of the provisions that 
comprise regulatory regimes. The first dimension of the typology organizes provisions as either 
restrictive or permissive. Restrictive provisions can deteriorate society’s trust in CSOs and thus 
decreases demand for them, or they can repress and intimidate organizations and thus decrease 
their supply. Permissive provisions, on the other hand, protect society and thus increase demand 
for CSOs, or create and preserve CSOs and thereby increase their long-run supply. The second 
dimension of the framework consists of four policy subgroups. These mutually exclusive 






CSOs that can exist and the procedures for their emergence (formation); establish if and how 
CSOs obtain permission to conduct activities (operations); and outlines how financial and non-
financial assets get recorded and reported (resources). A matrix typology organizes the types of 
provisions analyzed by scholars and presents them in the form of “institutional statements” (S. 
Crawford & E. Ostrom, 2005) for generalizability across contexts.  
I argue CSO regulatory regimes are best understood legal institutions with multiple 
dimensions and long histories. Thus, the study of the development of regulatory regimes requires 
various approaches including but not limited to institutional change through incremental 
adjustment (Lindblom, 1959), endurance (Weingast, 1996), and extended time horizons that 
account for path-dependency, thresholds, and causal chains (Pierson, 1993, 2000, 2003).  
 The ADICO syntax, a tool of institutional analysis, allowed me to transform the matrix 
typology into a coding protocol capable of rigorously coding laws from 17 countries. By 
systematically coding laws and inventorying their legal provisions, I was able to identify and 
measure institutional change within the sample’s 17 legal institutions. Two descriptive findings 
lay the groundwork for the analysis in the next chapter. First, the number of active laws within 
countries has steadily increased over time. The qualitative analysis finds that nearly all countries 
have always had laws regulating this policy space since before their independences. In many 
cases, colonial powers initially erected the regulatory regimes that new governments inherited at 
independence. The implication of this is that existing research may have severely biased its 
findings by omitting these preexisting institutions. Second, these legal institutions demonstrate 
substantial within-country variation over time and at single moments in time. National level 
measures—e.g., counts of active laws or stocks of provision—appear to hide significant variation 






suggests that subsequent analyses must account for preexisting institutions and use indicators 
that measure variation at the subgroup level. These insights directly inform the analysis 







CSO LAWS IN EAST AFRICA: A CROSS-NATIONAL & REGIONAL COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 Chapter Three showed preexisting institutions contribute to the development of CSO 
regulatory regimes and that legal provisions are different from each other. That analysis was 
limited, however, because it analyzed only a narrow range of restrictive resources provisions and 
omitted all legal provisions enacted before 1993. To overcome those data deficiencies, I made a 
strong turn toward history and narrowed my country sample to produce a novel dataset that I 
descriptively analyzed in the previous chapter. Chapter Four illustrated that regulatory regimes 
have long histories and contain multiple laws that fuse various permissive and restrictive 
provisions into one legal institution. That analysis showed that the legal provisions in regulatory 
regimes frequently change over time and suggests national-level measures—e.g., the number of 
active laws or a net measure of permissiveness or restrictiveness—mask this variation. What is 
more, the descriptive data suggest that permissive provisions are not reserved for democratic 
regimes and that a non-trivial number of nondemocratic countries have enacted permissive 
provisions. Indeed, since 1980, the data suggests it is more than twice as common for 
institutional change to take the shape of new “permissive” provisions rather than “restrictive” 
ones. The data also suggests that permissive expansions are not only more frequent but are also 
twice as large as restrictive expansions. This means that analyses that focus exclusively on the 
enactment of restrictive provisions ignore the type of institutional change that the data suggests is 
both bigger and more routine: new permissive expansions. 
 This new understanding of civil society laws and CSO regulatory regimes raises the stakes 






we must understand the conditions under which governments choose to enact permissive or 
restrictive expansions. Specifically, this means knowing which factors predict the direction and 
size of institutional change. The insights from Chapter Four lead me to alter my analysis in three 
meaningful ways. First, I now use two response variables: one measures restrictive changes and 
the other permissive ones. Second, I replace binary response variables with continuous ones. 
Rather than treating all change as the same (binary) or arbitrarily clumping different sizes 
together (counts), continuous response variables accurately measure the direction and magnitude 
of the year-over-year change to the regulatory regime. 1 Third, the current legal provisions in all 
four subgroups join international commitments and constitutions as preexisting intuitions.2 The 
latter represent preexisting constitutional rules, while current provisions represent preexisting 
collective-choice rules embodied in laws (Buchanan & Tullock, 1961; Brennan & Buchanan, 
1985; E. Ostrom, 2005). 
 To preview, this chapter conducts three interrelated analyses exploring the factors that lead 
governments to add permissive or restrictive rules to their regulatory regime. The analysis asks 
first, do nondemocratic regimes with autocratic institutions enact permissive provisions? Second, 
do laws currently on the books predict the types of new legal provisions that governments enact? 
If so, does that relationship change concerning new permissive and restrictive provisions? Third, 
when governments enact new legal provisions, are these changes associated with the 
circumstances and ideologies in other jurisdictions, namely neighboring African countries and 
 
1 See Appendix Figure 5A for histograms of response variables. 
2 I discussed these four subgroups in Chapter Four. To recap, these mutually exclusive categories contain 58 provisions 
that stipulate how provisions are made and enforced (governance); define the types of CSOs that can exist and the 
procedures for their emergence (formation); establish if and how a CSO obtains permission to conduct activities 






global hegemons? I examine these questions using a novel dataset that represents institutional 
change—i.e., permissive and restrictive expansions—in East African Community (EAC) 
countries between 1980-2016. I analyze this data with a directed-dyad event history analysis 
approach, which allows me to control for the unequal levels of influence that neighboring 
countries and global hegemons have on EAC members. The response variables represent 
institutional change only within the EAC; the data and modeling choice account for institutional 
change within the peripheral group.   
Theoretical Perspectives: Why Do Governments Enact Some Provisions and Not Others 
Explanation One: Regime Type Predicts Institutional Change 
 A growing literature argues that undemocratic governments use CSO laws as a tool of 
repression. This “closing space” literature suggests governments protect their hold on political 
power by enacting restrictive legal provisions that reconfigure CSO regulatory regimes and 
weaken civil society (Carothers, 2006; Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Carothers & 
Brechenmacher, 2014; Dupuy et al., 2016). This line of research leads to the conventional 
explanation that authoritarian regimes enact restrictive legal rules. And assuming the argument is 
symmetrical, the “closing space” literature suggests that democratic regimes enact permissive 
provisions.3 Yet, the analysis in Chapter Four showed that in a sample of 17 countries—few of 
which approach the definition of democratic regimes (see Table 2.3)—permissive provisions are 
quite common in the regulatory regimes authoritarian and hybrid regimes erect and maintain. 
 






This pattern challenges the conventional explanation that has focused primarily on the restrictive 
provisions.     
Lorch and Bunk (2017, pp. 989-991) offer a convincing explanation for the non-trivial 
number of exceptions to the “closing space” argument. They theorize a government manipulates 
its regulatory regime as part of a broader campaign to legitimize the regime and prolong its 
control. The effect is that democratic and nondemocratic governments reach the same de jure 
outcome—i.e., enacting permissive provisions—but do so for different reasons. Democratic 
regimes generally lead governments to enact legal rules that broadly protect rights and liberties 
and implement those rules impartially. Nondemocratic regimes, by contrast, enact permissive 
expansions to manipulate CSOs into directly and indirectly legitimizing the political regime. 
These manipulative tactics include “[using] civil society as a democratic façade” where 
permissive legal provisions and a growing the number of CSOs in the country shows the world 
flashes of democratic attributes (Kailitz, 2013; Lewis, 2013; Lorch & Bunk, 2017, p. 990). 
Another tactic entails “making [CSOs] play by the rules” and crafting regulatory regimes in such 
a way that they entice CSO compliance, which indirectly legitimizes the regime and directly 
gives the government administrative power (Wiktorowicz, 2000; Froissart, 2014; Lorch & Bunk, 
2017, p. 990). A third manipulation tactic, which the authors refer to as “using civil society as a 
strategy to increase output legitimation,” encourages service-oriented CSOs to deliver public 
service goods and support the government’s policy priorities (Lorch & Bunk, 2017, p. 991). 
Supporting evidence of this third tactic is found in China, Kenya, Morocco, North Korea, Peru, 
and Russia (S. Snyder, 2007; Dimitrovova, 2010; Spires, 2011; Brass, 2016; Benevolenski & 






H1: Nondemocratic regimes with a stronger grip on power enact more permissive 
provisions. 
 
Explanation Two: Institutional Change is a Path-Dependent Process 
 Robust analytical frameworks of institutional analysis underscore the importance of history 
and show that one period’s policy outcome shapes the rules of future political action arenas (E. 
Ostrom, 1990; E. Ostrom & Cox, 2010; E. Ostrom, 2011; Cole et al., 2014; McGinnis & Ostrom, 
2014). These preexisting institutions take the form of constitutions, international commitments 
embodied in treaties, legislation, and regulatory rules. Research on CSO laws often discuss the 
long histories of CSO regulatory regimes and acknowledge that laws add, amend, and replace 
each other over time (Salamon & Toepler, 1997; Mayhew, 2005; Bloodgood et al., 2014, p. 723; 
Dupuy et al., 2015; Breen et al., 2017; Maru, 2017; DeMattee, 2019b, pp. 11-13; Musila, 2019; 
Toepler et al., 2019). Yet, scholars rarely include preexisting institutions in their empirical 
analyses choosing instead to analyze lawmaking as if it occurs “in the wild.” But this trend is 
beginning to change.  
 As I showed in Chapter Three, CSO law research benefits from looking up to constitutions 
and the past to preexisting institutions. That research showed that given a constitutional context 
that privileges treaties above ordinary legislation, an international commitment to safeguard 
human rights retards the expansion of restrictive provisions. Unfortunately, the limited statistical 
analyses studying CSO laws have not yet controlled for preexisting collective-choice rules 
(Chaudhry, 2016; Dupuy et al., 2016, pp. 5-8; Reddy, 2018; Bromley et al., 2019; DeMattee, 
2019a; Swiney, 2019; Bakke et al., 2020). This analytical decision is driven, at least to some 






different countries. The data collection and coding procedures discussed in Chapters Two and 
Four are a direct response to this limited data problem.  
 Theorizing and analyzing new CSO laws under the ad hoc assumption that they are 
independent of preexisting institutions is incongruent with longstanding literature analyzing 
institutional development and rule change. Institutional theory does not preclude the possibility 
of large institutional change. Still, theories of path dependence suggest that policy enactment is 
less an exercise of significant reordering and more a process of incremental adjustment 
(Lindblom, 1959). And separate from whether institutional change is massive or incremental, 
institutional development rarely happens tabula rasa in an empty institutional space. Preexisting 
institutions are analytically relevant because preceding steps in a particular direction induce 
further movement in the same direction even when the initial step “originated by historical 
accident” (Pierson, 2000, p. 264). Failing to account for these preexisting institutions leaves 
analysis susceptible to omitted variable bias. In simpler terms, historical institutionalism and 
institutional analysis tell us that preexisting institutions are relevant until they are proven 
insignificant.  
 The descriptive analysis in Chapter Four showed that preexisting legal rules appear 
throughout the legal corpus, and theory tells us those rules almost certainly affect the 
institutional change that shapes de jure regulatory regimes. As an incremental process, 
preexisting institutions change during distinct moments of policy adoption, reinvention, and 
amendment (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, & Miller, 2016). In these moments of institutional 
development, preexisting rules make some change more likely, and other change less likely. I 






government considers changing institutions, the institution’s current rules take on one of four 
relationships with new rules (Mahajan & Peterson, 1985):  
1. Complementary if a preexisting rule increases the probability that the government enacts 
another rule. For example, a preexisting rule that makes CSOs tax exempt may be 
complementary to a later rule permitting a tax deduction for charitable contributions.  
2. Contingent if a preexisting rule is necessary for the enactment of another. CSOs receiving 
tax privileges may be contingent upon first requiring them to register as a particular legal 
form, which itself might be contingent upon first establishing a government agency.  
3. Substitutes if a preexisting rule prevents (or decreases the probability of) the enactment of 
another. A rule prohibiting CSOs from receiving foreign funding is a substitute for a rule 
taxing foreign funding.   
4. Independent if preexisting rules have no relationships with the new rules the government 
is enacting. I refer to this type of unguided development as “change in the wild” because 
it has no relationship with current rules and institutions.   
 In my theory, a government evaluates its preexisting rules and considers whether they 
sufficiently achieve the regime’s aims (Figure 1.1). The theory predicts that institutional change 
does not occur if the current provisions sufficiently achieve a government’s aims. However, if a 
government evaluates the current rules and determines they are insufficient, then a government 
chooses which rules to add and which to remove. And unless current rules are independent of 
future ones—which may be possible, albeit unlikely—then rule changes are in reference to 







 My theory predicts rule changes will be small if the de facto regulatory regime is close to 
achieving a government’s desired outcomes. In democratic regimes that seek to protect rights 
and liberties, a government will react as necessary to change the regulatory regime with 
provisions that meet legitimate aims and are necessary and democracy. This can be achieved by 
either adding new permissive provisions or removing current restrictive ones. As another 
example, hybrid regimes that seek legitimacy will not add permissive provisions into perpetuity. 
Instead, the more permissive the current regulatory regime is, the fewer permissive provisions 
the semi-authoritarian adds. Similar to the notion of diminishing returns, I argue that current 
permissiveness in each provision subgroup—governance, formation, operations, and resources—
has a substitutive effect on future permissive expansions. In simpler terms, once the regulatory 
regime is permissive enough, there is no need to add more permissive provisions. 
 Governments may manipulate legal institutions as part of a broader strategy to stay in 
power. Manipulation may present as a strong executive pushing legislation that hinders a civil 
society that has grown too bold and too strong under a regulatory regime that is too permissive. 
This discrete, heavy-handed response is less likely in environments where democratic rules and 
institutional constraints limit lawmaking. Governments may use indiscrete manipulation in 
different way. Synchronous manipulation occurs when governments use permissive provisions to 
distract from restrictive provisions in the same bill. Asynchronous manipulation takes place 
when a government determines current legal rules no longer align with its current aims and seeks 
institutional change. The goal of the institutional change is to either cull permissive provisions or 
counterbalance them with restrictive ones. The vessel for institutional change is either a bill that 
repeals and replaces a current law or an omnibus amendments bill that changes the contents in 






the consistent pattern is that semi-authoritarians respond to preexisting permissive provisions by 
enacting restrictive expansions. I argue that current permissiveness in each provision subgroup—
governance, formation, operations, and resources—has a complementary effect on future 
restrictive expansions. More simply, the government adds restrictive provisions if the regulatory 
regime is too permissive for the government’s preference. The two path dependency hypotheses 
are:  
H2A: Greater permissiveness in each subgroup—governance, formation, operations, 
resources—has a substitutive effect that decreases the size of later permissive 
expansions.  
H2B: Greater permissiveness in each subgroup—governance, formation, operations, 
resources—has a complementary effect that increases the size of later restrictive 
expansions. 
 
Explanation Three: Policy Diffusion Shapes CSO Laws 
 Current political circumstances and preexisting institutions offer local explanations for why 
governments choose to enact permissive or restrictive expansions. However, both explanations 
presume governments are independent and beyond the influence of international actors. 
Governments can be swayed by adjacent jurisdictions and more powerful countries. Policy 
diffusion is the inter-jurisdictional influence that one government’s policy decision has on 
changing the probability of adoption by the remaining pool of non-adopters (Strang, 1991, p. 
325; Simmons et al., 2006, p. 787; Berry & Berry, 2014, p. 308). Leaders are those jurisdictions 
that have enacted a policy. Laggards are those that are considering enactment. The processes of 






the three broad classes: learning, emulation, and competition (Gilardi, 2015).4 The shared trait of 
all processes is that laggard governments considering adoption first evaluate information from 
leaders who have already adopted a similar policy.  
 Learning is a pragmatic form of information evaluation that focuses on the policy and its 
outcomes. Policies are likely to diffuse if they create more positive results or fewer negative 
ones. This pragmatic learning diffusion process has recently expanded to include sameness-in-
context between two jurisdictions (S. Nicholson-Crotty & Carley, 2016). Here, decisionmakers 
in laggard jurisdictions evaluate information on local factors to handicap and refine their 
expectations regarding whether desired outcomes observed in leader jurisdictions will replicate 
locally. Increased sameness in the “implementation environment” may include jurisdictional 
similarities along with structural or institutional characteristics, government’s capacity to 
monitor and enforce policy, and society’s willingness to comply with the policy (S. Nicholson-
Crotty & Carley, 2016, pp. 78,82). Increased sameness in the implementation environment 
corresponds with the notion of “institutional stickiness,” where the likely success of a proposed 
institutional change is dependent on the ability of the change to “stick” where it is adopted 
(Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008). 
 Emulation is a sociological form of information evaluation that focuses on the leader 
government that adopted the policy rather than the policy or its objective consequences. 
Normative pressure drives one type of sociological emulation, known as the neighborhood effect. 
According to this process, the probability of enacting a given policy is positively correlated with 
 
4 The competition process of policy diffusion is beyond the current scope of this research. Testing for that process 
requires first identifying whether the policies have a measurable effect in the leader’s jurisdiction, and then 






the percentage of jurisdictions in the area that have previously enacted it. Analysts have found 
null results when testing for the neighborhood effect among CSO laws (Dupuy et al., 2016; 
DeMattee, 2019a). These null results conform with critiques policy scholars have for the 
approach. Specifically, the neighborhood effect is inaccurate because it operationalizes diffusion 
bluntly as a simple average effect across all prior adopters that are geographically close (Volden, 
2006, p. 295; Boehmke, 2009, p. 1125; Carley et al., 2016, p. 11). Another and more precise 
approach measures how ‘close’ jurisdictions are concerning political and historical factors, and 
then tests if that ‘closeness’ correlates with enactments. The emulation process predicts a laggard 
jurisdiction is more likely to imitate leaders that are ‘closer’ along certain measurable factors. 
Imitation occurs when a laggard jurisdiction imitates a leader because of its strong reputation and 
credibility (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013), shared characteristics such as religious group and 
common colonial heritage (Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006; 
Berinzon & Briggs, 2019), or similar ideological and democratic convictions (Baldwin et al., 
2019).  
 Together, I make three arguments drawing on this policy diffusion literature. The original 
data that I use makes it possible to frame my arguments in terms of both direction and size. First, 
regulatory regime expansions are larger if laggard and leader jurisdictions have similar 
implementation environments as measured by levels of organized opposition by CSOs to the 
current political system. Second, regulatory regime expansions are larger if jurisdictions have 
similar ideologies as measured by voting patterns in the UN. Third, expansions are larger if 
jurisdictions share common colonial histories. I reformulate these arguments into three testable 






H3A: Greater leader-laggard similarity in the implementation environment increases the 
size of the expansion regardless of the provision type. 
H3B: Greater leader-laggard similarity in political ideology increases the size of the 
expansion regardless of the provision type. 
H3C: Sharing a common colonial past increases the size of the laggard’s expansion 
regardless of the provision type. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Research Design 
 In Chapters Two and Four, I discussed collecting and systematically coding a legal corpus 
of 285 laws from 17 countries that produced the original dataset necessary for this analysis. I 
chose the EAC as the core group of countries to study. On theoretical grounds, the EAC is 
representative of African, low-, and middle-income countries. There is considerable political, 
social, and economic variation both between- and within-cases (Table 2.2). On practical grounds, 
these countries received their independence relatively recently, which allowed me to code their 
entire legal histories. My sample also includes a peripheral group to account for peer neighbors 
and global hegemons whose politics and policies might influence institutional change within the 
EAC core. The six countries adjacent to the EAC and the five Permanent Members of the UN 
Security Council (P5) constitute this peripheral group.     
 My research questions and hypotheses consider two dimensions of institutional change: 
direction and magnitude. These questions require a different analytical approach compared to 
what policy diffusion analyses generally use. Quantitative research studying CSO laws typically 
analyzes enactment among a large sample of countries and typically do not control for 
differences between laws (cf. DeMattee, 2019a; Bakke et al., 2020). Such an approach is 
common among diffusion analysts who use pooled event history analysis (PEHA) that stacks the 






2016). And similar to most quantitative research on CSO laws, PEHA imposes a homogeneity 
assumption on adoption events—i.e., all outcomes are either 0 or 1—that reality often violates 
(Jones, 1994; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004b; Kreitzer & Boehmke, 2016). 
 A more nuanced approach to event history analysis “emphasizes the unique determinants of 
a specific policy” and reveals that “certain variables have a heterogeneous effect” on adoption 
events (Jones, 1994; Kreitzer & Boehmke, 2016, pp. 123, 134; DeMattee, 2019a). Some analysts 
use multilevel modeling with random intercepts and random coefficients to control for policy 
heterogeneity (e.g., Kreitzer, 2015). In this analysis, policy heterogeneity is my precise focus. I 
examine policy heterogeneity to understand how the inventory of provisions within a regulatory 
regime changes over time while controlling for local, historical, and diffusion factors using a 
directed dyadic approach.  
 The directed dyadic approach organizes the data so that each country-dyad appears twice in 
a given year, alternating the identity of the leader and laggard country in the second observation 
(Boehmke, 2009, p. 1127). The data contain two types of dyads because unavailable data limits 
the number of cases for which I can construct politically relevant dyads. The six members of the 
East African Community (EAC), which is the primary sample in this analysis, comprise the first 
dyad type. EAC members have directional dyads with each other and generate at most 30 
observations each year with each state taking a leader and laggard position (6leaders x 5laggards = 
30directed-dyads). Remaining countries take only leader positions. Six countries adjacent to the EAC 
take a leader-only position and generate at most 36 observations annually. The P5 members 
represent global hegemons and generate 30 observations annually. 
 I fully conceptualize CSO regulatory regimes in Chapter Four. Here, I review those 






of multiple laws that combine various permissive and restrictive provisions. Permissive 
provisions are those that increase the autonomy of CSOs by making it easier to form and operate, 
enlarging their permissible scope of activities and lessening or eliminating restrictions on access 
to resources. Greater permissiveness strengthens society’s trust in CSOs, tends to increase the 
demand for CSOs, and contributes to organizational pluralism (World Bank, 1997; Kiai, 2012). 
Restrictive provisions lessen the autonomy of CSOs by imposing restrictions on their ability to 
self-govern, form, operate, and access resources (Swiney, 2019). Restrictive provisions may also 
reduce the public’s trust in CSOs and, therefore, decrease demand for their contributions, and 
ultimately, shrink the number and diversity of CSOs in a given country.  
 Figure 5.1 is another illustration of the data discussed in Chapter Four, but with variables 
relevant to the analyzes in this chapter. The panels show when and how frequently governments 
enact permissive expansion (left panels) and restrictive expansions (right panels). The top panels 
show that governments in East Africa have added both permissive and restrictive provisions to 
their regulatory regimes for several decades. The thick lines represent a regional average of the 
12 East African countries studied here, while thin lines represent individual countries. While 
these regional averages appear to have lower variation than individual countries, the average 
permissive expansion (thick line, top-left panel) appears larger than the average restrictive 
expansion (dashed line, top-right panel). The top panels in Figure 5.2 use a lowess function to 
smooth lines and ease the interpretation over the 60-year observation period. Histograms (bottom 
panels) complement the smoothing function to show the nearly 20 instances when governments 
in East Africa added over five new provisions to the preexisting regulatory regime. Combined, 
these graphs show the institutional change of regulatory regimes in East Africa is neither smooth 






Figure 5.1: Institutional Change & Changing Spaces of CSO Regulatory Regimes in East Africa 
 
Figure shows how East African CSO regulatory regimes changed from 1960 through 2019. Left panels show 
permissive provisions while the right panels show data on restrictive provisions. In the top panels, the thin lines 
represent individual countries, and the thick lines show an average across East African countries. Histograms omit 
zero-values, which account for 94% of permissive expansions and 96% restrictive expansions in the 602 country-year 
observations shown in the figure.  
 In Chapter Four, I discussed how top-level indicators—e.g., number of active laws (Figure 
4.2), total stocks of restrictive or permissive provisions (Figure 4.3)—may blur or simplify the 
institutional development happening within regulatory regimes. Another example of this is net 
permissiveness, where midrange values are muddled because multiple combinations of 
permissive and restrictive stocks can yield the same overall value on the indicator. The existence 
of this muddled middle leads me to deconstruct the total stock of provisions into two indicators: 
one a stock of permissive provisions, the other the stock of restrictive provisions.5 When the 
 
5 Separating the total stock in this manner is conceptually and operationally similar to deconstructing the highly cited 
POLITY variable of the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2017, p. 17) into its underlying Institutionalized Democracy 






analysis uses one provision type as a response variable, I use the other as a control variable. 
Year-over-year changes in these stocks become the response variables in this analysis (discussed 
below). Due to their continuous nature, my primary analysis is an OLS that regresses the year-
over-year change in the stock of the provision type on explanatory variables and appropriate 
controls. I conduct each analysis once for permissive and once for restrictive provisions. As a 
robustness check, I round the response variables to the nearest integer allowing me to verify my 
findings with a negative binomial regression model (NBRM).6 I cluster all standard errors by 
dyad pair to address potential intra-dyad dependencies and heteroskedasticity (Reiter & Stam, 
2003; Volden, 2006) and limit the analysis to only those dyads where the leader had a larger 
stock of the provision type than the laggard, which methodologists suggest eliminates potential 
bias (Boehmke, 2009). The first year in the dataset is 1980, the earliest point Soviet/Russian 
(1979) and Chinese (1980) laws were available through Consultant Plus (Russian: Консультант 
Плюс) and Westlaw China legal databases, respectively. 
Response Variable 
 The legal corpus described in Chapter Four provides the data needed to calculate my 
response variables. In this analysis, the response variables measure the direction and magnitude 
of year-over-year changes in the regulatory regime. One factor challenging the proper 
operationalization of the response variables is that multiple laws simultaneously comprise 
 
6 Policy diffusion literature does not generally combine continuous or count models with the directed dyad-year 
approach. Such applications are common in comparative politics and international relations studying the frequency of 
economic sanctions (King, 1989), the volume of refugee flows between countries (Moore & Shellman, 2007), the 
number of corporate participants in CSR frameworks (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012), the count of transnational terrorists 
attacks (Findley, Piazza, & Young, 2012), the impact of trade exit costs on the rate of conflict initiations (Peterson, 






regulatory regimes. For example, the legal corpus shows EAC members have as few as one to as 
many as 13 laws contributing legal provisions to the country’s regulatory regime. The simplest 
way to resolve this would be to focus on the enactment of particular laws, which would 
operationalize the response variable as the year-over-year change in the number of laws that 
contribute to the regulatory regime. Though straightforward and replicable, this 
operationalization risks oversimplifying these legal institutions while failing to account for 
differences in each law’s content. Together, these faults could yield misleading results and Type-
I and Type-II errors (Volden, 2002; Bailey & Rom, 2004; DeMattee, 2019a). 
 When studying institutional change, analysts sometimes use aggregate measures and 
“summative indexes” for theoretical, conceptual, and methodological reasons (Volden, 2002; 
Bailey & Rom, 2004; J. Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011, pp. 615-616). This 
operationalization requires knowing the type of change that occurs and not simply whether 
change happens. This solution, which remains replicable despite being harder, is the one I use to 
measure the direction and magnitude of institutional change within CSO regulatory regimes. In 
Chapter Four, I discussed operationalizing a coded legal corpus using the ADICO syntax and a 
58-item coding protocol. My first step uses brute force to code the contents of each law 
qualitatively. The coding protocol is a tool that I use to determine whether a legal provision 
exists in a law. When a law contains a particular restrictive provision, I code the provision as -1. 






law contains the negation of the restrictive provision, I code the provision as +1. A symmetrical 
set of rules codes permissive provisions: present +1; absent N/A; negation -1.7   
 My second step aggregates coded values of each provision across all active laws in a 
country. I do this by averaging all nonzero counts of a given provision from all laws adding to 
the regulatory regime in a particular year. Averaging equally weights all laws and creates a 
country-year-provision value (possibly non-integer) between -1 and +1. Averaging is desirable 
because it does not inflate values for countries with many laws active at once. The result of this 
second step is one value for each provision for each country-year measure.  
 My third step produces two country-level summative indexes. One summative index totals 
all country-year-provision values that are positive. This represents the stock of permissive 
provisions. Because the coding protocol contained 58 items, this stock of permissive provisions 
is bounded between 0 and +58—i.e., all permissive provisions present and all restrictive ones 
negated. The other summative index is the absolute value of all negative country-year-provision 
values, which represents the stock of restrictive provisions. It is also bounded between 0 and 
+58—i.e., all permissive provisions present and all restrictive ones in negation.   
 The final step generates the response variables that I use to study the conditions under 
which governments choose to enact permissive or restrictive expansions. I calculate both 
response variables by taking the first difference of each non-integer summative index.8 
 
7 I demonstrate this using the coding-protocol item: “All CSOs are forbidden to appeal a registration denial or a 
deregistration order after such a decision has been communicated or else face a noncompliance sanction.” As 
written, this institutional statement is a restrictive provision. If the law does not contain any language matching it, 
then I code it as absent (N/A). If a law contains language matching this restrictive provision, then I code it as a -1. If 
the law contains language matching the negation of the institutional statement—i.e., all CSOs may appeal a 
regulator’s unfavorable decision—then I code it as +1. Chapter Two discusses this coding procedure in detail. 
8 For the NBRM robustness check, I round the non-integer index to its closest integer value before taking the first 






Permissive Expansion is the year-over-year change in the stock of permissive provisions in the 
regulatory regime. This response variable ranges from -2 to 11 (Table 5.2, top panel). Positive 
values identify instances where a government added permissive provisions to its regulatory 
regimes. Negative values represent a government stripping permissive provisions out of the 
regulatory regime. Restrictive Expansion is the year-over-year change in the stock of restrictive 
provisions in the regulatory regime. The response variable ranges between -2.67 and 5 (Table 
5.2, bottom panel). Positive values flag observations where a government added restrictive 
provisions to the regulatory regime, while negative values represent a government removing 
restrictive provisions. 
Key Independent Variables 
 I measure Nondemocratic Grip on Power using the institutionalized autocracy variable 
produced by the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2017). The indicator is an additive eleven-
point scale (0-10) with higher values indicating weaker political participation, narrower 
executive recruitment, and fewer constraints on the executive. The variable tests my political 
regime hypothesis H1, which predicts nondemocratic regimes with a stronger grip on power 
enact more permissive provisions. In the 37 years analyzed, the six EAC countries had an 
average institutionalized autocracy score of 4.1 (n=186, std. dev. 2.30, min. 0, max. 7). These 
midrange values exemplify the types of hybrid regimes that exist in East Africa.9 In 1990, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Cuba, Kenya, Libya, and Vietnam were among the 30 countries 
with an institutionalized autocracy score of seven. Then, in 2000, Kyrgyzstan, Singapore, and 
 
9 EAC countries do not seem representative of the strong autocracies familiar to us from the late-1990s onward—e.g., 
Iraq (9 from 1990 to 2002), North Korea (10 from 1990 to 2016), Saudi Arabia (10 from 1990 to 2016), Syria (9 from 






Tunisia joined Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda as six of the 11 countries with an autocracy measure 
of four. In 2016, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Mauritania, and Uganda were the only countries with 
an institutionalized autocracy measure of two. I import the variable through the Varieties of 
Democracy dataset (V-Dem v.8, Coppedge et al., 2018).     
 Similar to the response variables, the legal corpus described in Chapter Four provides the 
data needed to test my two path dependency hypotheses. The first, H2A, predicts the more 
permissive the current regulatory regime is, the smaller the permissive expansion. This predicted 
substitutive relationship is similar to the notion of diminishing returns. The second, H2B, 
predicts the governments in hybrid regimes respond to permissive provisions by enacting 
restrictive ones. Thus, the more permissive the current regulatory regime is, the larger the 
restrictive expansion. I measure permissiveness for each mutually exclusive subgroup.10 The 
independent variables Governance Permissiveness, Formation Permissiveness, Operations 
Permissiveness, and Resources Permissiveness represent the permissiveness of each subgroup (0 
to 100). The number of permissive provisions minus the number of restrictive provisions 
calculates subgroup permissiveness. As with the response variables, I weigh all provisions 
equally to produce a clear, explicit, and replicable aggregation structure.11 To standardize values 
across subgroups as percentages, I divide each subgroup’s permissiveness by the number of 
provisions within each subgroup according to the coding protocol (12 for governance, 14 for 
 
10 Governance provisions stipulate how provisions are made and enforced; formation provisions define the types of 
CSOs that can exist and the procedures for their emergence and renewal; operations provisions establish if and how a 
CSO obtains permission to conduct activities; resources provisions prescribe how to record and report financial and 
non-financial assets (see full discussion in Chapter Four). 
11 I suspect the resulting measurements are imprecise and there is no theoretically grounded weighting scheme 
directing aggregation. I expect the “noisy” indicator will increase my standard errors, shrink my coefficients, and 
make it harder to find statistically significant relationships. Despite these challenges, this indicator is far more nuanced 






formation, 16 for operations, 16 for resources). To simplify interpretation, I rescale the measures 
to a 100-point scale.12  
 The third part of my analysis tests three policy diffusion hypotheses. The first policy 
diffusion hypothesis, H3A, predicts that if a laggard’s implementation environment is similar to 
a leader’s implementation environment, then the former is more likely “learn from” the leader. In 
this analysis, I measure the implementation environment using the CSOs are anti-system variable 
available in the Verities of Democracy dataset (V-Dem v.8, Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 178).13 
Similar Implementation Environment is a continuous variable that measures the degree to which 
CSOs in separate countries have the same level of organized opposition to the current political 
regime. The second policy diffusion hypothesis, H3B, predicts a laggard jurisdiction will 
“emulate” a leading jurisdiction if the two governments have similar political ideologies. I use 
the country’s ideal point in the United Nations multidimensional issue space as a proxy for its 
political ideology (Voeten, 2013; Bailey et al., 2017). Similar Political Ideology is a continuous 
variable that measures the degree of similarity between two countries’ ideal points on 
international matters.  
 Common Colonial Past is self-defining and tests my final policy diffusion hypothesis 
(H3C). The variable has a binary, time-invariant value of 1 if jurisdictions share a common 
colonial past. I do not code the United States as sharing a colonial history with other British 
 
12 The formula for rescaling was: (((subgroup’s permissiveness)/(subgroup’s # of provisions) x 50) + 50). An applied 
example is: (((-5.67)/12) x 50) + 50) = ((-0.4725) x 50) + 50) = (-23.625 + 50) = 26.375. 
13 An anti-system opposition movement is any domestic movement—peaceful or armed organized in opposition to the 
current political regime. Its aims are to change society and governmental control in fundamental ways—e.g., from 
democratic to autocratic, from capitalist to communist, from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa for any). The 
variable was initially collected using ordinal intervals and converted to a continuous interval using a Bayesian item 






colonies. All policy diffusion variables measure the degree of sameness in context between two 
jurisdictions with higher values indicating greater similarity. Table 5.2 shows the descriptive 
statistics for all variables. The top panel shows descriptive statistics for all permissive 
expansions, and the bottom shows similar information for restrictive expansions.  
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics—Selected Variables Only 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Response Variables      
  Permissive Provisions (continuous) 1,251 0.17 1.04 -2.00 11.00 
  Permissive Provisions (integer) 1,234 0.20 1.00 0 11 
Independent Variables      
  Nondemocratic Grip on Power (t-1) 1,251 4.11 2.24 0 7 
  Governance Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 45.30 7.72 37.50 70.83 
  Formation Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 53.37 6.00 42.86 78.57 
  Operations Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 47.56 8.49 28.13 65.63 
  Resources Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 57.94 3.96 53.13 69.79 
  Similar Implementation Environment (t-1) 1,251 -1.15 0.91 -5.03 0.00 
  Similar Political Ideology (t-1) 1,251 -1.11 1.10 -4.13 0.00 
  Common Colonial Past 1,251 0.18  0 1 
Control Variables 1      
  Commitment to Guard Human Rights 1,251 0.83  0 1 
  Constitution Bolsters Commitments 1,251 0.08  0 1 
Sample Characteristics      
  Number of Active Laws - Laggard 1,251 3.79 2.05 1 13 
  Number of Active Laws - Leader 1,251 6.66 4.92 1 27 
  Calendar Years  2000  1980 2016 
Response Variables      
  Restrictive Provisions (continuous) 741 -0.01 0.51 -2.67 5.00 
  Restrictive Provisions (integer) 715 0.04 0.40 0 5 
Independent Variables      
  Nondemocratic Grip on Power (t-1) 741 3.68 2.31 0 7 
  Governance Permissiveness (t-1) 741 47.18 10.01 37.50 70.83 
  Formation Permissiveness (t-1) 741 54.18 7.18 42.86 78.57 
  Operations Permissiveness (t-1) 741 51.34 7.31 28.13 65.63 
  Resources Permissiveness (t-1) 741 59.21 4.63 56.25 69.79 
  Similar Implementation Environment (t-1) 741 -1.04 0.88 -4.39 0.00 
  Similar Political Ideology (t-1) 741 -0.52 0.67 -3.48 0.00 
  Common Colonial Past 741 0.28  0 1 
Control Variables 1      
  Commitment to Guard Human Rights 741 0.90  0 1 
  Constitution Bolsters Commitments 741 0.08  0 1 
Sample Characteristics      
  Number of Active Laws - Laggard 741 4.34 2.85 1 13 
  Number of Active Laws - Leader 741 8.05 6.28 1 27 
  Calendar Years  2002  1980 2016 







Control Variables  
 My first control variable measures the number of provisions added to the CSO regulatory 
regime but of the type opposite that the response variable. Restrictive Rules Enacted are the 
number of restrictive provisions added to the regulatory regime in the same country-year 
observation as the response variable. Permissive Rules Enacted measures the number of 
permissive provisions that a government enacted concurrently with the restrictive expansion. The 
UN Office of Legal Affairs and the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) provide the raw 
data to control for international commitments and constitutional differences. The former provides 
information on a country’s support for human rights, specifically whether and when a country 
ratifies the ICCPR. For each country-year observation, International Commitment to Guard Civil 
and Political Rights (Commitment to Guard Human Rights for short) is operationalized as 1 if 
the country ratified the ICCPR human rights treaty.  The CCP provides constitutional texts for 
214 independent countries from 1789 (Elkins et al., 2014b). Constitutional Rules Strengthen 
International Commitments (Constitution Bolsters Commitments for short) is operationalized as 1 
for all constitutional systems that explicitly state international treaties are superior to ordinary 
legislation. The variable equals 0 if the constitution does not mention international treaties or 
gives them a status equal or inferior status to ordinary legislation. 
 Executive Power is a continuous variable measuring the powers given to the country’s chief 
executive. I construct the additive index using data from the CCP and following the working 
paper on the constitutional boundaries of executive lawmaking (Elkins et al., 2012, 2014b). 
Constitutional Freedoms is another additive index constructed from CCP data, which codes 
whether the constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly, association, expression, opinion, 






higher values indicating more constitutional powers entrusted to the chief executive and more 
constitutional enshrined freedoms, respectively. Analyses do not lag Commitment to Guard 
Human Rights, Constitution Bolsters Commitments, Executive Power, or Constitutional 
Freedoms. 
 The Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) provides data for over 100 years of regimes 
around the world (Coppedge et al., 2018) and provides several variables used here. CSO 
Routinely Consulted measures the degree to which policymakers consult major CSOs on matters 
relevant to their members with higher values representing more significant levels of consultation 
(Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 176). The variable was initially collected using ordinal intervals and 
then converted to a continuous interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement 
model (Ibid.).  
 The World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018) provide country-year data for 
population, and net official development assistance received (WBG code DT.ODA.ODAT.KD) 
in constant 2014 US dollars and Gross Domestic Product (WBG code NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) 
measured in constant 2010 US dollars. I combine these data to produce the control variables 
ODA per capita and GDP per capita. The analysis includes two directed-dyad control variables. 
Rule of Law Similarity and Freedoms Similarity each represents the similarity of these variables 
for each country in the dyadic pair, with higher values indicate greater similarity. Cubic splines 
control for time.   
Empirical Findings and Results 
 The following regressions test my hypotheses. Table 5.3 test the hypotheses under 






an OLS regression with a directed-dyad approach, but the appendix includes robustness checks 
using negative binomial regression models (Table 5D and Table 5E). All models include 
directed-dyadic controls and cluster standard errors by dyad pair. The following interpretations 
of the coefficients are made with respect to the full model (model 6 in all tables).  
 I begin with nondemocratic grip on power, which I measure using an eleven-point scale (0-
10) with higher values indicating weaker political participation, narrower executive recruitment, 
and fewer constraints on the executive (Marshall et al., 2017). Nondemocratic grip on power  
positively correlates with permissive expansions in all models. This statistically significant 
relationship provides suggestive evidence that supports my political regime hypothesis (H1) that 
nondemocratic regimes enact permissive provisions to manipulate civil society. The positive 
relationship supports the central thesis of my working theory that governments, whose grip on 
power is strong, use the regulatory regime to provide CSOs with greater operational space. The 
reason for this is that permissive provisions can be a tactic that governments use to give domestic 
and foreign observers the impression of democracy, thus adding to a democratic façade. 
Governments may also enact permissive provisions to grow particular types of CSOs that will 
help the regime deliver public service goods. Improved delivery in public service goods—
whether the government is steering or rowing—bolsters the government’s output legitimacy. 
Then, by using permissive provisions to entice CSO compliance, CSOs directly give the legal 
rules increased credibility, which in turn legitimizes the government’s authority to govern. Such 
compliance also embeds CSOs in a bureaucratic web that directly contributes to administrative 
power held by the government. As I show in Chapter Seven, multiple reasons for enacting 







Table 5.3: OLS Directed Dyad Models Predicting Permissive Expansions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power a 0.07*** 0.06** 0.05* 0.06** 0.06** 0.05* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) 
       
Governance Permissiveness a  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
       
Formation Permissiveness a  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Operations Permissiveness a  -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Resources Permissiveness a  -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* -0.04* 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
       
Similar Implementation Environment a   0.09**   0.09** 
   (0.031)   (0.032) 
       
Similar Political Ideology a    0.00  -0.01 
    (0.026)  (0.026) 
       
Common Colonial Past     -0.02 -0.02 
     (0.069) (0.068) 
       
Restrictive Rules Enacted 0.21* 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
       
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -0.15* -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 
 (0.070) (0.148) (0.145) (0.147) (0.146) (0.142) 
       
Constitution Bolsters Commitments 0.34** 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.02 -0.13 
 (0.121) (0.137) (0.150) (0.136) (0.137) (0.150) 
Observations 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
AIC 3587.92 3560.15 3555.64 3562.15 3562.06 3559.49 
BIC 3664.90 3657.66 3658.28 3664.78 3664.69 3672.39 
Degrees of Freedom 14 18 19 19 19 21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a variables lagged one period (t-1) 
Some controls omitted. See Appendix Table 5B for full results.  
 The effect size of nondemocratic grip on power and its significance are strongest in model 
1, which omits other explanatory variables. The variable retains its sign and significance as 
additional explanatory variables are added to the model. Using the full specification (model 6) 
and holding variables at their mean values, increasing the nondemocratic grip on power by one 






expansion on average by more than 0.10 (p < 0.05).14 The average permissive expansion in the 
data is 0.17, so the discrete change nearly doubles the size of the average permissive expansion. 
The variable representing restrictive provisions enacted concurrently with permissive ones is 
another indication that nondemocratic regimes manipulate CSO laws. When governments enact 
restrictive provisions alongside permissive ones, a one standard deviation increase in the number 
of restrictive rules enacted increases the size of the permissive expansion by 0.17 (p < 0.01). 
These relationships do not exist for restrictive expansions (see Table 5.4). 
 My analysis includes a “lawmaking on rails” argument that predicts preexisting rules have a 
directional relationship with certain types of institutional change. These path dependency 
hypotheses argue that preexisting institutions constrain future changes to regulatory regimes. The 
first predicts governments that seek legitimacy will not add permissive provisions into perpetuity 
(H2A). Similar to the notion of diminishing returns, permissiveness has a substitutive quality: the 
more permissive the current regulatory regime is, the fewer permissive provisions are added. In 
confirmation of H2A, the data show the permissiveness of preexisting institutions is related to 
the size of both permissive and restrictive expansions. For permissive expansions (Table 5.3), 
holding other variables at their mean values, increasing the permissiveness of the governance 
subgroup by one standard deviation, roughly 7 points on the 0-100 scale, decreases the size of a 
permissive expansion on average by -0.24 (p < 0.001). Similar discrete changes in the other 
subgroups further support this hypothesis: formation -0.06 (p = 0.11); operations -0.15 (p < 
0.001); and resources -0.14 (p < 0.05). A Wald test rejects the possibility these linear measures 
 






are simultaneously zero at the 0.001 level (X2(4) = 15.30).15 The negative signs on these 
coefficients support the argument that current permissiveness has a substitutive effect on future 
permissive expansions. The negative signs also correspond to the downward sloping lines in 
Figure 5.2. These graphs also suggest that a lack of permissiveness in these subgroups (x-values 
< 50) predicts larger permissive expansions. 
Figure 5.2: Permissiveness of Preexisting Institutions and Future Permissive Expansions 
 
Figures shows the average marginal effects for each provision subgroup on permissive expansions: governance (left 
panel), formation (center-left), operations (center-right), and resources (right). The vertical reference line bisects the 
dataspace identifying net-restrictive environments (left) and net-permissive environments (right). Downward sloping 
lines support the argument that current permissiveness has a substitutive effect on future permissive expansions.  
 
 
15 Results are not sensitive to the model or methodological approach. Wald tests in other models reject the possibility 
these linear measures are simultaneously zero for restrictive expansions: directed-dyad NBRM rejects at 0.001 level 






Table 5.4: OLS Directed Dyad Models Predicting Restrictive Expansions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power a 0.02+ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Governance Permissiveness a  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Formation Permissiveness a  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Operations Permissiveness a  0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Resources Permissiveness a  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Similar Implementation Environment a   0.02+   0.03* 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
       
Similar Political Ideology a    0.03*  0.04** 
    (0.014)  (0.014) 
       
Common Colonial Past     -0.03 -0.04+ 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Permissive Rules Enacted -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -0.15** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) 
       
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.21*** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
Observations 741 741 741 741 741 741 
AIC 1035.59 1033.39 1034.34 1034.20 1034.89 1036.19 
BIC 1104.71 1120.94 1126.50 1126.36 1127.05 1137.57 
Degrees of Freedom 14 18 19 19 19 21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a variables lagged one period (t-1) 
Some controls omitted. See Appendix Table 5C for full results. 
 The second path dependency argument (H2B) argues that governments will consistently 
respond to permissive provisions by enacting restrictive expansions. Here, current 
permissiveness stokes future restrictive expansions. Hypothesis H2B predicts a complementary 
relationship exists between current permissiveness and future restrictive expansions. The results 






possibility these linear measures are simultaneously zero at the 0.001 level (X2(4) = 13.42).16 
While the four subgroups may be jointly significant, individual subgroups are not equally 
significant. Holding other variables at their mean values, increasing the current permissiveness of 
the operations subgroup by one standard deviation, over 7 points on the 0-100 scale, increases  
Figure 5.3: Permissiveness of Preexisting Institutions and Future Restrictive Expansions 
 
Figures shows the average marginal effects for each provision subgroup on restrictive expansions: governance (left 
panel), formation (center-left), operations (center-right), and resources (right). The vertical reference line bisects the 
dataspace identifying net-restrictive environments (left) and net-permissive environments (right). Upward sloping 
lines support the argument that current permissiveness has a complementary effect on future restrictive expansions. 
the size of the restrictive expansion on average by 0.05 (p < 0.001). Then, increasing the current 
permissiveness of the resources subgroup by one standard deviation, over 4 points, increases the 
 
16 Results are not sensitive to the model or methodological approach. Wald tests in other models reject the possibility 
these linear measures are simultaneously zero for restrictive expansions: directed-dyad NBRM rejects at 0.001 level 






size of the restrictive expansion on average by 0.08 (p < 0.001). Figure 5.3 shows these predicted 
relationships between future restrictive expansions and current permissiveness. The relationship 
is strongest for the operations and resources subgroups.     
 The data suggests that the current permissiveness of operations and resources subgroups are 
the only types of regulatory regime provisions that elicit restrictive responses from governments. 
The remaining subgroups have weak associations with future restrictive expansions. Increasing 
the permissiveness of the governance subgroup by one standard deviation, roughly 10 points on 
the 0-100 scale, increases the size of the restrictive expansion on average by -0.05 (p = 0.32). A 
discrete change in the formation subgroup, roughly 7 points, has a near-zero and statistically 
insignificant relationship with restrictive expansions (p = 0.58). 
 In reaffirming earlier work arguing that the effectiveness of international commitments to 
guard human rights is conditional on specific constitutional provisions (DeMattee, 2019a), the 
data here show that when an otherwise average country’s constitution privileges international 
agreements above ordinary legislation then ICCPR ratification decreases future restrictive 
expansions by -0.20 (p < 0.01). These findings are supported by the robustness checks and 
provide evidence that the institutional development of regulatory regime is partially explained by 
“lawmaking on rails” because it is historically informed and shaped by preexisting constitutional 
collective-choice rules. These findings also mark a crucial contribution to the research program 
that has largely omitted preexisting institutions from analyses and measure all laws as having 
identical contents. 
 My final set of hypotheses argue that policy diffusion influences institutional change within 
regulatory regimes. I argue specifically that separate processes of policy diffusion—learning and 






through a process of pragmatic learning. It asserts that greater similarity between two 
jurisdictions’ implementation environments positively correlates with the size of both permissive 
and restrictive expansions. I proxy the implementation environment using a variable that 
measures the organized opposition by CSOs to the current political system. The data suggests a 
learning process of policy diffusion contributes to institutional change within regulatory regimes. 
What is more, the results suggest that the diffusion process of pragmatic learning is unequal 
across expansion types and is stronger for permissive expansions. Conditional on one jurisdiction 
(the leader) having more permissive provisions than one considering a permissive expansion (the 
laggard), a standard deviation increase in implementation environment similarity increases the 
size of the laggard’s permissive expansion by 0.09 (p < 0.01) holding other variables constant. A 
similar discrete change increases the size of restrictive expansions by 0.02 (p < 0.05), holding 
other variables constant. 
 My second diffusion hypothesis is less about pragmatic learning—”what works best”—and 
more about sociological emulation—”who is doing what.” H3B argues policy diffusion occurs 
through a process of sociological emulation. It asserts that increased similarity between two 
jurisdictions’ political ideology positively correlates with the rule expansions. I measure 
countries’ political ideology according to their ideal point on votes taken in the United Nations. 
The closer two ideal points are, the more similar the two jurisdictions. The analysis finds 
suggestive evidence supporting H3B, but the relationship is weaker for permissive expansions 
than restrictive ones. Conditional on the leader having more permissive provisions than the 
laggard, a standard deviation increase in ideological sameness decreases the size of the laggard’s 






discrete change in ideological sameness increases the size of the laggard’s restrictive expansion 
by 0.03 (p < 0.01), holding other variables constant. 
Figure 5.4: Regression Coefficients Plot (Discrete Change, 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
Figure compares discrete changes among selected coefficient. Discrete changes move continuous variables one 
standard deviation (see Table 5.2 for values) and change binary variables from 0 to 1. Circles represent permissive 
expansions (Table 5.3, model 6), and diamonds represent restrictive expansions (Table 5.4, model 6). “Opposite Rules 
Enacted” represents the Restrictive Rules Enacted variable in the permissive expansion models, and the Permissive 
Rules Enacted variable in restrictive expansion models.  
 The final diffusion hypothesis (H3C) argues sharing a common colonial history increases 
the expansion in the laggard jurisdiction if the leader jurisdiction has more provisions. I find no 
evidence supporting this hypothesis. The data and analyses show that sharing a common colonial 
history surprisingly decreases the laggard’s permissive expansion by more than -0.02 (p = 0.73) 
and decreases restrictive expansions by -0.04 (p < 0.10) holding other variables constant. A 






model (rejected at the 0.05 level (X2(3) = 3.63) and in the restrictive model (rejected at 0.05 level 
(X2(3) = 4.16).17 
Discussion 
  This analysis makes several novel contributions. To begin, it is the first to study permissive 
and restrictive provisions simultaneously in the same analysis. These legal provisions exist in the 
civil society laws that comprise CSO regulatory regimes. As de jure rules, legal provisions 
constrain and incentivize CSO behavior. Permissive provisions protect society and thus increase 
demand for CSOs, or those provisions create and preserve CSOs and thereby increase 
organizational pluralism and voluntary association over time. Restrictive provisions, by contrast, 
deteriorate society’s trust in CSOs and thus decrease demand for such organizations, or they 
repress and intimidate organizations and their members, thus eroding voluntary association. The 
conventional explanation suggests that hybrid regimes, such as those in East African countries, 
enact restrictive provisions to “close” and “shrink” the civic space. Counter to the prevailing 
argument, I find that hybrid regimes frequently enact permissive provisions. The statistical 
analyses provide evidence that nondemocratic grip on power positively correlates with a type of 
institutional change that adds permissive provisions to the current regulatory regime. I argue the 
reason governments add permissive expansions to their current legal institutions is to manipulate 
CSOs into directly and indirectly legitimizing the political regime. These tactics include building 
a democratic façade that gives onlookers the impression of democratic law and order, crafting 
regulatory regimes so that they entice CSO compliance to legitimize the regime and provide the 
 
17 Results are somewhat sensitive to the model. Wald tests following the directed-dyad NBRM reject the possibility 
these linear measures are simultaneously zero at the 0.001 level for permissive expansion (X2(3) = 24.30), but does 






government administrative power, or encouraging service-oriented CSOs to deliver public 
service goods and support the government’s policy. This critical finding calls on researchers to 
give increased attention to the ultimate aims and goals that guide the institutional development of 
regulatory regimes.  
 Second, I build on existing research using original data to incorporate preexisting 
institutions into my theory and analysis. In Chapter Three, I found that preexisting constitutional 
rules constrain lawmaking, specifically the institutional arrangement that minimizes the 
probability a country adopts restrictive provisions is one where international commitment to 
guard civil and political rights exists alongside constitutional rules that strengthen those 
commitments above ordinary legislation. Advancing that institutional argument, this chapter is 
the first to incorporate preexisting collective-choice rules in its analysis. I find that current legal 
provisions predict future legal changes. What is more, greater permissiveness in these current 
provisions decreases subsequent permissive expansions, while current permissiveness increases 
the size of restrictive expansions in the future. In simpler terms, if the permissiveness of current 
laws is sufficient for the government, then the government does not add new permissive 
provisions. But if the current laws are too permissive, then the government will add restrictive 
provisions. 
Third, I find that the learning and emulation processes of policy diffusion are associated with 
the institutional development of regulatory regimes in East Africa. These processes vary 
according to explanation type and deserve further attention in the future. The learning process 






permissive expansions. By contrast, the emulation process of policy diffusion only seems 
relevant to restrictive expansions.18   
Conclusion 
 The dominant argument among researchers studying CSO laws is that restrictive legal 
provisions are uncommon in democratic settings and more likely found in authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian regimes. The logic implies the reverse is also true and that permissive 
provisions are unlikely found in nondemocratic contexts and more likely belong to democratic 
regimes. Yet, as I first showed in Chapter Four, there is a puzzling and non-trivial number of 
exceptions to the conventional explanation, and the descriptive data show that permissive 
provisions characterize a large portion of the legal provisions that comprise CSO regulatory 
regimes in nondemocratic contexts. In this chapter, I find evidence that governments develop 
these legal institutions through a historical process that is influenced by both domestic and 
international politics. My analysis finds that legal institutions we see today are shaped by an 
incremental process in which preexisting institutions and policy diffusion are essential factors. 
 This research makes significant contributions to a growing interdisciplinary literature on 
CSO laws that is gaining increased attention in the Global South and around the world. While 
most prior research on this topic omits permissive provisions and preexisting institutions from 
their analyses and has found little evidence of diffusion, this research finds that all are 
 
18 The data does not find that common colonial history is a relevant factor when it is conceptualized and measured as 
a time-invariant factor. One possible explanation for the null effect of common colonial history is that the statistical 
models are estimating an average effect for the coefficient. Because the variable is historic and time-invariant, I suspect 
this average estimated effect is moderated by time and is strongest early in the period and wanes as time progresses. 
Thus, the four decades of data used here becomes a liability, and the time-varying dimension of colonial history is 
entangled with its fixed effect coefficient. It is reasonable that similar time-varying effects condition the other 






consequential. Yet, despite the careful analysis done here, the scope of inference is limited only 
to changes in de jure legal rules. The importance of de facto working rules increases the value of 
the contribution made here. The legal rules versus working rules difference (first distinguished as 
'law-in-books' versus 'law-in-action' by Pound, 1910; Cole, 2017, p. 829 ) tells us that the de 
facto regulatory regime is what helps or hinders CSOs and voluntary association.  
 This difference is relevant because it tells us how the government represses civil society. 
And wherever civil society experiences a “closing space,” that repression could be the output of 
different combinations of legal rules and working rules. The two extreme examples are: one, 
elected officials enact restrictive legal rules that the bureaucracy implements with minimal 
deviation. These “Type 1 working rules” (Cole, 2017) create a restrictive working rules 
environment that represses CSOs. In a second example, elected officials enact permissive 
provisions, but the bureaucracy deviates from those legal rules when it implements the regulatory 
regime. This combination creates “Type 3 working rules” (Cole, 2017) and leads to the same 
restrictive working rules environment reached in the first example. Simply put, we cannot 
understand what rules create the repression without first knowing the legal rules of the de 
jure regulatory regime. That knowledge is a prerequisite when comparatively studying the 







POLITICS, PRESIDENTS, AND CSO LAWS IN KENYA 
 This chapter is the first of two that uses a single case study, that of Kenya, to understand the 
conditions under which governments alter the content and enforcement of CSO regulatory 
regime over time. With Kenya’s political history as its backdrop, this analysis focuses on Kenyan 
presidents and the different approaches each used to steer the government-CSO relationship. 
This historical review complements existing research of Kenya’s political history with laws and 
primary data collected from CSO regulators. The analysis suggests Kenyan presidents took 
different approaches to alter legal rules and working rules to control and partner with civil 
society. To preview my findings, Jomo Kenyatta was a dominant figure who inherited a legal 
institution from the British and partnered with CSOs to fulfill his harambee policy and develop 
the country. Daniel arap Moi, Kenyatta’s successor, enacted permissive legal rules but enforced 
restrictive working rules to harass and intimidate CSOs. Mwai Kibaki made nominal changes to 
legal rules that Moi left him. Instead, as part of his approach characterized by openness and 
goodwill, Kibaki emphasized working rules to reinvigorate the government-CSO relationship 
and appointed civil society leaders into prominent government positions. Uhuru Kenyatta, defied 
by CSOs at multiple times, has ineffectively enforced the regulatory regime that Kibaki left him. 
My analysis in Chapter Severn uses this historical context to explore causal process explanations. 
CSO laws in Kenya: A Historical Overview 
 Before assessing each administration, I broadly review the role of civil society in Kenya and 
the legal institutions that structure CSO development. Civil society’s role in Kenya has taken on 






were some of the factors that shaped Kenya’s civil society in its pre-colonial and colonial history 
(Kanyinga et al., 2004; Brass, 2016, pp. 62-66). Traditionally, Kenyan people lived and worked 
in small rural communities. These tightly-knit communities contained institutionalized norms 
and collective resources that assisted members whenever necessary. These communities 
exemplify harambee’s original meaning as self-help groups formed through collective-action and 
voluntary mutual assistance. Harambee—a Swahili term meaning “let’s pull together”—is an 
essential concept to Kenyan civil society and shows how the government can use its policies to 
reshape government-CSO relationships. Traditionally, harambee was the act of local 
communities self-organizing to organically respond to local matters and issues, with norms of 
reciprocity guiding activity and government having little involvement.1 According to Ngau, 
harabmee efforts allowed community members to learn skills, make social ties, and develop 
moral values and group ethics. The colonial government exploited these self-help groups for 
forced labor and opposed harambee schools until it was clear that independence was unavoidable 
(J. E. Anderson, 1970; Holmquist, 1984; Brass, 2016).   
 European encroachment into East Africa profoundly affected societies. Christian 
missionaries arrived in East Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but their 
impact on society peaked during British occupation. As Hornsby (2012, p. 30) notes, the late-
nineteenth century British colonization “saw the Bible arrive alongside the gun” and initiated a 
 
1 Definition follows Ngau (1987, p. 524): “Harambee is the collective and cooperative participation of a community 
in an attempt to fill perceived needs through utilization of its own resources…These historical self-help efforts were 
mostly voluntary in nature, with self-formed groups of men and women opening virgin land, cultivating, or helping a 
community member to move his family or restore his house. Small self-formed groups, usually of equal-age groups, 
same-sex groups, or clans from one village or two, would meet to do one of the above activities, rotating in turn from 
one household to another and from one village to another… Decisions were made informally through deliberations by 
all members of each group sitting together… efforts were oriented toward production of basic needs. It was a social 






growth in European evangelical missions. Faith-based organizations provided essential social 
services such as healthcare and education to attract people to these congregations (Kanyinga et 
al., 2004; Hornsby, 2012).  
 British colonial law allowed for the establishment of CSOs to promote leisure and social 
welfare. Laws such as the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Ordinance (No. 12 of 1923), the 
Societies Ordinance (No. 52 of 1952), and the Companies Ordinance of 1959 (No. 50 of 1959) 
regulated distinct CSO legal forms. According to government records, between 1924 and 1963, 
individuals in British-controlled Kenya registered at least 766 private, self-governed, voluntary 
organizations as official legal entities. Many of these CSOs provided outlets for sports and 
play—e.g., athletic, football, cricket, and polo clubs—and common interests such as affinity 
groups for dog-lovers, debate, safari, and youth leagues. Faith-based groups registered 
congregations to celebrate religion and workers organized to form professional associations for 
barbers, charcoal retailers, farmers, fish mongers, medical researchers, public health inspectors, 
and taxi drivers. Kenya’s post-colonial present, the nearly 60-year period studied in this chapter, 
builds on this historical foundation.  
 At independence, President Kenyatta used his inaugural address to make harambee a 
national watchword that became the country’s official motto.2 Kenyatta evolved the harambee 
concept to achieve his development goals. In Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the government 
formalized harambee project’s as part of its economic policy (Hornsby, 2012, pp. 147, 152; 
Brass, 2016, p. 63). After Sessional paper No. 10, harambee groups built schools, clinics, and 
 
2 “But you must know that Kenyatta alone cannot give you everything. All things we must do together to develop 
our country, to get education for our children, to have doctors, to build roads, to improve or provide all day-to-day 






community centers (Barkan & Holmquist, 1989). Politicians and influential business people 
donated significant money during harambee fund drives to finance largescale projects such as 
roads and hospitals (Hill, 1991; Maxon & Ofcansky, 2000, p. 89). Some critique using harambee 
in this way. As Ngau (1987, p. 524) explains, Kenyatta’s version replaced organic self-
governance with a five-stage political planning process that included “initiation, planning, fund-
raising, implementation, and follow-up.” Nevertheless, President Kenyatta successfully used his 
policy to develop the country, support CSOs, and maintain political power (Thomas-Slayter, 
1985; Widner, 1992; Matanga, 2000). 
 Kenya has many varieties of formal and informal CSOs that actively contribute to society 
(Prosser, 1970; Makanda, 2008). Many of these voluntary associations are legal entities that 
predate Kenya’s independence. Community-based organizations (CBOs) are one type and may 
be the greatest in number (Brass, 2010, p. 9). With close ties to harambee, CBOs are mutual-aid 
groups that form on an as-needed basis as a “spontaneous response to social and economic 
difficulties facing their members and local communities [that other CSOs partner with] as entry 
points to local communities” (Kanyinga, 2004, p. 11). While these groups are essential to 
Kenyan civil society, they are outside my dissertation’s scope because they are not regulated 
nationally and may exist for economic profit.3 What is more, multiple searches of the National 
Council of Law Reporting4 did not identify any laws relating to CBOs.   
 
3 CBOs operate only within single counties (see CBO registration form item 1 (page 1) in the Appendix) and may 
exist to generate private profits for members (See CBO registration form item 6 (page 3) and Self-Help Group 
registration form item 6 (page 2) in the Appendix). While not all CBOs are organized for economic benefit, the 
possibility that some are for-profit places them outside my conceptualization of CSOs.  
4 The National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law) is part of The Judiciary. It is a semi-autonomous state 
corporation created by the National Council for Law Reporting Act (No. 11 of 1994) mandated to revise, consolidate, 






 Perpetual trusts (referred to locally as charitable trusts) are “any body or association of 
persons established for any religious, educational, literary, scientific, social, athletic or charitable 
purpose, or who have constituted themselves for any such purpose.”5 Created by British colonial 
laws, these charitable trusts are registered and regulated by a small office in the Ministry of 
Lands. Official government records show these CSOs are few in number but are among the 
oldest in Kenya. The Ministry of Lands registered 247 charitable trusts between 1924 and 1963. 
By comparison, 259 registered between 2015 and 2018.    
 The State Law Office regulates two CSO legal forms: societies and companies limited by 
guarantee. Societies are “any club, company, partnership or other association of ten or more 
persons, whatever its nature or object, established in Kenya or having its headquarters or chief 
place of business in Kenya, and any branch of a society [but not including companies, 
corporations, firms, cooperative societies, schools, building societies, banks, international 
organizations, and unlawful societies].”6 Political parties registered with the Registrar of 
Societies until a later statute established parties as a unique legal form (§44 of the Political 
Parties Act No. 59 of 2008). Companies limited by guarantee are “formed for promoting 
commerce, art, science, religion, charity or any other useful object, and intends to apply its 
profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects, and to prohibit the payment of any 
dividend to its members.”7 The Registrar of Companies, which manages the registration of 
private and public businesses, registers this CSO legal form. The precise number of companies 
limited by guarantee is unclear. Only as recently as 2016 has the Registrar of Companies’ 
 
5 § 3(1) of the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act of 1923. 
6 §§ 2(1), 4 of the Societies Act of 1968, which replaced the Societies Ordinance of 1952. 






electronic records started to identify organizations by their precise legal form. We can only 
estimate how many of the 361,948 companies that registered between 1960 and 2015 are CSOs. 
What we do know is that many prominent Kenyan and international non-governmental 
organizations have—and still do—incorporate as companies limited by guarantee.8  
 The government added two additional CSO legal forms more than 25-years after 
independence. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are “private voluntary groups of 
individuals or associations, not operated for profit or for other commercial purposes but which 
have organized themselves nationally or internationally for the promotion of social welfare, 
development, charity or research through mobilization of resources.”9 Article 2 further 
differentiates NGOs as either national “registered exclusively in Kenya with authority to operate 
within or across two or more districts,” or international with “original incorporation in one or 
more countries other than Kenya, but operating within Kenya under a certificate of registration.” 
In 1992, President Moi commenced the NGOs Act and registered nearly 150 new NGOs per year 
during his tenure (1,655 in total). His successors registered over 8,400: 600 per year under 
Kibaki and over 350 per year for Uhuru Kenyatta. According to official records obtained from 
the NGOs Board, by the end of 2018, more than 10,800 NGOs had registered but the regulator 
considered only 3,010 as “active.”10 
 
8 Examples include The Ford Foundation (1966), Aga Khan Foundation (1974), International Rescue Committee 
(1977), Oxfam (1977), World Concern International (1981), John Hopkins University (1994), World Vision 
International (1999), Action Against Hunger (2002), Catholic Medical Missions Board (2003), AfriCog (2007), 
Amnesty International (2010), Kenya Human Rights Commission (2011), Plan International (2011), and Save the 
Children (2012).  
9 § 2 of the Non-Governmental Organizations Co-Ordination Act of 1990. 
10 Data retrieved from NGOs Board in .xlsx format on November 12th, 2018. Private information omitted and contained 
only organization name, registration date (DD/MM/YY), scope (international/national), and sector (more than 50 
categories). NGOs Board personnel explained active is an internal status the regular assigns to organizations that either 






 Finally, a 2013 law created public benefit organizations (PBOs). These CSOs are “voluntary 
membership or non-membership groupings of individuals or organizations, which is 
autonomous, non-partisan, non-profit making and which is (a) organized and operated locally, 
nationally or internationally; (b) engages in public benefit activities in any of the areas set out in 
the Sixth Schedule; and (c) is registered as such by the Authority.”11 No PBOs exist in Kenya 
because the government has chosen not to commence this law. 
 Laws that create and define CSOs are not the only laws that comprise the CSO regulatory 
regime. Alongside such laws are others that discuss taxes, political participation, and national 
security. Figure 6.1 shows how many laws contribute to the regulatory regime in any given year 
and how frequently lawmakers amend, replace, and add laws. The timeline provides scale and 
identifies historic political and legal milestones. The figure uses horizontal bars to represent 
different laws and sorts them in a manner to show each law’s amendment history.   
 The degree to which variation in these laws affects civil society is outside the scope of this 
dissertation but is part of my future research agenda. It is reasonable to assume that the 
regulatory regime affects CSOs, at least partially. For example, it may affect the number of new 
registrations each year (Figure 6.2). Data collected from four Kenyan regulators shows the 
number of new registrations for each CSO legal type (left axis). Official government records 
indicate that, between 1964 and 1974, the number of CSOs that had registered in Kenya almost 
doubled from 3,867 to 7,008. Those numbers do not take into account that some organizations 
 
can interpret this to mean that, in 2018, the inactive status describes organizations that both registered on or before 
December 31st, 2016, and have not submitted the required annual filings to the NGOs Board since on or before 
December 31st, 2015. The NGOs Act does not require the NGOs Board to make its registry publicly available. Other 
Kenyan CSO laws requires the regulator to provide the public (§ 9(2) of the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act; § 
48 of the Societies Act; and § 884(8) of the Companies Act, 2015; and § 15(2) of the PBOs Act, 2013).     






dissolve over time. Assuming 50% of organizations that registered in the past remained 
operational, an estimated 3,504 CSOs were active in Kenya by 1974; that same estimate doubled 
by 1990 (7,523), tripled by 2000 (10,657), and surpassed 31,400 by the end of 2017.  
Figure 6.1: Institutional Development of CSO laws in Kenya 
 
Figure 6.1 identifies instances of changes to Kenya’s regulatory regime. Horizontal bars represent Kenyan laws in my 
dissertation’s legal corpus. I sort items vertically to show how laws amend each other over time. Details at the bottom 
identify notable historical events in the country (thick vertical connectors) and the world (thin vertical connectors). 






Figure 6.2: Kenyan CSO Registrations by Legal Type 
 
Data only show registrations and does not account for mergers or closures. Data generously estimate 62,808 registered 
CSOs operate in Kenya in 2017 (1,250 per million Kenyans). Data omit CBOs registered with the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Protection.    
 The smooth, upward-sloping line shows a total number of CSOs per million people (Figure 
6.2, right axis). Assuming all registrations are active, government data shows 62,808 registered 
CSOs operate in Kenya in 2017, which is 1,250 CSOs per million people. This is considerably 
lower than other reputable sources that approximate the combined number of societies and NGOs 
in Kenya exceeds 76,000 (nearly 1,600 CSOs per million people).12 Accounting for only 
population, the number of CSO registrations seems to vary by presidential administration: it 
 
12 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), “Civic Freedom Monitor: Kenya.” Retrieved June 4th, 2020 
from www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/kenya. A 2007 report “using anecdotal estimation” suggests 
“there are well over one million [CSOs] in Kenya,” or roughly 26,000 per million people (Kanyinga, Mitullah, & 






surges under Jomo Kenyatta and Kibaki, but wanes under Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta. I draw on 
existing research to explore this president-CSO relationship in the next section.  
Presidential Administrations: An Explanation for Changing CSO Regulatory Regimes 
 Kenya’s politics have been described as “schizophrenic” (Branch, 2011, p. 296) due to the 
juxtaposition of a vibrant civil society on one side, and on the other a government that is 
perpetually corrupt, violent, and prone to authoritarian tendencies. Enabling the government’s 
misbehavior is a “culture of impunity” (Branch, 2011, p. 21) that makes it nearly impossible to 
convict senior officials for major crimes even if they attracted considerable attention and 
criticism in the press (Branch, 2011, pp. 21, 109, 230, 281; Hornsby, 2012, pp. 440, 539, 552). 
While Kenya’s four presidents may share similar vices and tendencies, these men faced different 
environments and took noticeably different stances towards civil society (Widner, 1992; 
Matanga, 2000; Oloo & Oyugi, 2002; Hornsby, 2012; Brass, 2016; Gugerty, 2017).  
Jomo Kenyatta: 1st President of Kenya (December 12th 1963 – August 22nd 1978) 
 President Kenyatta is often described in benevolent terms by those nostalgic for the early 
post-independence period, but his presidency can be characterized as one in which power was 
increasingly centralized in the office of the president and in Kenyatta’s hands specifically. He 
amassed tremendous power and was unafraid to repress opponents (Branch, 2011; Hornsby, 
2012; Angelo, 2020). Kenya became a de facto one-party state during his tenure. As president, 
Kenyatta enforced legal institutions inherited from the British and changed them as necessary to 
serve the country’s interest. He tolerated CSOs as partners in his economic and development 
policy but did not allow them to outgrow his control. This section discusses each of these points 






 Kenyatta became the first President of Kenya because he was both a popular nationalist 
political symbol and the individual that the British transitional government identified as the best 
protector of British interests (Branch, 2011, p. 4; Angelo, 2020, pp. 81, 93). The euphoria of 
independence and the patriarchal respect others gave Kenyatta made it easy for him to mobilize 
power, abuse his authority, and repress dissenters (Mutua, 2008, p. 265). Even late into his 
administration, Kenyatta created such a “submissive climate” that high-ranking government 
officials gave great deference to the man “like a lot of junior schoolboys” in a disciplined 
classroom.13 His governing style mirrored the colonial one he experienced under colonialism: 
suppress dissenting voices and imprison opposition leaders (Maxon & Ofcansky, 2000, pp. 94-
95).14 The harambee policy provided Kenyatta a tool to impose his authority on the country, 
fracture his party, and leave the legislature in disarray. Kenya’s first president quickly and 
effectively consolidated power and governed as a supreme arbitrator influenced only by an inner 
circle of advisors (Holmquist, 1984; Angelo, 2020, pp. 17, 30). By 1965, Kenyatta could afford 
to be both distant and authoritative, and by the end of the decade he made the presidency an 
“untouchable system of rule” (Barkan & Chege, 1989; Branch & Cheeseman, 2006; Angelo, 
2020, pp. 248-249). 
 To navigate Cold War geopolitics, Kenyatta’s government remained rhetorically committed 
to non-alignment throughout the 1960s (Branch, 2011, pp. 37, 38). Despite the public profession 
of nonalignment and African Socialism, Kenyatta’s government were generally pro-West and 
 
13 Angelo (2020, pp. 256-257) citing British high commissioner Antony Duff’s confidential Diplomatic Report No. 
310/75. 
14 In 1953, the British charged Kenyatta with leading the Mau Mau rebellion and sentenced him to seven years hard 






pro-capitalism.15 Keeping true to his strategy of non-alignment, Kenyatta ratified both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—favored by the USA and allies—and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—championed by the USSR and 
other developing countries—on the same day (May 1st, 1972).16  
 Kenyatta faced multiple challenges in the 1970s that inflamed his autocratic tendencies. 
First, the septuagenarian’s age and declining health motivated many politicians to position 
themselves for potential succession. Yet, nobody dared challenge Kenyatta openly nor challenge 
the presidency’s informal powers. A military coup plot uncovered in 1971 forced Kenyatta to 
take an even harder line against political dissent and reinforced his authority and control over 
state institutions (Hornsby, 2012, p. 281; Angelo, 2020, p. 257). His impatience for political 
dissent mounted and eventually revealed how untouchable his system of rule had become. In 
October 15th, 1975, Kenyatta ordered police to enter Parliament and arrest longtime political 
opposition leaders—Martin Shikuku and Jean-Marie Seroney—in the middle of a parliamentary 
session and jailed them without trial. Both remained in solitary confinement for almost three 
years before being released after Kenyatta’s death in late 1978.  
 The practice of imprisoning opposition leaders was not the only technique the colonial 
government left the new state. At independence, Kenya inherited a British CSO regulatory 
regime that included three laws. Kenyatta made the legal institution more sophisticated during 
 
15 To maintain the appearance of nonalignment, a Kenyan delegation traveled to China and the USSR in April and 
May 1964 to establish relations. In Moscow, the governments agreed that the USSR would support the construction 
of a 200-bed hospital and a technical college. In Beijing, China agreed to provide labor, expertise, and money to fund 
a major irrigation project in Kenya (Branch, 2011, p. 38). 
16 In the process that led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), significant differences existed between 
UN members on the relative importance of negative civil and political rights versus positive economic (favored by 
Western democracies led by the US), and the social and cultural ones that challenged capitalist orthodoxy (led by the 






his administration. He increased the number of active laws from three in 1974 to six in 1973. In 
his first few years in office, President Kenyatta added the Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act 
(No. 19 of 1964) and replaced the Societies Ordinance (No. 52 of 1952) with the Societies Act 
(No. 4 of 1968). His final changes to the regulatory regime came in 1973 when he enacted the 
Income Tax Act (effective January 1st, 1974).17 These new laws carried with them an expanded 
number of provisions regulating the governance, formation, operations, and resources of CSOs in  
Figure 6.3: Institutional Change Under J. Kenyatta (Dec. 1963 – Aug. 1978) 
 
Figure illustrates changes to CSO laws during the president’s administration. Values correspond to the legal rules 
inherited (dotted), the rules at an intermediate point (dashed), and the rules left to the successor (solid). Axes are 
quantitative variables that describe the regulatory regime. At twelve o’clock is the number of laws that comprise the 
regulatory regime. Then, quadrants provide four points of information for each subgroup: (i) number of provisions 
coded, (ii) number of permissive provisions, (iii) net permissiveness, and (iv) number of restrictive provisions.   
 
17 The Income Tax Act made donations to registered charitable organizations—i.e., charitable trusts, societies, 






Kenya. Figures 6.3 illustrates the changes to the regulatory regime during Kenyatta’s 
administration. Values represent the legal rules the president inherited (dotted), the rules at an 
intermediate point (dashed), and the rules left to his successor (solid). The axes represent 
quantitative variables that describe the regulatory regime. Moving in a clockwise direction and 
starting at twelve o’clock are the number of laws that comprise the regulatory regime. Then each 
quadrant provides four points of information for each provision subgroup: (i) number of 
provisions coded, (ii) number of permissive provisions, (iii) net permissiveness, and (iv) number 
of restrictive provisions.      
 Most of the institutional change in Figure 6.3 can be attributed to the Societies Act (1968).18 
Societies are likely the type of organization that the Kenyatta government would have used to 
initiate, plan, and implement the harambee policy. Government records show 281 societies 
legally registered with the phrase “welfare society” in their name during Kenyatta’s 
administration. Some societies connected their immediate objectives with broader societal issues 
such as malnutrition, poverty and unemployment, and political instability. Some welfare 
associations leveraged ethnic ties to become politically powerful.19 Kenyatta resisted the 
establishment of any CSO that could outgrow his authority (Widner, 1992, p. 117; Angelo, 2020, 
p. 251). The law gave the Registrar of Societies a broad mandate to make new rules (§ 52), made 
it unlawful for voluntary associations of at least ten people to exist without registration (§§ 2, 4), 
 
18 Amended in 1997 by The Statute Law (Repeals and Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (No. 10 of 1997). 
19 One example of societies possessing significant influence is the Kenyatta-friendly Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association 
(GEMA)19 that “eclipsed” Kenyatta’s ruling party to occupy “centre stage in the political panorama” Oyugi (1994, p. 
176). GEMA filled the political space left in the wake of the KANU’s decline (Hornsby, 2012, p. 311). Following 
massive rallies showcasing GEMA’s public support in September and October 1976, the group led an effort to remove 
the constitutional provision that removed the vice president from the presidential line of succession (Widner, 1992, p. 






and bestowed the regulator with the power to determine how a society’s assets are to be disposed 
(§§ 33-37) and the authority to access a society’s documents and membership lists without cause 
(§§ 28, 31). 
 Was the Societies Act a tool to give Kenyatta greater control over CSOs and political 
opposition as some suggest (e.g., Angelo, 2020, p. 243)? While the list of restrictive provisions 
suggests yes, several observations challenge such a conclusion. Kenyatta often used extrajudicial 
tactics to intimidate and repress political challengers. It is therefore unclear why such a powerful 
figure would suddenly resort to laws to achieve political aims. Another observation is that the 
effect of the law fails to achieve the repression objective, at least by one measure. Instead of a 
crackdown, Kenya experienced a steady increase in the number of CSOs (Figure 6.2, smooth 
line) and societies (long-dashed line) registrations after the Societies Act was on the books.20   
 We can resolve these inconsistencies by returning to the argument I presented in Chapter 
One. Like other CSO laws, the Societies Act fuses many provisions. In addition to the restrictive 
provisions listed above, the law gave societies the positive right to challenge bureaucratic 
decisions (§§ 15, 41), established explicit guidelines for rejecting registration applications (§§ 
12-14, 51), made government records publicly available (§ 48), and required societies be 
financially transparent and accountable to members and the public (§§ 27, 30). These permissive 
legal rules created an environment in which CSOs could multiply and civil society grow. There 
was no guarantee that the legal rules would be impartially enforced, however. It was certainly 
 
20 A third is that the timing of events does not support the argument that the government enacted the law as a response 
to GEMA and other CSOs. The government added the Societies Act to the regulatory regimes on February 6 th, 1968 
and began enforcing it 10 days later. GEMA, meanwhile, was founded in 1970, reached its zenith of power in 1976, 







within the reach of the centralized powers of the presidency to alter the working rules to achieve 
the government’s, or rather Kenyatta’s aims. In all, it does not appear that the government 
enacted the Societies Act solely to control Kenyan CSOs. It does appear that Kenyatta could 
have selectively manipulated its enforcement to achieve political aims.    
Daniel Toroitich arap Moi: 2nd President of Kenya (August 22nd 1978 – December 30th 2002) 
 The constitutional line of succession made Daniel arap Moi president. Once in office, 
President Moi selectively dismantled CSOs he considered threatening. Soon after, he made 
numerous changes to the constitution to maximize his domestic control and power. After the 
Cold War, international pressure caused Moi to relinquish his authoritarian control and enact 
laws that supported political rights and civil liberties. These laws were not always enforced fully 
and impartially, and state-led repression remained a concern. Many civil society leaders, 
intellectuals, and academics returned to Kenya in the 1990s. They organized and fought for 
democratization, a new constitution, and educated voters ahead of two competitive national 
elections. Despite the return of multipartyism, Moi twice won reelection and left office “without 
fully internalizing the proper limits of executive power” (Mutua, 2008, p. 265).  
 Jomo Kenyatta died in the early hours of August 22nd, 1978, and later that day, Vice 
President Moi became acting president. The transition was nonviolent, but it did involve 
extensive debate and politicking (Hornsby, 2012, pp. 327-328).21 Moi moved quickly to solidify 
his position. Following in the footsteps of Kenyatta, Moi used patronage adeptly to reallocate 
 
21 As acting president, Moi’s primary duty was to arrange a national election in 90 days to select the next president. 
Because Kenyatta had led Kenya into a de facto one-party state, the party’s unanimous nomination of Moi on 
October 3rd, 1978, cleared his path to the presidency: “On October 10th, no other nominations from political parties 
having been received (as there were none), Moi was elected unopposed. On 14 October 1978, Chief Justice Wicks 






government resources to key allies throughout the country to divide political enemies and ensure 
loyalty from senior officers and military commanders (Maxon & Ofcansky, 2000, p. 174; 
Branch, 2011, p. 173).22 Unlike his predecessor, Moi was directly involved in polity, regularly 
traveled throughout the country, and did not shy away from public appearances.    
 During his tenure, President Moi repressed democracy advocates, opposition politicians, 
and disloyal individuals. He accomplished this with extrajudicial and judicial means, including 
changing constitutional and collective-choice rules. Civil society leaders and academics who 
persevered during President Kenyatta’s strict rule became increasingly marginalized under 
President Moi and many fled the country (Branch, 2011, p. 147). During the Cold War, Kenya’s 
strategic importance led countries like Britain and the United States to willfully ignore Moi’s 
human rights abuses and maladministration. Once the Cold War ended, foreign powers no longer 
enabled Moi. 
 CSOs did not openly oppose Moi’s government out of fear that he would swiftly punish 
critics and repress opposition (Holmquist, 1984, p. 80; Widner, 1992, p. 168; Brass, 2016, p. 66). 
That fear proved to be a reality as Moi’s administration dismantled cultural and ethnic 
associations that posed a threat. In 1980, Moi outlawed ethnic welfare associations that observers 
note was payback for the GEMA’s 1976 attempt to constitutionally prevent him from assuming 
the presidency upon Kenyatta’s death (Ndegwa, 1996, p. 26; Oloo & Oyugi, 2002; Hornsby, 
2012, p. 353). Unfortunately, the involuntary dissolution of GEMA was ‘legal’ under the 
 
22 A 2004 report suggests Moi and his allies “looted the Kenyan economy to the tune of nearly $2 billion” (Branch, 






Societies Act that granted the Registrar and significant discretion to cancel or suspend 
organizational registration (§ 12) and make new rules regulating such CSOs (§ 53).23     
 President Moi became increasingly authoritarian as economic growth slowed in the 1980s 
(Maxon & Ofcansky, 2000, p. 8; Ochieng, 2008, pp. ii,16). An attempted coup on August 1st, 
1982, pushed Moi over a tipping point.24 The coup gave Moi an opportunity to consolidate his 
power and marginalize opponents. He arrested political rivals, closed universities, interrogated 
students, detained lecturers that the government believed radicalized students, and within two 
days more than a thousand Kenyan Air Force airmen were arrested and found guilty of sedition, 
treason, or similar crimes (Branch, 2011, p. 158). Later that same year Moi abolished the multi-
party system25 and moved Kenya from a de facto to de jure one-party state.26 
 In 1988, Moi replaced the secret ballot with queue-voting and removed the constitutional 
guarantee of tenure for judges.27 These moves prolonged the era of repression. Moi’s power had 
become so authoritarian by the close of the 1980s that “civil society, or whatever fledgling 
nongovernmental organizations existed, the churches, and the press all operated under great 
strain and threat” (Mutua, 2008, p. 67). Moi’s control was so complete that Mr. Amos Wako, his 
 
23 According to the Societies Act (§§ 12(1)(a) - 12(5)(b)), a registration can be cancelled for a number subjective 
reasons including (a) the society is “likely to pursue, or be used for, any unlawful purpose”; (b) cancelling the 
registration is in “the interests of peace, welfare, or good order in Kenya”; and (c) if the bylaws “of the society are, in 
his opinion, in any respect repugnant to or inconsistent with any law.”    
24 Discontent and low morale among disaffected airmen in the Kenyan Air Force led to a coup that loyalists snuffed 
out in a matter of hours (Branch, 2011, pp. 154-157). 
25 The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act (No. 7 of 1982). Section 2A: “There shall be in Kenya only one 
political party, the Kenya African National Union.” 
26 Murungi (1992, pp. 58-60) explains Moi did not initiate the assault on the constitution. The 
independence Constitution included eight mechanisms to prevent Kenya’s independent 
government from engaging in the same “mischief” that characterized the “oppressive monolithic 
colonial system” that preceded it. The Kenyatta government embarked on a deliberate campaign 
to dismantle essential constitutional safeguards that Moi continued.  






new attorney general and former member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (1985 
to 1992), in his maiden speech to Parliament in July 1991, stated for the record: 
“Sir, it has been said that the Attorney-General of any country is a trustee of 
a great duty to see that rule of law prevails. The Government is fully 
committed to the rule of law and human rights, which are the pillars of the 
Kenyan society….I must say here that steps will be taken during my tenure of 
office as the Attorney-General to strengthen the rule of law and to enhance 
respect for human rights. A characteristic of the rule of law is that no man, 
except the President, is above law. Every man, whatever his rank or position or 
place in the society is subject to the law of the land and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the courts and tribunals by law established.…Kenya, and indeed 
the whole world, is going through critical times. These are times, which we as a 
nation, can sail through successfully if we can guard our sovereignty and our 
Constitution; exercise and enjoy our peace and freedom with maturity and in a 
responsible manner; recognize that the rule of law prevails in the country and 
that rule or law makes reciprocal demands on the rulers and the ruled and give 
total support to our beloved President.” (emphasis added. Parliament of Kenya 
(1991). Hansard for Tuesday, July 2nd, 1991. Pages 26-28. Retrieved from 
Library of Parliament, Nairobi.) 
  The geopolitics of the Cold War led many foreign observers to overlook Moi’s 
authoritarianism and human rights abuses. The arrangement persisted as long as Moi remained 
an ally to the West on the international stage (Branch, 2011, pp. 142,151,172) and the USSR a 
credible threat to Western interests. As soon as the Cold War ended Kenya’s strategic location 
and anti-communist position lost considerable importance.28 In turn, the international community 
devalued Moi’s strategic importance. In 1991, foreign partners clashed with the administration 
and international assistance became conditional on political and economic reforms (Haugerud, 
1995, pp. 14, 202; Mutua, 2008, p. 68; Branch, 2011, p. 185; Brass, 2016, p. 67). Moi’s power, it 
appeared, had begun to crack under international pressure.  
 
28 Branch (2011, p. 185) writes, “[Kenya’s] strategic importance, which derived from its relative 
proximity to the Middle East, was lost with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the opening up of 
military bases in the region for US forces. Kenya’s position within geo-political calculations in 






 At home, civil society started to openly challenge the Moi regime. CSOs such as Kituo Cha 
Sheria (“KITUO” Legal Advice Centre), academic unions, religious organizations such as the 
Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), and the Citizens for 
Constitutional Change (4Cs) collectively—yet individually—provided free legal services, 
defended social issues, and worked to reopen the civic space and enhance the rule of law 
(Kibwana, 1992; Nariuki, 1992; Mazrui & Mutunga, 1995; Mutunga, 1999; Makanda, 2008). 
The Law Society of Kenya (LSK) joined these CSOs and pushed Moi to reinstate democratic 
rules.29 Their collective efforts proved fruitful, and in the early 1990s and under intense domestic 
and international pressures,30 Moi restored judicial tenure (1990), re-legalized political 
opposition (1991), and amended the constitution to limit presidents to two five-year terms 
(1992). For the first time since independence, “[Kenyans] began enjoying freedom and right of 
speech and association” (Samuel A. Nyanchoga, Muchoki, Wanyonyi, & Mwangi, 2008, p. 63). 
Those basic freedoms allowed civil society to contribute to democratic and constitutional 
reforms.31  
 With constitutional tinkering no longer an option, Moi turned to the de jure regulatory 
regime as a means to maintain power and control. During his time in office, the government 
 
29 I use the term “joined” because the LSK is slightly outside my definition of a CSO. The bar association was created 
by statute (§3 of the Law Society of Kenya Ordinance, 1949; later replaced by Law Society of Kenya Act, 1992; later 
replaced by Law Society of Kenya Act No. 21 of 2014). Despite its governmental origins, the LSK has championed 
for the maintenance and advancement of constitutionalism, justice and the rule of law.       
30 For example, in November 1991, a group of foreign donors suspended aid to Kenya. Less than a week later, Moi 
made a histrionic reversal and legalized political opposition (Barkan, 2004; Mutua, 2008, p. 68). 
31 The Green Belt Movement (GBM), led by Wangari Maathai, was founded in 1984 with an environmental mission 
but quickly connected its efforts to political matters. Official records kept by the Registrar of Societies indicate the 
Green Belt Movement registered as a society on April 13th, 1984, as a welfare organization with adult members. 
Records identify Wangari Maathai as the founding chairman. GBM later switched registrations to the NGOs Board 
(September 17th, 1993) and a sister organization—Green Belt Movement International Limited—registered with the 






added or amended 11 laws affecting civil society. Only three of those institutional changes 
occurred before the return of basic democratic rules in the 1990s;32 while seven changed the 
regulatory regime in the period after the reinstatement of multi-party democracy.33 The most 
significant of piece of legislation is the Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Act 
(No. 19 of 1990), which Moi signed into law on January 14th, 1991.   
Figure 6.4: Institutional Change Under Moi (Aug. 1978 – Dec. 2002) 
 
Figure illustrates changes to CSO laws during the president’s administration. Values correspond to the legal rules 
inherited (dotted), the rules at an intermediate point (dashed), and the rules left to the successor (solid). Axes are 
quantitative variables that describe the regulatory regime. At twelve o’clock is the number of laws that comprise the 
 
32 All changes were amendments: the Land (Perpetual Succession) (Amendment) Act (No. 2 of 1980), Trustees 
(Perpetual Succession) Act (No. 22 of 1987), and the Value Added Tax Act (No. 20 of 1989).    
33 Moi’s final adjustment to the regulatory regime occurred shortly after the al Qaeda bombings of U.S. Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania (August 7th, 1998). The government enacted the National Security Intelligence Service Act (No. 






regulatory regime. Then, quadrants provide four points of information for each subgroup: (i) number of provisions 
coded, (ii) number of permissive provisions, (iii) net permissiveness, and (iv) number of restrictive provisions.   
 The government wrote and enacted the NGOs Act during a period when Moi’s authoritarian 
instincts were colliding with the international community’s demand for political and economic 
reforms. The process created an imperfect law with provisions that that appealed to each side. 
First, the law created an oversight body (the “Board”) to supervise the new regulator’s (the 
“Bureau”) regulatory operations. An oversight board is commendable if it operates fairly and 
independently. In this case, the NGOs Act allowed the government to manipulate the board’s 
composition to favor the regime: the law gave the government the ability to manipulate the 
board’s membership in such a way that the oversight body could be 33% to 75% government or 
government appointed positions.34 
 The Board’s far-reaching powers to interfere in an organization’s operations was a second 
concern. The law gave the regulator the authority “to facilitate and co-ordinate the work of all 
national and international Non-Governmental Organizations” operating in Kenya (§ 7(a)). That 
authority could be broadly interpreted that the regulator had the power to interfere in 
organizations’ external activities. The act required the regulator to receive and evaluate work 
permits for international employees and make recommendations to the immigration office 
whether to issue work permits (§ 17). Such influence on an organization’s workforce gave the 
regulator an opportunity to unnecessarily meddle in an organization’s internal affairs. The third 
concern was the vast power and discretion entrusted to the Minister overseeing the NGOs Board. 
The law required the Minister to select individuals in the regulators’ operational and oversight 
 
34 § 4(1)(a)-(j) explains the board’s 18-20 members must contain five civil society representatives, eight government 
offices and government-appointed positions, and five to seven members with qualified experience from either the 






roles (§§ 4, 5), set fees unilaterally (§ 11), make final decisions on appeals submitted by 
aggrieved organization (§§ 19, 34(2)), and establish new rules regulating the sector (§ 32). 
 Given Moi’s authoritarian tendencies, track record of human rights abuses, and strong hold 
on power, we might predict the NGOs Act to be a repressive and highly restrictive piece of 
legislation. But the opposite is true. Following the coding scheme I described in Chapter Four, 
the number of permissive provisions (12) in the NGOs Act outnumbered the number of 
restrictive ones (8). Unlike any Kenyan law before it, the act strongly encouraged self-regulation 
(§§ 2, 23, 24), established an oversight body to preempt abuse and corruption inside the regulator 
(§§ 4, 6, 30-31), and minimized operating requirements for registered organizations (§ 12). The 
Repeal and Miscellaneous Amendments Act (No. 14 of 1991, pp. 610-614) made the NGOs Act 
even more permissive. Those amendments removed the five-year renewal requirements (§§ 13, 
15 of the NGOs Act) and democratized the long-term leadership of the self-regulator (§ 26 of the 
NGOs Act). 
 There are at least two explanations for why a powerful authoritarian like Moi would allow 
permissive provisions into his CSO-controlling bill. The first is that is that the regime needed 
CSOs. One way the regime needed CSOs was that the international community was applying 
pressure for political reforms. Figure 6.4 illustrates that Moi’s government enacted laws that 
expanded the permissiveness of the governance, formation, and operations subgroups after the 
international community demanded and applied pressure that Moi correct his poor human rights 
record. Meanwhile, domestically the regime needed CSOs to provide public services like 
education and healthcare (Kameri-Mbote, 2002; Brass, 2010, 2012a). As the Assistant Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation told Parliament, “[The government] would 






they are using U.S. $300 million, but we would like them to double this amount because they are 
welcome in the country.”35 But certainly not all operations. We can infer the “operations” the 
government wanted to “double” was the delivery of unmet public service goods, not human 
rights or democracy promotion. 
 The second reason the NGOs Act contains permissive provisions is that Moi’s strong hold 
on power gave him the option—not the obligation—to enforce permissive provisions. Like 
Kenyatta before him, Moi could manipulate or outright ignore the enforcement of whatever 
permissive provisions existed. Assuming the impartial enforcement of legal rules is tenuous at 
best under authoritarians. Indeed, the inclusion of permissive provisions had minimal impact and 
as late as 1998 humanitarian watchdogs such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 
Africa Watch, and Amnesty International remained critical of the government’s human rights 
record under Moi (Maxon & Ofcansky, 2000, p. 95). In Chapter Seven, I use interview data with 
government officials to support these causal processes. 
Mwai Kibaki: 3rd President of Kenya (December 30th 2002 – April 9th 2013) 
 Kibaki’s presidency is a story of two different administrations. In 2002, he led an opposition 
coalition and handily won the State House and Parliament. The public gave him the mandate to 
end corruption, govern fairly, and enact long-awaited constitutional reforms. As president, 
Kibaki placed prominent CSO leaders in important administrative posts. Regarding CSO laws, 
he inherited Moi’s regulatory regime and made only a few changes to its legal rules. New CSO 
registrations boomed during the Kibaki administration. The economy did well, but inequality 
 







remained a challenge for the masses. Despite his political experience, educational training, and 
legislative majority, President Kibaki underperformed in his first term. Heavy losses in 
Parliament, a questionable reelection victory, and post-election violence marred Kibaki’s control 
and legitimacy as he began his second term. 
 Kibaki finished second in the 1992 and 1997 general elections while earning the largest 
share of the opposition’s splintered vote. Opposition leaders aimed to unify voters behind a 
singular candidate to dethrone the incumbent party in the next election. Coordination 
commenced in January 2002. A series of memorandums of understanding (MOU) between 
political parties culminated in October and established the National Alliance and Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC). The alliance selected the experienced Kibaki as its singular nominee ahead of 
the general election.36 NARC made broadly popular campaign promises such as ending 
corruption, enacting constitutional reforms, increasing teachers’ pay, providing free primary 
education, reforming the civil service, and improving the economy (Samuel A. Nyanchoga et al., 
2008, pp. 54-61; Branch, 2011, p. 251; Hornsby, 2012, pp. 686-687). The alliance and 
extravagant party platform gave Kibaki an undeniable victory and a clear mandate to govern.37 
The MOU that made the victory possible committed the president-elect to distributing 
government posts and responsibilities among alliance members (D. M. Anderson, 2003, p. 3).  
 President Kibaki differed from his predecessor in key ways. The first was the political 
veteran’s leadership style. As President Moi’s Permanent Secretary observed, Kibaki “wanted 
 
36 Kibaki was both a logical and familiar selection. He was from the same ethnic group as Moi’s handpicked successor, 
which meant Kibaki would split that ethnic voting block. He was also a known quantity capable of governing. As a 
lifelong politician, he held four cabinet-rank positions in the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, served as Moi’s vice 
president, and was a Member of Parliament for over 35 years.  
37 Kibaki’s won nearly two-thirds of the votes cast margin of victory was 1.8 million votes, 31% of all 5.9 million 






very much to switch the country’s management style” back to Jomo Kenyatta’s approach and 
end “[Moi’s] era of roadside policy declarations” (Ochieng, 2008, p. 7). In practice, this meant 
less interaction with the public, less travel outside the capital, less hands-on management of 
ministries’ operations, and a stronger civil service. This hands-off style was possible for 
Kenyatta, the patriarchal figure of the independence era, who successfully consolidated power 
and led a de facto one-party state. Kibaki, by contrast, led a fragile alliance that required him to 
be “active and assertive,” traits that the president seemed unwilling or unable to embrace 
(Hornsby, 2012, p. 702).  
 Another difference was the posture Kibaki took towards civil society. The conflict and 
tensions that characterized the government-CSO relationship under Moi was replaced with 
attitudes of openness and collaboration under the Kibaki (Branch, 2011, p. 256; Brass, 2016, pp. 
60-61). We can attribute part of this change in attitude to the president’s recognition of civil 
society’s efforts to unseat Moi. Religious and secular civil society leaders played a key role in 
educating voters for the 1992 and 1997 elections, and in 2002 one prominent CSO went so far as 
to endorse Kibaki ahead of the general election (Mutunga, 2003, p. 31; Kanyinga, 2004, pp. 17-
23; Mutua, 2008, p. 276).38 The administration went further to repair the government-CSO 
relationship. Kibaki assigned prominent CSO leaders to critical governmental posts such as 
 
38 Kanyinga describes several ways CSOs aided democratization. Religious leaders preached on matters of good 
governance and provided a formidable cover to governmental critics. Then, CSOs monitored the government’s actions 
to ensure it honored the pro-democracy constitutional amendments. Thirdly, because political opposition had been 
absent from political society for so long, CSOs complemented weak parties with policy ideation and voter education. 
And finally, CSOs led a campaign of civic education where various groups discussed the importance of 
constitutionalism and democracy, legal education, equality, and social justice. In 2002, the Kenyan Human Rights 






fighting corruption and leading the judiciary.39 The consequence of those appointments was the 
courageous voices that once critiqued government from the outside were now part of the political 
machine. As Branch (2011, p. 256) notes, this “brain drain weakened the quality of civil society 
leadership in the aftermath of 2002, but also restrained criticism of the government from many of 
the once forthright critics of human rights abuses who now sat in parliament.”  
 President Kibaki’s first term showed many successes in absolute terms and relative to his 
predecessors. The Kenyans experienced improvements in democratic governance, economic 
growth, international relations, and civil liberties (Ochieng, 2008; Brass, 2016). But these 
victories failed to satisfy the extravagant campaign promises made in 2002 (Samuel A. 
Nyanchoga et al., 2008, p. 65; Hornsby, 2012, p. 702). And constitutional reform, which NARC 
promised in Kibaki’s first 100 days, failed the people and fractured the NARC alliance (Samuel 
A. Nyanchoga et al., 2008, pp. 52-57; Nic Cheeseman, 2009, pp. 108-110; Hornsby, 2012, pp. 
722-725). Many observe the experienced and educated Kibaki should have done far more 
regarding corruption, press freedoms, income inequality, and unwinding the immense 
concentration of power in the “bureaucratic-executive” (e.g., Branch & Cheeseman, 2006, p. 15; 
Mutua, 2008; Samuel A. Nyanchoga et al., 2008; Nic Cheeseman, 2009).    
 Kibaki’s control and legitimacy reduced after the 2007 general election. His margin of 
victory collapsed from a commanding 31% in 2002 to less than 3% five years later.40 Perhaps 
more damaging was the president’s inability to hold Parliament. His party secured only 20% of 
 
39 Examples include: John Githongo, former director of Transparency International, led the fight against corruption; 
Wangari Maathai, renowned environmental activist and Nobel laurate, served as assistant minister for Environment 
and Natural resources; and Willy Mutunga, leader of the prominent Kenyan Human Rights Commission and the 
Citizens’ Coalition for Constitutional Change, was appointed Chief Justice of Kenya. 
40 Assisted by a fractured opposition vote, Mwai Kibaki’s victory over Raila Odinga was only 231,728 out of 9.9 






the seats in Parliament—down from 60% in 2002—while the opposition party won 47%. 
Another dent to Kibaki’s legitimacy came when election monitors raised concerns that the 
general election was seriously flawed, especially with respect to counting presidential ballots 
(Mutua, 2008, p. 247). Kibaki expedited the swearing-in protocols and plunged Kenya into 
“chaos and near meltdown” as ethnic clashes and postelection violence killed over 1,000 people 
and displaced at least 250,000 Kenyans (Mutua, 2008, p. 249; Nic Cheeseman, 2009). Kibaki’s 
grip on power in his second term was far weaker than the moral and legal legitimacy he enjoyed 
in 2002. 
 The Kibaki administration oversaw the largest expansion of CSO registrations in Kenya’s 
history, but with very little changes to the de jure regulatory regime. As Figure 6.2 illustrates, 
government data estimates that there were approximately 750 CSOs per million people when 
Moi left office. That figure increased to more than 1,100 CSOs per million—a 50% increase—
during Kibaki’s tenure that included two constitutional referenda and six laws that affecting the 
Kenyan CSO regulatory regime (Figure 6.1).41 The Kibaki era laws made very few changes to 
the regulatory regime and added only two new statutes to the 11 that comprised the legal 
institution developed by Presidents Kenyatta and Moi.  
 The first new statute came at the end of Kibaki’s first term. The Political Parties Act of 
2007 separated CSOs and political parties and legislated that the latter would no longer be 
“societies” and gave them a unique legal identity (§ 44) and prohibited donations from “foreign 
government, inter-governmental or nongovernmental organizations” (§ 31(1)(c)). The separation 
 
41 The first referendum (November 2005) failed with 58% of 6.2 million voters opposing it, while the second (August 






of these legal entities removed opportunities for corrupt behavior because cash donations to 
organizations registered under the Societies Act are tax-deductible (§ 15(2)(w) of the Income 
Tax Act, 1973). The Political Parties Act of 2011 replaced the 2007 statute but kept these 
provisions. 
Figure 6.5: Institutional Change Under Kibaki (Dec. 2002 – Apr. 2013) 
 
Figure illustrates changes to CSO laws during the president’s administration. Values correspond to the legal rules 
inherited (dotted), the rules at an intermediate point (dashed), and the rules left to the successor (solid). Axes are 
quantitative variables that describe the regulatory regime. At twelve o’clock is the number of laws that comprise the 
regulatory regime. Then, quadrants provide four points of information for each subgroup: (i) number of provisions 
coded, (ii) number of permissive provisions, (iii) net permissiveness, and (iv) number of restrictive provisions.   
 The second new statute was one of Kibaki’s last as president. The Public Benefits 
Organizations Act (No. 18 of 2013) was a private member’s bill introduced by Sophia Abdi Noor 
of the opposition party that controlled parliament (ODM). Described as a “middle of the roader” 






bill’s best chance at becoming law. She worked well with elected officials in the minority 
(Kibaki’s PNU) and had experience leading CSOs. The calculus was that if the president and 
members of his party could embrace the bill, then ODM would be unlikely to reject legislation 
sponsored by one of their own. The bill drew heavily on Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2006—the 
Kibaki administration’s official policy document towards CSOs—to attract government support. 
The bill had broad support throughout civil society and buttressed the regulatory regime’s 
permissive qualities. Upon commencement, the act would repeal and replace the NGOs Act (§ 70 
of the PBOs Act).42  
 Like other CSO laws, the PBOs Act fuses permissive and restrictive provisions. Its 
permissive provisions are laudable if they are enforced fully and impartially. The act explicitly 
allows CSOs to join self-regulation forums other than the one created by the act (§§ 21, 23-26, 
28), permits associations to remain unregistered and informal (§§ 6-7), requires the regulator to 
make registration decisions with 60 days (§ 9(5)), does not require CSOs obtain additional 
permits to operate throughout the country (§ 10(1)), and gives CSOs the option to pursue 
income-generating activity related to their organizational missions (§ 65). Its restrictive 
provisions, by contrast, could quickly become repressive if the regulator acts without effective 
oversight. Three examples follow. One, the regulator can still collect “information that the 
Authority may deem necessary to include or as may be provided in the regulations” (§ 15(1)(e)) 
and must make that information available to public inspection (§ 15(2)). Another is that CSOs 
must still allow the regulator to influence private organizational decisions such as the nationality 
 
42 Private member’s bills are those introduced into the legislature by a member legislator not acting on behalf of the 







and residency of directors (§ 11(5)(a)) and includes requirements for how each CSO governs 
itself and conducts its day-to-day activities (§§ 25-26). And finally, the PBOs Act gives the 
regulator and Cabinet Secretary the authority to institute new rules in support of the act’s other 
legal provisions (§ 69).  
 Another concerning downside of the PBOs Act is that it would consolidate Kenya’s 
fragmented CSO regulatory responsibilities under the Public Benefit Organizations Regulatory 
Authority (§ 34). Currently, there are four regulators in Kenya that register and regulate CSOs. 
As I discuss in my next chapter, this regulatory pluralism allows CSOs to “shop” for the best 
regulator that meets their needs in terms of service, accessibility, fees, sophistication, registration 
requirements, etcetera. What is more, regulatory pluralism also makes it harder for the 
government to control civil society by capturing or coopting regulators. In short, regulatory 
pluralism is a feature not a bug and legislating it away may have undesirable consequences for 
fragile democracies.  
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta: 4th President of Kenya (April 9th 2013 – current) 
 CSOs made Uhuru Kenyatta’s path to the presidency uneasy. As Moi’s handpicked 
successor in 2002, Kenyatta ran as a member of KANU, his father’s party. Civil society leaders 
associated Uhuru Kenyatta with KANU’s long history of repression and human rights abuses. 
The Kenyan Human Rights Commission’s (KHRC) bold endorsement of presidential contender 
Mwai Kibaki contributed to Kenyatta’s electoral defeat in 2002 (Mutua, 2008, p. 276).43 CSOs 
challenged Kenyatta two more times: one was their support for the International Criminal 
 
43 The executive director of the KHRC explained human rights CSOs cannot remain silent and adhere to a “no-
comment orthodoxy” when a dictatorial government systematically abuses and oppresses basic human rights 






Court’s (ICC) investigation of Kenyatta, the other was petitioning the Supreme Court to dismiss 
the 2013 election results and nullify Kenyatta’s victory. In a different era and under different 
circumstances, this uneasy relationship may have foreshadowed an abusive response from Uhuru 
Kenyatta once he became president. Although President Kenyatta has ineffectively—and at times 
illegally—enforced the regulatory regime he inherited, characterizing his style as heavy-handed 
is inaccurate.        
 Kibaki’s term-limited presidency ended as his Prime Minister Raila Odinga (Orange 
Democratic Movement party) competed against his Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta (The 
National Alliance party). Both men were standard-bearers for alliances that sought to unify 
voters, a strategy that aided Kibaki in his first electoral win. Despite the ongoing investigation by 
the ICC for his involvement in the 2007-2008 post-election violence, 44 the Independent Electoral 
& Boundaries Commission announced Uhuru Kenyatta the winner on March 9th. Soon after, on 
March 16th, Odinga filed a petition at the Supreme Court arguing the election results were 
unreliable and needed reexamination.45 The Supreme Court moved quickly and announced its 
unanimous decision on March 30th. The court found that the election had been conducted in 
compliance with the law, that presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta validly won, and that 
rejected ballots should be omitted when calculating final tallies.46 Odinga accepted the court’s 
decision and Uhuru Kenyatta was inaugurated on April 9th. 
 
44 In December 2010, the ICC charged Kenyatta and other prominent figures with five counts of crimes against 
humanity. Public support for the ICC investigation neared 80% in November 2010 but lost support over time (T. 
Chapman & Chaudoin, 2019). On March 13th, 2015, the ICC withdrew charges and terminated the case (ICC Press 
Release ICC-CPI-20150313-PR1099 https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1099).  
45 Article 87(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and the Elections Act, 2011 (§§ 74, 80) required the Supreme Court 
to settle the electoral dispute in a timely manner (Lumumba & Franceschi, 2014, pp. 335-336). 
46 Raila Odinga & 5 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others (Petition No. 5 of 2013). 






 Kenyatta’s approach to civil society is unlike any of his predecessors. He has not embraced 
CSOs with an attitude of goodwill as Kibaki did. Nor has he partnered with them to develop the 
economy strategically as his father showed possible. But he has not been openly hostile towards 
civil society in the same way Moi had been. It is unlikely that Kenyatta is a full-throated 
supporter of civil society. CSOs endorsed his presidential opponent in 2002 and supported the 
ICC investigation that embarrassed and delegitimized him on the international stage. These 
grudges provide insight into the continued delay in commencing the PBOs Act (Amnesty 
International, 2015, p. 215; 2018, p. 223).   
Figure 6.6: Institutional Change Under U. Kenyatta (Apr. 2013 – current) 
 
Figure illustrates changes to CSO laws during the president’s administration. Values correspond to the legal rules 
inherited (dotted), the rules at an intermediate point (dashed), and the rules left to the successor (solid). Axes are 
quantitative variables that describe the regulatory regime. At twelve o’clock is the number of laws that comprise the 
regulatory regime. Then, quadrants provide four points of information for each subgroup: (i) number of provisions 






 The Kenyan regulatory regime changed very little under President Uhuru Kenyatta, as 
Figure 6.6 illustrates. The figure does not reflect the government’s failed attempt to amend the 
PBOs Act through a 2013 bill. The October 2013 bill proposed limiting a PBO’s external 
funding at 15% unless it had Cabinet Secretary authorization, lowering qualifications for persons 
serving on the oversight board, and reinserting the CSO regulator into CSOs’ work visa 
applications.47 Those amendments did not receive sufficient support during the legislative 
process. The act the government eventually enacted in December 2014—i.e., the Security Laws 
(Amendment) Act (No. 19 of 2014)—did not alter the PBOs Act in meaningful ways. As I 
discuss in the next chapter, elected officials explained the bill’s original restrictive elements 
failed because Members of Parliament organized to protect CSOs that were providing public 
service goods to their constituents. Those research participants made clear that CSOs’ effective 
service provision increased their reelection chances. 
 President Kenyatta seems determined to selectively alter the working rules to create the de 
facto regulatory regime that he wants. Not commencing the PBOs Act is one example. Another 
example is who he appoints to lead CSO regulators, particularly Mr. Yusuf Mahamed Fazul, 
Executive Director, NGOs Coordination Board (December 2014 to February 2018). In addition 
to abusing his own organization (Amollo & The Office of the Ombudsman, 2016), Mr. Fazul 
showed a pattern of directing his agency to conduct illegal and highly prejudicial enforcement 
actions that appeared to directly benefit President Kenyatta. In May 2017, Director Fazul alleged 
the Kalonzo Musyoka Foundation was laundering money and ordered the Central Bank to freeze 
 
47 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill, 2013. Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 146 (Bills No. 32). October 






the CSO’s accounts.48 The directive appeared politically motivated because the foundation was 
associated with Raila Odinga’s running mate to unseat President Kenyatta in the upcoming 
election. Then, on August 4th, 2017, Fazul’s agency deregistered the Key Empowerment 
Foundation, a CSO associated with Raila Odinga daughter.49 After the disputed August 8th, 2017 
presidential election, Mr. Fazul reportedly wrote to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations to 
investigate two prominent pro-democracy CSOs. On August 16th, Kenyan Police and Kenya 
Revenue Authority raided KHRC and AfriCOG offices after those CSOs raised public concerns 
regarding the outcome of the election.50 Fazul’s enforcement actions became so baseless that 
human rights CSOs in Mombasa ignored summonses by the regulator and dismissed it as an 
ineffective agency under questionable leadership.51 I discuss the implications of this lost 
legitimacy on the regulator in Chapter Seven.  
Conclusion 
 Research suggests that Kenyan presidents have taken different stances towards civil society: 
Jomo Kenyatta inherited a legal institution from the British and enacted some changes that 
allowed his harambee policy to develop the country and shape the political landscape. Moi 
selectively dismantled CSOs he considered threatening before making numerous changes to 
Kenya’s constitution that maximized his domestic control and power. Only after the Cold War 
did international pressure cause Moi to relinquish his authoritarian control and enact laws that to 
support political rights and civil liberties. Kibaki took over Moi’s regulatory regime and made 
 
48 Maina, Carole. (2017, June 1). “Kalonzo Foundation’s accounts to be active.” The Star, Kenya. 
49 Thoronjo, Paul. (2017, August 4). “Board ‘deregisters’ Raila daughter’s NGO.” The Standard. 
50 Ndunda, Joseph. (2017, August 23). “KHRC, AfriCOG to blame for ugly spats with state, says NGOs council.” The 
Star, Kenya. 






only a few changes to the legal rules. He made a concerted effort to improve the bureaucracy by 
placing prominent civil society leaders in important administrative positions. The current 
president, Uhuru Kenyatta, has ineffectively—and at times illegally—enforced the regulatory 
regime that Kibaki left him. With this historical overview as context, my final empirical chapter 
uses interviews with elected officials, bureaucrats, and four CSO regulators to understand why 







FOUR CSO REGULATORS IN KENYA 
 The preceding chapters analyzed the institutional development of CSO regulatory regimes 
as if they were strictly de jure legal rules. In Chapters Three and Five, I showed that preexisting 
constitutional and collective-choice rules, path dependence, and policy diffusion affect the 
institutional development of regulatory regimes. And in Chapters Four and Five, I illustrated that 
governments fuse permissive and restrictive provisions to craft the legal institutions governments 
want and need. Important questions remain, such as under what conditions do nondemocratic 
governments enact permissive provisions? Drawing on the case of Kenya for evidence, I argue 
that de jure institutional change is not an endpoint, and a provision’s mere existence does not 
ensure its impartial enforcement. This means that the government’s ulterior motives can cause 
working rules to bear no resemblance to legal rules. 
 It is therefore necessary but insufficient to study the institutional development of de jure 
regulatory regimes. What is also needed is to get one’s hands dirty and understand the 
enforcement of regulatory regimes from the inside. To fully understand how and why 
governments regulate CSOs, we must understand the degree to which working rules deviate from 
legal rules and explore the factors that may cause that deviation. In this chapter, I examine the 
enforcement of the Kenyan regulatory regime by interviewing Kenyan government officials and 
agency personnel. My interviews focused on why Kenyan CSO laws exist and how they are 
enforced. To verify the interview data collected from research participants at CSO regulators, 






knowledge of those regulators and Kenyan civil society more broadly.1 I combine this interview 
data with additional archival materials to show that different presidential administrations led the 
bureaucracy to enforce the same regulatory regime in different ways for political expediency. 
And while the interview data suggests that CSOs regulators lack the necessary personnel, 
expertise, and technology to be an imposing omnipresent threat, participants widely agreed that 
individual managers can do considerable damage to targeted CSOs and damage the regulator’s 
credibility in the process.   
 Evaluating these data together leads to my primary contribution that regulatory regimes are 
another tactic that governments use to directly and indirectly legitimize the regime and expand 
its control. Specifically, I argue that although elected officials in all political regime types may 
enact similar de jure legal provisions, the way they instruct the bureaucracy to enforce those 
rules can be explained as a quest of legitimacy at different levels. Legitimacy is therefore a 
subversive method for increasing control, maintaining power, and prolonging the regime’s 
existence.  
 While particular tactics may vary, the strategy remains the same. As one example, when a 
government aims to increase control directly, it uses coercive tactics. This occurs when elected 
officials enact de jure restrictive provisions and instruct the bureaucracy to enforce them with 
little deviation. In the same moment, the bureaucracy under-enforces de jure permissive 
provisions by enforcing them selectively (if at all). A second example shows that governments 
may have ulterior motives for enacting permissive provisions. When a government seeks to 
 
1 A concern is that government officials may embellish statements concerning why the civil societies laws exist or 
bias responses regarding enforcement and enforcement. I manage this by interviewing personnel at each regulator as 






increase control through legitimacy, it uses laws to manipulate civil society. This happens when 
elected officials enact de jure legal institutions that contain permissive and restrictive legal 
provisions. The disingenuous “dark side” of this tactic is that a nondemocratic government 
highlights permissiveness in a way that appears to empower and enable civil society, but actually 
increases the government’s legitimacy and buttresses its control.  
The Importance of Legitimacy 
 Scholars use legitimacy to describe concepts at different levels of analysis within societies. 
At the national level, legitimacy is analogous to “system affect” and “diffuse support” and 
describes the citizenry’s general evaluation of and support for the political system (Lipset, 1960; 
Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965, 1975). Applied at the subnational-level, legitimacy is the 
evaluation of and support for particular government actors and policies, which makes it 
analogous to terms such as “specific support,” “effectiveness,” and “incumbent affect” (Lipset, 
1960; Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965). In countries like Kenya, governments tie their 
legitimacy to their ability to deliver public service goods (Bratton, 1989a; Fowler, 1991; 
Katumanga, 2004; Owiti, Aluoka, & Oloo, 2004).  
 Legitimacy is a vital concept because it is the impetus for enacting different provisions in 
CSO laws (Bratton, 1989b). This loss of legitimacy is central to the “closing space” argument 
that explains why governments enact legal provisions that hinder civil society. That reasoning 
has sent analysts on a quest to investigate the conditions under which governments enact 
restrictive provisions. But restrictive provisions are not the only response available to 






that nondemocratic governments can enact them and selectively enforce them as part of a 
broader strategy to maintain power.  
Why Nondemocracies Enact Permissive Provisions: Legitimacy, Control, and Manipulation 
 In Chapters Four and Five, I carefully detail that nondemocratic governments routinely 
enact permissive provisions and that the practice is not random.2 Lorch and Bunk (2017, pp. 989-
991) have identified several tactics where governments use permissive provisions to legitimize 
their regimes and expand their control. I discuss these tactics as contributing to the government’s 
strategy though direct or indirect legitimization, or through manipulation.3 Two tactics use 
permissive provisions to directly bolster the regime’s legitimacy. The first direct tactic uses 
permissive provisions to strengthen the regime’s democratic façade (Tactic #1). The action is 
that the government enacts permissive provisions to the de jure CSO regulatory regime. Doing 
so flashes the impression of democratic qualities to observers in the domestic or international 
spheres.4 The intended effect is to increase diffuse support for the regime. The other direct tactic 
engages CSOs on social matters to demonstrate responsiveness (Tactic #2). The first action is 
that the government enacts permissive provisions that allow for the controlled growth of CSOs, 
some of which will be friendly towards the current administration. The second action is that the 
government meets with those CSOs and claims they represent society’s collective interests, even 
 
2 Analyses in Chapter Five suggest that a one standard deviation increase in institutionalized autocracy almost doubles 
the size of the average permissive expansion (0.10, p < 0.05). The direction, magnitude, and statistical significance of 
this relationship is consistent among models analyzing permissive expansions (see Table 5.3). 
3 Prior research shows these tactics are used in contexts such as the Middle East and North Africa (Wiktorowicz, 
2000; Dimitrovova, 2010), Southeast Asia (Lorch, 2006; Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011), Sub-Saharan Africa (Tripp, 
2001; Brass, 2016; Lorch & Bunk, 2017), and many other authoritarian and hybrid regimes  around the world 
(Lewis, 2013; Froissart, 2014; Teets, 2014; Benevolenski & Toepler, 2017; Toepler et al., 2019; Toepler et al., 
2020). 






if some or all of them support the administration. The first intended effect is to engage with 
legally registered CSOs and depoliticize widespread social discontent (Giersdorf & Croissant, 
2011) and thus publicly demonstrate the government’s willingness to work with groups that 
represent society’s concerns—i.e., CSOs. The other intended effect is to collect information that 
the government can use to understand pressing societal concerns and respond to them before they 
threaten the regime (Tripp, 2001; Teets, 2014). Both legitimize the government by improving its 
responsiveness.  
 Two additional tactics indirectly add to the regime’s legitimacy. One uses permissive 
provisions to entice CSOs to comply with the regime (Tactic #3). The action is that the 
government enacts permissive provisions to increase compliance. Compliance does not directly 
improve diffuse-support legitimacy, but instead adds specific-support legitimacy to the 
regulatory regime. The intended effect is to turn the specific support for the legal institution into 
a signal that legitimizes the government’s authority to govern (Froissart, 2014). The other (Tactic 
#4) uses CSOs’ service provision to increase the government’s output of public service goods. 
The action is that the government enacts permissive provisions to encourage and engineer the 
growth of particular types of CSOs. This may involve facilitating the growth of welfare- and 
service-oriented CSOs because those organizations fulfill fundamental social needs unmet by the 
government (Bratton, 1989b; Lorch, 2006; Spires, 2011; Brass, 2016; Toepler et al., 2019). The 
intended effect is to absorb CSOs’ organizational outputs into the government’s official policy 
and allow the regime to seize credit for those successes through either cooperation or cooptation. 
Improved service provision directly bolsters the regime’s output legitimacy.  
 The final two tactics are manipulative.  The first (Tactic #5) increases the regime’s 






practices and legal codes” (Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 43). Similar to Tactic #3, the action is that the 
government enacts permissive provisions to increase voluntary compliance. The manipulation 
happens when CSOs willingly—and perhaps unknowingly—surrender to the government the 
basic information it needs to observe these autonomous non-market and non-governmental 
organizations. This information may be as banal as physical and website addresses, but it allows 
governments to scrape additional information, monitor social media accounts, collect names and 
phone numbers, and arrive unannounced at public meetings. The intended effect is to accumulate 
the information necessary to penetrate and observe civil society. With that information and 
administrative power, the government can monitor, control, and prevent collective action. The 
final tactic (Tactic #6) uses permissive provisions to attract international assistance that 
indirectly expands the government’s resource base. The action is that the government enacts 
permissive provisions that promote foreign assistance to local CSOs. The manipulation happens 
when the provisions legally require international assistance to specific locations—e.g., deposited 
at certain financial institutions, placed in escrow at government ministries for later distribution, 
or channeled to favored or coopted organizations. The intended effect is to give the regime 
multiple opportunities to use those funds to increase its influence and resource base 
(Dimitrovova, 2010, pp. 528-529; Lewis, 2013, p. 329).5  
Interviewing Kenyan Elected Leaders, Bureaucrats, and CSO Regulators  
 This chapter analyzes data collected from the Government of Kenya (GOK). I conducted 
interviews with participants associated with multiple GOK offices and triangulate that interview 
 






data with archival materials obtained from government repositories managed by the executive 
and legislative organs. Table 7.1 identifies the GOK entities that participated in my primary data 
collection and describes the type of data they provided.6  
Table 7.1 Government Agency Archival and Interview Data 
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Table identifies government agencies that graciously participated in my research. Additional information summarizes 
the types of data collected from each source.  
 
6 I attempted to conduct interviews and collect data from the National Intelligence Service (NIS), but despite multiple 






 I used a top-down interviewing strategy to identify research participants.7 I interviewed six 
Members of Parliament (MPs). These elected officials averaged more than a decade of political 
experience and represented several political parties. To interview government employees, I had 
to place a formal request with a senior official in that particular GOK office. Once the necessary 
permission had been given, I requested to interview 5-15 employees at the agency with varying 
characteristics according to role and responsibilities, professional experience within the agency, 
and gender. In echoing the contents of my formal request for information, I explained that all 
interviews should be voluntary and offered to meet interview participants at a time and place of 
their choice. This strategy resulted in eight GOK managers scheduling interviews with 23 willing 
research participants. Table 7.2 summarizes the sample, and my analysis randomizes pronouns to 
protect participants’ identity and privacy.  
 Involving GOK managers in my recruitment process was unavoidable, and I suspect their 
necessary participation made my sample less representative. I expect that managers handpicked 
participants who would satisfactorily represent the agency. By this I mean that each participant 
knew enough about the agency and their position within it to provide adequate responses to my 
queries and, conservatively, did not harbor underlying resentment towards their employer. To be 
clear, I suspect managers selected participants who they thought would make their agency look 
good.   
 
7 The constraints that accompany data acquisition from government agencies prevented me from interviewing a 
random or representative sample for two reasons. First, any request for information from a GOK agency required 
approval from a senior manager within that agency. The approval process varies across agencies, but most required 
an information packet with a formal letter requesting access. This packet contained my official request and detailed 
the precise information that I sought, a high-level description of my project, my CV, and copies of my NACOSTI 
research permit and IRB notification. The speed of approvals came as quickly as 1.5 weeks (Library of Parliament) to 







Table 7.2 Deidentified Interview Participant Characteristics 
ID# Government of Kenya Agency Professional Experience Professional Responsibilities 
GOK094 NGOs Board Under 5 years Junior Professional 
GOK095 Parliament Over 20 years Elected Official 
GOK096 Kenya Law Reform Commission  Over 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK097 Parliament Over 20 years Elected Official 
GOK098 Registrar of Companies 5 to 9 years Senior Professional 
GOK099 Parliament 10 to 20 years Elected Official 
GOK100 Ministry of East African Affairs 10 to 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK101 NGOs Board Under 5 years Junior Professional 
GOK102 Kenya Law Reform Commission  Over 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK103 Ombudsman 10 to 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK104 Registrar of Trusts 10 to 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK105 Registrar of Societies 5 to 9 years Junior Professional 
GOK106 Registrar of Societies Under 5 years Junior Professional 
GOK107 Registrar of Companies Under 5 years Junior Professional 
GOK108 NGOs Board 10 to 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK109 Public Service Commission 10 to 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK110 NGOs Board 5 to 9 years Senior Professional 
GOK111 Registrar of Societies 5 to 9 years Junior Professional 
GOK112 Registrar of Companies 5 to 9 years Junior Professional 
GOK113 Registrar of Companies Under 5 years Junior Professional 
GOK114 Parliament 5 to 9 years Elected Official 
GOK115 Registrar of Trusts Under 5 years Junior Professional 
GOK116 Registrar of Societies Over 20 years Senior Professional 
GOK117 Registrar of Companies 5 to 9 years Junior Professional 
GOK118 NGOs Board 5 to 9 years Senior Professional 
GOK119 Parliament Under 5 years Elected Official 
GOK120 Parliament 10 to 20 years Elected Official 
GOK121 Registrar of Societies 10 to 20 years Junior Professional 
GOK122 NGOs Board 10 to 20 years Senior Professional 
Table summarizes interview data. Identification numbers (ID#) are randomized and do not reflect the order in which 
interviews occurred. Full anonymity was given when asking for informed consent. To fully deidentify participants, no 
names or specific titles are used.  
 The selection process likely increases the probability that interview data contains a positive 
tone regarding CSO laws. I anticipate this distortion is largest among CSO regulators. 
Accordingly, I discount thinly corroborated interview data that paints legal provisions and 
regulators in a positive light. Data of this sort would likely embellish legal provisions as strongly 
permissive, exaggerate compliance rates from CSOs, and overstate the resources and capacities 
of the agency. To be convincing, nearly all interview participants would need to corroborate this 






Conversely, given the gatekeeper-selected sample, I give extra attention to the low-probability 
interview data that negatively discuss CSO laws and consider it smoking-gun evidence 
(Mahoney, 2012, p. 578; Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 17). By way of comparison, if I included 
CSO leaders in my analysis, I would discount the highly-probable interview data that discuss 
CSO laws and regulators with a negative tone, and overweight the less-probable data that 
positively discuss those same topics.      
 I conducted nearly 30 hours of interviews with 29 GOK bureaucrats and elected officials 
between August and December 2018 (Table 7.2). The average interview lasted slightly over one 
hour (min = 0.5 hour, max = 2.25 hours). The average interview was shorter for elected officials 
(51 minutes), approximately the same for CSO regulators (62 minutes), and slightly longer for 
other GOK agencies (70 minutes). Semi-structured interviews included general questions about 
participants’ professional background, their perception of government-CSO relationships in 
Kenya, inter-agency partnerships, and the creation and enforcement of Kenyan CSO laws. 
Handwritten notes were transformed into contemporaneous interview memos following each 
interview. When participants allowed it, a common smartphone recorded the conversation to 
assist in writing the interview memos. 
 Using NVivo (v.12), I analyzed all interview memos according to the themes used to 
construct my interview protocol. Then, with a second close reading of the data, I used iterative 
open coding to sort the data into themes explaining why the governments enacts and enforces 







Analytical Findings: Exploring the Dark Side of Permissive Legal Provisions 
Tactic #1: Using Permissive Provisions to Strengthen a Democratic Façade 
 Kenyan elected officials, bureaucrats, and CSO regulators supported the argument that 
governments use CSO laws to strengthen a democratic façade. Reaffirming the historical 
research discussed in Chapter Six, one Member of Parliament explained that during the Cold 
War, Moi used a strategy of non-alignment to allow himself maximum leeway on domestic 
issues. She continued that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kenya had to “lean towards the 
West” and Moi used the return of multi-party democracy as a brick in the democratic façade 
(GOK114). A Kenyan legal expert and a senior official with the Kenya Law Reform 
Commission (KLRC) supported this. He observed that the NGOs Act was a product of the 
movement pushing for governance reform and a government willing to negotiate on certain 
terms (GOK096). He noted that many in civil society wanted an entirely new constitution (e.g., 
Mutunga, 1999). Instead, to appease critics, President Moi showed his commitment to the 
democratization efforts and agreed to changes in the NGOs bill demanded by CSOs pushing for 
democracy and governance reform. The enacted statute gave CSOs the room necessary to pursue 
governance activities and made sure those actions took place under the watchful eye of the 
government.   
 CSO regulators also described Kenyan CSO laws as possessing dual intentions. A legal 
expert with the Registrar of Societies explained the Societies Act and other CSO laws are 
publicly portrayed as protecting society and societal actors, but the private intention has always 
been to ensure these actors play by the rules (GOK106). A seasoned regulator at the NGOs Co-






believe that foreign donors “imposed” multi-party democracy on an unwilling government and 
that CSO laws had two intentions: one was to control and stifle political competition and the 
other was to regulate the CSOs that were now receiving increased levels of foreign aid that 
donors once channeled to the government (GOK122).  
 CSOs weigh many things when deciding whether and if to incorporate as an official legal 
entity. Not registering with the regulator does not prove decision-makers saw through a 
democratic façade or any other attempt to manipulate CSOs. Still, a CSO’s decision to register 
with an agency signals that it was swayed by something in the legal rules. Evaluating the 
decisions sophisticated CSOs made concerning the NGOs Act provides information on whether 
those actors accepted the government’s gesture that the new law protected society and CSOs. 
Two sophisticated CSOs actors are Oxfam and the Legal Advice Centre.8 After Moi enacted and 
finally commenced the NGOs Act in June 1992,9 Oxfam registered with the NGOs Board on 
March 11th, 1993. The local legal experts soon followed, and the Legal Advice Centre registered 
on August 2nd, 1993. Neither of these CSO should be considered naïve, and their decisions to 
register suggest the legitimizing tactic to give domestic and international onlookers the 
impression of democratic qualities worked, at least to some degree.   
 Kenyan elected officials, bureaucrats, and CSO regulators discussed the need for a certain 
degree of willpower among political elites to execute the democratic façade tactic (GOK095, 
 
8 Oxfam is the international humanitarian organization, which registered as a Kenyan company limited by guarantee 
in 1977. The Legal Advice Centre (Kituo Cha Sheria) is one of the oldest and most experienced legal aid CSOs in 
East Africa. A group of legal experts established the human rights CSO on July 9th, 1973, to offer free legal advice 
and education to poor Kenyans. 
9 The Non-Governmental Organizations Co-Ordination Act (No. 19 of 1990) was assented to on January 14th, 1991. 
The law was not commenced until June 15th, 1992, after it was amended by The Statute Law (Repeal and 






GOK096, GOK097, GOK109, and GOK114). Participants concurred that President Moi and 
President Uhuru Kenyatta most clearly possessed the willpower necessary to enforce permissive 
provisions minimally. Some participants qualified the explanation and added that the same 
willpower could be used for good to build democratic institutions by insisting permissive 
provision be enforced as they are written. Interview participants generally identified President 
Kibaki as having a genuine interest in helping Kenyan civil society. They described President 
Jomo Kenyatta as supporting Kenyan CSOs to achieve a broader policy agenda. In support of the 
historical research reviewed in Chapter Six, research participants suggested that political elites 
can direct the bureaucracy to enforce legal institutions that help CSOs; they just have to choose 
to do so (GOK095, GOK103, GOK109, GOK122).  
 At the agency level, one regulator suggested to me that presidents’ concern for control and 
legitimacy manifests as a constraint on CSO regulators (GOK118). The Kenyan regulatory 
regime directs regulators to cancel or suspend CSO registrations for legitimate purposes by 
following an exact process (e.g., Societies Act § 12; NGOs Act § 16). The participant informed 
me that she believed the regulator was instructed not to process legitimate cancellations because 
doing so would create a blowback that would damage the administration’s democratic façade. 
Additional data suggests that public management objectives and performance benchmarks align 
with this legitimization tactic to give local and international onlookers the impression of 
democracy. A growing number of CSOs in a country gives such an impression and is one 
straightforward metric that onlookers may compare. As one junior professional at the Registrar 
of Companies told me, her agency structures individual performance goals around the number of 
CSO registration applications they complete, with higher volumes indicating better performance 






Tactic #2: Engaging CSOs Increases Government’s Responsiveness Legitimacy 
 The Kenyan government officials I interviewed agreed that by engaging CSOs in dialogue, 
the government both addresses social problems and minimizes public criticism. Further analysis 
of the interview data shows this legitimacy-through-engagement tactic is a nuanced process. 
Respondents widely agreed that the government actively recruits and meets with CSOs to 
prevent allegations that the government is unresponsive. These officials commented that the 
large supply of CSOs makes it easy to initiate engagement because all CSOs seek dialogue with 
policymakers.  
 Politics determines which CSOs the government invites to the table. As one official 
observed, engaging faith groups—i.e., Catholic, Muslim, Christian churches and organizations—
and secular groups together is the most effective way to address social unrest (GOK120). As I 
reviewed in the previous chapter, broad coalitions such as these were vital to democratization in 
the 1990s, constitutional reform in the 2000s, and reconciling election disputes after the 2010 
constitution. But there are occasions when the government does not want a strong or effective 
CSO coalition. The government can profoundly influence—and in some cases predetermine—
the outcome of engagement by intentionally selecting participants. As another leader reported, 
the government is reluctant to involve “noisemakers” in the policymaking process (GOK097). 
The implication is that CSOs may self-censor or acquiesce if they wish to remain involved in 
future policy discussions. The government may further manipulate engagement by handpicking 
particular CSOs that promote a particular policy or carry a loyalty towards the regime.  
 The preponderance of interview data I collected depicts genuine engagement with CSOs. As 
one bureaucrat with over 20 years of experience drafting legislation in multiple policy areas told 






problems and contribute policy formulation (GOK102). She explained that her agency—the 
KLRC—first produces a “concept paper” that summarizes the social problem a government 
partner wants to address through the legislative process. Next, the KLRC makes a “request for 
memorandums” through publicly accessible sources—e.g., its website and the media. After a 
sufficient amount of time, the KLRC identifies CSOs it wants to invite to a multi-day forum to 
engage the topic further: “[we] discuss, we exchange views, and we reach consensus.” She 
clarified that when necessary, the KLRC will ask CSO regulators for recommendations on which 
CSOs are the most relevant to a particular issue. The respondent proudly informed me that this 
manner of engagement is considered “public participation” and is both constitutionally and 
statutorily required.10  
 The Registrar of Societies maintains ongoing discussions with religious CSOs regarding the 
alleged dishonest actions of religious leaders and self-regulation within religious communities. 
Some religious leaders in Kenya have taken to “misquoting Holy Scriptures” and abusing the 
prosperity gospel to commit “blatant theft” (Mutunga, 2018, p. 3). Growing allegations of this 
led the Attorney General to respond quickly to this public concern. He directed his Registrar of 
Societies to halt the registration of all religious congregations effective November 11th, 2014 (see 
Figure 7.3 and the Appendix for full statement). Days later, on November 14th, the Attorney 
General organized a consultative forum to discuss religious congregations’ operations and lay the 
groundwork for a regulatory framework preventing future abuses. Representatives from the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims 
 
10 Articles 10, 118, 124, 201, 221, and 232 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and the National Assembly Standing 






(SUPKEM), and the Hindu Council of Kenya attended. Following the forum, religious CSOs 
submitted their opinions as memoranda that laid the foundation for a policy discussion at a 
second forum four months later (March 31st, 2015). An agreement was not reached, and the 
second forum ended with the moratorium in full effect. 
Figure 7.3: Moratorium Stopping the Registration of Religious Organizations 
 
Public notice of the moratorium halting the registration of new religious organizations in Kenya. Photo taken October 
5th, 2018, inside the offices of the Registrar of Societies (State Law Office—Sheria House, Nairobi).  
 Observers may consider the Attorney General’s moratorium an overreaction to protect 
society from phony pastors that unnecessarily punishes innocent religious groups. I explored this 
possibility with a senior member of the State Law Office who was quite generous with his time 






Blackstone formulation (Blackstone, 1765),11 which I posed to him in the form of a question and 
then asked it a second time rephrased with respect to the moratorium on religious congregations. 
The conversation is paraphrased as follows: 
DeMattee:  Do you think it is better to let ten guilty persons go free than 
   allow one innocent person to be wrongly punished?  
GOK116:  [Without hesitation and with full confidence] It is better to let 
   ten go free than allow one innocent to suffer.  
DeMattee:  Is it better to let ten phony congregations register or deny one 
   legitimate entity the ability to register? 
GOK116:  [Again without hesitation] It is better to deny all of them  
   registration. There needs to be a proper framework to protect 
   the public interest. That framework is the law.  
 What is compelling about this exchange is that the respondent’s full-throated endorsement 
of the current moratorium is unshaken despite first anchoring him to his legal thinking on the 
Blackstone formulation. Still, every word he spoke during our 143-minute interview were 
honest, relaxed, and unrehearsed. His insights regarding the moratorium seemed to me to be a 
sincere explanation of what he thought was the government’s prudent and evenhanded course of 
action. If experienced legal experts such as this gentleman are so quick to go to such lengths to 
demonstrate genuine responsiveness, then a similar attitude may energize regulatory fixes to 
societal concerns relating to CSOs more broadly—e.g., briefcase NGOs and terrorism. Elected 
officials, bureaucrats, and regulators repeatedly identified those societal issues as leading 
justifications for legislative action (GOK098, GOK095, GOK109, GOK122).     
  
 
11 The Blackstone formulation is named after English jurist William Blackstone who argued that it is better to let ten 






Tactic #3: Using Compliance to Legitimize the Government’s Authority to Govern  
 My interview data expands the proposition that compliance gives laws and regulators 
credibility, which in turn legitimizes the government’s authority to govern. Multiple participants 
suggested there is a concerted effort to improve the credibility and legitimacy of agencies. The 
Kenyan regulators with whom I spoke appeared keenly aware of how others experience and 
perceive their agency. What is more, these individuals suggested a causal connection between 
the agency’s perceived credibility and its ability to regulate and fulfill statutory responsibilities.  
 One participant retold stories of ordinary citizens feeling frustrated or defeated by the 
incredible processes that laypersons believe should be simple and quick (GOK115). He 
suggested that these events tarnished the agency’s reputation and credibility. Regulators at the 
NGOs Co-ordination Board felt strongly that the wrongful actions of a single individual in a 
leadership role severely damaged the credibility of the entire organization. A long-time 
employee of the NGOs Board described how the actions of Mr. Yusuf Mahamed Fazul, 
Executive Director of the regulator from December 2014 to February 2018, stained the regulator 
with a negative perception and caused it to lose credibility among CSOs, other government 
agencies, and elected officials (GOK108). As I reviewed in Chapter Six, the Commission on 
Administrative Justice (CAJ) investigated allegations that Mr. Fazul lacked the necessary 
qualifications for the position, made irregular promotions and transfers of agency staff, 
victimized and intimidated personnel, and mismanaged public funds (Amollo & The Office of 






concluded in November 2016 with the official report “Death of Integrity.”12 The report, 
alongside a courtroom defeat of Mr. Fazul and his questionable deregistration of certain CSOs in 
Kenya, sowed distrust and “bad blood” between CSOs and the regulator (GOK904).13 
 Questions remain concerning the drama that engulfed the NGOs Board during Mr. Fazul’s 
tenure. Each relates to the simple question: did the government appoint Mr. Fazul knowing that 
he would unfairly enforce the legal rules entrusted to him? For the first scenario, let us assume 
the government did not expect Mr. Fazul would act in the way he did, which is possible given his 
short political resume. If the government honestly did not expect him to act the way he did, then 
why did neither the Minister who appointed him nor the Board that oversaw his actions demand 
his resignation? Innocent until proven guilty is not an explanation. Mr. Fazul stayed on the job 
for more than a year after the court ruled against his managerial decisions (September 2016) and 
the Commission on Administrative Justice published the “Death of Integrity” report (November 
2016). Let us now consider a scenario where the government did expect Mr. Fazul would act in 
the manner he did. If that is the case, then we can reasonably conclude that the Minister who 
appointed him did so in the interest of the government and President Kenyatta. This is supported 
 
12 “[CAJ] wrote to Mr. Fazul vide a letter Ref: CAJ/NGO/076/6/15-DKO dated 1st September, 2015 to inform him 
about the allegations raised in the anonymous complaint letter dated 21st July, 2015 and to request him to respond to 
the allegations. Mr. Fazul responded to the allegations vide a letter Ref: NGOB/5/30A/8/Vol. XII dated 15 th 
September, 2015 in which he disputed all the allegations raised against him. CAJ then received other anonymous 
complaint letters against Mr. Fazul Considering Mr. Fazul’s response which was not satisfactory as well as other 
anonymous complaints received, the Commission made a decision to undertake investigations… The Commission 
notified the Principal Secretary, Planning and Statistics vide a letter Ref: CAJ/IE/6/46/16(1) dated 17th August 2016 
of its decision to undertake investigations” (Amollo & The Office of the Ombudsman, 2016, pp. 1-2).  
13 “Petition No. 107 of 2016: Josephine Ngatia Vs. The Executive Director and NGOs Coordination Board was 
determined on 22nd September, 2016 in favour of Ms. Josephine Ngatia, the Human Resource and Development 
Manager…Investigations noted that the NGOs Coordination Board currently has no chairperson, thereby giving the 







by the fact that six months after he resigned from the NGOs Board, the government appointed 
Mr. Fazul to be the director general of the Private Security Regulatory Authority.14 
Assuming that the government knew what Fazul might do, it may still seem unclear why 
under these circumstance that the government permitted an investigation into the very regulatory 
malpractice it expected. Why did President Kenyatta allow the CAJ investigation to press 
forward? One straightforward explanation is that squashing the investigation would damage the 
regime’s democratic façade. Another is that the CAJ had no teeth and the government knew it 
could ignore its findings and recommendations. Whether the regime intended it or not, it appears 
Mr. Fazul was the person the government wanted running the NGOs Board with the 2017 
general election on the horizon. 
 The theory that I proposed in Chapter One guided the above explanations. Both scenarios 
exemplify a government manipulating the working rules to create the de facto regulatory regime 
it desires. I also attribute the unwanted attention—i.e., news headlines, courtroom battles, and 
CAJ reports—during Mr. Fazul’s tenure to missteps of a politically inexperienced bureaucrat. In 
the end, the disgraced public manager’s most valuable service to the regime may have been 
giving it plausible deniability to all of the NGOs Board’s damnable actions committed between 
December 2014 to February 2018.  
 Interview participants held Former Executive Director Fazul singularly responsible for 
tarnishing the reputation of the NGOs Board and harming the credibility of the law that 
empowers it. This led the NGOs Board to undertake actions different from other CSO regulators 
 







in Kenya. Following his departure, the NGOs Board launched initiatives to increase compliance 
and rebuild credibility. One seasoned official recalled that, historically, compliance was never 
the top priority compared to registration, capacity building, or coordination (GOK122). But she 
remembered a clear turning point three years ago (circa 2015) where compliance became the top 
priority.  
 Triangulating my interview data and knowledge of Kenya’s CSO laws leads me to identify 
three overlapping reasons—short, medium, and long term—that explain the urgency surrounding 
these compliance initiatives. Most immediately, a savvy regulatory veteran cited precise numbers 
off the top of her head that less than 25% of the over 11,000 organizations registered with the 
NGOs Board submit annual reports (GOK122). While several factors may contribute to the low 
compliance rate, she implied that a diminished level of credibility made the compliance level 
abnormally low. In her explanation of the situation, the low compliance rate was the symptom 
caused by a lack of credibility among CSOs. This had a knock-on effect that impeded the NGOs 
Board from fulfilling its statutory duty to advise the government on the role of NGOs in Kenya.15 
This created a downward spiral where a lack of credibility lowered the compliance rate, and a 
low compliance rate weakened credibility through an inability to meet statutory obligations. 
Thus, the immediate reason for improving compliance was to halt the tailspin caused by a lack of 
credibility.   
 
15 Unlike other CSO regulators in Kenya, the Non-Governmental Organizations Co-Ordination Act, 1990 requires the 
NGOs Board to receive, review, and synthesize annual reports and advise the government on the role NGOs have in 
development within Kenya (§ 7). NGOs Board interview participants concur that this responsibility is fulfilled by the 






 In the medium-term, the reason the NGOs Board sought to increase compliance was to 
repair its damaged reputation in the eyes of CSOs and government officials. This reputational 
rebuilding will take time, and the agency has initiated several strategies to mend relations 
between the NGOs Board, NGOs, and Kenyan civil society more broadly. Appointing Gichira 
Kibara—a civil society insider, legal expert, proven manager, and former Kibaki appointee—
Chairman of the NGOs Co-ordination Board, was a strong first step. Additional efforts included 
TV interviews with its chairman, networking with clusters of CSOs such as the Civil Society 
Reference Group and the NGO Council, and engagement forums with organizations in 
Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nairobi (GOK108). Each of these forums aimed to raise compliance 
levels through dialogue on laws and regulations, compliance training, goodwill, and post-
workshop surveys to identify areas where the agency can improve (GOK110). Interview 
participants at the NGOs Board explained these “goodwill tours” are new while participants 
outside the NGOs Board gave no indication that other CSO regulators use similar programs.   
 Improving year-to-year compliance rates and repairing its damaged reputation add 
momentum to the agency’s long-term goal of becoming Kenya’s lone CSO regulator. Many 
interview participants interpreted the legal language of the Public Benefits Organization Act as 
consolidating all CSO regulators under one roof: the Public Benefit Organizations Regulatory 
Authority, or “the Authority.” The transitional provisions in the PBO Act (§ 70 and Schedule 
Five) explain that the NGOs Board will temporarily act as the PBO Authority and regulate all 
CSOs in Kenya.16 The act does not explicitly state the Board will become the Authority, 
 
16 The act defines a PBOs as “voluntary membership or non-membership grouping of individuals or organizations, 
which is autonomous, non-partisan, non-profit making and which is—(a) organized and operated locally, nationally 






however. Interview participants at the NGOs Board presumed the NGOs Board would 
seamlessly and fully transition into the Authority, but other participants disagreed. CSO 
regulators widely acknowledged the NGOs Board would act as a custodian, but those outside the 
NGOs Board maintained the Authority’s structure and personnel would look different from the 
Board. Elected officials, meanwhile, suggested little will change until MPs exercise oversight 
responsibilities.   
Tactic #4: CSOs’ Service Provision Increases Government’s Output Legitimacy 
 Interview data with elected officials, bureaucrats, and CSO regulators support the argument 
that, under certain conditions, nondemocratic governments tolerate the growth of service-
oriented CSOs because those organizations fulfill fundamental needs left unmet by the 
government’s public service provision. My data suggests that instead of leading CSOs, the 
government sets its policy priorities to align with the areas in which CSOs allocate considerable 
resources. The outcome is the same, even if the execution differs.  
 One elected official, speaking in broad terms, explained CSOs are “an addition to public 
services” that fill the gap, especially in the hinterlands on issues such as education and health 
(GOK097). Similarly, an experienced bureaucrat emphasized that the bigger the gap, the greater 
the urgency. Citing South Sudan as an example, she explained, “[the country is] in the middle of 
a civil war, and it would make more sense for international relief organizations to be given a 
bigger leeway to operate in the country, to deliver food and medical supplies” (GOK102). 
Referring to Kenyan history, another MP argued the early CSO laws were meant to help farmers, 
 
registered as such by the Authority” (Section 5(1)). The act explicitly states that it does not affect societies (§ 5(2)(e)) 






particularly tea farmers organize themselves so that they could better work with the government. 
She read the Societies Act (1968) and other early laws as establishing governance and facilitating 
economic transactions between government and the civil society groups, what she referred to as 
“the business nature of things” (GOK114).  
 Another elected official’s account suggests this particular legitimizing tactic may be newer 
than others. The participant was alive at the time of Jomo Kenyatta’s death and explained that 
event marked the beginning of “dark days for the country” (GOK095). He insisted it was not 
because CSOs were bad, but because of the way Moi’s dictatorial regime treated them. He retold 
many stories from that period and informed me that Moi never attempted to claim credit for the 
public service goods provided by CSOs and financed by international donors. 
 Now, with the benefit of learned experience, elected officials seem to be turning away from 
Moi’s example and embracing CSOs’ public contributions. The same elected official recited his 
involvement in the legislature concerning the proposed 2014 amendments to the PBO Act 
(2013). According to him, there was a multi-party coalition that defeated those amendments 
because the elected officials recognized the restrictive provisions would adversely affect CSOs’ 
ability to complement and supplement public service provision within constituencies. To be 
clear, the elected official did not suggest that in 2014 Kenyan MPs were liberal vanguards 
protecting CSOs. He suggested instead that there is a positive relationship between an 
incumbent’s reelection and CSOs providing public service goods in their constituencies 
(GOK095). A top-level bureaucrat at the KLRC agreed that this new perspective exists. She 
reported that CSOs can sometimes go on the offensive and will “withhold their services, like 
their attendance of meetings, their formulation of policies, joint partnerships with government 






 While an elected official may be able to individually identify and benefit from CSOs’ 
activities in his/her constituency, it is more laborious for the government to aggregate the actions 
of tens of thousands of CSOs in Kenya and claim those deeds as its own. In practice, the only 
formal tool available to the government to accomplish such widespread usurpation is the “NGO 
Sector Report” published by the NGOs Board. Interview participants at the NGOs Board 
expressed that the report demonstrates the government’s ability to organize, understand, and 
communicate what NGOs have done in the country over a particular period (GOK0094, 
GOK122).17  
 A third regulator at the NGOs Board explained that that government encourages CSOs to 
consider supporting particular programmatic “areas of interest” (GOK1110). When asked for 
examples, the respondent identified microfinance and geriatric care as past and present examples, 
respectively.  
 The NGOs Board research participant claimed that government leadership steered CSO 
programming away from microfinance and into geriatric care. He explained that microfinance 
had been part of Kenya’s charitable sector. The evolving nature of the country led the Central 
Bank to develop policies to regulate microfinance itself. No longer considered charitable, 
microfinance now belongs to the commercial sector and is regulated by the Central Bank of 
Kenya (GOK1110). Evidence does not support this explanation. One, it appears CSOs are still 
active in this commercial sector. More than 70% of the 660 NGOs engaged in microfinance 
 
17 When I requested access to copies of these reports, the NGOs Board informed me it was unable to share its 
unpublished drafts and directed me to its Resource Center library for all available documents. That library contained 
only one such report (Financial Year 2013/14). Since my time conducting fieldwork, the NGOs Board published the 






activities registered in the years after the government commenced the Microfinance Act.18 Two, 
NGOs’ microfinance expenditures have increased from 586 million KSh in 2013/14 to 620 
million KSh in 2018/19 (NGOs Co-Ordination Board, 2014, p. 9; 2019, p. 24). Turning to 
geriatric care, there exist only 59 registrations (20 international and 39 national) of NGOs 
engaged in that activity. The expenditure toward that programmatic area is down 54% from 
2017/18. Expenditure in that area is only 66 million KSh for 2018/19, slightly more than 10% of 
expenditures allocated towards charitable microfinance.   
 While the government has unsuccessfully lead CSO activity, it has effectively changed its 
own policy to follow CSO programmatic activity. In late-2017, the Kenyatta administration 
identified four flagship programs it publicizes as “The Big 4.”19 These initiatives include 
manufacturing, affordable housing, universal health coverage, and food security. Governmental 
reports show the government’s top policy areas are the same sectors in which CSOs are the most 
active as measured by expenditure. According to the NGOs Board official report for 2018/19, 
more than 1,000 registered NGOs and nearly 45% of all NGO expenditure was directed to 
charitable programs closely related to The Big 4 initiatives. Specifically, these areas included 
economic trade (19 million KSh), agriculture, water, and sanitation (6.8 billion KSh), population 
health, reproductive health, and HIV/AIDS (27.8 billion KSh), and housing (19.6 million KSh).20 
 
18 The Microfinance Act (No. 19 of 2006, commencement May 2nd, 2008) gives the Central Bank regulatory authority, 
which supports the participant’s argument that the number of registered charitable organizations involved in 
microfinance activity should quickly diminish after commencing the law. However, according to the NGOs Board 
own records, there are 660 NGOs (184 international and 476 national) registered with the agency that are involved in 
microfinance to some degree. Yet, only 194 of these organizations registered with the agency before the 
commencement of the Microfinance Act. This means, the government permitted 466 charitable organizations to 
participate in this space after declaring it a non-charitable, commercial zone. 
19 https://www.president.go.ke/ and https://big4.delivery.go.ke/ 






Yet, with only the 2018/19 datapoint, it is unclear whether The Big 4 led or followed NGO 
expenditures. The historical data tells us that expenditures in these charitable sectors have not 
varied. In 2012/13, these sectors accounted for 43% of all NGO expenditure. Nearly a decade 
later in 2018/19, these same sectors accounted for 45% of NGO expenditure.21 In the larger 
picture, the government seems unable to steer CSO activity towards the administration’s policy 
priorities. Instead, the data suggests that the government’s policy priorities follow CSO activity. 
This, in turn, allows the administration to capitalize on CSOs’ service provision to increase the 
government’s output legitimacy.  
Tactic #5: CSO Compliance and the Government’s Fractured Administrative Power  
 Some of the interview data support the thesis that CSO regulatory regimes are an antecedent 
to control. Yet, my data contain little evidence supporting the notion that CSO regulators are 
capable of mobilizing the administrative power necessary to observe civil society over a large 
territory for a prolonged period. However, the ability to periodically harass a handful of CSOs is 
still very much a concern. My data also suggest that true administrative power rests with a 
government agency mentioned nowhere in Kenya’s CSO regulatory regime: the National 
Intelligence Service. 
 Interview participants did not agree on the types of legal provisions the Kenyan regulatory 
regime should and should not contain. The types of legal provisions that the Kenyan regulatory 
regime should contain and the powers CSO regulators should have seemed to vary across 
interview participants and how they perceive Kenya’s political history. One participant believed 
 
21 In 2012/13, just as President Kenyatta was coming into office, these same sectors accounted for nearly 43% of all 







the reason for controlling Kenyan civil society after independence was the “political differences 
between Kenya’s founding fathers” (GOK118). In support of my argument that these legal 
institutions have long histories, she explained earlier laws followed the colonial example and 
were established to know what CSOs existed and keep tabs on what they were trying to do.  
 The strongest critiques against these laws are framed in the context of the Moi 
administration. One observer noted the legal rules Kenyatta used to build the country in 
partnership with Kenyan civil society were manipulated by Moi to “stifle” political competition 
(GOK109). An elected official agreed with this and explained that Moi directed the bureaucracy 
to use its administrative power to selectively target CSOs organized to agitate and challenge the 
political regime (GOK114). She insisted the government’s true motivation in Moi’s enactment 
and enforcement of these laws was to control the civic space saying, “[Moi told CSOs] you have 
a chance to organize yourselves, agitate, make demands of the government, but we will control 
how much you will do” (GOK114, emphasis added). Her explanation was not limited to the 
NGOs Act that Moi enacted and enforced in the early-1990s. She made a point to emphasize that 
Moi’s fixation with power and control began when he became president in 1978. 
 An experienced observer of both Kenyan law and civil society shared a less-scathing 
opinion of Kenya’s regulatory regime. She observed Kenya regulates CSOs firstly to pursue its 
national interest and achieve national security. Then, secondly, to promote social or national 
cohesion (GOK102). Her assessment bordered on approval, “We can say that regulations 
promote social justice and national cohesion. Then the regulations are also meant to regulate the 
actions and activities of CSOs so as to achieve a measure of accountability” (GOK102). Her 
opinion placed great emphasis on ensuring that the laws had the proper content and did not 






critical because it is the abuse of legal rules that gives the government some of its administrative 
power.  
 When discussing administrative power it is necessary to understand the types of information 
CSOs give regulators when registering. Most are banal information that parallel intake 
documentation required by regulators in democracies. CSOs provide the organization’s 
location(s), partner(s), operational scope, and resources. They also provide particular information 
regarding the organization’s founding members and leaders—e.g., names, biographical 
information, and qualifications. Regulators keep this data in hardcopy form, organized in single 
files, and stored in large dusty rooms. Most regulators have made modest efforts to digitize these 
records. But unreliable systems and the lack of resources keep regulators tethered to physical 
documents and processes. There were no signs that the situation would change soon and all 
regulators admitted that they are severely under-resourced in terms of expertise, staff, and 
technology (GOK098, GOK101, GOK104, GOK105, GOK108, GOK110, GOK111, GOK114, 
GOK115, GOK116, GOK118, GOK121, and GOK122).  
 The four regulators seemed technically incapable of turning their administrative power into 
a prolonged national campaign to observe and control Kenya’s civic space. It did appear that 
regulators were able to respond to requests to compile and provide information on a handful of 
CSOs. Interview participants concurred they use their administrative power to assist 
investigations into alleged unlawful activities but explained their involvement in investigations 
typically starts and ends with providing requested information to other agencies conducting 






NGOs Board, which is the only regulator that has created the necessary administrative capacities 
to investigate the CSOs that register with it.22  
 Only two of the six interview participants from the NGOs Board had the necessary 
experience to discuss these functions. Beginning in 2015, the NGOs Board started relying on 
citizen-based complaints to investigate CSOs (GOK118). Fire-alarm complaints ranged from 
matters of internal governance to complaints from citizens that included untrue, frivolous, and 
legitimate complaints (GOK094). The NGOs Board’s Operations Department leads 
investigations and allocates three full-time employees to receive, verify, and prioritize 
complaints from citizens regarding CSO activities. Citing concerning examples that include 
female genital mutilations and child abuse in orphanages, interview participants separately 
emphasized prudence is practiced when receiving unsolicited and unverified information. 
Investigations move forward carefully using documentation stored at the NGOs Board—e.g., 
annual reports, compliance history, assets, prior complaints. This information allows 
investigators to make a preliminary desk review and will make phone calls to collect additional 
information if necessary (GOK118, GOK094). One estimated that he investigates 30 to 40 
complaints per week and investigated over 750 in his time at the NGOs Board (GOK094). Of 
those, fewer than five came from outside this normal fire-alarm process. Two of those five, he 
recalls, were high-profile organizations that he saw in the news after conducting those 
investigations “off the books” (GK094). He underscored that these cases were anomalies and 
 
22 The NGOs Act gives the NGOs Board the ability to establish “subsidiary organs” that are “necessary for the 
performance of its functions” (§ 8(a)), which includes only eight functions. The broadest function is “to conduct a 






occurred before the establishment of the Compliance and Enforcement Committee that prevents 
administrators of the NGO Board from unilaterally investigating NGOs.  
 Overall, there is little evidence that regulators possess the agency assets necessary to abuse 
their administrative power. The power to observe the Kenyan civic space is diversified across 
four CSO regulators, an arrangement that I refer to as “regulatory pluralism.” Participants from 
each regulator lamented their dependency on manual systems and physical recordkeeping. And 
while the ability to observe and harass singular organizations may be possible, regulators’ 
expertise and technological resources seem inadequate to maintain prolonged efforts to 
simultaneously observe and subvert collective action in 47 countries and multiple CSO legal 
forms. CSO regulators might not be the agency that should concern us. Multiple interview 
respondents told me that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) possesses the administrative 
power to observe Kenyan civil society for a prolonged period. And given the agency’s history 
and resources, the NIS is likely capable of using this power to control or undermine CSOs.23  
 In general, national security agencies are not regularly involved with CSOs. It would 
certainly be the exception rather than the rule for agencies such as the American FBI or the 
British MI5 to participate in CSO affairs. Learning the Kenyan NIS is involved with the local 
regulatory regime is no surprise because the “closing space” argument warns that some 
governments use these agencies to episodically harass CSOs (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 
2014). What I found unusual is that multiple interview participants told me that the NIS is 
involved with every registration decision processed by Kenya’s four CSO regulators. One 
 
23 Article 242(1) of the Constitution established the NIS, or the “Service,” to replace the National Security Intelligence 
Service (NSIS) that the National Security Intelligence Service Act established in 1998. The transitional provisions (§ 






elected official explained the security agency’s involvement in such simple matters was at the 
direction of the current administration who sought revenge on “evil society organizations” that 
provided evidence to the International Criminal Court’s 2010-2015 investigation into the post-
election violence of 2007/8 (GOK097). She believed the government only recently—circa 
2015—sought to boost its administrative power by making CSO regulation part of the national 
security apparatus (GOK097). Archival data at one CSO regulator refutes this. Government 
records show a steady flow of confidential communications between the regulator and the Office 
for the Director of Intelligence as early as November 1981. Its apparent 40-year involvement 
with the application process for CSO legal types in Kenyan makes the NIS a super-aggregator of 
information that gives it unparalleled administrative power.   
 I was unable to collect precise information on NIS and its processes. Research participants 
insisted their roles and responsibilities as CSO regulators were to prepare the necessary materials 
for NIS to determine whether a particular CSO and its leaders should be allowed to operate in 
Kenya.24 CSO regulators vary in what they tell CSOs about NIS and its process. The Registrar of 
Companies explained applicants are told NIS will contact them and that the CSO cannot begin 
operations until after NIS makes its recommendation and the regulator completes its registration 
process (GOK112). A participant at the NGOs Board reported that he tells organizations they 
will be contacted to provide more information but does not go into specifics because “we don’t 
want them to preempt their activity” (GOK110). He elaborated that the rationale for this is one, 
 
24 Other than appealing regulatory decisions to the courts or involving necessary authorities in investigations, Kenyan 






the NGOs Board does not want organizations to change what they are doing, and two, he and his 
colleagues do not know how NIS operates. 
 While some participants expressed that the NIS vetting process may be slow and that 
ordinary citizens registering their simple organization may find the process unnecessarily 
difficult, all regulators support the intelligence agency’s expertise. One participant told me, “NIS 
will investigate applicants to be sure they are not malicious in their intentions and that the 
company limited by guarantee will work as directed” (GOK098). Another justified the vetting 
process because “[CSOs] work in a very sensitive sector, and we don’t want [unqualified people] 
managing such organizations. So we need to vet them, and if they pass the vetting process, we 
issue a registration” (GOK1110). Respondents unequivocally emphasized that the NIS 
recommendation is a nearly unchallengeable veto-point in the registration process. The vetting 
process remains a black box, and the agency did not accept two formal invitations to participate 
in this research. The government’s silence aside, none of the over 75 CSOs independently 
interviewed in Kenya reported negative experience of the NIS process. Those that chose to 
elaborate shared similar experience and described the vetting experience as cordial, undisruptive, 
and on some occasions, even humorous. Of course, that interview data is censored and does not 
contain any data from informal groups rejected by the registration process.  
Discussion 
 The qualitative analysis in this chapter helps us make sense of the statistical relationship 
identified in Chapter Five that shows nondemocratic governments have a propensity to enact 
permissive provisions. The legitimization tactics identified by Lorch and Bunk (2017, pp. 989-






government uses CSO laws for its own purposes. By considering legal rules and working rules 
simultaneously, my analysis finds the Kenyan government used several legitimization tactics 
collectively, separately, and episodically as it altered its de facto regulatory regime. 
 Multiple elected officials, bureaucrats, and CSO regulators suggested that the government 
enacts permissive provisions to give the impression of democratic institutions to local and 
international observers. Interview participants made a point to explain that not all administrations 
use this tactic. They stressed that the government could improve the CSO regulatory regime in 
two ways, either by enacting new permissive provisions or enforcing current permissive 
provisions the way they are written. This supports my theory that the de facto regulatory regime 
can change through both formal and informal processes. 
  Interview data from senior government officials indicated that the government goes to great 
lengths to incorporate CSOs in policy discussions to demonstrate responsive. One salient 
example of this is the routine involvement of CSOs whenever the Kenyan Law Reform 
Commission crafts new legislation. Another powerful example comes from the Registrar of 
Societies that moved very quickly to enact a moratorium on the registration of new religious 
congregations. At the same time, it worked with religious leaders on a solution to a new societal 
problem. While the data show the government makes considerable investments involving CSOs 
in lawmaking and responding to societal concerns, it remains unanswered whether such 
engagement produces effective policy. Despite that, the findings accord with the theory that 
governments engage organizations to maintain their responsiveness legitimacy.   
 The qualitative data had mixed support for the argument that compliance with the regulatory 
regime gives laws and regulators credibility, which in turn legitimizes the government’s 






explanation, the dominant theme in the data suggested the compliance-legitimacy process is 
salient only at the agency level. What is most interesting from the data is that compliance and 
credibility are interdependent. Several participants believed that the inappropriate enforcement 
actions of one former senior manager directly contributed to lower compliance levels. This made 
it harder for this regulator to fulfill its statutory responsibilities to elected officials, which they 
feared would further damage credibility. 
 Interview and archival data supported the hypothesis that governments use CSOs’ service 
provision to bolster their output legitimacy. The evidence appeared strongest at the local level 
based on the report that MPs mobilized to protect the PBO Act from amendments that would add 
restrictive provisions that would hinder CSOs’ ability to provide public service goods to MPs’ 
constituencies. Nationally, there was little evidence to support the claim that the government 
engineers CSO activity to support its policy initiatives. More investigation is required, but the 
data suggested that CSOs’ ability to access charitable donations and foreign assistance may lead 
administrations to follow CSOs and claim some of those charitable deeds as policy successes.  
 A consistent theme in the interview data was that CSO regulators possessed administrative 
power, but it was weak. Participants in all corners of the government told me CSO regulators 
lack resources and technology. Assembling their collective grievance of low morale, 
understaffing, and unreliable physical and electronic systems suggested to me that CSO 
regulators are incapable of mounting a large-scale campaign to observe—much less control—
civil society. However, participants explained that all registration applications are routed through 
the national security apparatus, which means the concerns of this tactic are very real but are not 







 Scholars have given significant attention to the enactment of CSO laws around the world, 
but most of this research has focused on de jure restrictive provisions. As I showed in Chapters 
Four and Five, permissive provisions appear more frequently in CSO regulatory regimes than 
restrictive ones. Building on those findings and the work of other scholars, this chapter shows 
that it is critical to not only study the enactment of both provision types but also how they are 
enforced.   
 We cannot be confident of a provision’s effect on society and CSOs without studying 
enforcement. Some governments enact permissive provisions with the genuine intention of 
helping CSOs and there is nothing that limits nondemocratic governments from doing the same. 
Yet, we must also consider the possibility that governments enact permissive provisions with no 
intention of enforcing them as they are written. This chapter considered several tactics to explain 
the conditions under which governments use CSO laws for its own purposes. This analysis 
showed that governments alter legal provision and enforcement actions to create the de facto 
regulatory regime they want. The complication for researchers is that the deviation between these 
legal rules and working rules is not guaranteed to be either large or small, but to vary at different 






 --Chapter VIII-- 
GOVERNMENTS USE CSO LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TO CREATE THE 
GOVERNMENT-CSO RELATIONSHIP THEY WANT 
 This dissertation has focused on answering one overarching research question: how and 
why do governments regulate CSOs? Each of my empirical chapters studies this topic from a 
different perspective using multiple forms of data and multiple types of analyses. Individually, 
each makes an original contribution. Collectively, the dissertation offers a new understanding 
into how and why governments use legal institutions and enforcement actions to engineer the 
government-CSO relationship they want. I find that it is the de facto CSO regulatory regime that 
either supports or upends voluntary association; by manipulating it, the government can 
profoundly influence democratic processes. My principal contribution is a theory that explains 
the conditions under which governments enact and enforce permissive and restrictive legal 
provisions. The following sections of this concluding chapter revisit my causal argument and 
locate evidence supporting it in my empirical chapters. I then discuss why my arguments matter 
to the real world before concluding with several possible areas of future research.   
Restating the Argument 
 This dissertation presented and tested a theoretical argument that predicts the conditions 
under which governments enact and enforce the legal provisions that help or hinder CSOs. I will 
first explain some of my argument’s features before restating it in detail. My theory uses an 
institutional approach as its foundation. Doing so emphasizes the various rules that affect actors 
by shaping their incentives and constraints. Institutional rules come in two forms, the de jure 






institutional rules are not unidirectional but instead feedback on themselves. In simpler words, 
the laws’ outcomes in one period initiate changes in a later period. 
 Four arguments act as pillars for my theory. First, CSO laws in all political contexts contain 
provisions that both help and hinder CSOs. These legal institutions, what I introduced as CSO 
regulatory regimes, contain multiple laws and fuse permissive and restrictive provisions to 
regulate CSOs. Second, path dependency steers the regulatory regimes’ institutional 
development. This process creates distinct relationships whereby current rules make some 
institutional change more likely, and other change less likely.1 The third argument places 
international influence alongside path dependency and local politics as factors that shape 
institutional change. Finally, rules-in-form do not necessarily match rules-in-use. This means the 
government’s enforcement actions may deviate from the provisions that exist in the de jure 
regulatory regime. When deviation occurs it is not necessarily malicious, however. Deviation 
becomes malicious when governments manipulate enforcement by intentionally under-enforcing 
permissive rules. Or by over-enforcing restrictive ones. In the final analysis, it is this de facto 
regulatory regime that affects CSOs and society. 
 In a highly cited article, Michael Bratton (1989b) theorized about the politics of 
government-CSO relationships in Africa. He argued the degree to which the government 
perceives CSO activity as a threat to its power is consequential for how it regulates the sector: 
“where leaders are confident of their grip on power, they will not fear [CSOs]. The more fragile 
a government’s sense of political legitimacy, the less permissive it is likely to be toward [CSOs]” 
 
1 Namely, a complementary relationship exists when certain current rules make a particular type of institutional change 






(1989b, p. 576). Bratton’s article is one of the earliest arguments that we can associate with what 
scholars and practitioners refer to as the “closing space” phenomena. This research argues 
governments enact and enforce CSO laws to maintain control over CSOs within their borders 
and prolong the regime’s rule. Scholars and practitioners have made important contributions by 
studying the restrictive provisions within CSO laws. Studying restrictive provisions is a 
reasonable entry point to understanding the legalized repression of CSOs. Likewise, it makes 
sense to examine permissive provisions when studying the laws governments use to strengthen 
civil society. These logics do not consider the possibility that governments enact some laws with 
ulterior motives. In particular, analysts rarely consider that nondemocratic governments enact 
permissive legal provisions for reasons other than strengthening civil society. The theoretical 
contribution of my work is that how the government perceives its control and legitimacy causes 
it to take one of two actions: enact provisions to enforce them as they are written or enact 
provisions with the intention of disregarding or sabotaging their enforcement. 
 My causal theory predicts two pathways by which governments create the de facto 
regulatory regime they want. Both paths begin with the government evaluating whether the 
current provisions in the regulatory regime are sufficient to achieve the government’s aims. By 
aims I mean the government’s goals to maintain political control and expand its legitimacy 
among its citizenry and the international community. The law is the first available path. When 
necessary, governments initiate institutional change that alters the legal provisions in their 
regulatory regimes. In Chapter One I reviewed several factors that shape this process and its 
outcome: the political system of power that sets broad boundaries on what governments can and 
cannot do, structural constraints and incentives that change more frequently than regime types 






government adds or removes provisions, that institutional change merges with current provisions 
to literally rewrite the de jure regulatory regime. CSO regulators are the second path 
governments have at their disposal. If the current de jure regulatory regime is sufficient, or too 
difficult to change, then governments can manipulate their regulatory regimes by altering 
enforcement actions. When done consciously with malice, the result is the blatant under-
enforcement of permissive provisions or the targeted over-enforcement of restrictive ones. It is 
important to note that governments are not limited to only one path. When creating their desired 
de facto regulatory regime, governments can change the content of the legal institutions and 
simultaneously alter regulators’ enforcement actions.    
CSO Laws and Enforcement Actions: Locating the Argument in Chapters  
 I now turn to my empirical chapters, which used five different methods and four different 
datasets, to show how those findings support my theory. My findings in Chapters Three and Five 
show structural constraints limit the government’s choices when enacting new provisions. My 
analysis in Chapter Three studied the relationship between a global commitment to safeguard 
civil and political rights and governments’ decision to enact restrictive provisions. Using a global 
dataset of 138 countries, I found that countries that make a global commitment to safeguard civil 
and political rights and whose constitutions demand those commitments be honored are less 
likely to pass restrictive provisions. The pledge to protect human rights is a constraint on only 
those countries that make the commitment. It comes in the form of a constitutional rule that 
limits the types of legal provisions a government can enact.2 The more rigorous analyses in 
 
2 The commitment is that any law regulating voluntary association will meet a three-part test: (1) prescribed by law 
and use sufficiently precise and accessible language; (2) established to meet legitimate aims specified by Article 22(2) 






Chapter Five found that the commitment consistently diminished the size of restrictive 
expansions. 
Chapters Two, Four, and Five provide evidence that shows the evolution of regulatory 
regimes is a long, slow, and muddled process in which new provisions are added to the current 
legal institution rather than an unconstrained process of “lawmaking in the wild.” My general 
description of the legal corpus in Chapter Two (Table 2.4) shows that over 70% of changes to 
regulatory regimes are made by laws that amend the current legal institution. Then, using a novel 
dataset created by coding 285 laws from 17 countries, Chapter Four illustrates that institutional 
development is typically an incremental process rather than stepwise changes. Finally, the 
analyses in Chapter Five demonstrates that certain preexisting provisions make the addition of 
new provisions more likely and others less likely. Specifically, when the permissiveness of the 
current regulatory regime is high, then governments add fewer permissive provisions. The 
opposite is true for new restrictive provisions. When the permissiveness of the regulatory regime 
is high, then governments add more restrictive provisions. In the larger picture, Chapter Three 
thru Five provide evidence showing the importance of preexisting institutions to countries’ 
regulatory.    
 Chapter Five thru Seven provide evidence that the government’s perception of its control 
and legitimacy is the mechanism for the type of institutional change it enacts. These chapters 
explored the role of international influence on governments’ decision to add restrictive or 
permissive provisions to the regulatory regime. The particular processes considered are whether 
 
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”; (3) be “necessary for 






governments learn from each other on how to regulate civil society, or whether they emulate 
each other to garner legitimacy. Using a novel directed-dyad-year dataset produced by coding 
primary sources, my analyses in Chapter Five suggest that as countries have increasingly similar 
implementation environments, those governments use similar approaches to control civil society 
and enact similar provisions. These analyses also show that as governments have increasingly 
similar political ideologies, those governments emulate each other by enacting similar 
provisions.  
 Chapters Six and Seven used data from Kenya to understand the processes identified in the 
statistical relationships in earlier chapters. Chapter Six reviewed existing research of Kenya’s 
political history. The historical evidence suggests that on numerous occasions Kenyan presidents 
have enforced the regulatory regime to either expand their control or increase their legitimacy. 
The historical record also shows a pattern in which fluctuations in control and legitimacy initiate 
changes to the regulatory regime. Chapter Seven exclusively focused on the enforcement of 
regulatory regimes. The analysis drew primarily on interview data with government officials 
triangulated with archival data collected from government sources. Elected officials, bureaucrats, 
and CSO regulators explained the government’s perception of its control and legitimacy is the 
mechanism that initiates changes to legal rules and enforcement actions. Government officials 
touched on several broad themes to explain how control and legitimacy initiate changes to the de 
facto regulatory regime. The first was that the government enacted permissive provisions in a 
direct attempt to give the impression the democratic institutions but failed to enforce those 
provisions. This is just one of several tactics the government used collectively, separately, or 
episodically to expand its control and legitimize the regime. CSO regulators repeatedly shared 






concerns suggest the bureaucracy lacks the infrastructure and power necessary to observe and 
control civil society on a national scale. However, many participants separately commented that 
the national security apparatus possesses the information necessary for administrative power 
and—we can presume—has the resources to wield it effectively.   
What Have We Learned? Why My Argument Matters  
 There are three points to take away from the analysis of why and how governments use 
CSO laws to help or hinder non-market, non-governmental organizations worldwide. First, 
human rights defenders are doing a great service by calling our attention to governments that 
enact laws that hinder CSOs. Building on research that has studied nondemocratic regimes’ 
enactments of such laws in recent decades, I find restrictive legal provisions are older than we 
think. Many predate the twenty-first century, the internet, and the associational revolution of the 
1980s and 1990s. In some cases, restrictive legal provisions are inherited from colonial occupiers 
and predate a country’s independence. With scarce exceptions, nearly all of the 285 CSO laws in 
my legal corpus include some restrictive provisions. This tells us that restrictive CSO laws are an 
old pattern of repression rather than a new global phenomenon.  
 Second, research and reports that discuss CSO laws have focused primarily on developing 
countries or nondemocratic states. Excluding wealthy, democratic societies places such countries 
beyond reproach and reinforces a structure of global power. Deciding to omit democracies from 
our inquiries means their restrictive laws pass unnoticed by analysts. In fact, democratic 
exemplars such as France, Great Britain, and the United States all include restrictive provisions 
in their regulatory regimes. A specific example is the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Public Law 






Subversive Activities Control Act, created the Subversive Activities Control Board (the “Board”) 
and gave the government incredible powers to investigate CSOs and American citizens in order 
to protect the United States against certain un-American and subversive activities. French and 
British colonial era laws and ordinances are an even more widespread example, in which civil 
society was stifled for most of the people living in the French and British political systems. 
Cherry-picking the countries we study reinforces a normative discourse that nondemocratic (and 
usually non-Western) governments are the only actors that pass restrictive laws that undermine 
the freedom to associate. This distorts reality. Legal aggressions by Western, democratic 
governments have tended to go unreported in global scholarship, but analysts can choose to use 
these historical events to understand current patterns in CSO laws. 
 My third point is a call to human rights defenders, practitioners, and scholars to recognize 
the possible “dark side” to CSO laws: that a government can use permissive provisions to 
increase the regime’s control and legitimacy. Little research exists on this particular pattern of 
repression because the data have not been systematically collected until now. Those concerned 
by governments’ abuse of CSO laws will make significant progress and discover new insights 
using such the holistic approach that I have developed here. 
A Research Agenda 
 This dissertation has made original contributions to advance theory, but additional work is 
needed. There are two pressing needs in the literature. The first involves a more rigorous, 
holistic, and historical assessment of CSO laws around the world. Currently, highly credible 
institutions that report on legal developments around the globe are leading this effort. Their 






restrictive provisions. Studying only the adoption of restrictive provisions misses the larger and 
more the concerning pattern that permissive and restrictive provisions exist together, and they 
cooccur where they are least expected. In this dissertation, I coded the legal histories of CSO 
laws in 17 countries, but a complete worldwide set would allow researchers to understand (1) the 
prevalence of various permissive and restrictive provisions globally; (2) the conditions under 
which these provisions diffuse globally; and (3) how these legal provisions affect sociopolitical 
outcomes such as civil society robustness, democratization, and regime legitimacy.  
 The second pressing need is the increased attention to the working rules governments use to 
enforce CSO regulatory regimes. My subnational analysis of four regulars in Kenya showed how 
enforcement varies within a controlled political context. Future research into enforcement will be 
more valuable if analysts can speak to why and to what degree working rules deviate from legal 
rules. This deviation is vitally relevant because wherever government-led repression occurs, it 
can be either repression that matches rules-in-form or repression bears no resemblance to legal 
rules. This enforcement agenda will be most valuable if research begins with a knowledge of the 
provisions that comprise the de jure regulatory regime. Only with that information is it possible 
to determine the degree to which working rules deviate from legal rules. Thus, incorporating 
enforcement into the analysis identifies the politics of control and legitimacy: a tactic of direct 
control is the strict enforcement of restrictive provisions, whereas a tactic of control-through-
legitimacy is the subjective or incomplete enforcement of permissive provisions. While the 
former is a mostly straightforward subject, the latter is harder to study because it involves 
manipulation. 
 This dissertation, like much of the prior research, has focused primarily on legal rules, the 






research agendas continues to advance, scholars must also consider what other government 
entities affect how and why governments regulate CSOs. For example, scholars have not yet 
studied or theorized the role of the judiciary and national security agencies as political actors 
affecting CSO laws. Overlooking them has created two considerable gaps in the research. One 
shortcoming is the omission of the judiciary and its vital function: the review of legislative 
enactments. Through its decisions, the courts inform lawmakers and bureaucrats if laws need 
changing or if government enforcement action went too far. By understanding this process, we 
animate the judiciary as a political actor and improve our theory. Common law systems, which 
assign the preeminent position to legal precedent as opposed to legislation, would be a fruitful 
place to begin this research.  
 The role of national security agencies is another considerable gap. Scholars and 
practitioners generally argue that national security agencies undermine many civil society efforts. 
Still, under different conditions, these law enforcement agencies may produce positive outcomes 
by culling unscrupulous actors attempting to abuse CSO legal forms. To date, scholars have been 
unable to systematically study national security agencies because data on their activities has not 
been available. 
* * * * * * 
 Beyond scholarly debates, this dissertation engages an inspiring and sobering topic: the 
freedom to associate. Voluntary associations allow individuals to participate in society by 
building communal ties, engaging fellow citizens, and involving ourselves in democratic 
processes. Freedoms mean we take the good with the bad, and for every CSO we want to support 






Society) or downright despicable (e.g., the KKK).3 I believe this trade-off is inherent to the 
freedom of association and is a tension that accompanies democratic citizenship. The alternative 
is a government that chooses which CSOs should stay and which should go.  
 In a society that values freedom of association and speech, the government’s intervention 
into a CSO’s private matters should be limited. The government should enact laws that protect 
society and are necessary for democracy. Then, it should enforce those laws impartially and with 
due process. Two very recent examples demonstrate this is possible in a highly politicized 
environment. The first came to the public’s attention exactly three days after I defended this 
dissertation. On August 6th, 2020, New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit seeking to dissolve 
the National Rifle Association alleging a culture of self-dealing, mismanagement, negligence, 
and extensive violations of fundamental IRS regulations.4 The second example grabbed the 
public’s attention two weeks later when Steve Bannon, former adviser to the President of the 
United Sates, and three of his associates were charged with defrauding donors who contributed 
to an American CSO.5 These CSOs have not been closed and the individuals charged remain 
innocent until proven guilty. Still, these organizations have almost certainly experienced 
 
3 The Flat Earth Society is registered with the IRS as a public charity eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable 
contributions under the name Flat Earth Society of Covenant People Church (EIN: 23-7154049). On May 15th, 2010, 
the IRS automatically revoked the tax exempt status for the Christian Knights of the KKK (EIN: 58-1677607) for not 
filing a Form 990-series return or notice for three consecutive years. The National Ku Klux Klan Museum Inc. (EIN: 
26-1654936) is a public charity eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. Retrieved from: 
https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/.   
4 The Attorney General began her investigation into the NRA in February 2019. The suit specifically charges the NRA 
as a whole, as well as Executive Vice-President Wayne LaPierre, former Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
Wilson “Woody” Phillips, former Chief of Staff and the Executive Director of General Operations Joshua Powell, and 
Corporate Secretary and General Counsel John Frazer with failing to manage the NRA’s funds and failing to follow 
numerous state and federal laws, contributing to the loss of more than $64 million in just three years for the NRA. 
Retrieved from: https://ag.ny.gov/press-releases. 
5 We Build the Wall is a 501(c)(4) tax exempt organization classified by the IRS in 2019 as a social welfare 






negative repercussions from government actions. Damage to those organizational reputations is 
unfortunate, but necessary for democracy. If these allegations are true, then these CSOs failed at 
their responsibility to self-govern their activities in a manner that would protect their members 
and not harm society. Under such circumstances the government’s impartial enforcement of laws 
was necessary to protect society and prevent usurpers from abusing the CSO legal form. But 
intervention was necessary only after—not before—these CSOs proved incapable of preventing 
their leaders’ illegal actions.  
 Several global events unfolded while writing this dissertation and illustrate the different 
ways governments and citizens engage with and react to civil society. I began writing this 
dissertation immediately after completing my fieldwork in December 2018. It was around that 
same time, February 2019, that the people of Hong Kong began to assemble and demand greater 
freedoms from the government. Over a year later, without any public debate, the Chinese 
government abruptly ended the “one country, two systems” policy on June 30th, 2020, and 
silenced a social movement. Those 18 months showed just how quickly a government could 
crack down on civil society using either laws or enforcement actions. My writing also witnessed 
a global pandemic where government inaction spurred CSOs to mobilize personal protective 
equipment, produce masks in small community groups, and provide food and essential services 
to the suddenly unemployed. Some governments have used the pandemic as an excuse to enact 
executive orders and laws affecting the freedoms of expression and assembly.6 Then, a 
reenergized Black Lives Matter movement is demanding social change around the world; “good 
 
6 The International Center for Not-for-Profit-Law leads a collaborative effort that monitors public health responses to 






trouble” as the late United States Representative John Lewis described similar collective action.7 
Unfortunately, some of its protests were infiltrated by troublemakers fulfilling an ugly urge to 
damage property and undermine a social movement. Civil society and CSOs are not guaranteed 
to bring out the best people, but they are an opportunity to bring out the best in people. 
 
7 Black Lives Matter is separately a 501(c)(3) in the United Sates but has also taken on the qualities of social movement 






Chapter I—Regulating the Freedom to Voluntary Associate 
Click here to return to chapter. 
Appendix Table 1A: Legal Definitions of CSO in East African Countries 
BURUNDI  
Association of Foreigners—Article 
3(2) Organic Framework of Non-
profit Associations (2017) 
a non-profit association created under this Act and of which the majority 
of the actual members or of the executive committee are of foreign 
nationality 
Collective—Article 3(9) Organic 
Framework of Non-profit 
Associations (2017) 
a non-profit association formed by several non-profit associations in order 
to achieve common objectives;  
 
Foreign Association—Article 3(3) 
Organic Framework of Non-profit 
Associations (2017) 
an association whose constitution obeys a legal regime other than the 
Burundian regime 
Foreign Non-governmental 
Organization—Article 2 General 
Framework of Cooperation Between 
the Republic of Burundi and 
Foreign Non-Governmental 
Organizations (ONGEs) (2017). 
is a not-for-profit institution of foreign law, created by a private initiative 
to the exclusion of any intergovernmental agreement, comprised of 
private or public natural or legal persons, having its principal head office 
abroad that can be of various nationalities and pursuing aims covering 
broad and varied areas. 
Foundation—Article 3(11) Organic 
Framework of Non-profit 
Associations (2017) 
any organization created for a philanthropic purpose to ensure the 
sustainability of a work or values;  
 
International Association of 
Burundian Law—Article 3(4) 
Organic Framework of Non-profit 
Associations (2017) 
any organization composed of Burundian and foreign associations created 
in the form and spirit of the present law and having its headquarters in 
Burundi; 
Non-profit Association 
Recognized as a Public Utility—
Article 3(6) Organic Framework of 
Non-profit Associations (2017) 
an association with at least five years of existence, with significant 
achievements in areas of public utility; 
Non-profit Association—Article 
3(7) Organic Framework of Non-
profit Associations (2017) 
any association which does not undertake commercial, industrial and 
political activities as its main objective and whose purpose is not the 
sharing of profits between members; however, is not considered to be a 
lucrative activity, the fact that an Association undertakes activities that 
tend to make its heritage yield a profit in order to better realize its purpose 
Non-profit Associations—Article 
2(6) Code General Taxes (1969) 
[any organization] whose purpose is to deal with religious, scientific, 
social or philanthropic works which have been granted a legal person 
status under former decrees or which will be obtained under the laws or 
regulations of the Kingdom of Burundi 
Professional or Corporate 
Association—Article 3(16) Organic 
Framework of Non-profit 
Associations (2017) 
any organization created by professionals of an area, sector or a 









Company Limited by 
Guarantee—Articles 2, 4(2b), 
21(1) The Companies Ordinance 
(1962) 
a company having the liability of its members limited by the 
memorandum to such amount as the members may respectively thereby 
undertake to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its 
being wound up [and] formed for promoting commerce, art, science, 
religion, charity or any other useful object, and intends to apply its profits, 
if any, or other income in promoting its objects, and to prohibit the 
payment of any dividend to its members. 
International Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Co-
Ordination Act (1990) 
means a Non-Governmental Organization with the original incorporation 
in one or more countries other than Kenya, but operating within Kenya 
under a certificate of registration. 
National Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Co-
Ordination Act (1990) 
means a Non-Governmental Organization which is registered exclusively 
in Kenya with authority to operate within or across two or more districts 
in Kenya. 
Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Co-
Ordination Act (1990) 
means a private voluntary groups of individuals or associations, not 
operated for profit or for other commercial purposes but which have 
organized themselves nationally or internationally for the promotion of 
social welfare, development, charity or research through mobilization of 
resources.  
Perpetual Trust (known locally as 
charitable trust)—Article 3(1) The 
Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act 
(1923) 
trustees who have been appointed by any body or association of persons 
established for any religious, educational, literary, scientific, social, 
athletic or charitable purpose, or who have constituted themselves for any 
such purpose. 
Public Benefit Organization—
Article 5(1-2), Schedule 6 Public 
Benefits Organization Act (2013)  
means a voluntary membership or non-membership grouping of 
individuals or organizations, which is autonomous, non-partisan, non-
profit making and which is— 
a) organized and operated locally, nationally or internationally; 
b) engages in public benefit activities in any of the areas set out in 
the Sixth Schedule; and 
c) is registered as such by the Authority. 
Society—Articles 2(1), 4 The 
Societies Act (1968) 
includes any club, company, partnership or other association of ten or 
more persons, whatever its nature or object, established in Kenya or 
having its headquarters or chief place of business in Kenya, and any 
branch of a society [but not including companies, corporations, firms, 
cooperative societies, schools, building societies, banks, international 





Article 3(2) Governing the 
Organisation and the Functioning of 
National Non-Governmental 
Organisations (2012) 
organisations which act in a specific domain in favour of their members. 
Foundation—Article 3(3) 
Governing the Organisation and the 
Functioning of National Non-
Governmental Organisations (2012) 
an organisation whose purpose is either to establish a fund or to collect 
funds, manage and use them to provide beneficiaries with support. 
International Non-Governmental 
Organisation—Article 2 Governing 
the Organisation and the 
Functioning of International Non-
Governmental Organisations (2012) 
an organization that was established in accordance with foreign laws and 





Article 3(1) Governing the 
Organisation and the Functioning of 
National Non-Governmental 
Organisations (2012) 
organisations serving public interests. The organisations carry out 
activities in the development of various sectors including civil society, 
economy, social welfare, culture, science and human rights. 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation—Articles 2(2), 3 
Governing the Organisation and the 
Functioning of National Non-
Governmental Organisations (2012) 
an organisation which is comprised of natural persons or of autonomous 
collective voluntary organizations whose aim is to improve economic, 
social and cultural development and to advocate for public interests of a 
certain group, natural persons, organizations or with the view of 
promoting common interest of their members. [They] are classified into 
three (3) broad categories in respect of their main objectives and nature of 
membership. 
Non-profit Making 
Organization—Articles 1, 5-7 
Relating to Non-Profit Making 
Organizations (2000) 
any grouping having legal entity, governed by civil law, constituted by 
physical or by moral entities which aim at social works and which decide 
to put in common, and in a permanent way, their knowledge or their 
activity for a goal other than making profit. The organization must fulfill 
condition provided by this law. It has its main objective to exercise 
religious, philanthropic, scientific, cultural and sporting activities. It may, 
at a subsidiary level and for no profit making, extend its field to other 
activities. [It] shall choose freely its headquarters within the territory of 
the Republic of Rwanda [be] constituted for an indefinite duration [by] 







Governmental Organizations Act 
(2016) 
a public or private, nonprofit including religious entity, which is a 
representative of a community or a significant segment of a community, 
and is engaged in meeting human, education, environmental or public 
safety community needs. 
International Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 5 Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2016) 
any Non-Governmental or semi-governmental Organization established in 
a foreign country and registered in South Sudan in accordance with 
section 9 of this Act. 
National Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 5 Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2016) 
means any National Non-Governmental Organization registered in 
accordance with section 9 of this Act.  
Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 5 Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2016) 
means a non-profit voluntary Organization formed by two or more 
persons, not being Public bodies, with the intention of undertaking 
voluntary or humanitarian projects.  
Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 3 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2003) 
means a voluntarily formed organization or association with a written 
Constitution stating the aims and objectives of that organization or 
association for the promotion of social welfare and charity through 
mobilization of private resources regardless of whether these resources 
were internally or externally raised. Without prejudice to the generality of 
this definition, this shall include, Churches, Mosques, synagogues, 
Indigenous Religious Communities or other Relief, humanitarian, 
Religious organizations or associations operating in the New Sudan in 





64(8) The Income Tax Act (2008) 





a) the entity was established and functions solely as an organisation 
for: 
i. the relief of poverty or distress of the public; 
ii. the advancement of education; or 
iii. the provision of general public health, education, water or 
road construction or maintenance; and 
b) the entity has been issued with a ruling by the Commissioner 
under section 131 currently in force stating that it is a charitable 
organisation or religious organisation. 
International Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2002) 
means a Non-Governmental Organization established outside mainland 
Tanzania. 
National Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2002) 
means a Non-Governmental Organization established in accordance with 
the Provisions of this Act and whose scope of Operation extends to more 
than two regions. 
Non-Governmental 
Organization—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organizations Act 
(2002) 
means a voluntary grouping of individuals or organizations which is 
autonomous, non-partisan, non-profit sharing- 
a) organized at the local, national or international level or the 
purpose of enhancing or promoting economic, environmental, 
social or cultural development or protecting the environment, 
lobbying or advocating on such issues; or 
b) established under the auspices of any religious or faith 
propagating organization, trade union, sports club, political party, 
religious or faith organization or community based organization,  
but does not include a trade union, social club, a religious or faith 
propagating organization or community based organization. 
Society—Article 2 Societies 
Ordinance (1954) 
Any club, company, partnership or association of ten or more person 
whatever its nature or object but does not include— 
a) company registered under the Companies Ordinance, or any 
company which has complied with the requirements of section 
321 of that Ordinance,  
b) any company, council, authority, association, board or committee 
lawfully constituted or established under Royal Charter, or Royal 
Letters Patent, or any Applied Act, or any law for the time being 
in force in Tanganyika, 
c) any Lodge of Freemasons regularly constituted under any of the 
registered governing bodies of Freemasons in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
d) any trade union registered under the Trade Unions Ordinance, 
e) any company, association or partnership consisting of not more 
than twenty persons formed and maintained for the sole purpose 
of carrying on any lawful business, 
f) any co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Cap. 
211 Societies Ordinance, 
g) any society which the President may, by order published in the 






Organisation—Article 2 The Non-
Governmental Organisations 
Registration Regulations (2009) and 
means an organisation wholly controlled by Ugandans operating at a sub-
county level and below, whose objective is to promote and advance the 







3 Non-Governmental Organisations 
Act (2016) 
means an organisation that has its original incorporation in any African 
country, other than the Partner States of the East African Community, and 
is partially or wholly controlled by citizens of one or more African 
countries, other than the citizens of the Partner State of the East African 
Community, and is operating in Uganda under the authority of a permit 
issued by the Bureau. 
Indigenous Organisation—Article 
3 Non-Governmental Organisations 
Act (2016) 
means an organisation that is wholly controlled by Ugandan citizens. 
International Organisation—
Article 3 Non-Governmental 
Organisations Act (2016) 
means an organisation that has its original incorporation in a country, 
other than a Partner State of the East African Community and is partially 
or wholly controlled by citizens of one or more countries, other than the 
citizens of the Partner States of the East African Community, and is 
operating in Uganda under the authority of a permit issued by the Bureau. 
Exempt Organisation—Article 
2(bb) The Income Tax Act  (1997) 
means any company, institution, or irrevocable trust – 
i. which is – 
A. an amateur sporting association; 
B. a religious, charitable, or educational institution of a 
public character; or 
C. a trade union, employees’ association, an association of 
employers registered under any law of Uganda, or an 
association established for the purpose of promoting 
farming, mining, tourism, manufacturing, or commerce 
and industry in Uganda; and 
ii. which has been issued with a written ruling by the 
Commissioner currently in force stating that it is an exempt 
organisation; and 
iii. none of the income or assets of which confers, or may 
confer, a private benefit on any person; 




means an organsation which is not a local organisation 
Foreign Organization—Article 3 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Act (2016) 
means an organisation that does not have original incorporation in any 
country, and is partially or wholly controlled by citizens of other 
countries, other than the citizens of the Partner States of the East African 
Community, and is operating in Uganda under the authority 
of a permit issued by the Bureau 
Organization—Article 1(d) The 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
Registration Act (1989) 
means a nongovernmental organization established to provide voluntary 
services, including religious, educational, literary, scientific, social or 
charitable services to the community or any part of it. 
Organization—Article 3 Non-
Governmental Organisations Act 
(2016) 
means a legally constituted non-governmental organisation under this Act, 
which may be a private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations 
established to provide voluntary services to the community or any part, 
but not for profit or commercial purposes; 
Regional Organization—Article 3 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Act (2016) 
means an organisation incorporated in one or more of the Partner States of 
the East African Community, and which is partially or wholly controlled 
by citizens of one or more of the Partner States of the East African 
Community, and which is operating in Uganda under the authority of a 
permit issued by the Bureau; 
Trust—Article 1(1) The Trustees 
Incorporation Act (1939) 
any body or association of persons established for any religious, 





Chapter II—Research Design 
Click here to return to chapter. 
Existing Cross-National Studies of CSO Laws 
 The following edited volumes are leading contributions in the research program. The 
International Guide to Nonprofit Law (Salamon & Toepler, 1997) carefully reviews laws in 22 
countries. National legal experts wrote each chapter following a shared outline written in a dense 
legalese that is consistent in phrasing and meaning (p. xiii). While the consistent content allows 
readers to find similar information for each case, the volume's legal summaries did not leave 
room for systematic comparison. Further, the chapters represent ‘snapshots’ of countries’ current 
regulatory regimes and does not discuss their development. Four cases appear in my sample. 
Regulatory Waves: Comparative Perspective on State Regulation and Self-Regulation Policies in 
the Nonprofit Sector (Breen et al., 2017) compares regulation and self-regulation policies of 
nonprofit sectors around the world. A combination of scholars and subject-matter experts author 
10 chapters discussing 15 countries. These “country narratives” defend the working hypothesis 
that an “ongoing causal relationship exists between statutory and nonstatutory regulation of the 
nonprofit sector” and discuss the factors that energize the relationship (p. 2). Though the authors 
admirably unpack the history and politics of each case study, they were unable to systematically 
compare cases. Eight countries appear in my sample. The following table summarizes the 
samples, approaches, and outputs of the edited volumes and compares them to the research 






Appendix Table 2A: Summarizing Three Cross-National Studies of CSO Laws 
 International Guide Regulatory Waves Regulating Freedom  
Number of countries 
 
22 15 17 
Cases overlapping with 
this work 
4—France, Russia, UK, 
USA 
8—China, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Uganda, UK, USA 
 
Ref. 
Analytical scope Preexisting institutions; 









and International Treaties 
 
Method of analysis National legal experts 
summarize each country’s 
regulatory regime in a 
highly consistent manner 
Academic and subject-
matter experts describe the 






coding protocol applied to 
legal corpus of 285 laws 
enacted between 1872 and 
2019; in-depth interviews 
with elected officials, 
legal experts, bureaucrats. 
Analytical output Detailed legal summaries 
of current regulatory 
regimes 
Analytical narratives 
outlining development of 
regulatory regimes 
Longitudinal dataset of 
provisions that comprise 
regulatory regimes 
  
Amenable to quantitative 
description and analysis 
 
No No Yes 






Chapter III—Covenants, Constitutions, and Distinct Law Types 
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Appendix Table 3A: Descriptive Statistics of Estimation Sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
138 Cases     
Enacted Law1     
     Any Law a 0.268  0 1 
     Prohibitive a 0.072  0 1 
     Red-Tape a 0.210  0 1 
     Notification a 0.109  0 1 
     
2,398 Country-year Observations     
Enacted Law1     
     Any Law a 0.015  0 1 
     Prohibitive a 0.004  0 1 
     Red-Tape a 0.012  0 1 
     Notification a 0.006  0 1 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights b, 2 0.744    
Constitution Bolsters Commitments b, 3 0.272    
Executive Power b, 2 3.223 2.30 0 7 
Electoral Competition c, 4 0.536 0.50 0 1 
ln(ODA per capita) c, 5 2.382 3.06 -6.10 6.83 
CSOs Routinely Consulted c, 4 0.579 1.12 -2.25 3.04 
CSOs are Anti-System c, 4 -0.561 1.14 -2.94 3.33 
Imputed FH/Polity2 c, 4 5.790 2.85 0 10 
U.N. Votes with USA (%) c, 6 19.991 11.75 0 100 
U.N. Votes with Russia (%) c, 6 65.976 11.71 0 100 
Regional Diffusion (%) c, 1, 5 7.317 11.53 0 55.56 
PTS Average c, 7 2.685 1.05 1 5 
Rule of Law Index c, 4 0.488 0.27 0.03 0.98 
Analysis Time (years) d 10.125 5.69 1 20 
a Outcome variable; b Institutional variables; c Control variables lagged one year in analysis; d Control variable for the 
number of years without adopting a law since entering the dataset. Sources 1Dupuy et al. (2016), Ron, Prakash 2016); 
2Comparative Constitutions Project; 3United Nations Office of Legal Affairs; 4Varities of Democracy dataset; 5World 






Appendix Table 3B.1: Competing Risk Model with Logistic Regression (full table) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled Prohibitive Red-Tape Notification 
(DV: Enacts specific law)     
Commitment to Guard Human Rights 0.37 0.33 0.49 -0.36 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -14.24*** -14.13*** -15.03*** -13.74*** 
Commitment x Constitutional Rules 12.99*** 12.57*** 13.86*** 13.23*** 
Executive Power 0.30*** 0.24 0.29** 0.16 
Electoral Competition a 1.72* 1.92 1.93* 1.53 
ln(ODA/cap)a 0.10 -0.09 0.09 0.14 
ln(ODAcap) x ElectComp a -0.15 -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 
CSO Routinely Consulted a 0.26 -0.31 0.21 1.25** 
CSOs are Anti-System a -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.33 
Imputed FH/Polity2 a -0.56*** -0.35 -0.58*** -0.62** 
UN votes with USA (%)a -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
UN votes with RUS (%)a 0.04* 0.02 0.04 0.08** 
Regional Diffusion (%)a -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
PTS average a 0.39+ 0.42 0.46+ 0.25 
Rule of Law Index a -0.18 0.02 -0.10 0.01 
Time 0.13** 0.15* 0.13* 0.05 
Constant -8.96*** -8.76** -9.26*** -10.93*** 
Observations 2398 2398 2398 2398 
AIC 339.78 141.53 284.52 184.09 
BIC 438.08 239.83 382.82 282.39 
Degrees of Freedom 16 16 16 16 
Failure Events 37 10 29 15 
Countries in Sample 138 138 138 138 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a Denotes one-year lag on variables 






Appendix Table 3B.2: Cox with Time-Varying Coefficients CRM (full model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled Prohibitive Red-Tape Notification 
(DV: Enacts specific law)     
Commitment to Guard Human Rights 0.28 0.29 0.44 -0.33 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -20.43*** -21.74*** -20.24*** -20.12*** 
Commitment x Constitutional Rules 19.40 20.17 19.32 19.90 
Executive Power 0.85** 0.70 0.92* 0.79 
Electoral Competition a 1.54* 2.58* 1.73* 1.57 
ln(ODA/cap)a 0.08 -0.04 0.07 0.18 
ln(ODAcap) x ElectComp a -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.20 
CSO Routinely Consulted a 0.24 -0.39 0.28 1.22** 
CSOs are Anti-System a -0.10 0.09 -0.10 -0.33 
Imputed FH/Polity2 a -0.66 -3.05* -0.40 -0.28 
UN votes with USA (%)a 0.10 0.63*** 0.08 -0.07 
UN votes with RUS (%)a -0.03 0.22** -0.07 -0.02 
Regional Diffusion (%)a -0.22* -0.21 -0.16+ -0.44** 
PTS average a 0.39* 0.59 0.46+ 0.27 
Rule of Law Index a -2.58 14.35* -6.99+ -9.79 
Time-varying Coefficients     
Executive Power -0.04 -0.02 -0.05+ -0.05 
Imputed FH/Polity2 a 0.01 0.18* -0.01 -0.03 
UN votes with USA (%)a -0.01 -0.06*** -0.01 0.01 
UN votes with RUS (%)a 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.01 
Regional Diffusion (%)a 0.01* 0.01 0.01+ 0.03** 
Rule of Law Index a 0.19 -0.97* 0.50+ 0.80 
Observations 2398 2398 2398 2398 
AIC 329.14 105.46 260.80 152.67 
BIC 444.79 221.10 376.45 268.32 
Degrees of Freedom 20 20 20 20 
Failure Events 37 10 29 15 
Countries in Sample 138 138 138 138 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a Denotes one-year lag on variables 
Cox model with robust standard errors using Stata 15. Coefficients are displayed rather than exponentiated coefficients 
or hazard ratios. Time-varying covariates (TVC) added because model 2 failed the proportional hazard assumption. 
New predictors are added to the model using the -tvc()- option. These time-varying covariates are temporal interaction 
terms equivalent to the product of the predictor interacted with a function of time. The hazard ratio of the TVC at 
time=0 is shown in the top panel of the table and adjusts by the value shown in the bottom panel of the table for every 
unit of time. Thus, like any interaction term, the effect of each TVC is unenterable as one number and instead changes 






Appendix Table 3B.3: Rare-Events CRM (logistic regression, random 35% of sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled Prohibitive Red-Tape Notification 
(DV: Enacts specific law)     
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -0.27 0.22 -0.11 -0.65 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -16.10*** -13.33*** -14.99*** -15.05*** 
Commitment x Constitutional Rules 14.94*** 12.01*** 13.98*** 14.61*** 
Executive Power 0.33*** 0.21 0.31** 0.18 
Electoral Competition a 1.70+ 1.73 1.97* 1.27 
ln(ODA/cap)a 0.16 -0.10 0.14 0.22 
ln(ODAcap) x ElectComp a -0.20 0.06 -0.20 -0.24 
CSO Routinely Consulted a 0.29 -0.57 0.27 1.18** 
CSOs are Anti-System a -0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.21 
Imputed FH/Polity2 a -0.45*** -0.24 -0.48*** -0.40+ 
UN votes with USA (%)a 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.01 
UN votes with RUS (%)a 0.06* 0.04 0.06+ 0.09* 
Regional Diffusion (%)a -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
PTS average a 0.20 0.41 0.32 0.05 
Rule of Law Index a -1.08 0.48 -0.99 -1.02 
Time 0.22*** 0.22* 0.20** 0.13+ 
Constant -10.07*** -11.06* -10.39*** -11.49** 
Observations 849 849 849 849 
AIC 268.12 121.74 228.72 154.98 
BIC 348.76 202.38 309.37 235.63 
Degrees of Freedom 16 16 16 16 
Failure Events 37 10 29 15 
Countries in Sample 135 135 135 135 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a Denotes one-year lag on variables 
Models ran with Stata 15 with cluster-robust standard errors grouped by unique country IDs. Random 135 cases 
sampled following recommendations by King & Zeng (2001, p141-142). All 482 country-year observations of 






Appendix Table 3C: Assessing Conceptual Equivalence & Distinctness (All Model Strategies)  






Panel A: Conceptual-equivalence Hypotheses 
H2A: ODA per capita positively correlated with enactment. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) -0.000 (p=0.330) 0.000 (p=0.881) 0.000 (p=0.462) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check -0.000 (p=0.880) -0.000 (p=0.916) 0.000 (p=0.877) 
    Rare-events robustness check -0.000 (p=0.560) 0.001 (p=0.549) 0.001 (p=0.292) 
H2B: Electoral competition positively correlated with enactment. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) 0.001 (p=0.400) 0.002 (p=0.071) 0.001 (p=0.338) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check 0.000 (p=0.878) 0.004 (p=0.839) 0.000 (p=0.856) 
    Rare-events robustness check 0.004 (p=0.523) 0.009 (p=0.142) 0.002 (p=0.623) 
H2C: CSOs are anti-system positively correlated with enactment. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) 0.000 (p=0.986) -0.000 (p=0.783) -0.000 (p=0.281) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check 0.000 (p=0.892) -0.000 (p=0.852) -0.000 (p=0.863) 
    Rare-events robustness check -0.000 (p=0.652) -0.000 (p=0.788) -0.001 (p=0.459) 
H2D: Level of democracy negatively correlated with enactment. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) -0.000 (p=0.234) -0.001 (p=0.001) -0.001 (p=0.079) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check -0.000 (p=0.883) -0.002 (p=0.848) -0.000 (p=0.868) 
    Rare-events robustness check -0.001 (p=0.471) -0.004 (p=0.005) -0.002 (p=0.222) 
    
Panel B: Conceptual-distinctness Hypotheses 
H3A: Voting alignment with Russia positively correlated with enacting prohibitive laws. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) 0.000 (p=0.592) 0.001 (p=0.233) 0.001 (p=0.019) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check 0.000 (p=0.897) -0.002 (p=0.830) -0.000 (p=0.763) 
    Rare-events robustness check 0.001 (p=0.400) 0.005 (p=0.148) 0.004 (p=0.019) 
H3B: CSO consultation positively correlated with enacting notification laws. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) -0.000 (p=0.432) 0.000 (p=0.544) 0.002 (p=0.004) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check -0.000 (p=0.890) 0.001 (p=0.844) 0.001 (p=0.870) 
    Rare-events robustness check -0.001 (p=0.167) 0.002 (p=0.441) 0.007 (p=0.017) 
H3C: International commitment + constitutional rules negatively correlated with enactment of prohibitive laws. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) -0.000 (p=0.147) -0.004 (p=0.028) -0.001 (p=0.518) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check -0.000 (p=0.887) -0.010 (p=0.850) -0.000 (p=0.876) 
    Rare-events robustness check -0.003 (p=0.196) -0.008 (p=0.033) -0.002 (p=0.525) 
H3D: Voting alignment with USA positively correlated with enacting notification laws. 
    Primary modeling strategy (logit) -0.001 (p=0.162) -0.000 (p=0.773) -0.000 (p=0.730) 
    Cox with TVC robustness check 0.000 (p=0.894) 0.004 (p=0.869) -0.000 (p=0.861) 
    Rare-events robustness check -0.001 (p=0.485) 0.001 (p=0.477) 0.000 (p=0.778) 
    
Bold text represents factors with statistically significant regression coefficients (p<0.10) in either main effects, 
interaction effects, or time-varying coefficients. See individual regression tables for additional information. Shaded 
cells identify statistically significant discrete marginal effects at the p<0.10 and p<0.20 level. Discrete changes are 
changes from 0 to 1 in binary variables and a standard deviation change in continuous variables. Each average marginal 
effect is accompanied by its p-value in the parentheses for readers to evaluate statistical significance in their own 






Chapter IV—Creating Better Data 
Click here to return to chapter. 
Assessing Measurement Validity 
 Measurement is a comparative exercise that uses a standard metric to equivalently and 
consistently measure a concept (Gerring, 2012b, pp. 159-160). My use of the ADICO syntax to 
produce a coding protocol produced numerous indicators measuring the different dimensions of 
CSO regulatory regimes. The degree to which these indicators meaningfully reflect concepts is 
known as measurement validity. This methodological quality underpins the adequacy of 
descriptive and causal inference and is of prime importance for both qualitative and quantitative 
researchers (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 25; Brady & Collier, 2010, pp. 337, 357).  
 A signal of measurement validity will be if my approach consistently reaches similar 
measurements as other researchers independently studying the same concept. Unfortunately, few 
studies have attempted to both systematically analyze CSO laws and produce measures that 
enable valid comparisons. Some of the most thorough analyses produced highly detailed legal 
summaries and "country narratives" (Salamon & Toepler, 1997; Breen et al., 2017, p. 2) but 
stopped short of producing metrics. Many other studies, meanwhile, use secondary data to 
produce binary outcomes measuring whether certain restrictive provisions exist (e.g., Dupuy et 
al., 2016; Reddy, 2018; DeMattee, 2019a; Swiney, 2019). Those binary measures seem 
oversimplified compared to the data discussed here.  
 A recent article in International Studies Quarterly provides the best comparison. Bakke et 
al. (2020) study state-sponsored restrictions on civil society in 176 countries between 1994 and 
2014. The authors code secondary data from the U.S. Department of State to create a count 




permissive provisions, the researchers' variable measuring CSO restrictions is equivalent to my 
indicator that counts the total number of restrictive provisions (e.g., Figure 2). Bakke et al. coded 
ten restrictions that organize into the four provision subgroups discussed throughout this chapter: 
• Governance—(i) harassing civil society activists; (ii) surveilling civil society activists. 
• Formation—(i) banning specific civil society organizations; (ii) creating difficulties in 
registering as civil society organizations.  
• Operations—(i) curtailing travel; (ii) restricting their visits to government sites; (iii) 
creating difficulties in obtaining visas or denying visas; (iv) censoring their publications.  
• Resources—(i) limiting their domestic funding sources; (ii) limiting their international 
funding sources.   
 With Bakke et al. serving as an independent robustness check, I find our separate 
measurements of the same concept are strongly similar, but not perfectly identical. The 
correlation between the two measures is significant (rho = 0.34, p-value = 0.000). And regressing 
their values on mine shows my measures predict the Bakke et al. measurements with high 
statistical precision (coefficient = 0.201, standard error = 0.031, n = 319, degrees of freedom = 
1). This linear relationship means for every five restrictions coded in my data, Bakke et al. coded 
one. This ratio is reasonable given a 58-item coding protocol produced my measures, while a 10-





Appendix Figure 4A: Assessing Measurement Validity  
 
Figure compares counts of restrictive provisions from Bakke et al (2019) and this study (DeMattee 2020). Data 
restricted to the years studied by Bakke et al (2019) and limited to countries coded here. Scatter plot (left) uses studies' 
original values. Line graphs (right) use standardized values for comparability. Each line graph displays data for each 
country (1994-2014) but omits the United States because of missing data in Bakke et al (2019). 
 Bakke et al. is the only reasonably comparable study available to assess measurement 
validity because they used secondary data to code all 17 of my cases for 1994-2014. There may 
still be concerns that using measurement similarity to draw broader conclusions about 
measurement validity is invalid for a sample using primary sources of East African countries and 
P5 members. Thus, I draw on Frank, Maroulis, Duong, and Kelcey (2013) to quantify how much 
bias there would have to be due to the non-random sample (or any other source) to invalidate my 
descriptive inference supporting measurement validity. Analyzing this threat to inference 
indicates that over 69% of the cross-study measurement correlation would have to be due to bias 
to invalidate the inference that the two studies have similar measures for the same concept. 




inference in this analysis, one would have to replace over 69% of the observed data (222 of 319 
country-year observations) with measurements for which there is zero cross-study similarity.1 
This cross-study comparison provides evidence that both analyses use scores that meaningfully 
reflect the concept (measurement validity), and whatever inferences rely on those measures for a 
set of cases are correct for those cases (internal validity).    
  
 
1 I derive these estimates from sociologists making important methodological contributions to how empirical analyses 
discuss robustness and threats to descriptive and causal inference (Frank, 2000; Pan & Frank, 2003, 2004; Frank & 




Chapter V—CSO Laws in East Africa 
Click here to return to chapter. 
Measurement Decisions: Continuous, Count, or Binary Response Variables? 
 Figure 5A shows histograms summarizing the distribution of the response variable among 
12 East African countries using the traditional monadic setup. The top graphs show the response 
variable using a continuous operationalization for permissive expansions (left) and restrictive 
expansions (right). Values above each bar represent the frequency of that value in the data, and 
the line is a simple normal-density plot. Lower graphs show the same information using count 
(middle) and binary (bottom) operationalizations, respectively.  
Appendix Figure 5A: Histograms of Response Variables and Supporting OLS as the Primary 
Model 
 
 The histograms show the continuous measure is a superior operationalization for two 




during analysis. The data also show some, but not many, contractions of both permissive and 
restrictive provisions. A negative binomial regression model (NBRM) used as a robustness check 
and a logit would be unable to analyze these negative values, but a straightforward OLS using 
continuous variables can. For these reasons, the primary analysis of the paper is an OLS, and the 
NBRM serves as a robustness check. A logit model is not discussed because of how strongly is 





Appendix Table 5A: Descriptive Statistics—All Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Permissive Provisions (continuous) 1,251 0.17 1.04 -2.00 11.00 
Permissive Provisions (integer) 1,234 0.20 1.00 0 11 
Restrictive Rules Enacted (continuous) 1,251 0.07 0.72 -2.67 6 
Similar Implementation Environment (t-1) 1,251 -1.15 0.91 -5.03 0.00 
Similar Political Ideology (t-1) 1,251 -1.11 1.10 -4.13 0.00 
Common Colonial Past 1,251 0.18  0 1 
Governance Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 45.30 7.72 37.50 70.83 
Formation Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 53.37 6.00 42.86 78.57 
Operations Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 47.56 8.49 28.13 65.63 
Resources Permissiveness (t-1) 1,251 57.94 3.96 53.13 69.79 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights 1,251 0.83  0 1 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments 1,251 0.08  0 1 
Executive Power 1,251 2.23 2.38 0 6 
Constitutional Freedoms 1,251 3.32 3.05 0 7 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power (t-1) 1,251 4.11 2.24 0 7 
CSO Consultation (t-1) 1,251 0.51 0.85 -1.37 2.21 
ODA/cap (t-1) 1,251 58.22 26.89 12.34 161.67 
GDP/cap (t-1) 1,251 446.27 215.48 204.77 1435.33 
Rule of Law Sameness (t-1) 1,251 -0.32 0.22 -0.91 0.00 
Freedoms Sameness (t-1) 1,251 -2.23 2.58 -7.00 0.00 
Time 1,251 35.89 12.42 2.00 56.00 
Time Spline 1 1,251 17.40 13.33 0.00 46.96 
Time Spline 2 1,251 3.64 3.85 0.00 13.13 
Number of Active Laws - Laggard 1,251 3.79 2.05 1 13 
Number of Active Laws - Leader 1,251 6.66 4.92 1 27 
Calendar Years  2000  1980 2016 
Restrictive Provisions (continuous) 741 -0.01 0.51 -2.67 5.00 
Restrictive Provisions (integer) 715 0.04 0.40 0 5 
Permissive Rules Enacted (continuous) 741 0.27 1.51 -2 11 
Similar Implementation Environment (t-1) 741 -1.04 0.88 -4.39 0.00 
Similar Political Ideology (t-1) 741 -0.52 0.67 -3.48 0.00 
Common Colonial Past 741 0.28  0 1 
Governance Permissiveness (t-1) 741 47.18 10.01 37.50 70.83 
Formation Permissiveness (t-1) 741 54.18 7.18 42.86 78.57 
Operations Permissiveness (t-1) 741 51.34 7.31 28.13 65.63 
Resources Permissiveness (t-1) 741 59.21 4.63 56.25 69.79 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights 741 0.90  0 1 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments 741 0.08  0 1 
Executive Power 741 2.36 2.38 0 6 
Constitutional Freedoms 741 3.36 2.92 0 7 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power (t-1) 741 3.68 2.31 0 7 
CSO Consultation (t-1) 741 0.52 0.78 -1.37 2.21 
ODA/cap (t-1) 741 58.67 27.31 12.34 161.67 
GDP/cap (t-1) 741 496.08 245.97 204.77 1,435.33 
Rule of Law Sameness (t-1) 741 -0.26 0.18 -0.89 0.00 
Freedoms Sameness (t-1) 741 -1.65 2.30 -7.00 0.00 
Time 741 38.22 12.84 2.00 56.00 
Time Spline 1 741 20.58 14.20 0.00 46.96 
Time Spline 2 741 4.60 4.16 0.00 13.13 
Number of Active Laws - Laggard 741 4.34 2.85 1 13 
Number of Active Laws - Leader 741 8.05 6.28 1 27 





Appendix Table 5B: OLS Directed Dyad Models Predicting Permissive Expansions (Full Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Permissiveness a  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Formation Permissiveness a  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Operations Permissiveness a  -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Resources Permissiveness a  -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* -0.04* 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Similar Implementation Environment a   0.09**   0.09** 
   (0.031)   (0.032) 
Similar Political Ideology a    0.00  -0.01 
    (0.026)  (0.026) 
Common Colonial Past     -0.02 -0.02 
     (0.069) (0.068) 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power a 0.07*** 0.06** 0.05* 0.06** 0.06** 0.05* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) 
Restrictive Rules Enacted 0.21* 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -0.15* -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 
 (0.070) (0.148) (0.145) (0.147) (0.146) (0.142) 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments 0.34** 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.02 -0.13 
 (0.121) (0.137) (0.150) (0.136) (0.137) (0.150) 
Executive Power -0.09*** -0.10** -0.09* -0.10** -0.10** -0.09* 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) 
Constitutional Freedoms 0.08*** 0.10** 0.09* 0.10** 0.10** 0.09* 
 (0.012) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) 
CSO Consultation a -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.038) (0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) 
ODA/capita a -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP/capita a -0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law Sameness a 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.08 
 (0.079) (0.087) (0.087) (0.120) (0.092) (0.119) 
Freedoms Sameness a -0.01+ -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.01+ 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Tknot1 0.01 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tknot2 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 
 (0.031) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) 
Tknot3 0.01 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.18 
 (0.085) (0.129) (0.135) (0.129) (0.129) (0.135) 
Observations 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
AIC 3587.92 3560.15 3555.64 3562.15 3562.06 3559.49 
BIC 3664.90 3657.66 3658.28 3664.78 3664.69 3672.39 
Degrees of Freedom 14 18 19 19 19 21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a variables lagged one period (t-1) 






Appendix Table 5C: OLS Directed Dyad Models Predicting Restrictive Expansions (Full Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Permissiveness a  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Formation Permissiveness a  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Operations Permissiveness a  0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Resources Permissiveness a  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Similar Implementation Environment a   0.02+   0.03* 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
Similar Political Ideology a    0.03*  0.04** 
    (0.014)  (0.014) 
Common Colonial Past     -0.03 -0.04+ 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power a 0.02+ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Permissive Rules Enacted -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -0.15** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.21*** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
Executive Power 0.03* 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Constitutional Freedoms -0.05** -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
CSO Consultation a -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
ODA/capita a -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP/capita a -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law Sameness a 0.08 0.11+ 0.09 0.07 0.11+ 0.03 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.067) 
Freedoms Sameness a -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tknot1 -0.04*** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Tknot2 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) 
Tknot3 -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.52*** 
 (0.102) (0.109) (0.113) (0.109) (0.109) (0.112) 
Observations 741 741 741 741 741 741 
AIC 1035.59 1033.39 1034.34 1034.20 1034.89 1036.19 
BIC 1104.71 1120.94 1126.50 1126.36 1127.05 1137.57 
Degrees of Freedom 14 18 19 19 19 21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a variables lagged one period (t-1) 






Appendix Table 5D: NBRM Directed Dyad Models Predicting Permissive Expansions (Full Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Permissiveness a  -0.08** -0.06* -0.08** -0.07* -0.05+ 
  (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
Formation Permissiveness a  -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.12** 
  (0.047) (0.039) (0.048) (0.046) (0.038) 
Operations Permissiveness a  -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** 
  (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) 
Resources Permissiveness a  -0.36*** -0.41*** -0.36*** -0.38*** -0.44*** 
  (0.098) (0.094) (0.099) (0.096) (0.096) 
Similar Implementation Environment a   0.92***   1.03*** 
   (0.221)   (0.219) 
Similar Political Ideology a    0.00  -0.27+ 
    (0.175)  (0.149) 
Common Colonial Past     0.62 0.88* 
     (0.411) (0.394) 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power a 0.91** 0.96*** 0.99*** 0.96*** 1.04*** 1.10*** 
 (0.289) (0.261) (0.286) (0.264) (0.268) (0.293) 
Restrictive Rules Enacted 0.50*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 
 (0.078) (0.147) (0.130) (0.149) (0.147) (0.129) 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -2.86*** -2.85** -2.19* -2.85** -2.81** -2.13* 
 (0.730) (1.034) (0.897) (1.023) (1.009) (0.866) 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments 0.80 -3.98*** -4.74*** -3.98*** -4.05*** -4.96*** 
 (0.608) (1.106) (1.167) (1.104) (1.134) (1.218) 
Executive Power -0.83*** -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 
 (0.130) (0.164) (0.178) (0.164) (0.173) (0.188) 
Constitutional Freedoms 0.67*** 0.31* 0.33* 0.31* 0.30* 0.35* 
 (0.134) (0.150) (0.154) (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) 
CSO Consultation a 0.64+ -0.67* -0.79** -0.67* -0.69* -0.91*** 
 (0.344) (0.268) (0.271) (0.271) (0.278) (0.262) 
ODA/capita a 0.02*** 0.03* 0.02+ 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
GDP/capita a 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Rule of Law Sameness a -1.75* -0.62 -1.12+ -0.64 -1.01 -0.70 
 (0.707) (0.618) (0.591) (1.028) (0.706) (0.947) 
Freedoms Sameness a 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.053) (0.054) (0.049) 
Tknot1 0.14 0.67*** 0.92 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.90 
 (0.182) (0.175) (1.129) (0.174) (0.169) (1.360) 
Tknot2 0.74 -0.22 -0.94 -0.23 -0.13 -0.82 
 (0.631) (0.650) (2.156) (0.645) (0.643) (2.585) 
Tknot3 -2.13 0.23 1.99 0.23 0.01 1.75 
 (1.591) (1.671) (4.413) (1.662) (1.649) (5.262) 
ln(alpha) 2.45*** 1.95*** 1.84*** 1.95*** 1.95*** 1.82*** 
 (0.189) (0.146) (0.135) (0.148) (0.140) (0.128) 
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
AIC 816.61 761.19 750.57 763.19 761.10 750.30 
BIC 898.50 863.55 858.05 870.67 868.58 868.01 
Degrees of Freedom 14 18 19 19 19 21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a variables lagged one period (t-1) 





Appendix Table 5E: NBRM Directed Dyad Models Predicting Restrictive Expansions (Full Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Permissiveness a  0.78*** 0.79*** 0.73*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 
  (0.108) (0.102) (0.107) (0.112) (0.124) 
Formation Permissiveness a  0.48*** 0.50*** 0.34+ 0.49** 0.34+ 
  (0.122) (0.114) (0.187) (0.154) (0.204) 
Operations Permissiveness a  1.96*** 1.99*** 1.64*** 1.96*** 1.75*** 
  (0.261) (0.240) (0.245) (0.262) (0.260) 
Resources Permissiveness a  -2.27*** -2.22*** -2.02*** -2.31*** -2.12*** 
  (0.366) (0.366) (0.307) (0.423) (0.371) 
Similar Implementation Environment a   -0.74   -0.51 
   (0.563)   (0.453) 
Similar Political Ideology a    2.96+  2.86* 
    (1.530)  (1.422) 
Common Colonial Past     0.19 -0.02 
     (0.547) (0.591) 
Nondemocratic Grip on Power a 0.86** 4.46*** 4.37*** 4.22*** 4.64*** 4.21*** 
 (0.311) (0.745) (0.847) (0.872) (1.090) (1.027) 
Permissive Rules Enacted 0.82** 1.84*** 1.93*** 1.47*** 1.86*** 1.61*** 
 (0.300) (0.236) (0.231) (0.258) (0.247) (0.260) 
Commitment to Guard Human Rights -6.42*** -5.09*** -5.30*** -6.06** -4.94*** -6.79** 
 (1.580) (1.286) (1.270) (1.903) (1.212) (2.292) 
Constitution Bolsters Commitments -15.74*** 9.40** 11.49*** 6.19* 9.96*** 9.18* 
 (0.853) (2.909) (3.235) (2.571) (2.644) (3.741) 
Executive Power -0.20 1.82*** 1.63*** 1.68* 1.71** 1.69* 
 (0.266) (0.491) (0.475) (0.671) (0.582) (0.839) 
Constitutional Freedoms 0.09 -2.82*** -2.88*** -2.61*** -2.73*** -2.78*** 
 (0.227) (0.463) (0.442) (0.540) (0.504) (0.697) 
CSO Consultation a -1.43* -0.37 -0.41 -1.08 -0.26 -1.34 
 (0.621) (0.505) (0.537) (0.971) (0.587) (1.100) 
ODA/capita a 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.03* 0.03** 0.02 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) 
GDP/capita a 0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Rule of Law Sameness a 0.53 -0.15 -0.04 -1.40 0.05 -0.96 
 (1.836) (1.534) (1.456) (1.587) (1.544) (1.656) 
Freedoms Sameness a 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.84*** 0.59+ 0.79*** 0.62* 
 (0.174) (0.189) (0.207) (0.317) (0.203) (0.312) 
Tknot1 -1.35*** -0.74*** -0.83*** -0.87** -0.78*** -0.82* 
 (0.322) (0.158) (0.170) (0.289) (0.189) (0.342) 
Tknot2 5.58*** 2.69*** 2.95*** 3.48*** 2.73*** 3.41*** 
 (1.349) (0.345) (0.389) (0.697) (0.365) (0.877) 
Tknot3 -14.46*** -6.44*** -7.17*** -8.61*** -6.42*** -8.51*** 
 (3.506) (0.817) (0.945) (1.658) (0.836) (2.178) 
ln(alpha) 2.62*** 1.54*** 1.45** 1.01 1.55*** 0.95 
 (0.249) (0.428) (0.490) (1.067) (0.418) (1.136) 
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 
AIC 159.63 140.89 142.19 139.56 142.86 143.12 
BIC 232.79 232.33 238.21 235.58 238.88 248.29 
Degrees of Freedom 14 18 19 19 19 21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a variables lagged one period (t-1) 
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Appendix Archival Document 6A: Community Based Organization Registration Form (Page 1) 
 
CBO Registration Form provided by Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, State Department for Social Protection. 




Appendix Archival Document 6B: Community Based Organization Registration Form (Page 3) 
 
CBO Registration Form provided by Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, State Department for Social Protection. 





Appendix Archival Document 6C: Self-Help Group (SHG) Registration Form (Page 3) 
 
SHG Registration Form provided by Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, State Department for Social Protection. 





Appendix Figure 6A: Institutional Development of CSO Laws in Burundi 
 
Figures 6A-6E show the development and multidimensionality of civil society laws separate EAC member countries. 
The timeline at the top of the figure provides scale and identifies significant political and legal milestones in the 
country’s history. Triangles immediately below the timeline identify significant civil society laws. Horizontal bars 
represent primary sources contained in the legal corpus and coded in the data. I order all coded items vertically to 
show how laws amend each other over time. Items at the bottom identify notable historical events in the country (thick 
vertical connectors) and the world (thin vertical connectors). 






Appendix Figure 6C: Institutional Development of CSO Laws in South Sudan 
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Appendix Archival Document 7A: Registrar Halts the Registration of Religious Congregations 
 
(Page 1 of 3) February 2017 Press Release Statement on Proposed Churches Laws. Provided by State Law Office. 





(Page 2 of 3) February 2017 Press Release Statement on Proposed Churches Laws. Provided by State Law Office. 






(Page 3 of 3) February 2017 Press Release Statement on Proposed Churches Laws. Provided by State Law Office. 





Legal Repositories Accessed to Collect Primary Sources (Legal Texts) 
Abyssinia Law—an online free-access resource for Ethiopian legal information. Abyssinia Law is 
administered and maintained by Liku Worku Law Office and it is not affiliated with any government 
entity. The online collection is an independent effort to understand the Ethiopian legal system. 
https://www.abyssinialaw.com/ 
African Legal Information Institute (AfricanLII)—is a programme of the Democratic Governance and 
Rights Unit at the Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town. It helps organizations and 
governments build and maintain sustainable free access to law portals. It convenes a network of 16 
African legal information institutes. 
https://africanlii.org/ 
Commonwealth Legal Information Institute (CommonLII)—provides core legal information from all 
Commonwealth countries. It provides a common technical platform through which all Commonwealth 
countries can cooperatively provide access to their laws. CommonLII supports the rule of law 
throughout the Commonwealth, by making each country's legal system more transparent.  
http://www.commonlii.org/ 
Consultant Plus (Russian: Консультант Плюс)—a proprietary system containing the legislation of Russia. 
Consultant's centralized database is updated daily and distributed via a network of partners. 
http://www.consultant.ru/ 
Foreign Law Guide (FLG)—an essential database offering relevant information on sources of foreign law, 
including complete bibliographic citations to legislation, the existence of English translations and 
selected references to secondary sources in one virtual destination. Broad in content and global in scope, 
the FLG is an indispensable resource for comparative law research and a fundamental tool for 
developing a foreign and comparative law collection. Approximately 190 jurisdictions are systemically 
covered and updated by a global team of experts.  
https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/foreign-law-guide 
Gazette of DRC—an unofficial publication attempting to digitize and share the DRC’s legal information. The 
online repository includes a variety of sources including the DRC’s Gazette and laws. 
http://www.leganet.cd/index.htm 
GlobaLex—and electronic legal publication dedicated to international and foreign law research. Published by 
the Hauser Global Law School Program at NYU School of Law, GlobaLex is committed to the 
dissemination of high-level international, foreign, and comparative law research tools in order to 
accommodate the needs of an increasingly global educational and practicing legal world.  
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/about.html 
Government Gazettes Online—attempts to list all online government gazettes and their characteristics to aid 
researchers. Government Gazettes, which are published by federal governments worldwide, are the 
means through which the government can communicate to officials and the general public. Although 
most countries publish a gazette, their regularity and content varies widely, which is noted in the 
description of each gazette. Gazettes are useful not only to monitor the actions of the government, but 
also as primary source documentation in research.  
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~graceyor/doctemp/gazettes/index.htm 
Guide to Law Online—prepared by the United States Law Library of Congress Public Services Division. It is 
an annotated guide to sources of information on government and law, and includes selected links to 
useful and reliable sites for legal information. 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide.php 
International Center for Not-for-Profit-Law (ICNL)—founded in 1992 as one of the first organizations to 
focus on the legal environment aspect of civic space, ICNL works with partners from civil society, 
government, and the international community to develop long-term relationships to advance reforms. 




affecting civil society, philanthropy, and public participation. Its Civic Freedom Monitor provides up-to-
date information on legal issues affecting civil society and civic freedoms, including freedoms of 
association, expression, and peaceful assembly for 55 countries and 8 multilateral organizations. Each 
country report provides an overview of key legal issues relating to civic freedoms, with a focus on legal 
barriers to civil society activity. It also curates a Digital Legal Library collection of nearly 4,000 
resources from more than 200 countries and territories, written in more than 60 languages. The database 




Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF)—is the government gazette of the French Republic. It 
publishes the major legal official information from the national Government of France and the French 
Parliament. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr  
Legislation.gov.uk—carries most (but not all) types of legislation and their accompanying explanatory 
documents relevant to the United Kingdom. Researchers can browse legislation by type and category, or 
use an advanced search to explore by title or keyword in text. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
Legislationline.org—online legislative database created to assist OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe) participating States in bringing their legislation into line with relevant international 
human-rights standards. The database was designed as a drafting tool for lawmakers and provide 
assistance to those who prepare and draft laws at the working level. 
https://www.legislationline.org/ 
Leibniz Information Center for Economics (ZBW, German: Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft)—the 
world's largest research infrastructure for economic literature with a national mandate. 
https://www.zbw.eu/en/ 
LLMC Digital—non-profit cooperative of libraries dedicated to the twin goals of preserving legal titles and 
government documents while making copies inexpensively available digitally through its on-line service 
LLMC-Digital. 
http://www.llmc.com/default.aspx 
NATLEX—database of national labour, social security, and related human right legislation maintained by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.byCountry?p_lang=en 
National Council for Law Reporting (Kenya Law)—provides universal access to public legal information by 
monitoring and reporting on the development of jurisprudence for the promotion of the rule of law. 
Kenya Law is an entity of Kenya’s judiciary and is a semi-autonomous state corporation created by The 
National Council for Law Reporting Act (Act. No. 11 of 1994). It monitors and reports on the 
development of Kenya’s jurisprudence through the publication of the Kenya Law Reports; and revises, 
consolidates, and publishes the Laws of Kenya. 
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/ 
Official Gazettes & Civil Society Documentation—collection of official gazettes and other key historical 
government documentation from countries where the integrity of the public record is known to be at 
risk. Center for Research Libraries’ (CRL) open web repository promotes transparency and 
accountability by providing a permanent public record of government documentation that defines the 
rights and obligations of citizens and records the activities of government. CRL is digitizing official 
gazettes from its extensive collection of print and microfilm, and will augment these materials by 





Southern African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII)—publishes legal information for free public access 
which comprises mainly of case law from South Africa. SAFLII also hosts legal materials from other 
countries in the region which are obtained through partnerships, collaborative efforts and more recently 
through linking to other Legal Information Institutes established in these regions. 
http://www.saflii.org/ 
Uganda Legal Information Institute (ULII)—provides legal information relating to Uganda, with a view of 
promoting and supporting the rule of law. It publishes public legal information such as decisions of 
courts, legislation and some publicly available secondary legal materials created by public bodies for 
purposes of public access 
https://ulii.org/ 
United States Statutes at Large—collection of laws passed by the United States Congress, in chronological 
order. The Law Library of Congress has digitized this collection and aims to make historic Statutes at 
Large accessible to the public. This project incorporates additional years and legal material on an 
ongoing basis. 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/ 
Westlaw China—online China law database launched by Thomson Reuters. Legal topics are compiled by 
experienced attorney editors to help researchers understand key legal issues. Westlaw China is updated 
daily to ensure the most current and accurate information. 
http://www.westlawchina.com/index_en.html 
World Constitutions Illustrated: Contemporary and Historical Documents and Resources—enables 
scholars to research the constitutional and political development of every country in the world. It 
includes substantial constitutional histories for all countries and provides  original text, amending laws, 
consolidated text, and important related texts. The database includes more than 11,000 historical and 
current constitutions and constitutional documents from more than 190 countries. 
https://libguides.heinonline.org/world-constitutions-illustrated 
World Law Guide, The (Lexadin)—extensive collection of structured links to world legal information 
resources on the internet, maintained by Lexadin, the legal technology service based in the Netherlands. 
The repository contains more than 70,000 links to legal sites in over 180 countries.  
https://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/ 
World Legal Information Institute (WorldLII)—non-profit global legal research facility developed 
collaboratively by the following Legal Information Institutes and other organizations. Over 270 






Statute Coding Bibliography 
East African Community 
BURUNDI 
1. Decree December 28, 1888. Institutions. Scientific, religious, philanthropic associations, 
etc. [28 décembre 1888. DECRET DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Institutions. Associations 
scientifiques, religieuses, Philanthropiques, etc. — Personnalité civile.]. Burundi. Decree 
of 28 December 1888 (1922). Enacted: January 4, 1922. Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian 
Mandate 1922-1962). 
2. Decree December 31, 1888. African Red Cross Association [31 décembre 1888. 
DECRET DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Association africaine de la Croix Rouge.]. Burundi. 
Decree of 31 December 1888 (1922). Enacted: January 5, 1922. Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian 
Mandate 1922-1962). 
3. Decree May 28, 1902. Direct and Personal Taxes – Deductions [28 mai 1902. DECRET 
DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Impositions directes et personnelles. — Réductions.]. 
Burundi. Decree of 28 May 1902 (1922). Enacted: January 6, 1922. Ruanda-Urundi 
(Belgian Mandate 1922-1962). 
4. Code General Taxes [CODE GENERAL des Impots et Taxes Legislation mise a jour au 
1er janvier 1969]. Burundi. Legislation updated 1 January 1969 (1969). Enacted: January 
1, 1969. 
5. General Framework of Cooperation Between the Republic of Burundi and Foreign Non-
Governmental Organizations (ONGEs) [LOI N°1/01 DU 23 JANVIER 2017 PORTANT 
MODIFICATION DE LA LOI N°1/011 DU 23 JUIN 1999 PORTANT 
MODIFICATION DU DECRET- LOI N°1/033 DU 22 AOUT 1990 PORTANT CADRE 
GENERAL DE LA]. Burundi. Law No. 1/01 of January 23, 2017 (2017). Enacted: 
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Burundi. Law No. 1/02 of January 27, 2017 (2017). Enacted: January 27, 2017. 
Amending the Decree-Law No. 1/11 of 18 April 1992 on the organic framework of non-
profit associations. 
KENYA 
1. Stamp Duty Act Cap. 480. Kenya. No. 31 of 1958 (1958). Enacted: October 1, 1958. 
2. The Public Order Act Cap. 56. Kenya. No. 54 of 1960 (1960). Enacted: January 1, 1960. 
Amending Cap. 56 (1950). 
3. The Companies Ordinance. Kenya. Chapter 486 (1962). Enacted: 1-Jan-62. 
4. The Trustees (Perpetual Succession Act) Cap. 164. Kenya. No. 19 of 1964 (1964). 
Enacted: January 1, 1964. Amending Cap. 164 (1948). 




6. Income Tax Act Cap. 470. Kenya. (1973). Enacted: January 1, 1974. 
7. The Land (Perpetual Succession) (Amendment) Act. Kenya. No. 2 of 1980 (1980). 
Enacted: May 2, 1980. Amending Cap. 164 (1948). 
8. Trustees (Perpetual Succession) Act. Kenya. No. 22 of 1987 (1987). Enacted: January 1, 
1987. Amending Cap. 164 (1948). 
9. Value Added Tax Act. Kenya. Cap. 476 (1989). Enacted: January 1, 1990. 
10. The Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Act. Kenya. No. 19 of 1990 (1990). 
Enacted: Amended before enacted. 
11. The Statute Law (Repeal and Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1991. Kenya. No. 14 of 
1991 (1991). Enacted: December 27, 1991. Amending and commencing No. 19 of 1990. 
12. The Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1992. Kenya. No. 11 of 1992 (1992). 
Enacted: October 23, 1992. Amending No. 19 of 1990. 
13. Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Regulations, 1992. Kenya. Legal Notice 
No. 152 of 1992 (1992). Enacted: May 22, 1992. For matters relating to the NGO Act 
No. 19 of 1990. 
14. Non-Governmental Organizations Council Code of Conduct, 1995. Kenya. Legal Notice 
No. 306 of 1995 (1995). Enacted: September 8, 1995. In exercise of powers conferred by 
section 24 of the NGO Act No. 19 of 1990. 
15. The Statute Law (Repeals and Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1997. Kenya. No. 10 of 
1997 (1997). Enacted: November 7, 1997. Amending Cap. 56 (1950). 
16. The Statute Law (Repeals and Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1997. Kenya. No. 10 of 
1997 (1997). Enacted: November 7, 1997. Amending Cap. 108 (1968). 
17. National Security Intelligence Service Act. Kenya. No. 11 of 1998 (1998). Enacted: 
January 1, 1999. 
18. The Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act. Kenya. No. 7 of 2007 (2007). 
Enacted: October 15, 2007. Amending No. 19 of 1990. 
19. Political Parties Act, 2007. Kenya. Cap. 7A (2007). Enacted: January 1, 2008. 
20. The Companies Act. Kenya. Chapter 486 (2008). Enacted: January 1, 2008. Amending 
Cap. 486. 
21. Political Parties Act, 2011. Kenya. No. 11 of 2011 (2011). Enacted: November 1, 2011. 
Replacing Cap. 7A of 2007. 
22. National Intelligence Service Act. Kenya. No. 28 of 2012 (2012). Enacted: October 5, 
2012. Replacing No. 11 of 1998. 
23. Value Added Tax Act. Kenya. No. 35 of 2013 (2013). Enacted: September 2, 2013. 
Replacing Cap. 476 (1989). 
24. Public Benefits Organizations Act. Kenya. No. 18 of 2013 (2013). 
25. The Public Order Act (Amendment). Kenya. No. 19 of 2014 (2014). Enacted: January 1, 




26. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014. Kenya. No. 19 of 2014 (2014). Enacted: 
December 22, 2014. Amending No. 18 of 2013. 
27. Companies Act. Kenya. No. 17 of 2015 (2015). Enacted: September 15, 2015. Replacing 
Companies Act, Cap. 486. 
28. The Finance Act. Kenya. No. 15 of 2017 (2017). Enacted: April 3, 2017. Amending Cap. 
470 (1973). 
RWANDA 
1. Decree December 28, 1888. Institutions. Scientific, religious, philanthropic associations, 
etc. [28 décembre 1888. DECRET DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Institutions. Associations 
scientifiques, religieuses, Philanthropiques, etc. — Personnalité civile.]. Rwanda. Decree 
of 28 December 1888 (1922). Enacted: January 1, 1922. Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian 
Mandate 1922-1962). 
2. Decree December 31, 1888. African Red Cross Association [31 décembre 1888. 
DECRET DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Association africaine de la Croix Rouge.]. Rwanda. 
Decree of 31 December 1888 (1922). Enacted: January 2, 1922. Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian 
Mandate 1922-1962). 
3. Decree May 28, 1902. Direct and Personal Taxes – Deductions [28 mai 1902. DECRET 
DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Impositions directes et personnelles. — Réductions.]. 
Rwanda. Decree of 28 May 1902 (1922). Enacted: January 3, 1922. Ruanda-Urundi 
(Belgian Mandate 1922-1962). 
4. Relating to Non-Profit Making Organizations. Rwanda. Law No. 20/2000 of 26/07/2000 
(2000). Enacted: April 1, 2001. 
5. Governing the Organisation and the Functioning of National Non-Governmental 
Organisations. Rwanda. Law No. 04/2012 of 17/02/2012 (2012). Enacted: April 9, 2012. 
6. Governing the Organisation and the Functioning of International Non-Governmental 
Organisations. Rwanda. Law No. 05/2012 of 17/02/2012 (2012). Enacted: April 9, 2012. 
SOUTH SUDAN 
1. The Non-Governmental Organizations Act. South Sudan. (2003). Enacted: December 31, 
2003. 
2. The Taxation Act. South Sudan. (2009). 
3. Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Act. South Sudan. (2016). 
4. Non-Government Organizations Act. South Sudan. (2016). 
TANZANIA 
1. Societies Ordinance. Tanzania. No. 11 of 1954 (1954). Enacted: June 1, 1954. 
2. Societies Ordinance. Tanzania. No. 22 of 1957 (1957). Amending Cap. 337 (No. 11 of 
1954). 
3. Societies Ordinance. Tanzania. No. 76 of 1962 (1962). Enacted: December 12, 1962. 
Amending Cap. 337 (No. 11 of 1954). 
4. Societies Ordinance. Tanzania. No. 54 of 1963 (1963). Enacted: December 31, 1963. 




5. Societies Ordinance. Tanzania. No. 16 of 1969 (1969). Enacted: February 7, 1969. 
Amending Cap. 337 (No. 11 of 1954). 
6. The Income Tax Act. Tanzania. No. 33 of 1973 (1973). Enacted: January 1, 1974. 
7. The Non-Governmental Organizations Act. Tanzania. No. 24 of 2002 (2002). Enacted: 
December 14, 2002. 
8. The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act. Tanzania. No. 2 of 2005 (2005). 
Enacted: June 4, 2005. 
9. The Income Tax Act. Tanzania. No. 27 of 2008 (2008). Enacted: November 30, 2008. 
10. The Value Added Tax Act. Tanzania. No. 5 of 2014 (2014). Enacted: December 11, 
2014. 
UGANDA 
1. Trustees Incorporation Act 1939. Uganda. Cap. 165 (1939). Enacted: May 31, 1939. 
2. Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Act 1989. Uganda. Cap. 113 (1989). 
Enacted: September 29, 1989. 
3. Non-Governmental Organisations Regulations. Uganda. Statutory Instrument No. 113-
1/1990 (1990). Enacted: April 6, 1990. Under section 12 of the Non-Governmental 
Organisations Statute, 1990. 
4. The Income Tax Act. Uganda. Cap. 340 (1997). Enacted: July 1, 1997. 
5. Local Governments Act 1997. Uganda. Cap. 243 (1997). Enacted: March 24, 1997. 
6. Non-Governmental Organisations Registration (Amendment) Act. Uganda. Act No. 25 of 
2006 (2006). Enacted: August 4, 2006. Amending Cap. 113. 
7. Income Tax (Amendment) Act. Uganda. Act No. 4 of 2008 (2008). Enacted: July 1, 
2007. Amending Cap. 340 of 1997. 
8. Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Regulations 2009. Uganda. Statutory 
Instrument No. 19 of 2009 (2009). Enacted: March 20, 2009. Under section 13 of the 
Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Act, Cap. 113. 
9. Income Tax (Amendment) Tax, 2011. Uganda. Act No. 21 of 2011 (2011). Enacted: July 
1, 2011. Amending Cap. 340 of 1997. 
10. Income Tax Amendment, 2012. Uganda. Act No. 4 of 2012 (2012). Enacted: September 
26, 2012. Amending Cap. 340 of 1997. 
11. Anti-Money Laundering Act. Uganda. Act. No. 12 of 2013 (2013). Enacted: January 1, 
2013. 
12. Anti Homosexuality Act. Uganda. (2014). Enacted: February 24, 2014. 
13. Non-Governmental Organisations Act. Uganda. (2016). Enacted: February 11, 2016. 
14. Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2017. Uganda. Act No. 10 of 2017 (2017). Enacted: July 
1, 2017. Amending Cap. 340 of 1997. 
15. Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act. Uganda. Act. No. 3 of 2017 (2017). Enacted: 
May 26, 2017. Amending No. 12 of 2013. 
16. The Non-Governmental Organisations (Fees) Regulations, 2017. Uganda. Statutory 
Instrument No. 21 of 2017 (2017). Enacted: May 5, 2017. Under Section 55of the Non-




17. The Non-Governmental Organisations Regulations, 2017. Uganda. Statutory Instrument 
No. 22 of 2017 (2017). Enacted: May 5, 2017. Under Section 55 of the Non-
Governmental Organizations Act, 2016. 
18. Income Tax (Amendment) Act , 2019. Uganda. (2019). Enacted: July 1, 2019. Amending 
Cap. 340 of 1997. 
African Countries Adjacent to the EAC 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
1. Natural Persons Income Tax (IRPP) [Directive relative à l’Impôt sur le Revenu des 
Personnes Physiques (IRPP) Directive n°01/04-UEAC-177 du 30 juillet 2004]. Central 
African Republic. Directive No. 01/04-UEAC-177 (2004). Enacted: July 30, 2004. 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
1. Decree December 28, 1888. Institutions. Scientific, religious, philanthropic associations, 
etc. [28 décembre 1888. DECRET DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Institutions. Associations 
scientifiques, religieuses, Philanthropiques, etc. — Personnalité civile.]. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Decree of 28 December 1888 (1888). Enacted: 12/28/1888. 
2. Decree December 31, 1888. African Red Cross Association [31 décembre 1888. 
DECRET DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Association africaine de la Croix Rouge.]. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Decree of 31 December 1888 (1888). Enacted: 
12/28/1888. 
3. Decree May 28, 1902. Direct and Personal Taxes – Deductions [28 mai 1902. DECRET 
DU ROI-SOUVERAIN — Impositions directes et personnelles. — Réductions.]. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Decree of 28 May 1902 (1902). Enacted: May 28, 
1902. 
4. Ordinance-Law No. 69/009 of February 10, 1969 - Schedules on Income [Ordonnance-loi 
n° 69/009 du 10 février 1969 – Contributions cédulaires sur les revenus]. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Law No. 69/009 of 1969 (1969). Enacted: February 10, 1969. 
5. Decree-Law No. 196 of 29 January 1999 on Regulating Public Demonstrations and 
Meetings [Décret-Loi N0 196 du 29 janvier 1999 portant réglementation des 
manifestations et des réunions publiques]. Democratic Republic of the Congo. Law No. 
196 of 29 January 1999 (1999). Enacted: January 29, 1999. 
6. Attaching General Enforceable Provisions to Non-Profit Making Organisations and 
Charitable Corporations. Democratic Republic of the Congo. Law No. 004/2001 (2001). 
Enacted: July 20, 2001. Replacing Legislative decree No. 195 of 1999. 
ETHIOPIA 
1. The Civil Code Proclamation of 1960. Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 165 of 1960 (1960). 
Enacted: September 11, 1960. 
2. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 4/1995 (1995). Enacted: August 23, 
1995. 




4. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS REGULATIONS NO. 78/2002 REGULATIONS ISSUED 
PURSUANT TO THE INCOME TAX PROCLAMATION. Ethiopia. Council of 
Ministers Regulations No. 78/2002 (2002). Enacted: July 19, 2002. 
5. Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002. Ethiopia. (2002). Enacted: July 4, 2002. 
6. Charities and Societies Union Directive No. 1/2002. Ethiopia. (2002). Enacted: January 
15, 2002. 
7. Chambers of Commerce and Sectorial Association Establishment Proclamation No. 
341/2003. Ethiopia. (2003). Enacted: May 27, 2003. 
8. Directive to Determine the Operational and Administrative Costs of Charities and 
Societies Directive No. 2/2003. Ethiopia. (2003). Enacted: July 19, 2003. 
9. Directive to Provide for Establishment and Administration of Charitable Committee No. 
3/2003. Ethiopia. (2003). Enacted: July 9, 2003. 
10. Directive to Provide for Public Collections by Charities and Societies Directive No. 
5/2003. Ethiopia. (2003). Enacted: July 9, 2003. 
11. Directive to Provide for the Liquidation, Transfer and Dissolution of Properties of 
Charities and Societies Directive No. 6/2003. Ethiopia. (2003). Enacted: August 31, 
2003. 
12. Directive to Provide for Income Generating Activities by Charities and Societies No. 
07/2004. Ethiopia. (2004). Enacted: September 13, 2004. 
13. Directive to Determine the Particulars of the Audit and Activity Report of Charities and 
Societies Directive No. 8/2004. Ethiopia. (2004). Enacted: September 13, 2004. 
14. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 471/2005 (2005). Enacted: October 11, 
2005. 
15. Charities and Societies Council of Ministers Regulation No. 168/2009. Ethiopia. (2009). 
Enacted: November 9, 2009. 
16. Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009. Ethiopia. (2009). Enacted: February 
13, 2009. 
17. Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. Ethiopia. (2009). Enacted: August 28, 2008. 
18. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 691/2010 (2010). Enacted: October 27, 
2011. 
19. Organizations of Civil Societies Proclamation No. 1113/2019. Ethiopia. (2019). Enacted: 
March 7, 2019. 
MALAWI 
1. Trustees Incorporation Act Cap. 5:03. Malawi. No. 5 of 1962 (1962). Enacted: June 15, 
1962. 
2. Trustees Incorporation Rules. Malawi. G.N. 87 of 1962 (1962). Enacted: June 15, 1962. 




3. Companies Act Cap. 46:03. Malawi. No. 22 of 1989 (1989). Amending No. 19 of 1984. 
4. Taxation Act Cap. 41:01. Malawi. No. 1 of 1990 (1990). Amending No. 4 of 1988. 
MOZAMBIQUE 
1. Regulating the Right of Association [Regula o direito a livre associacao Lel N. 8/91]. 
Mozambique. Law No. 08/91 (1991). Enacted: July 18, 1991. 
ZAMBIA 
1. Societies Act Cap. 119. Zambia. No. 65 of 1957 (1958). Enacted: June 2, 1958. 
2. Organisations (Control of Assistance) Act Cap. 116. Zambia. No. 13 of 1994 (1994). 
Amending No. 11 of 1966. 
3. Trades Licensing Act Cap. 393. Zambia. No. 13 of 1994 (1994). Amending No. 41 of 
1968. 
4. Societies Act Cap. 119. Zambia. No. 13 of 1994 (1994). Enacted: January 1, 1994. 
Amending No. 65 of 1957. 
5. Non-Governmental Organisations' Act. Zambia. No. 16 of 2009 (2009). Enacted: August 
28, 2009. 
Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council 
CHINA 
1. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国个人所
得税法, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员长令第十一号]. China. Order No. 11 of 
1980 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(1980). Enacted: September 10, 1980. 
2. Law of the People's Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations [
中华人民共和国集会游行示威法, 中华人民共和国主席令第二十号]. China. Order 
No. 20 of 1989 of the President of the People's Republic of China (1989). Enacted: 
October 31, 1989. 
3. Interim Provisions for the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China [
外国商会管理暂行规定, 国务院令第36号]. China. Decree No. 36 of 1989 of the State 
Council (1989). Enacted: July 4, 1989. 
4. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国个人所
得税法, 中华人民共和国主席令第十二号]. China. Order No. 12 of 1993 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (1993). Enacted: January 1, 1994. Amending 
No. 11 of 1980. 
5. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Red Cross Society [中华人民共和国红十
字会法, 中华人民共和国主席令第十四号]. China. Order No. 14 of 1993 of the 




6. Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision [中华人民共和国
行政监察法, 中华人民共和国主席令第八十五号]. China. Order No. 85 of 1997 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (1997). Enacted: May 9, 1997. 
7. Regulations on Registration Administration of Associations [社会团体登记管理条例, 国
务院令第250号]. China. Order No. 250 of 1998 of the State Council (1998). Enacted: 
October 25, 1998. 
8. Interim Regulations on the Administration of the Registration of Privately-Operated Non-
Enterprise Organizations [民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例, 国务院令第251号]. 
China. Decree No. 251 of 1998 of the State Council (1998). Enacted: October 25, 1998. 
9. Interim Regulations on Registration Administration of Institutions. China. Decree No. 
252 of 1998 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (1998). Enacted: 
October 25, 1998. 
10. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国个人所
得税法, 中华人民共和国主席令第二十二号]. China. Order No. 22 of 1999 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (1999). Enacted: August 30, 1999. Amending 
No. 11 of 1980. 
11. Law of the People's Republic of China on Donation for Public Welfare Undertakings [中
华人民共和国公益事业捐赠法, 中华人民共和国主席令第十九号]. China. Order No. 
19 of 1999 of the President of the People's Republic of China (1999). Enacted: September 
1, 1999. 
12. Accounting Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国会计法, 中华人民
共和国主席令第二十四号]. China. Order No. 24 of 1999 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China (1999). Enacted: July 2, 2000. 
13. Trust Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国信托法, 中华人民共和国
主席令第五十号]. China. Order No. 50 of 2001 of the President of the People's Republic 
of China (2001). Enacted: October 1, 2001. 
14. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of Privately-run Schools [中华
人民共和国民办教育促进法, 中华人民共和国主席令第八十号]. China. Order No. 80 
of 2002 of the President of the People's Republic of China (2002). Enacted: September 1, 
2003. 
15. Interim Regulations on Registration Administration of Institutions [事业单位登记管理
暂行条例, 国务院令第411号]. China. Decree No. 411 of of 2004 the State Council 




16. Accounting System for Private Non-profit Organizations [民间非营利组织会计制度]. 
China. Ministry of Finance, 2004 No. 7 (2004). Enacted: January 1, 2005. 
17. Regulations on Administration of Foundations [基金会管理条例, 国务院令第400号]. 
China. Decree No. 400 of 2004 of the State Council (2004). Enacted: June 1, 2004. 
18. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Administrative Supervision [中华人民共和国行政监察法实施条例, 中华人民共和国
国务院令第419号]. China. Decree No. 419 of 2004 of the State Council (2004). Enacted: 
October 1, 2004. 
19. Law of the People's Republic of China on Individual Income Tax [中华人民共和国个人
所得税法, 中华人民共和国主席令第四十四号]. China. Order No. 44 of 2005 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (2005). Enacted: January 1, 2006. Amending 
No. 11 of 1980. 
20. Measures for Annual Inspection of Private Non-enterprise Entities. China. Order No. 27 
of 2005 of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2005). Enacted: June 1, 2005. 
21. Measures for the Information Disclosure of Foundations. China. Order No. 31 of 2005 of 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2005). Enacted: January 12, 2006. 
22. Law of the People's Republic of China on Individual Income Tax [中华人民共和国个人
所得税法, 中华人民共和国主席令第六十六号]. China. Order No. 66 of 2007 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (2007). Enacted: June 29, 2007. Amending 
No. 11 of 1980. 
23. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国个人所
得税法, 中华人民共和国主席令第八十五号]. China. Order No. 85 of 2007 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (2007). Enacted: March 1, 2008. Amending 
No. 11 of 1980. 
24. Interim Administrative Measures for the Acceptance of Public Donations and Financial 
Aid by Medical and Health Care Institutions [医疗卫生机构接受社会捐赠资助管理暂
行办法, 卫规财发[2007]117号]. China. No. 117 of 2007 (2007). Enacted: April 6, 2007. 
25. Regulations on the Implementation of Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's 
Republic of China [中华人民共和国企业所得税法实施条例, 国务院令第512号]. 
China. Decree No. 512 of 2007 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
(2007). Enacted: January 1, 2008. 
26. Notice of the Ministry of Finance People's Republic of China, State Administration of 
Taxation and Ministry of Civil Affairs of People's Republic of China Concerning the 
Relevant Issues of Pre-tax Deduction of Public Welfare Donations [财政部、国家税务




Notice No. 160 of 2008 of the Ministry of Finance People's Republic of China (2008). 
Enacted: January 1, 2009. 
27. Administrative Measures for the Donations for Disaster Relief [救灾捐赠管理办法, 民
政部令第35号]. China. Decree No. 35 of 2008 of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2008). 
Enacted: April 28, 2008. 
28. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Revising 
Certain Laws [全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改部分法律的决定, 中华人民共
和国主席令第十八号]. China. Order No. 18 of 2009 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China (2009). Enacted: August 27, 2009. Amending No. 14 of 1993. 
29. Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on Issues 
Concerning the Confirmation and Administration of Tax-exemption Qualification of 
Non-profit Organizations [财政部、国家税务总局关于非营利组织免税资格认定管理
有关问题的通知, 财政部; 国家税务总局 财税[2009]123号]. China. Ministry of 
Finance, Cai Shui [2009] No. 123 (2009). Enacted: January 1, 2008. 
30. Notice of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Issues concerning Prohibiting Foundations and 
other Social Organizations from Providing Rebates for Public Welfare Donations [民政
部关于基金会等社会组织不得提供公益捐赠回扣有关问题的通知, 民发[2009]54号]. 
China. Ministry of Civil Affairs, Min Fa [2009] No. 54 (2009). Enacted: April 21, 2009. 
31. Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issues Relating to the 
Administration of Foreign Exchange Donations from Domestic Institutions [国家外汇管
理局关于境内机构捐赠外汇管理有关问题的通知, 汇发[2009]63号]. China. State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, Hui Fa [2009] No. 63 (2009). Enacted: March 1, 
2010. 
32. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Amending the 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision. China. Order No. 
31 of 2010 of the President of the People's Republic of China (2010). Enacted: October 1, 
2010. Amending No. 85 of 1997. 
33. Law of the People's Republic of China on Individual Income Tax [中华人民共和国个人
所得税法, 中华人民共和国主席令第四十八号]. China. Order No. 48 of 2011 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (2011). Enacted: September 1, 2011. 
Amending No. 11 of 1980. 
34. Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issues concerning the Control 
of Foreign Exchange in Administering the Activities of Foreign Non-governmental 
Organizations in China [国家外汇管理局关于境外非政府组织在华活动管理工作有关
外汇管理问题的通知, 汇综发[2011]23号]. China. State Administration of Foreign 




35. Provisions on the Administrative Penalty Procedures of Registration Administration 
Organs for Social Organizations [社会组织登记管理机关行政处罚程序规定, 民政部令
第44号]. China. Decree No. 44 of 2012 of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2012). Enacted: 
October 1, 2012. 
36. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of Privately-run Schools [中华
人民共和国民办教育促进法, 中华人民共和国主席令第五号]. China. Order No. 5 of 
2013 of the President of the People's Republic of China (2013). Enacted: June 29, 2013. 
Amending No. 80 of 2002. 
37. Administrative Measures for Government Procurement of Services (Interim) [政府购买
服务管理办法（暂行), 财综[2014]96号]. China. Ministry of Finance, Cai Zong [2014] 
No.96 (2014). Enacted: January 1, 2015. 
38. Regulations on Registration Administration of Associations [社会团体登记管理条例, 国
务院令第66号]. China. Decree No. 66 of 2016 of the State Council (2016). Enacted: 
February 6, 2016. Amending No. 250 of 1998. 
39. Charity Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国慈善法, 中华人民共和
国主席令第四十三号]. China. Order No. 43 of 2016 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China (2016). Enacted: September 1, 2016. 
40. Law of the People's Republic of China on Administration over the Activities of Overseas 
Non-government Organizations within China [中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活
动管理法, 中华人民共和国主席令第四十四号]. China. Order No. 44 of 2016 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (2016). Enacted: January 1, 2017. 
41. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Red Cross Society [中华人民共和国红十
字会法, 中华人民共和国主席令第六十三号]. China. Order No. 63 of 2017 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China (2017). Enacted: May 8, 2017. Amending 
No. 14 of 1993. 
42. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Amending the 
“Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax” [全国人民代表大会
常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国企业所得税法》的决定, 中华人民共和国主
席令第六十四号]. China. Order No. 64 of 2017 of the President of the People's Republic 
of China (2017). Enacted: February 24, 2017. Amending No. 512 of 2007. 
43. Administrative Measures for Charitable Trusts [慈善信托管理办法, 银监发[2017]37号]. 
China. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Yin Jian Fa [2017] No. 37 (2017). 




44. The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Revising 
the Electric Power Law of the People's Republic of China and Other Three Laws [全国人
民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国电力法》等四部法律的决定,（
2018年12月29日第十三届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议通过）]. China. 
Order No. 23 of 2018 of the President of the People's Republic of China (2018). Enacted: 
December 29, 2018. Amending No. 512 of 2007. 
FRANCE 
1. Law Relative to the Association Contract [Loi relative au contract d'association]. France. 
(1901). Enacted: July 1, 1901. 
2. Decree of 16/08/1901 Issued for the Execution of the Law of 1 July 1901 Relating to the 
Association Contract [Décret du 16/08/1901 pris pour l'exécution de la loi du 1er juillet 
1901 relative au contrat d'association]. France. (1901). Enacted: August 16, 1901. 
3. Decree of 12 April 1939 [Décret du 12 avril 1939 (JO du 16 avril 1939)]. France. (1939). 
Enacted: April 12, 1939. Amending Law of July 1 1901 Relative to the Association 
Contract. 
4. Law of 3 September 1940 [Loi du 3 septembre 1940 (JO du 4 septembre 1940)]. France. 
(1940). Enacted: September 3, 1940. Amending Law of July 1 1901 Relative to the 
Association Contract. 
5. Law n°42-505 of 8 April 1942 [Loi n° 42-505 du 8 avril 1942 (JO du 17 avril 1942)]. 
France. (1942). Enacted: April 8, 1942. Amending Law of July 1 1901 Relative to the 
Association Contract. 
6. Law n°71-604 of 20 July 1971. France. (1971). Enacted: July 20, 1971. Amending Law 
of July 1 1901 Relative to the Association Contract. 
7. General Tax Code Article 238 bis [Code général des impôts Article 238 bis]. France. 
(1979). Enacted: January 1, 1979. 
8. Decree No. 81-404 of 24 April 1981 (OJ of 29 April 1981) [Décret n° 81-404 du 24 avril 
1981 (JO du 29 avril 1981)]. France. (1981). Enacted: April 24, 1981. Amending the 
Decree Relating to the Association Contract. 
9. Law n°87-571 of 23 July 1987 [Loi n° 87-571 du 23 juillet 1987 (JO 24 juillet 1987)]. 
France. (1987). Enacted: July 23, 1987. Amending Law of July 1 1901 Relative to the 
Association Contract. 
10. Law No. 90-559 of July 4, 1990 (JORF July 6, 1990) [Loi n°90-559 du 4 juillet 1990 
(JORF 6 juillet 1990)]. France. (1990). Enacted: July 4, 1990. Amending Law on 
Development of Patronage. 
11. Ordinance n°2000-916 of 19 September 2000 [Ordonnance n° 2000-916 du 19 septembre 
2000 (JO n° 220 du 22 septembre 2000)]. France. (2000). Enacted: September 19, 2000. 
Amending Law of July 1 1901 Relative to the Association Contract. 
12. Ordinance No. 2000-912 of September 18, 2000 (JORF September 21, 2000) 
[Ordonnance n°2000-912 du 18 septembre 2000 (JORF 21 septembre 2000)]. France. 




13. Tax Reduction Granted for Donations made by Individuals [Réduction d'impôt accordée 
au titre des dons faits par les particuliers (JORF 14 juillet 2000)]. France. Law 2000-656 
(2000). Enacted: July 13, 2000. 
14. Aiming to Strengthen the Prevention and Repression of Sectarian Movements Affecting 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [Loi n° 2001-504 du 12 juin 2001 tendant à 
renforcer la prévention et la répression des mouvements sectaires portant atteinte aux 
droits de l'homme et aux libertés fondamentales]. France. Act No. 2001-504 of 12 June, 
2001 (2001). Enacted: June 12, 2001. 
15. Law No. 2002-5 of January 4, 2002 (JORF January 5, 2002) [Loi 2002-5 2002-01-04 
(JORF 5 janvier 2002)]. France. (2002). Enacted: January 4, 2002. Amending Law on 
Development of Patronage. 
16. On Patronage, Associations, and Foundations [Loi n° 2003-709 du 1er août 2003 relative 
au mécénat, aux associations et aux fondations]. France. Law No. 2003-709 of 1 August, 
2003 (2003). Enacted: August 2, 2003. 
17. Official Tax Bulletin Directorate General of Taxes [BULLETIN OFFICIEL DES 
IMPÔTS DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES IMPÔTS 4 C-5-04 N° 112 du 13 JUILLET 
2004]. France. 4 C-5-04 No. 112 of 13 July 2004 (2004). Enacted: July 13, 2004. 
18. Ordinance n°2005-856 of 28 July 2005 [Ordonnance n° 2005-856 du 28 juillet 2005 (JO 
n° 175 du 29 juillet 2005)]. France. (2005). Enacted: January 1, 2006. Amending Law of 
July 1 1901 Relative to the Association Contract. 
19. Decree No. 2007-807 of 11 May 2007 (OJ No. 110 of 12 May 2007) [Décret n° 2007-807 
du 11 mai 2007 (JO n°110 du 12 mai 2007)]. France. (2007). Enacted: May 11, 2007. 
Amending the Decree Relating to the Association Contract. 
20. Law No. 2009-526 of May 12, 2009 [Loi n°2009-526 du 12 mai 2009]. France. (2009). 
Enacted: December 30, 2009. Amending Law on Development of Patronage. 
21. Law No. 2011-893 of 28 July 2011 (JO No. 174 of 29 July 2011) [Loi n° 2011-893 du 28 
juillet 2011 (JO n° 174 du 29 juillet 2011)]. France. (2011). Enacted: July 28, 2011. 
Amending Law of July 1 1901 Relative to the Association Contract. 
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